

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
HANDBOOK

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

DR. ALBERT STÖCKL



VOL. I.

PRE-SCHOLASTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

SECOND EDITION.

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DUBLIN:

FALLON AND CO., LTD.

1903

THE INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
10 ELMSLEY PLACE
TORONTO 5, CANADA.

MAR 29 1932

4648

PRINTED BY
SEALY, BRYERS AND WALKER,
MIDDLE ABBEY STREET,
DUBLIN.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THIS translation of a work, well-known and largely used in the Catholic Schools of Germany, has been made with a view to provide for Catholic students of philosophy in our English speaking Colleges, a trustworthy manual of the History of Philosophy. Students will find in this work a fulness of information unusual in a handbook. And they will further find that the Schools of Philosophy which have grown up within the Church, or have stood in close relation with her teaching, here receive explicit and adequate notice. In this respect the work offers an advantage not provided by the text-books on which our Catholic Schools have hitherto been forced to rely. Perhaps the manual hitherto most largely used by our Catholic students, in their study of the History of Philosophy, has been Schwegler's Handbook, translated by Dr. Stirling. How far such a work falls short of the requirements of Catholic students is shown by the fact that the author omits from his history all treatment of Scholastic Philosophy. His reasons for this omission are thus set forth: "We exclude also Scholasticism, or the Philosophy of the Christian middle ages; which belongs (being not so much philosophy as rather a reflecting or a philosophizing within the pre-suppositions of a positive religion, and therefore essentially theology) to the historical science of the Christian dogmas." Philosophy within the limits of a positive religion is of prime importance to the Catholic student, and a work from which the history of this portion of philosophy is excluded, must be a defective aid in the studies he is supposed to prosecute. Another advantage which the history here offered possesses over most German works on the same subject, is its clearness of statement, and

general intelligibility of language. For the beginner at all events, such phrases as Schwegler's definition of philosophy: "the thought totality of the empirical finite," are neither very definite nor very luminous. The simple phraseology and definite conceptions of Dr. Stöckl's work contrast strongly with this vagueness of expression and mistiness of thought. Readers of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy will notice that in many parts of his work Dr. Stöckl has followed not only the thought but the very words of that writer. In the German text of his book, Dr. Stöckl is careful to acknowledge by italics what he borrows from Ueberweg. In the translation these italics are not always inserted; it was not considered that the quotation marks would be of importance to our students. The Translator acknowledges gratefully the courtesy of Dr. Stöckl and of his German publisher, Herr Kirchheim, in authorising this translation.

University College, Dublin,
June, 1887.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In this Edition the Translation of Dr Stöckl's work has been carried down to the end of the Scholastic period. In this form it will, we may hope, serve more largely the purpose with which it was undertaken.

University College, Dublin,
January, 1903.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

It is not without cause that in the modern teaching of philosophy great importance is attached to the History of Philosophy. In itself it is a deeply interesting study to follow the progress of philosophical thought through the course of its development. But our interest in the study increases when we observe that the History of Philosophy teaches us into what by-paths the human mind wanders when it abjures the guidance of Christianity, and that it indicates to us the safe route to follow if we would arrive at the true term of speculative inquiry.

A "Handbook of the History of Philosophy" which sketches the course philosophy has followed in its development, and the leading philosophical systems through which that progress had been effected, cannot fail to have its use for the student who seeks a safe way through this vast and varied field of study.

In the present Handbook I have endeavoured to provide for the student a help of this sort. There are, indeed, many Handbooks already in existence. But these, for the most part, do not view the subject from the Catholic standpoint, and are not sufficiently safe guides for Catholic students. In this respect, the present work, will, it is hoped, meet a want not hitherto satisfied. In composing this Handbook, I have followed the plan of my larger work on the History of Philosophy. I have also largely made use of the well-known works of Ritter, Sigwart, Nixner, Zeller, Uschold, Erdmann, and Ueberweg. I am specially indebted to Ueberweg's work, which is very complete in its account of the literature of this subject, and I have largely drawn on it in this respect.

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In the case of each philosopher, I have cited, as far as possible, the original works in which his opinions are contained, and have indicated with regard to the more important, the modern works in which their systems are discussed. To enter at further length into the literature connected with their systems, or to cite from their works in greater detail was not permitted by the character of the manual on which I was engaged.

The present work will serve as a sort of complement to my Handbook of Philosophy (2nd Edit., Kirchheim, Mainz). In every science the complement of scientific theory is the history of the science, that is of the actual process of development through which the science has passed. The rule holds good for Philosophy.

May this work, by the blessing of God, be found of avail to promote the study of philosophy in union with the spirit of Christianity, and to advance the philosophical education of our Catholic youth.

Münster, 8*th September*, 1870.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In offering to the public this Second Edition of the *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, I have not to announce any change in the arrangement of the work. Here and there some slight omissions have been supplied, and certain needful explanations added. The literature of the subject has, however, been noticed more fully, and the developments of recent philosophy have been accorded more attention than in the First Edition. These changes have added somewhat to the size of the volume.

History, it is said, is a good teacher. This is specially true of the History of Philosophy. It teaches us that anarchy has invaded the realm of mind whenever and wherever Revelation, and the depository of revelation—the Church—have been discarded; wherever the peoples "have risen up against the Lord and against His Christ"; and it shows that anarchy has subsided only when men have returned to God and to His Church. The History of Philosophy thus throws light upon our present surroundings. If the men who now "have risen up against the Lord and against His Christ" were capable of instruction, they would learn from history that they are drawing society in Europe to the verge of an abyss. We have no hope that they will learn any such lesson. But for those who "have not bowed the knee to Baal," who have not sacrificed their independence of thought to the prejudices of party, the History of Philosophy will serve as an incitement to hold fast to truth, though it be persecuted and despised, certain that now, as ever, it must triumph in the end.

Eichstätt, 21*st June*, 1875.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.

1. Looked at from the subjective standpoint, Philosophy is nothing more than the effort of discursive thought to reach the highest and ultimate reasons of all things that are, in the measure in which this end is attainable by mere reason. The task which the human mind undertakes in this study is very vast and very difficult. For this reason it lay in the nature of things that Philosophy should not reach its perfect development at a bound—that in the course of centuries many thinkers should set themselves to the solution of the great problem, and should devote the power of intellect allotted them to attain, as best they could, the end of philosophical inquiry. In this way the course of time has brought forth many philosophical systems. Each of these represents the labour which its author has expended in the investigation of the ultimate reasons of things that are, and the results he has attained by this inquiry.

2. The philosophical systems with which the history of the human race confronts us are not only many in number; they furthermore differ from one another as well in Matter as in Form. The sum of truth is greater in one than in another; and some seem in this respect to have failed altogether; some systems are of wider comprehensive range, taking in the whole domain of speculative thought; others are devoted to a special field of philosophical inquiry; some are, in their arrangement, rigidly systematic—in others the several parts seem loosely bound together, the effort after system is not prominently apparent. If we seek the reasons of this diversity, we shall find them, partly in the great range and difficulty of the task which Philosophy sets the human mind, partly in the different points of view adopted by the several thinkers, and partly in extrinsic conditions—in the influences exercised upon the several thinkers by the circumstances in which they lived.

3. In spite, however, of this diversity we find a certain inner connection between the several philosophical systems which succeed one another in time. The results attained by earlier philosophers were not lost upon those who succeeded them. The latter made the theories of their predecessors part of their own systems, when they held them to be satisfactorily established. If they considered them insufficiently proved, or wholly false, they set up in opposition to them other principles which appeared to them more tenable. Thus there came to be established a

certain intrinsic order of connection between the successive systems, corresponding to the extrinsic order of succession in time. One philosophic system refers us to another, and each can be understood in its full significance only in connection with others to which it stands immediately related.

4. This inner connection between the successive systems of Philosophy gives a reason why, with the progress of time, a continuous development of Philosophy and philosophic thought is observable. Each succeeding thinker had before him, in the systems of his predecessors, the results hitherto achieved by philosophical inquiry. These were in part available for the construction of his own system. In part they had to be refuted, and the philosopher, in order to set right the teaching in question, was led to a deeper study of the subject matter concerned. His system would naturally be more highly perfected than those of his predecessors—a distinct advance upon them. The succession of philosophical systems in time is thus seen to involve a progressive development of Philosophy itself, a constant advance towards the perfection of philosophic knowledge.

5. It must, indeed, be admitted that this advance has not always been uninterrupted. The human race does not advance to the goal of perfection fixed for it by God in undisturbed progress. It passes through periods of storm and profound disturbance, though these, in their measure, seem ultimately to purify and perfect it. So it is with the progress of Philosophy. Periods of difficulty and danger arise, which sometimes interrupt for centuries the progress of philosophical thought. Systems imposing in their grandeur, and rich in the possession of truth, are abandoned for others that are at once poor and pretentious; and these failing to satisfy the human mind, a moment comes when philosophical inquiry is thrown aside as without utility and without fruit, and Scepticism or Materialism reigns instead. These, however, are but moments of crisis. They do not last for ever. They even serve to impel the human mind to higher efforts of inquiry when the crisis is past. For the errors which come to the surface in these periods of stormy confusion call for repression and competent refutation, and thus oblige the philosopher to make deeper the foundations, and more extended the range of his philosophic knowledge.

6. It will appear from what we have been saying that it is a profitable study to make acquaintance with the successive philosophical systems, as well in themselves as in their mutual connection, and in this way to follow step by step the development of philosophic knowledge as it manifests itself in the series. "The mind is roused and strengthened by observing how many highly-gifted men have, out of mere love of truth, laboured with untiring zeal to build up the great structure of philosophical science, and have furthered by their efforts the harmonious development of man's spiritual life; while at the same time it is protected against pride and self-deception by learning how weak it is, notwithstanding the great thoughts with which it teems. Furthermore, he who will achieve anything like a higher philosophical knowledge must

make acquaintance with the opinions and methods which philosophical investigation has already called into existence, that he may estimate the problems before him aright, and avoid every one-sidedness from which others have already escaped." We cannot, however, be required to study all philosophical systems with the same attention. We must chiefly occupy ourselves with those which stand out prominently above the rest, and round which the others group themselves as round so many centres.

7. We are now in a position to form a right notion of the history of Philosophy. Objectively considered, it is nothing more than the series of philosophical systems which have appeared in time, and the development of philosophical knowledge as manifested in them. In the subjective sense—with which we are now concerned—the history of Philosophy is an exposition of the successive systems of Philosophy, setting forth their contents, their mutual connection, and the progressive development of philosophical knowledge represented in them.

8. A history of Philosophy thus involves three requirements:

The contents of the several philosophical systems must be set forth with the greatest attainable clearness, and with all possible completeness. The historian must address himself to his task cautiously, thoughtfully, dispassionately and impartially. It must be his first effort to set forth each philosophical system exactly according to the mind of its author, to omit nothing which is essential, and to add nothing.

In the second place, the history of Philosophy has to make clear the relation in which each system stands to those which preceded it, what elements it has borrowed from them, or in what antagonism it stands to them. And again, it has to show what influence each system has exercised upon those that followed, how its principles have been subsequently expanded, transformed, or otherwise modified, that its bearing and significance may be fully understood.

In the third place, the history of Philosophy must indicate how far a given system has been an advance or a falling back in philosophical knowledge, that we may be able to fix its place in the order of development which philosophy has followed.

9. As regards the method to be applied by the historian of Philosophy in the execution of his task, the question arises, which of the two methods, the *a priori* or the *a posteriori*, meets the requirements of a history of Philosophy such as we have described? To this we reply:

The *a priori* method lays down a pre-established principle as the foundation of the whole historical system, and from this derives all the systems which have appeared in time, showing their contents and the order of succession in which they have appeared to be alike necessary results of the development of the principle assumed. It is thus that Hegel, in his "History of Philosophy," has endeavoured to establish, on *a priori* grounds, that the several philosophical systems which the course of time has brought forth are no more than isolated, imperfect elements of the Absolute Philosophy—the Hegelian. This successive

realisation of the several elements of the Absolute Philosophy was required, in order that the gradual synthesis of contradictions might at last give rise to the perfect Philosophy, that is to say, that God might attain to perfect consciousness in the mind of man. This *a priori* method of Hegel has found many imitators, though the pantheistic principle has not in all cases been an assumption in these methods.

But *a priori* constructions of history after this fashion must be peremptorily rejected as unjustifiable and mistaken. In the first place, an exact knowledge of the various systems, as their authors framed them, is not possible if we view their development in the light of a philosophical theory of our own, and study them only as seen through this medium. Under such circumstances the several systems will be judged according to the standard and the requirements of our own. The tendencies and opinions of the historian himself will be apparent at every turn, but what the authors of the systems under discussion thought, and aimed at, will not be put before us. In the second place—and this argument is decisive—systems of Philosophy come before us as facts of history, and as such they are contingent, not necessary. The contingent cannot be proved a necessity; he who undertakes such a proof is forced to deny the contingent character of all historical facts—a proceeding which involves assumptions that belong either to Pantheism or Materialism.

The *a posteriori* method is the only method which accords with the notion of a history of Philosophy. In this matter, as in history generally, we have to do with questions of fact; we have first to make acquaintance with the several systems of Philosophy, as with so many facts, before we proceed to seek the reasons of these facts, that is, before we inquire how they have come to be, in what relations of dependence they stand to other systems, and what progress of philosophical thought is manifested in them. Nor shall we proceed further in this latter direction than the sense attributed by the authors to the systems which they actually framed will warrant. The historian must, therefore, make his own philosophical system subserve the purposes of history. He must not make of it the criterion or the measure of others. Only in this way can he present us with a history of Philosophy true in its details and faithful to facts.

10. Again, "the development of Philosophy is, in many respects, dependent upon the development of other sciences (of the empirical sciences more particularly), and upon the religious convictions and opinions as well of the individual philosopher as of the people to which he belongs. Its progress or decline is influenced by the intercourse of nations with one another, by the conditions of social life peculiar to the several peoples, by the family organisation as maintained among them, by their political institutions, by the state of art among them, and, lastly it is affected by the peculiar circumstances which have shaped the lives of the individuals who have specially contributed to its development. It is true a history of Philosophy cannot enter minutely into all these details. They are the material for other departments of history. But it cannot avoid occasional allusions to them, since they have exercised an important influence on

the progress of Philosophy. For the same reason, it cannot omit from view the outward lives of the several philosophers. On this point, too, it must furnish adequate information."

11. The sources from which a history of Philosophy must be drawn are:—

Primarily, such works of the philosophers as have reached us, or such fragments of their writings as are still preserved. But, before using such works or fragments of works for the purposes of history we must first be assured of their authenticity and integrity. Historical criticism, by which this assurance is given us, must, therefore, prepare the way for a history of Philosophy.

In dealing with philosophical theories and systems where the author's own exposition is not accessible to us, we must, of course, content ourselves with the statements of others. In such cases these statements are most reliable which are based immediately on the writings of the philosophers; and next to these, the statements of disciples as to the oral teachings of their masters. If the purpose of the writer whose statements are our source of information be not so much historical narration as proof of the doctrines he is stating, we must, in order to make his utterances available for purposes of history, discover from them the exact thoughts of the author of the theories in question, and we must test each statement made by its bearing on this issue. The source from which the writer drew, and the purpose of his writings, are of first importance; next in importance, as a criterion of his trustworthiness, is his own education in Philosophy, his capacity to understand the doctrines with which he is dealing.

12. In seeking a division of the history of Philosophy, we find two great divisions obviously suggested—the history of the pre-Christian (ancient) Philosophy, and the history of Philosophy since Christ. Christ is the central point for all history. His coming into the world has been called by the Apostle "the fulness of time" (*plenitudo temporis*). He was the scope and the consummation of the times that preceded Him, He was the point of departure for the time that followed; for the events that have filled it have all been hallowed by the Redemption he effected. For the Christian all history is thus divided into two great periods, and with the rest, the history of Philosophy. This view is in strict accordance with the facts of the case. The Philosophy which preceded, and that which followed Christ, differ more widely in character than the philosophies of any of the several periods subordinate to these. The world has never witnessed such a revolution in human thought, such an enlargement of the range of human knowledge as that effected by the introduction of Christianity. We cannot, therefore, find elsewhere a more appropriate point at which to divide the history of Philosophy into its main divisions than at the point where Christianity appears in the world.

13. If we inquire what are the characteristic features of these two chief eras of Philosophy, we find them in their respective relations to Christianity which we have indicated above.

To speak first of pre-Christian Philosophy.

Pre-Christian Philosophy is characterised generally by persistent vigorous efforts to attain a purer knowledge of that truth which was embodied in the religious tenets and traditions of the several ancient peoples. Religious traditions, though derived from an untainted source (the primary tradition), had undergone so many transformations among various nations, and had been so thickly overlaid with errors, that in the state they had reached they could no longer satisfy the longing of the human mind for truth. The mind of man set itself, therefore, to reach by rational investigation what it no longer possessed in the traditions of religion. Its innate desire of knowledge was the force which impelled it to consecrate its energies to the search after truth.

This effort of the human mind was, it must be admitted, in many respects successful. The philosophers of antiquity arrived at the knowledge of many important and lofty truths. But the path they had entered on did not lead them to the whole truth, and of this the ablest thinkers amongst them were only too well aware. Manifold errors, too, found entrance into and disfigured their systems. No one of the ancient philosophies stated the whole truth, and all contained many errors. Philosophy could not maintain itself at the level reached in these systems; it sank after a time into Materialism and Scepticism.

From this point of view Philosophy, in its earlier development, appears as a preparation of the human mind for the Christian Revelation which was made to the world in the fulness of time. This preparation was accomplished in three ways:

In the first place, the great thinkers of antiquity, having attained a knowledge of many important truths, but not of the whole truth, had roused that longing after the fulness of truth, to which, as we know, Plato gave such striking expression. By exciting this desire for truth in its fulness, and thus rendering the human mind more ready to receive it, ancient Philosophy did its most important work in preparation for Christian Revelation.

Furthermore, Philosophy, having failed to maintain itself at the level reached in the more celebrated systems, had fallen into Materialism and Scepticism. And these had called forth in the human mind the feeling of need for higher assistance, for some divine revelation which should help man to a fuller knowledge of the truth. This feeling of the need of a revelation further contributed to dispose the human mind for the due reception of revealed teaching.

A third service, important to be remembered, was rendered by the ancient Philosophy to Christianity. On the one hand it thoroughly investigated the conditions and laws of scientific thought; and on the other, by its efforts of speculation, it amassed a considerable body of truths of the natural order. In both these ways it prepared materials for the fabric of speculative Philosophy, which, after the time of Christ, was raised in connection with Christian Revelation. Thinkers of the Christian schools found abundant materials ready to hand, and these, as we shall see, they used in the fullest measure.

14. We come now to the Philosophy of the newer or Christian period.

The Philosophy of this period is characterised in general by the effort to reach a profounder understanding of truth, to dig deeper the foundations of knowledge. But the founders of the newer systems have pursued this effort on widely different lines.

Some have fallen in with the ordinances of God, have submitted to divine revelation, and, in submission to it as the guiding principle of their inquiries, have sought to penetrate the truth more profoundly, and to establish it on a more unassailable foundation. Following this path, they have achieved most brilliant successes, the systems which such thinkers have built up being amongst the most imposing with which the history of Philosophy presents us.

Others again have followed a course at variance with the divinely-established order They have adopted a false and perverted attitude towards divine revelation, have even rejected Christianity altogether, and by a method thus opposed to the order established by God, have sought to discover the truth and to demonstrate it. Thinkers of this class have never attained satisfactory results. The philosophic movements begun by them have led always, in course of due development, to far-reaching errors, and have at length lost themselves in Scepticism and Materialism.

But whatever road philosophers may have followed, whatever results they may have produced, the final outcome has ever been to place the truth of Christian revelation in clearer light before the scientific mind. To this end one set of philosophers have directly contributed by systems developed in harmony with, and in support of revelation. Others have contributed to the same effect indirectly. By the very errors into which they have fallen in consequence of their perverseness of thought they furnish proof that it is only when in accord with divine revelation, and when unreservedly obedient to its teachings, that the human mind can know the truth profoundly, and vindicate it successfully.

If, then, we regard pre-Christian Philosophy as a preparation for the Christian revelation, we must recognise in the newer Philosophy a continued confirmation of the same revelation, a power which has served to bring out more clearly, more comprehensively, and more forcibly the truth of Christianity.

PART FIRST.

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

GENERAL VIEW. DIVISION.

§ 2.

1. In any general view of the history of the pre-Christian period, our attention is first drawn to the East, the cradle of human civilization. The history of Philosophy will therefore begin with an exposition of the Philosophy of the Eastern nations. Generally speaking, however, Philosophy, among these nations, is not met with as an independent science, standing apart from systems of religious teaching. Among them, philosophical theories are, as a rule, identified with doctrines of religion. In India alone do we find a system of strictly philosophical doctrines; but even here Philosophy stands in close relation to Religion. It is either a speculative development of religious doctrines, or it is framed in antagonism to a religious system whose principles it directly or indirectly combats. The history of Eastern Philosophy will, therefore, do no more than, firstly, bring into prominence the philosophical elements of the several Oriental religions; and secondly, give an account of those more strictly philosophical systems which, in India, took their place beside the doctrines of Religion. Oriental Philosophy, as we have said, does not exhibit the characteristics of a philosophy in the strict sense of the term; but it cannot, for this reason, be left out of sight altogether. As we shall show further on, an attempt was made at a later date to blend together certain notions derived from the East with certain conceptions of the Greek mind, and the attempt gave rise to peculiar systems of Philosophy.

2. From the East we turn to the West, and first of all to Greece. Here we come upon the birthplace of Philosophy strictly so called—Philosophy which is no longer a body of religious doctrines. The Eastern mind, with its innate tendency to inactive Quietism, did not possess that mobility and energy which the construction of strictly philosophical systems demanded. But these gifts were abundantly possessed by the Greeks. To them genuine Philosophy owes its origin. The history of ancient Philosophy is, therefore, mainly concerned with the creations of the Greek mind. To the Greeks we are indebted for

those great and strikingly original systems which mark the highest level of philosophic thought in antiquity, and which, for this reason, have exercised an incalculable influence upon succeeding ages. The Philosophy of the Romans was an offshoot from the Greek, not a development of it. The Romans adopted the ideas and systems current in Greece, explaining or modifying them after their fashion. But they have given us no philosophical system of their own creation.

3. Later, about the time when the Christian Revelation was first preached to the world, in the city of Alexandria, which under the Ptolemies and the Romans had become a great centre of intellectual activity, there arose a philosophical school which strove to unite the religious doctrines of the East with the teachings of Greek Philosophy. "From the philosophical systems of the Greeks and the religious doctrines which had obtained currency chiefly in the East it chose out what seemed likely to meet the moral and intellectual needs of mankind." Its procedure was purely eclectic—a method by which it hoped to reach the goal of perfect knowledge. The movement lasted far into the Christian period; not before the sixth century of our era did it come finally to an end. It is, nevertheless, to be treated as belonging to ancient Philosophy. It lay without the sphere of Christianity; the Christian doctrines seem to have exerted no influence on the authors of the systems that belong to it.

4. We thus perceive that the ancient Philosophy did not at once make way for the Christian Revelation. Just as Paganism did not disappear as soon as Christianity was preached, but yielded slowly before it; so was it with the ancient Philosophy. Though it had fallen from its high estate, and had degenerated partly into Scepticism, partly into Materialism, it gathered all its remaining energies together in the effort to make head against the might of Christianity, and to maintain its hold on the minds of men. The effort, it is true, ended in failure: the old Philosophy paled before the light of the Gospel, and perished at last from the sheer weakness of age. But, for all this, it played an important part in the history of the early ages of Christianity, and the writer of a History of Philosophy must not omit to take notice of it as it appeared in its latest phases.

5. The history of ancient Philosophy, then, may be divided into three sections:—

The first section deals with Oriental Philosophy, whether embodied in religious systems or developed in close relation with them.

The second section comprises the history of Greek Philosophy and of the Roman Philosophy which arose out of it, and follows both as far as they extend into the Christian period.

The third section embraces the Græco-Oriental Philosophy, its rise in Alexandria out of the blending of Oriental religion with Greek Philosophy, and its course through the ages that followed till its final extinction in the sixth century.

SECTION I.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE EAST.

In this section we shall treat first of Philosophy among the Chinese; then of the philosophical systems of India; next of the Philosophy embodied in the Medo-Persian religions; and lastly of the Philosophy embodied in the religions of the other nations of Western Asia.

1. Philosophy among the Chinese.

§ 3.

1. The sacred books of the Chinese are called *Kings* (y-King and Chou-King). Fohi is regarded as the founder of a religious civilization among them. To him the authorship of the *y-King* is ascribed. The precise period at which he lived has not been determined. He is credited with having discovered the eight primordial *kua*—at once elements of written language and symbols of the primary agents which are at work in all the transformations of nature. In their first significance they give rise, by transposition and multiplication, to the 40,000 characters of the Chinese syllabic alphabet; in their second significance they contain the elements of all physical science, as their combinations represent the processes by which material bodies are formed. "This combination takes place in four figures, the complete symbols in which represent perfect and active being; the incomplete symbols, imperfect and passive being. As three lines are united to form each figure, we have eight figures in all, four with a preponderance of the perfect, representing æther, pure fire, pure water, and thunder; four with a preponderance of the imperfect, the expressions for wind, water, mountains, earth."

2. Turning now to the religious notions of the Chinese, we find that they regard Heaven and Earth as the primary powers. "The thing of greatest excellence in the universe is Heaven—the object, consequently, of divine homage. Next in excellence comes the centre of the earth (China), for here the opposing principles are maintained in that equilibrium on which the existence of the world depends. Man is the link that binds Heaven and Earth together. His duty is to preserve harmony in the world. The fixed, unbending law, according to which the life of man must be fashioned in the fulfilment of this duty, emanates from the Sovereign, who, in the 'Empire of the Centre,' is the 'centre' in the strict sense, and who, as 'Son of Heaven,' is in immediate relation with the celestial order. The law thus given is a rule of domestic or family life. The Emperor is the father of his people. In union with him they form one great family, which is subdivided into smaller family groups." Obedience to domestic law, the thorough observance of the family ordinances, whether general or particular, is the fundamental

obligation of all members of the "Empire of the Centre." On this obedience depends the maintenance of harmony and equilibrium in the world. Violations of this obedience must be rigorously punished by the Emperor, that order may be restored.

3. It is clear that these religious notions contain no element of speculation. We have in this circumstance an explanation of the fact that there is no genuine speculative Philosophy of Chinese origin. There was no basis for such a Philosophy in the religion of the people. Wherever we discover products of abstract thought among the Chinese, we shall find, on inquiry, that these have been received from without. The Chinese seem to have been incapable of an independent effort of speculation. This is evident even in the man whom they regard as their greatest sage, the reputed author of the lesser *Kings*—Confucius.

4. Confucius (Kung-fû-dsû), who lived about five hundred years before Christ, turned his whole attention to the principles of moral law. His career was that of a great reformer of the moral life of his nation. His teaching was wholly practical. It exhibited no tendency to abstract speculation. Even in his practical theories he was not original. His merit is that he collected and reduced to orderly arrangement the principles of morality which already governed the popular mind. His teaching was, in brief—self-restraint and moderation. "Harmony and concord among reasoning beings is the primary requirement of reason. This concord is possible only when each man restricts himself to a determined sphere of action, and in all his actions maintains a fixed standard, beyond which he will not pass, and short of which he will not fall. Only that which is done in this wise is good and just; what departs from this rule, on the one side or the other, is ever and always bad. The wise man is a man of action, but always within his own determined sphere, always observing that law of moderation which secures him against any violation of the general harmony."

5. About the time of Confucius, Laotsee promulgated a peculiar teaching at variance with the popular religion. The tenets of his system, however, point to India as the place of its origin. His doctrine, the exposition of which is contained in the book *Taoking*, assumes the existence of one primary being, infinite and unchangeable, which he names *Tao*—Reason. In itself this being is an indeterminate unity; but it is, nevertheless, the primary source of all determinate being. From it the latter, in all its forms, emanates, but only to return to it again. "The end of all human effort is the supremacy of the spiritual in man's nature, freedom from passion, the undisturbed contemplation of the Eternal Reason, and ultimate union with the Primary Being in untroubled rest and deliverance from all corporeal motion." The votaries of this doctrine form the sect of the *Taosee*.

6. Last in order comes the teaching of *Fo*, or *Foö*. This doctrine is nothing more than a degenerate form of Buddhism, and is supposed to have reached China from India (according to others, from Japan) about the sixty-fifth year of the Christian era. The leading principle of this system of doctrine may be stated thus: "Strive to annihilate self. In

the measure in which you cease to exist for self, you begin to be one with God, and to enter again into his being. All activity is evil; complete inactivity—absolute rest—is the only supreme perfection. The nearer the sage approaches the state of the plant or the stone, by closing the avenues of sense, the higher is his perfection." This, it is manifest, is a theory of absolute Quietism.

2. PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA.

§ 4.

1. It is usual to distinguish four periods in Indian literature; the period of the Vedas, or sacred writings of the Brahmins; the period of the Epic Poems or *Itihasas*; the period of the more refined poetry of the Court of the Rajah Vikramaditja; and, lastly, the period of the Commentaries on the earlier writings—a period which falls within the Christian era.

(*a.*) The Vedas, which some writers make as old as the fourteenth or sixteenth century before Christ, are four in number: the Rig-Veda, the yajur—Sama—and Atharva-Veda. They are the work of different authors, and consist partly of prayers, partly of religious ordinances, and partly of theological doctrines—the parts standing in no definite relation to one another. In these writings we find certain elements of a distinctly speculative character, chiefly in the so-called *Upanishads*, or extracts from the Brahmanas (Commentaries), which make the second part of every Veda. It is usual to connect with the Vedas the Book of Laws of Menu, which is assigned to a period mid-way between the time of the Vedas and the time of the Itihasas—though some writers assign it a far later date.

(*b.*) The Itihasas (Heroic poems) are two in number—the *Ramajana* and the *Mahabharata*. The Ramajana is attributed to an ancient sage, Valmiki. There is little reference in it to speculative doctrines. The Mahabharata is of more importance in this respect, chiefly because of the episode it contains, on which the name Bhagavad-Gita has been bestowed, and which is of distinctly philosophical character. This poem is attributed to the mythical Vyasa,—who is also credited with having collected the Vedas. The composition of the eighteen Puranas—likewise attributed to Vyasa—has also been said to belong to this period; but it has been shown that these are of much more recent date. They may be compared to our encyclopedias, as they embrace the whole range of science known to the Hindus. This characteristic seems of itself to indicate a comparatively modern origin.

(*c.*) In the third period we find the Gita-Govinda, a lyrical poem, the author of which is named Dshayaveda, and the Sakuntala, the most celebrated of the Hindu dramas, the work of Kalidasa. There are grounds for believing that Kalidasa lived in the century immediately preceding the Christian era.

(*d.*) Last in order comes the age of the Commentaries on the earlier writings. There is little doubt that this period gave birth to a considerable philosophical literature. Certain mythical beings, belonging to a remote antiquity, are named as the authors of these writings. Judged by internal evidence, however, these writings are not of very ancient origin: it has been surmised that they do not date from a period more remote than the last century before Christ.

2. Philosophy among the Hindus has been developed in intimate connection with Religion. Even in its most modern form, this Philosophy bears traces of its origin, since it professes to be still an exposition of the Vedas. To understand it aright we must, therefore, cast a glance at the religious system of the Hindus.

3. In the earliest form of the Hindu Religion with which the

Vedas make us acquainted, we find three supreme elemental divinities—*Indra*, *Varuni* and *Agni*—the God of the Firmament, the God of Night, and the God of Fire. This doctrine was succeeded later by that of the *Trimurti*. In the latter system the supreme object of all religions is the Deity—the absolute unity which exists in all things, but is not represented by any notion we can form—Brahma. Buried in deep repose, this being is absorbed in self-contemplation. His awakening from this slumber gives existence to concrete and individual objects, all of which come forth from him. In this process he becomes the creator, and it is as creator that he, properly speaking, is called by the name Brahma: as the Sustaining Power in nature he is called Vishnu; as Destroying Power, effecting constant changes in the forms of things, he is called Shiva. These three divinities form together the Hindu Trimurti, and to these divine worship is rendered. The metamorphoses of Vischnu, or the Incarnations of the Divinity, are the main subject of the sacred books. Every thing returns again to Brahma, the absolute unity. It is the duty of man to strive after union with Brahma. This is attainable by sacrifice and penance, and these presupposed, by the effort to rise to undisturbed contemplation of the Supreme Unity. The man who cannot reach this perfection has still to undergo a transmigration of soul, with the miseries and sufferings attending it.

4. In the later Itihasas we find these religious doctrines so far modified that heroes and penitents are honoured as gods. Even here, however, it is not deeds of heroism which win divine honours, but rather sacrifices of special worth (sacrifices of horses), or extraordinary practices of penance—the stifling of all sense of earthly pleasure and pain. "When a king offers steeds in sacrifice, or betakes himself to the desert to practise superhuman penance, or devotes himself to superhuman contemplation, then do Indra and the gods of heaven tremble lest he should push them from their thrones, for in this way they, too, have reached their dignities." This, it will be perceived, is no more than a polytheism of the anthropomorphic kind.

5. Buddhism had its rise about the fifth or sixth century before Christ. The author of this religious system is said to have been Sakja Muni—the first Buddha. The Buddhist doctrines are nihilistic. Sakja Muni had no God but nothingness. Nothingness, so runs the first of the four "great truths" of Buddhism, is the true being of all things, all that we take to be reality is void and without substance. Existence, or rather the clinging to individual existence, is the cause of evil, the source of suffering. It is, therefore, man's duty to shake himself free from this vain semblance of existence, or rather from his attachment to it. His end is to attain to the primary, the only true state—non-existence, to the extinction of his personal being and personal consciousness—"Nirvana."

6. A system of mystical asceticism is the appointed way by which man must reach this end. He must pass through a course of frightful penance, in order to extinguish individual consciousness in himself, and thus lose himself in Nirvana. Should he achieve this, he becomes one

with God, and in his knowledge of the nothingness of all things, becomes lord of all. He is raised above all moral law, he cannot sin any more, he has freed himself from the trammels of nature, and becomes the benefactor and redeemer of his kind. The ideal of Buddhism the Buddhists naturally find to have been realised in the founder of their sect. "Master of self-forgetting contemplation, hero of self-annihilating asceticism, Sakja Muni,—Buddha is the ideal and the refuge of his disciples. He lives in those who imitate his perfection. Whoever resembles the first Buddha shares in the divine honours which are his due. In the holy disciples of Buddha the deity is ever generated anew, to vanish anew into Nothing; is in fact nothing else than man delivering himself from existence." Whosoever fails to reach the perfection of Buddhist mysticism is not permitted after death to enter into Nirvana, but is condemned to wander over the earth in some spectral form. To avoid this fate the Buddhist must not shrink from penance, be it ever so appalling.

7. The Buddhists became divided into several sects. Their resistance to the authority of the Brahmins, and their opposition to the system of castes, provoked sanguinary religious wars. During these struggles large numbers of them were forced into exile, and in this way Buddhism was propagated in many countries of Eastern Asia.

8. With this general outline of the religions of India before us, we may now pass to the systems of Hindu Philosophy. These we may divide into the Philosophy of Mimansa and Vedanta, of Sankhya and Yoga, of Nyaya and Vaiseshika. We may further add the doctrines of the Dshainas, of the Tscherwakas, and of the Lokayatikas, but of these enough is not yet known to allow us to give an account of them in detail.

PHILOSOPHY OF MIMANSA AND VEDANTA.

§ 5.

1. The Mimansa-Darcanam (system of investigation) is divided into two closely related parts: the Karamimansa (investigation of actions)—the practical, and the Brahmamimansa (investigation of Brahma), or Vedanta—the speculative. This system of doctrines is looked upon as the most ancient form of Hindu Philosophy, though some authors, like Colebrooke, are of opinion that it is of later origin than the other systems, since it deals polemically with them. Be this as it may, it is certain that this system professes to be the orthodox Philosophy of the Brahminical religion, that it constantly appeals to passages of the Vedas in proof of its theories, and refers to a certain number of the Upanishads as the source from which it is derived. For this reason we give it the first place in our exposition.

2. The object of the Karamimansa (of which Gaimini is said to be the author) is to interpret rightly the maxims of the sacred books, to explain the contradictions that appear in them, and by careful inquiry

to determine exactly what are the religious obligations really imposed by the Vedas. At the same time it sets forth the motives and the purpose of these obligations, namely, the deliverance from sin, and the attainment of blessing and proportionate happiness through the fulfilment of duty. It is thus no more than an exegesis of the sacred books, and possesses but little interest for the philosopher. It is otherwise with the Brahmamimansa or Vedanta Philosophy; in this the speculative element is predominant.

3. The Vedanta is a fully developed system of Pantheism at once mystical and idealistic. "What is, is Brahma (God); what is not Brahma is nothing;" such is the fundamental teaching of the Vedantists. Brahma is the Infinite, and as such he alone has being. The multitudinous objects of the universe, inasmuch as multitudinous, are non-existent—mere non-being. The objects seen by us in their individuality and in their multiplicity appear to us different from Brahma and from one another, but this is a mere deception—we are still far from real knowledge. Brahma alone has being, he is One without another, unchangeable, eternal, unspeakable, Lord, Spirit, Truth, Wisdom, Bliss. As Spirit, he is the indivisible unity of all being, the whole, but not anything of the whole. To admit that Brahma could produce anything distinct from himself would be to admit in him a principle of finiteness and limitation, since what is distinct from him must be finite; and thus he would cease to be infinite. Brahma is Being, and being out of him there is none.

4. What is called the created universe is no more than an unfolding of the divine being, or rather a transformation of Brahma in varying forms. Brahma is at once the efficient and the material cause of the world. He is at once that which is changed and that by which change is effected. As milk is transformed into curds, and water into ice, so does Brahma transform himself variously. As the spider spins her web from out herself, as the sea sends forth its foam, so does Brahma produce all things from himself, and transforms himself in them. This transformation is effected by successive processes. First comes æther; out of this is formed the air; out of air water; out of water the earth. In this wise the Universe comes to be.

5. Although Brahma is the being of all things, the subject in every change, yet in himself he is not affected by change or transformation. In his own being he is infinitely raised above all things. He takes every form, but his own being has no determined form, nor does it occupy any determined place. He is like pure space; all things exist and move in him, but he is not himself changed thereby. And as his being enters into all things without undergoing change in those transformations, so does he take all things again into himself without any accession to his being. The elements come forth from God in determined order; in the same order do they return to him. But no increase of perfection thereby accrues to Brahma, for this return to him is merely the undoing of his previous transformations.

6. In this theory creation is merely a sport of Brahma with him-

self; our notion of all matter rests upon a delusion—in fact, matter is itself deception (Maya). The conservation and duration of the universe is no more than the sheen and shadow of Brahma's eternal existence. Nothing of it all has real existence or continuance. It is a mere appearance which soon vanishes in the abyss of the Divine unity. Brahma is at once the generating and the destroying power. There is no essential difference between things in the world. All are forms of Brahma transformations. Our sense cognition is but a delusion; it has no truth, no reality.

7. To the human soul, however, the Vedantists allot a special place in their system. The soul is indeed one in being with Brahma, but it is not a transformation of Brahma, it is a part of him. The soul is a spark shot forth from the eternal spirit, it is therefore of immortal nature like Brahma himself. Birth and death affect it not; it is not born, neither does it die. It is not immediately united with the body. The Vedantists seek to remove the soul as far as possible from contact with the body, and for this reason they will not admit an immediate union between them.

8. They therefore distinguish between the subtle invisible body—*Lingasarira*, and the material body—*Sthulasarira*. The soul is immediately invested by the invisible body, and through this is united to the material body. In the body immediately investing it the soul is enclosed as in a sheath, but this sheath is itself formed of three successive envelopes. The inmost is the rational, then follows the imaginative, and lastly the vital part. This triple envelope is in time enveloped by the material body.

9. This union with a material body is an evil for the soul, not an advantage; for by this connection it is held fast in the domain of delusion, it is deprived of the repose towards which it naturally aspires, and is made to act and to suffer. Brahma reposes eternally in himself, and finds bliss in this repose. The soul is destined to a like repose and a like bliss; but of this it is deprived by its union with the body, and is forced into action and to suffering. The action and the sufferings of this life are not, then, to be attributed to the soul's own nature—they are occasioned by the body and its organs. Thus the material body is like a chain which confines the soul to a state wholly at variance with its nature.

10. Since the soul is one in being with Brahma, in fact only a part of Brahma, there can be no question of independent action, nor consequently of free self-determination. Brahma is the principle of being in the soul, he is the one principle of its action also. "Brahma alone works in me. I myself am without will or act." Brahma is not, however, for this reason the author of evil. The transmigrations of the soul have been going on throughout eternity. Each new life of the soul is determined in all respects, even to its moral condition, by that which immediately preceded. Every soul brings with it into this life special predispositions, and according to these predispositions the moral character of its activity during its earthly career is determined. Brahma

can act in each individual man only after the manner which the moral predispositions received from an antecedent life require. This being so, it is evident that guilt for evil deeds lies on man alone. Brahma has no part therein.

11. To turn again to the consideration of the relations between soul and body: since the union of the soul with the material body is not a natural condition of the soul, it follows that the task devolving upon the soul in life is to free itself from the burden of the body, and again become one with Brahma. This brings us to the practical part of the Vedantist theories. Deliverance is the highest object after which the soul can strive and must strive—this is the fundamental principle of the practical teaching of the Vedanta. Deliverance is the highest moral duty; the question next arises how this deliverance is to be attained.

12. The deliverance of the soul is attained by "knowledge," *i.e.*, by the perfect comprehension of Brahma, which involves an apprehension of the truth that the soul is one with Brahma, and with all that emanates from him or has part in his being. This knowledge, according to the Vedantists, is of the mystical not of the rational order. It is reached by immediate intuition. In immediate mystical contemplation of Brahma, and in the consciousness thence arising of the soul's oneness with him, and of the oneness with him of all other things, consists the deliverance of the soul—the highest end of the soul's life here below. In this deliverance by mystical contemplation the soul attains that quietude and bliss to which it naturally tends. In its union with the body it has lost its repose and thereby lost the happiness to which it naturally aspires, but it recovers both when, in mystical contemplation, it emancipates itself from the burden of the body and again unites itself to Brahma.

13. In accordance with these theories the Vedantists teach that the supreme end of man is to be attained by the practices of a mystical asceticism. The process of the deliverance of the soul through "knowledge" must begin with works of penance and sacrifice. Without these the first step in this deliverance is impossible. In the next place, the soul must withdraw from the world of sense—the domain of illusion, and become concentrated within itself. As long as it expends itself on the phantoms of sense, deliverance is out of the question; it must turn from these and fix its gaze upon itself. Through this concentration of the soul within itself we reach the third stage in the process of deliverance—repose in God. In this state the soul maintains itself entirely passive and merely permits God to work in it. It "leaves itself" to God. This condition of soul is described by the Vedantists as tranquil bearing, self-control, endurance, special sitting and standing attitude, holding of the breath, focussing of thought, faith.

14. This, then, is the mystical process of deliverance. When this has been completed, final deliverance in the knowledge of Brahma follows of itself. When the soul has succeeded in giving itself wholly to God, the light of contemplation dawns upon it, the spirit shines within it in its native brilliancy, the soul recognises itself as the immacu-

late Brahma; it perceives all other things to be one with Brahma; it is united with God; it knows no longer, it is itself knowledge. Like the river which loses itself in the sea the soul loses itself in God. Knowing Brahma it becomes Brahma himself. "All illusion is at an end, the soul in all things sees only Brahma." In this wise has it reached quietude and bliss. The deliverance of the soul through contemplation of God means, then, complete identification with the God-head, absorption into the Divine Being. Individual personality is something to be got rid of, it must be sacrificed in order that man may come forth from the flame of the holocaust a part of the Universal Divine Spirit.

15. The man who has reached this condition of complete emancipation has become, by the fact, cleansed of all sin and made independent of all moral law. As soon as he reaches "knowledge" his past sins are wiped out, and future misdeeds are not admissible. Water does not moisten the leaf of the lotus, neither does sin touch the soul that knows God. It is sinless and cannot sin. There is no vice left nor any virtue. For virtue too is a fetter, and it matters not that the fetter should be of gold rather than of iron; eternal liberty admits of neither. Evil disappears and so also does every virtue with the activity corresponding to it; the soul is raised above both alike, it has entered into rest. The Yogi (perfect contemplative) has therefore no account to render; he is as independent as the Divine nature itself.

16. The eschatology of the Vedantists is in keeping with these principles. Entire deliverance, complete absorption of the soul in Brahma, is impossible here below. Perfect Emancipation, complete quietude and bliss in God, is attainable only after the death of the body. But different souls enter into different states after death. The Yogi properly so-called, *i. e.*, the man who has reached such perfection of knowledge as is possible on earth, enters immediately into the Divine Being, is absorbed into it, and is not subject to further change. But the soul whose "knowledge" has been imperfect, which can reach only Brahma's home, but is not prepared for absorption into his being, remains invested after death with its invisible body, is not, indeed, subject to further change during the duration of the world now existing, but may be subject to it in the new worlds that are to follow, unless exempted by special favour of Brahma.

17. As to other souls, those, to wit, which have not followed the ways of mystical asceticism—they too, invested with the inner or invisible body, enter, after death, into other spheres, to receive the reward of their good or evil deeds. Sinners are condemned to various regions of punishment where Tschitragupta, and other mythological personages hold rule in the realms of Yama (Death). The virtuous, on the other hand, ascend into the moon, and there enjoy the reward of their good deeds. But they have yet to return to this world, and to enter again into new bodies. They are still subject to the conditions involved in the transmigration of souls. The cycle of change from one body to another must last till they enter at length upon the path of mystical asceticism, and by the process of self-deliverance enter into eternal rest.

18. Such, in outline, are the doctrines of the Vedanta. They are, in truth, what they purport to be—the speculative development of the religious notions of the Vedas. They are, in their entirety, a characteristic product of the Eastern Mind. This indolent quietism, this merging of the personal spirit in the universal divinity, this contempt of activity, this emancipation of the sage from the requirements of the moral law—all these things bear upon them the stamp of Oriental thought. They mark, as we shall see later, the characteristic difference between the Oriental and the Greek Philosophy.

The Sankhya and Yoga Philosophy.

1. The Vedantist Philosophy may be described as a mystico-idealistic Monism; the Sankhya on the other hand (of which Capila is said to be author) is a well-marked Dualism. According to the Sankhya, all that exists is either producing and not produced, or at once produced and producing, or produced and not producing, or finally neither produced nor producing.

(*a.*) What produces without being produced is Nature (Prakriti) *natura naturans*,—the ultimate basis of all material things, a subtle but yet a corporeal substance.

(*b.*) What produces and is produced is Reason (Buddhi), the Reason of nature, its rational condition.

(*c.*) What is produced without producing is Self-consciousness (Ahankara), the basis of the Ego.

(*d.*) What is neither producing nor produced, is the Soul, the spirit (Purusha).

2. Of the four members of this division, the first and last, Nature and Spirit—stand farthest apart, while the intermediate members form a connecting link between them, and are dependent on them.

Nature—Prakriti, is uncreated, eternal, but wholly blind, working without consciousness and without knowledge. It is a single principle, by the forces inherent in which is evolved everything that we find in the material world.

Next comes Reason—Buddhi. This reason is not something raised above nature; it is something indwelling in it. It manifests itself in the purpose visible in all nature's works. It is the rational element in nature, nature itself being merely matter.

From Nature and Reason is further evolved Consciousness (Ahankara). By this is not meant the pure Ego, eternally self-knowing—the spirit in itself, but rather that Ego which is always studiously asserting itself, that more or less empty consciousness, that spontaneity in which the wavering reason seeks to establish for itself a centre for the relations created by its activity. Ahankara is the groundwork of Avarice and Pride; through it all evil comes into the world. Ahankara is furthermore the principle in man on which depend the internal Sense, the understanding (Manas), the organs of sensation

and movement, and the bodily condition in general. By the term Ahankara, Sankhya would seem to signify a kind of brute soul.

Above Nature thus developed, and essentially differing from it stands the Soul—Puruscha. Sankhya proves the existence of a soul distinct from nature in this wise:—

(*a.*) We find an organic formation existing in blind material nature, such a formation as we may compare to a workman's instrument. This implies the existence of something else for whose benefit the instrument exists. This something else must be a being of knowledge—a soul. As there exists an object to be made use of, there must exist a being to use it; this being is the soul.

(β.) Again, the effort after supreme happiness supposes an abstraction which rises above the passing world, the world of sense. This effort, which we recognise in ourselves, is proof of the existence of a soul, for the soul alone is capable of such abstraction.

(γ.) Lastly, the members of an antithesis mutually suppose one another. From the existence of a force in nature exercised in blind, unreasoning outward action, we may argue the existence of an intelligent self-contained soul.

3. From what has been said, it is now apparent in what relation the two members of the antithesis—Nature and Soul—stand to one another. The principle of all activity and all motion is Nature, and Nature alone. The Soul is neither active nor productive, it is merely a tranquil spectator of what goes on in Nature. There are, however, mutual dependences between them. Nature, as a blind principle of action, can have no purpose in itself, it can exist only for something else, for something which is intelligent; Nature, then, exists for the Soul. On the other hand, the Soul cannot, apart from Nature, attain to knowledge, especially to the knowledge of itself as of something distinct from Nature. They are to one another as the blind and the lame; the Soul has no power of movement or action, Nature cannot see the way before it; the one supplies what is wanting to the other, and from both together arises the whole order of spiritual and material phenomena.

4. Sankhya does not make the Soul a single principle as it makes Nature; it admits a plurality of souls. "This it takes to be proved by the fact, that different destinies befall souls; that different pains and pleasures are experienced by them; that they are engaged in different occupations." We have also to distinguish in man between the subtle body—Linga, and the gross material body by which the former is enveloped. The former consists of Buddhi (Reason), Ahankara, Manas, the ten senses, and the five subtle elements. The Linga has not in itself a personal character, it attains this perfection in virtue of its union with the Soul, to which it is united until the latter is finally emancipated.

5. With regard to the duty of man in life, Sankhya makes the deliverance of the Soul (from the trammels of Nature) the highest end of all human effort. And here, too, "knowledge" is the means by which deliverance is accomplished. Human works avail nothing. The

required knowledge consists in this, that the Soul apprehends the essential difference between itself and Nature. "Deliverance" is no more than the divesting of the Soul, by right knowledge, of that which belongs to it in appearance only, and which hides it from the eye of sense. All that happens in Nature, happens that the Soul may attain this self-knowledge, this view of its own being.

6. When the Soul has reached this term; when it has attained the conviction that nothing of all that happens in the world is its work, or its concern, it is freed thereby from earthly disquiet, from all the influences, and hampering forces of Nature. It may still remain in union with the body, just as the potter's wheel continues to revolve, though it is no longer in use; but the movements of the body no longer trouble the Soul, they can be of no further use to it. Prakriti, like a dancing girl, presents itself before Puruscha to lead it to knowledge, and then modestly withdraws when the task is finished. If deliverance is not complete in this life, it will be perfected after death, and the man who has attained it, is exempted from those transmigrations to which other souls are subject.

7. Connected with Sankhya, and probably an offshoot from it, is the philosophical system of Yoga. Respecting this system, we have little detailed knowledge. It is to a great extent in accord with Sankhya, but it differs from it in this, "that it admits a supreme God, ruler of all things, who is a Spirit or Soul, distinct from other souls, untroubled by the evils to which they are subject, free from good and free from evil deeds and their consequences, infinite, eternal, omniscient." What relations Yoga established between this God and the world we do not know. It may have been the object of the teaching of Yoga to set up a Divinity which should unite in one being the elements Nature and Soul, so sharply contrasted in Sankhya.

Philosophy of Nyaya and Vaiseshika.

1. The Philosophy of Nyaya, of which Gotama is said to be the author, is a system of Logic. But this Logic is the path of "deliverance" for the Soul—not a mere means to deliverance, but in itself actual deliverance, and thus a certain way to bliss. Logic, to wit, leads to true knowledge (the knowledge of the essences of things), and in this precisely consists the emancipation of the Soul.

2. The further development of Nyaya is effected in the Philosophy of Vaiseshika, of which Kanada is reputed the founder. This system may be said to be a Philosophy of Nature, as it deals chiefly with the corporeal world. Vaiseshika advocates the atomic theory. All bodies, according to the disciples of this Philosophy, are formed from homogeneous, minute, indivisible atoms. In dividing bodies we must ultimately reach parts that are no longer divisible; otherwise corporeal substances would contain parts infinite in number, and everything in nature would thus be infinite, and the least equal to the greatest.

3. The combinations of atoms form bodies. "The first combination

of two atoms is the simplest. The bipartite elements thus formed combine in threes; the tripartite elements thus arising, in fours; and so on in every increasing number. Only those elements can unite to form a perceptible substance between which there is mutual adaptability. The smallest perceptible magnitude is that of the mote of the sunbeam. This is a combination of the second order, and consists, accordingly, of six atoms. The size of the ultimate atom is, therefore, one-sixth that of the mote of the sunbeam."

4. The combination of atoms to form perceptible bodies is governed, according to Vaiseshika, by a fixed law. The chance combinations of the Greek atomistic doctrines are therefore excluded. Vaiseshika also assumes the existence of a higher force which controls the combinations of the atoms. It will not admit the possibility of spontaneous combinations among them; the action of God must intervene to determine them to union.

5. Vaiseshika furthermore undertakes an explanation of man's nature: there is a soul in man distinct from the body, for he possesses attributes different from the attributes of other things; to wit, intelligence, desire, aversion, will, pleasure, and pain. In the body, on the other hand, are located action and the effort after that which gives pleasure, the organs of sense, and the feeling of sensuous pleasure and pain. Intermediary between soul and body is Ahankara (self-consciousness), which, although united to each individual soul, is yet wholly distinct from it. But everything which in this life is united to the soul is an evil for the soul: "the body is evil, the senses are evil, the objects of sense, the elements, consciousness of the external world, consciousness of self, action, pleasure, and pain."

6. And thus we are again conducted to the term in which all Hindu systems eventually end—the Deliverance of the Soul. It is the task of the Soul to free itself from the evils of the body, by means of that sacred knowledge in which it contemplates itself as a thing distinct from the body and independent of it. Through this realization of its own essence the Soul rises above the sphere of action, above merit and responsibility, and attains to perfect quietude and bliss.

7. To the systems hitherto set forth we must add three others, with the details of which, however, we are but imperfectly acquainted. They have this in common, that they are materialistic in character, and are therefore at variance with the religious doctrines of the Hindus. The first system is that of the Dschainas. In this system a distinction is allowed between the animate and the inanimate, but both, it is contended, are constituted by atoms only. It admits no supramundane existence, and will not acknowledge a Providence. Closely connected with this system is that of the Tscherwakas, which maintains that the corporeal alone is real; that spirit is merely an empty word. Last in order comes the system of the Lokayatikas, an offshoot of the previous school. Here, too, the body is the only reality; spirit is mere nothing. Sensation, consciousness, intelligence, though they do not formally exist in the several elements, exist potentially in them, subject to the con-

dition that these elements combine to form organic bodies. Thought has, therefore, no other cause than a certain definite combination of the elements; it is merely a mode of their co-existence, in the same way as the fermenting together of several substances produces an exciting beverage, which could not be procured from each substance taken separately, nor from all taken together, unless when mixed in the required manner. As long, therefore, as the body exists a fully constituted organism, so long will thought and feeling, joy and suffering, endure; but these cease to exist when the body ceases to be.

8. We may notice that Hindu Philosophy has covered a tolerably wide field during its development. From the loftiest Idealism it descends by many stages to Materialism, and—if we take the Buddhist doctrines into our reckoning—even to Nihilism. Many of the notions which we have met with here will confront us again in various guises during the further course of the History of Philosophy. To this extent the Philosophy of India cannot be devoid of special interest for us.

Religious Philosophy of the Medo-Persians.

§ 8.

1. Turning westward from India, we encounter the Persians, a people which holds a prominent place in ancient history. A Philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, we do not find amongst them. But their system of religion has many elements of a philosophical character, and, besides, has exercised an important influence on the doctrinal systems of subsequent ages, notably on the heretical theories current in the early Christian times. For both reasons it deserves careful notice. Zoroaster, who is said to have lived in the sixth century before Christ, was, if not the founder, at least the reformer of the religion of the Medo-Persians. To him is ascribed the Zendavesta, an exposition of their religious doctrines.

2. The Zendavesta assumes two ultimate principles of all things — Ormuzd and Ahriman. The synthesis of these two principles in a higher Zeruane-Akerene (Infinite Time), from which both are derived, is a doctrine of later origin. These two principles, Ormuzd and Ahriman, are mutually antagonistic. Ormuzd is the unclouded infinite light, the being of supreme wisdom and perfection, and, as such, the author of all good. Ahriman, on the other hand, is a being of defilement and gloom, and, as such, the principle of darkness and author of all evil. He is, therefore, the enemy of Ormuzd. Ahriman was originally a being of light, but he envied Ormuzd, thereby lost his brightness, and became the antagonist of Ormuzd. The dualism involved in these two principles is not, therefore, a primary, eternal state; it arose in consequence of the falling away of the one principle from the other.

3. Ormuzd uttered his "*honover*" (I am), and thereby created the good spirits and all that is good in the visible world. Ahriman, on the other hand, brought forth the spirits of evil (Dews), and, in alliance

with these, perverted the creation of Ormuzd by opposing to its brightness and its blessings destroying activities and works of evil. This explains why good and evil are blended in the world, and why the course of the universe puts before us a constant struggle between good and evil.

4. The spirits created by Ormuzd are ranged in a certain hierarchical order. The Amshaspands occupy the first rank; the Izeds the second. Last in order come the Fervers—protecting spirits, and archetypes whose perfection men must strive to reproduce. In the same way, the Dews created by Ahriman have their differences of rank.

5. The souls of men were created by Ormuzd, and dwelt originally in heaven. But their union with material bodies has involved them in the struggle between good and evil that fills the world. It is, therefore, the duty of man to serve Ormuzd, and to combat Ahriman and his works. The latter obligation is fulfilled by benevolence towards others, by cultivating the soil, by exterminating the living things that have been created by Ahriman, &c.; the former by sacrifice and the worship of fire, the symbol of Ormuzd. If man fulfils these duties here below, his soul is admitted to the presence of Ormuzd on the second day after the death of the body. Should he offend against these obligations—*i.e.*, should he serve Ahriman in life—his soul is condemned after death to companionship with Ahriman in hell.

6. The antagonism and strife between Ormuzd and Ahriman are not however to last for ever. Ahriman will eventually be overcome, will then reconcile himself with Ormuzd, will enter with all his following into the kingdom of the latter, and eternal peace shall ensue. The resurrection of the body will be part of this restitution of all things. In this wise is the final triumph of good over evil announced.

7. There is, it is clear, a distinctly ethical principle involved in this system, inasmuch as it binds man to resist evil. But this resistance is something altogether external. Man is bound to combat evil in the outer world, and in the corporeal part of his own being; further than this his obligation does not go. The perfecting of the inner self is nor insisted upon nor suggested. Good and evil are both extrinsic to man. Of an interior moral perfection the Zendavesta knows nothing.

8. It is further deserving of remark that the religious system of the Persians speaks of a Mediator between the two antagonistic principles to whom it gives the name Mithras. Mithras stands between Ormuzd and Ahriman to aid the former in his struggle with the principle of evil, and to lead the latter to final transfiguration in Ormuzd. Through Mithras light and life flow out upon creation, in the strength of which evil is combated in the world and everything at last brought to union with Ormuzd. He it is who introduces to Ormuzd the souls which, after the death of the body, are found fully purified.

9. The religious worship of the Persians was concerned chiefly with fire—the symbol of Ormuzd; their priests were for this reason styled Athrava (provided with fire), and bore different names according to their sacrificial functions. The Athrava were replaced in later times by

the Magi—at once a caste of priests charged with the functions of religious worship, and a caste of sages in exclusive possession of the wisdom of the nation. They were particularly devoted to Theology and Astronomy, to Physics and to Medicine. Beyond this we know little of the wisdom of the Magi.

Philosophical Theories embodied in the Religious Beliefs of Egypt and Western Asia.

§ 9.

1. The religions of the peoples of Egypt and Western Asia are, throughout, forms of nature-worship, and contain few speculative elements. A short outline of them will be sufficient.

2. The religion of Egypt was a system of nature-worship, inclining, however, to Dualism. In it primeval night (Athor) is Primary Matter. This Matter is not itself endowed with any formative power, but within it there is lodged an active principle of generation. In consequence, there comes forth from it, self-generated, self-delivered from the maternal womb, the divinity of action—the sun, from which in turn all life and plastic energy in nature is derived. This active principle of generation appears in Egyptian mythology under the name Osiris, the passive or maternal principle under the name Isis. These are the two prominent Egyptian divinities; around these and subordinate to the relations they bear to one another are ranged the other mythical divinities of the Egyptians. The worship of animals was part of this system of nature-worship. We also find among the Egyptians the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and belief in a judgment after death.

3. The Egyptian priests seem to have been adepts in a higher knowledge. The ancients were at one in ascribing a higher wisdom to them. What their esoteric doctrines were we cannot determine with exactness. They loved to shroud their philosophic teaching in a veil of mystery; and the hieroglyphics of their monuments have not yet been interpreted with sufficient accuracy to enable us to build any trustworthy theory upon them. They seem to have devoted themselves specially to Mathematics and Astronomy. That they exercised an influence on the course of thought in Greece is proved by the journeys of the Greek Philosophers to Egypt to make acquaintance with the wisdom of its priests. We have, however, no means of determining the extent of this influence.

4. A system of nature-worship, much resembling the Egyptian, is found amongst the peoples of Western Asia—the Babylonians, Assyrians, Phœnicians, &c., and here again we find particular prominence given to the sexual differentiation of the powers of Nature (the active and passive). The Sun-God is the active principle, the Ruler of Heaven, the great fecundating power. By his side is the Moon-Goddess —the passive, fecundated principle in generation, a deity who sometimes seems to stand also for the fecundated Earth. All things in nature

owe their origin to the fecundation of the passive element by the active; all came forth from the womb of the Great Mother, images of the generating parent, to be destroyed by him again, and to return to the womb whence they have issued. The two powers of nature, thus personified, take different names with different peoples. The Babylonians name them Baal and Mylitta, the Syrians Baal and Astarte, the Phœnicians Moloch (Melkarth) and Astarte, &c.

5. Among the Babylonians, the order of the learned—on whom the name Chaldeans was bestowed—were, like the Persian Magi, devoted to star-worship, astrology, and magic. They specially cultivated the science of Mathematics and Astronomy. The Cosmogony of the Chaldean Berosus dates from the time of Alexander the Great. In this system, Baal (the supreme divinity) creates Heaven and Earth by dismemberment of the goddess Omorka (the Sea), man himself being produced from drops of the blood of Baal. Differing from this is the Cosmogony of the Phœnician Sanchuniaton, who is said to have lived about 1,200 B.C. He assumes a primeval Chaos, which, by the breath of God brooding over it, is divided into Heaven and Earth. Only fragments of these systems have reached us; and the true date of the latter system is a matter of complete uncertainty.

6. Thus much for the wisdom of the East. What has been said will suffice to make known the speculative ideas of the Oriental peoples, and the essential character of these ideas. Any closer examination of them, especially as regards their connection with forms of religious worship, belongs to the history of Religion. We leave them, therefore, to turn our attention to the true home of Philosophy—to Greece.

SECTION II.

Philosophy of the Greeks.

Outline and Division.

§ 10.

1. It is undeniable that the Greeks received from the East many of the elements of their civilisation. Colonists from Egypt, Phœnicia, and Phrygia carried with them into Greece their arts and inventions, their knowledge of agriculture and of music, their religious hymns, their poetry, and their mysteries. There can be no doubt that philosophical notions also, those especially which were connected with religious beliefs, were introduced into Greece in the same fashion. This is clearly indicated by the close resemblance which we observe to exist between the secret dogmas of the oldest Greek mysteries, and the earliest teachings of the East. But we should not be warranted in concluding from this that the Greeks owe their civilisation wholly to the East, that the

philosophy of Greece was drawn entirely from foreign sources, and was no more than a special development of Oriental notions. The Greek mind was stimulated by influences that reached it from the East, but it was independent in its growth; the philosophy of Greece, in its entirety, is a product of the Greek mind, though certain Oriental notions are unmistakably embodied in it.

2. With all peoples religion has been the basis and first beginning of civilisation. The Greeks are no exception to the rule. Their poetry and their philosophy alike grew out of their religion. Their poetry was first in its growth; for the effort of the poetic imagination to picture to itself the being and evolution of things human and divine precedes and prepares the way for genuine philosophical investigation. In the case of the nation, as in the case of the individual, activity of the imagination comes before activity of the intellect, the inquiries of the philosopher come after the efforts of the poet. It happened so in Greece. We may see in this truth an explanation of the fact that the poetic genius of Greece had reached its highest expression in the Drama of Athens, long before Attic philosophy had taken full possession of the riches of thought amassed by earlier thinkers, as of the further fact that the golden age of Attic philosophy outlasted, by a considerable time, the golden age of Attic poetry.

3. There are two sides to the religion of the Greeks, an internal and an external one. We notice among the Greeks what we may style an esoteric religion, embodied in the so-called mysteries, which, under sense-images and allegories, propagated certain higher religious notions, and an exoteric, or popular, religion, wholly concerned with these graceful outer forms, and with no thought for their primary meaning. Both these aspects of the religion of the Greeks found early expression in their poetry. The poems of Hesiod and Homer reproduce in many forms the myths of the popular religion, while the esoteric religion found expression in the so-called songs of Orpheus, a species of poetry much more speculative in character, and manifesting a much higher development of religious feeling.

4. Historians and poets alike inform us that Orpheus (as well as Linus and Musæus) lived in the thirteenth century before Christ, and that he was the founder of the Thracian system of Bacchus-worship. They furthermore tell us that these men were not mere singers or poets, but that they were sages as well, who could tell of the birth of the gods and the origin of the universe. Orpheus cannot, however, be credited with all the songs which bear his name. At an early period, metrical compositions on Cosmogony—the work of Onomacritus, who lived about the time of the Pisistratidæ, in the sixth century before Christ, and of other authors—were falsely attributed to him. For the most part, the songs of Orpheus, of which we have accurate knowledge, belong to a comparatively recent period. But the matter they contain comes down from a distant antiquity, for the later poets either reproduce the Orphic songs and legends, or model their own upon them. This observation applies also to Pherecydes, Epimenides, Antiphanes and

Acusilaus, who, in the sixth century before Christ, imitated the Orphic lays in their poems on the origin of the world.

5. If we inquire what influence the religion of the Greeks exercised upon the rise and the structure of Greek philosophy, we shall find that the popular religion, with its merely external forms, was of little avail in giving a positive stimulus to philosophic thought. The gods of the Greek Olympus are no more than men, of ideal beauty it is true, but moving, nevertheless, in the same sphere of thought, will, feeling, and passion as other men. Some of the many myths connected with the several divinities seem to have a deeper meaning, to give a glimpse occasionally of an ancient faith of higher purity; but there are many other legends of the gods which have no such higher meaning, which belong purely and simply to the region of human passions, vices, and hateful animosities.

6. The popular religion contributed negatively rather than positively to rouse philosophic thought. The myths in which a deeper thought lay concealed might, perhaps, do positive service to the philosopher in his inquiry; and we notice that Plato has embodied many such in his philosophic writings, in order to bring higher truths within the reach of sense. But the other legends of the gods provoked philosophic thought to antagonism by the palpable errors and absurdities which they contained, and in this way impelled philosophy to seek, by reason, a higher theological knowledge. In this negative way, principally, did the popular religion of Greece contribute to stimulate philosophic investigation. And to this we may attribute the fact that philosophy in Greece, at an early stage, set itself to combat the popular faith, with its polytheistic doctrines and its theological myths. We remember Plato's censures of the popular religious legends, and his efforts to exclude them from the education of the young, and to replace them by higher notions of God and things divine (cfr. de Rep. Lib. 2 and 3).

7. The esoteric religion, on the other hand, and principally those notions which were embodied in the so-called Orphic hymns, must have exercised a positive influence on the early course of philosophy in Greece. This appears from the fact that these songs are already highly philosophic in character. The philosophic notions contained in them are no doubt still shrouded under a mythical veil, but they show clearly through the enveloping myth, and must naturally have stirred the thinking mind to a further advance on the road of philosophic research. We may, indeed, assert that the Orphic songs were themselves the first beginnings of philosophy among the Greeks, that in them the spirit of philosophy in Greece first warmed into life.

8. These songs deal for the most part with principles of Cosmogony and Theogony—they contain indeed little more than theories of the kind. The fundamental notion in all these theories is the same—that all things were originally contained in one being, one primal matter, out of which everything (heaven and earth) was formed by plastic forces, in accordance with the principle of dualism which divided the universe from the beginning. We have many accounts as to the form in which this

common origin of all things was represented. According to Suidas the elements in the Orphic Cosmogony were, Æther, Chaos, and Night;* according to Simplicius, Time, Æther, Chaos; according to Apollonius of Rhodes, Heaven, Earth, Sea; while Athenagoras understands the primeval chaos to have signified a kind of ovum from which the universe grew. However this may be, we are warranted in attributing to the influence of these theories the fact that the earliest philosophers of Greece devoted themselves to the search after a single principle from which the cosmical order was evolved, and strove to trace back the origin of all things to primary matter.

9. In the maxims of the "Seven Sages" of Greece, we have the transition from the philosophy of religious belief to rational philosophy proper. The Seven Sages were—Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Solon of Athens, Cleobulus of Lindus, Chylon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth. It was not philosophic principles scientifically evolved and combined which formed the subject of their brief and pithy maxims, but certain laws of human life and human society apprehended with precision, and enunciated with simplicity. We find in them, besides rules of prudent action, special commendation of self-knowledge, sagacity, control of the passions, abstinence and temperance. We have here a practical wisdom—not yet philosophy strictly so-called, for it does not rest on a strictly philosophic basis; but an advance from the obscurity of the myth, a creation of the reflecting mind. These maxims could not fail to affect the development of the practical side of the philosophy of Greece.

10. The history of Greek philosophy may be divided into three periods—the period of its rise and early development, the period of its maturity and its perfection, and the period of its decline and decay. In its highest development Greek philosophy did not compass the whole truth—the light of a higher revelation was wanting to it. It could not, therefore, maintain itself at the height it reached at the period of its greatest glory. Notwithstanding its extraordinary fruitfulness at this time, it bore within it the seeds of dissolution; the point which marked its highest development marked also the beginning of its decline. It was during the epoch of its decline that the philosophy of Greece found its way to Rome.

11. We divide, then, the history of Greek Philosophy into three periods. The first period, embracing the rise and gradual development of philosophy among the Greeks, extends from Thales to Socrates. The second, the period of its highest perfection, extends from Socrates to Aristotle. The third, the period of its decline and decay, extends from Aristotle (end of the fourth century, B.C.) to the close of its history. This period falls partly within the Christian era. To this period belongs the Philosophy of Rome, which was, as we have already remarked, in contents and in general character, a mere offshoot of the Philosophy of Greece.

* Epimenides, Antiphanes, and Acusilaus likewise represent all things as coming forth from "Night."

12. On the plan of this division, we shall set forth the history of Greek and Roman Philosophy. In the first period we shall observe a number of different philosophic schools—the Ionic, Pythagorean, Eleatic—grow up, side by side, with little interchange of influence during their growth, but towards the close of this period, mutually acting upon one another, and tending thereby to union. In the second period, the independent existence of the several schools comes virtually to an end, and there ensues a common movement of philosophic progress, represented in the three greatest philosophers of Greece—Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. At first, indeed, several Socratic schools came into existence; but this was owing to the fact that the pupils of Socrates had not all been able to comprehend the spirit of his philosophy. The true development of Greek Philosophy, subsequently to Socrates, is represented in Plato and Aristotle. In the third period, Greek Philosophy was again divided into a number of independent schools. Union in progress was lost, and the decline of Philosophy among the Greeks was thereby assured.

13. The sources from which the history of Greek Philosophy may be drawn are immediate or mediate. Among the former are to be reckoned the writings of the philosophers themselves, which have been preserved to us sometimes in their entirety, sometimes only in a fragmentary state. The latter include the accounts which contemporary or subsequent writers give us of the doctrines of the several philosophers. Of special importance in this respect are the writings of Plato and Aristotle, in which frequent allusion is made to the opinions of earlier philosophers. "Plato indicates in various dialogues the views of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Gorgias and other sophists, and in a special manner those of Socrates and of his several followers. Aristotle, in all his writings, follows the plan of beginning the discussion of every problem with a review of the tenable theories of earlier philosophers, and in this way he gives us—particularly in the introduction to his Metaphysics—a critical examination of the principles of his predecessors from Thales to Plato." The writings of Plato and Aristotle are thus important sources from which the historian of Greek Philosophy must draw. The writings of Xenophon, more particularly his *Memorabilia*, are of special importance for the history of Socratic Philosophy.

14. Among the Platonists, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides of Sinope in Pontus, and at a later date Clitomachus, have, in their writings, either treated expressly of the earlier philosophers, or otherwise furnished data for a history of philosophy. Like service has been rendered by the Aristotelians, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Aristoxenus, Dicæarchus, Phanias of Lesbos, Clearchus, Strato, and others. The same may be said of a few of the Stoics and Epicureans. But the works of these writers, of which later philosophers made use, are no longer extant. The schools of Alexandria took up the work which the earlier philosophers had carried on. Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 284-247), established the library of Alexandria, in which the works of the philosophers were collected. Callimachus of Cyrene (B.C. 260), Superintendent of this library, drew up a catalogue of celebrated authors and their works (*Πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν*). Aristophanes, of Byzantium, pupil of Callimachus and Zenodotus, arranged the dialogues of Plato, dividing them into trilogies and independent dialogues. Eratosthenes (B.C. 276-194), whom Ptolemy Euergetes set over the library of Alexandria, reviewed the various schools of philosophic thought (*Περὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἱρέσεων*), and his writings Apollodorus made the basis of his metrical chronicle, which he composed about B.C. 140. The lives, the disciples, and the doctrines of the philosophers, also furnished a theme to Duris of Samos (about B.C. 270), to Neanthes of Cyzicus (about B.C. 240, *Περὶ ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν*), to the Peripatetic Hermippus of Smyrna (B.C. 220), from whom Diogenes Laertius draws largely (*Περὶ τῶν συφῶν, περὶ μάγων, Περὶ Πυθαγόρου, περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους, περὶ Θεοφράστου βίοι*), to the Peripatetic Sotion (B.C. 200—*Περὶ διαδοχῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων*), to Sosicrates (about B.C. 180—*Διαδοχαί*), Satyrus (B.C. 160—*βίοι*), Apollodorus (B.C. 140—*Χρονικά* and *Περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων αἱρέσεων*), and Alexander *Polyhistor* (in the time of Sylla—*Διαδοχαὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων*), Heraclides Lembus, son of Serapion, made a compilation of extracts from the *Διαδοχαί* of Sotion, and the *Βιοι* of Satyrus, to

which Diogenes Laertius makes frequent allusion. Demetrius Magnes, one of Cicero's teachers, was the author of a critical work on the earlier philosophers, and from this also Diogenes Laertius borrows largely.

15. Of the later writers whose works have come down to us, and who furnish us with materials for the history of Greek Philosophy, we may mention (*a*) Cicero, Lucretius, and Seneca, whose writings are of special importance in this connection; (*b*) Plutarch (A.D. 120. De placitis philosophorum, sive de physicis philosophorum decretis Ll. 5; (*c*) the physician Galen (A.D. 131-200), whose works contain many references to Greek Philosophy—the treatise Περὶ φιλοσόφων ἱστορίας which has been attributed to him is not genuine; (*d*) Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 200. Pyrrhoniarum Institutionum Ll. 3, and Adv. Mathematicos Ll. 11); (*e*) Diogenes Laertius (A.D. 230, of Laërte in Cilicia. De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum Ll. 10); (*f*) Flavius Philostratus (Vitæ sophistarum); (*g*) Eunapius of Sardis (A.D. 400. Vitæ philosophorum et sophistarum). Further materials for a history of Greek Philosophy are supplied by (*h*) Justin Martyr; (*i*) by Clement, of Alexandria, in his works: Cohortatio ad Græcos, Pædagogus, and Stromata; (*k*) by Origen, chiefly in his Φιλοσοφούμενα; (*l*) by Hippolytus in his treatise: Refutationes omnium heresium, Ll. 10; (*m*) by Eusebius in his Præparatio Evangelica; (*n*) by the Neo Platonists and the Commentators of Aristotle, notably by Simplicius, Comm. ad Arist. physicas auscultationes; also (*o*) by Gellius (A.D. 150) in his Noctes Atticæ; (*p*) by Athenæus (A.D. 200) in his Deipnosophistæ; (*q*) by Joannes Stobæus (A.D. 500) in his Florilegium, and Eclogæ physicæ et Ethicæ; (*r*) by Hesychius of Melitus (A.D. 520) in the treatise Περὶ τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων ἀνδρῶν; (*s*) by Photius (A.D. 880) in his Lexicon and Bibliotheca; (*t*) and by Suidas (A.D. 1000) in his Lexicon.

16. Of modern writers on the history of Greek Philosophy, it will be enough to mention (*a*) W. Traugott Krug, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vornehmlich unter Griechen und Römern, Leipzig, 1815; (*b*) Christ. Aug. Brandis. Handbuch der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1835; and Geschichte der Entwickelung der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirkungen im römischen Reiche 1862-64; (*c*) Aug. Bernh. Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, Bd. I.: Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, 1840; (*d*) Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang, und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwickelung, 3 Thle.; Aufl. 1. 1844-46-52. Aufl. 2, under the title: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, 3 Thle.; (*e*) Historia philosophiæ Græco-Romanæ, ex fontium locis contexta. Locos collegerunt, disposuerunt, notis auxerunt H. Ritter et L. Preller., Ed. 3; Goth. 1864; (*f*) Ludw. Strümpell, Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, zur Uebersicht, Repetition und Orientirung bei eigenen studien entworfen. Leipz. 1854-61, Abth. 2.; (*g*) Albert Schewgler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, herausg. von Costlin, Tübing. 1858; (*h*) N. T. Schwarz Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Liege, 1842; (*i*) Ch. Lévêque, Etude de la Philosophie Grecque et Latine, Paris, 1864; (*k*) Ed. Roth, Geschichte unserer Abendländischen Philosophie, Bd. 2 Griechsiche Philosophie, Mannheim, 1858; (*l*) Karl Prantl, Uebersicht der griechisch-römischen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1854; (*m*) O. Caspari Die Irrthümer der altclassischen Philosophen in ihrer Bedeutung für das philosophische Princip., Heidelberg, 1868.

Among the writers on the Greek and Roman systems of Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy may be mentioned: K. Hildenbrand, Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, Leipzig, 1860; A. Vedder, Historia philosophiæ juris apud veteres, Lugd. Batav. 1832; H. Henkel, Lineamenta artis græcorum politicæ, Berol. 1847; M. Voigt, Die Lehre vom jus naturale, æquum et bonum und jus gentium der Römer, Leipzig, 1856. On the history of Philology among the Ancients we have the work of H. Steinthal, Geschichte der sprachwissenschaft bei der Griechen und Römern, Berl. 1863-64. We may add to the list of authors here given: Grote, Plato, and other Companions of Socrates; London, 1865; G. H. Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Vol. I. and II.: London, 1845. W. H. Butler: Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, 2 Vols.: Cambridge, 1866. Cfr. Ueberweg.

FIRST PERIOD.

Pre-Socratic Philosophy.

1. In the pre-Socratic period of Greek Philosophy, we can distinguish three well-marked currents of thought. The first is that of the Ionic School—of the philosophers of external nature, who, true to the character of the Ionians, devoted themselves to the study of the world accessible to sense, and sought to discover an ultimate principle of all things in nature, and to explain their origin and their dissolution. The second is that of the Pythagoreans, whose investigations were more speculative in character, but who embodied their speculative notions in mathematical formulæ, and, in general, made mathematics the basis of their speculative structure. The third is that of the Eleatics, who, passing beyond the sphere of mathematical conceptions into the realm of pure thought, aimed at building up a science of Metaphysics, strictly so called. The doctrines of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics spread chiefly among the Greeks of the Doric race, especially among the Greeks of Southern Italy. In this way the Ionians and the Dorians—the most remarkable of the Hellenic races throughout the historic period—were also the representatives of the earliest forms of Greek Philosophy. But the pre-Socratic philosophy was, in every school, merely a one-sided effort; the truth after which it aspired could not be reached by its methods; scepticism, as an ultimate result, was unavoidable. This stage of ultimate scepticism was reached in the teachings of the Sophists.*

2. We shall therefore treat first of the Ionic Philosophy, or Philosophy of Nature; then of the doctrines of the Pythagoreans; next of the Eleatic Philosophy; and finally, of the teaching of the Sophists.

IONIC PHILOSOPHY—PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

1. When we speak of the Ionic Philosophy of Nature we do not mean to imply that the representatives of this Philosophy form what is called a "Philosophic School" in the strict sense of this term. There was no centre among them from which a common movement of thought spread abroad. We have to do only with a number of Philosophers who had a common subject of investigation—Nature, and whose philosophic views had certain common characters. These Philosophers do not even belong without exception to the Ionian race. They do not form a sect acknowledging one founder whose doctrines they uphold, and therefore it is only by a somewhat strained use of the term that we can speak of an "Ionic School."

* The fragments of the writings of the Pre-Socratic philosophers that still remain have been published by Guil. Aug. Mullach (Fragmenta philosophorum græcorum. Paris, 1860-1867.)

2. We can, however, divide these Philosophers of Nature into two classes—the earlier and the later. The earlier (Ionic "Physiologists," φυσιολόγοι) are the representatives of the Greek Philosophy of Nature in its rudimentary stage; while the later, having before them the works as well of the earlier Ionic Philosophers as of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, were enabled to give this Philosophy a wider development. It is, however, worth noticing that the earlier Ionic Philosophers for the most part adopted a dynamical principle to explain the origin of things, while the later as generally incline to mechanical conceptions.

3. We shall treat, in order, first the earlier, and then the later Ionic Philosophers.

THE EARLIER IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.

The earlier Ionic Philosophers had this in common, that in their inquiry as to how things in nature come into being and cease to be, they identified the active and the passive principles, the *causa efficiens* and the *causa materialis* (ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον), and strove to explain the rise of the order of nature by a dynamical process from this principle. Their doctrines are thus fundamentally forms of Hylozoism (Doctrine of Animated Matter). Amongst the earlier Ionic Philosophers are to be numbered Thales of Miletus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Diogenes of Apollonia, whose theories bear chiefly on the primal material basis of all things; and Heraclitus who concerned himself mainly with the processes of origin and decay.

THALES OF MILETUS.

1. Thales of Miletus, of Phœnician extraction, born B.C. 640, is described by Aristotle (Met. 1. 3.) as the founder of the Ionic Philosophy, and so the founder of Greek Philosophy as a whole. He is said to have studied Geometry in Greece; at least Proclus makes this statement regarding him (on Euclid, p. 19). He is furthermore credited with having foretold an eclipse of the sun which occurred during the reign of the Lydian King, Alyattes.

2. The fundamental theory of his Philosophy of Nature may be thus stated:—Out of water all things are made. Water is the primal matter, and with this primal matter, the force which is active in nature is identified. From this primal matter, probably by a process of rarefaction or condensation, he derives the origin of all things. According to Aristotle (Met. 1. 3.) "Thales was perhaps led to this opinion by observing that the nutriment of all things is moist, that heat itself, by which living things are maintained in life, is educed from moisture,—but that from which another thing is derived is a principle of that other thing—and further by observing that the seed (from which living organisms spring) is of its nature moist. But the principle making moist objects moist is water." In consequence of this view Thales could

regard all things as penetrated and vivified by the Divine power, and in this sense could say that the gods filled all thing, *πάντα πλήρη Θεῶν εἶναι.* (Arist. de anim. 1. 5.) He held the magnet to be animated because of its attraction of iron. He was of opinion that the earth floated upon water.

3. In later times Hippo of Samos or of Rhegium—a Physicist of the time of Pericles, who seems to have lived for a considerable time at Athens, adopted the theory of Thales. He discovers in water, or the moist element, the ultimate principle of all things. He does not seem to have attracted much attention. Aristotle mentions him but seldom, and not always in terms of praise. (De anim. 1. 2. Met. 1. 3.)

ANAXIMANDER, ANAXIMENES, DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.

1. Anaximander of Miletus (born about B.C. 611), was the first of the Greeks to compose a treatise "On Nature." The primal basis of all being (*ἀρχή*), and out of which all things came forth is, in his view, the Unlimited (*τὸ ἄπειρον*). From this *ἄπειρον* all things derive their origin. At first it differentiates itself into the opposing elements, hot and cold, moist and dry—kindred elements standing in antithesis. "As a result of a perpetual movement of revolution, condensations of the air are effected, and in this way numberless worlds come into being—heavenly divinities—in the midst of which the earth, cylindrical in form, maintains itself at rest owing to its being equally distant from all points of the heavenly sphere." The earth was evolved from the primeval moisture under the influence of heat emanating from the sun, and, fecundated by heat, it gave birth to living beings. The latter thus derive their being from the element of moisture, and this explains why the creatures now living on the land were originally of the fish kind, and acquired their present form only as the surface of the earth became dry. It is said that Anaximander described the soul as of gaseous nature. All things come forth from the *ἄπειρον*, and all things are fated to return to it again.

2. With regard to the question, what Anaximander really meant by the *ἄπειρον*, opinions are divided. Some (Ritter) maintain that he understood by the term a congeries of the primary elements; that the origin of things from the *ἄπειρον* is nothing more than a separation of elements, and that thus the evolution of the order of nature is, in his theory, a purely mechanical process. Others (Herbart) are of opinion that Anaximander meant by the *ἄπειρον* a primary matter indeterminate in quality and unlimited in quantity, and that he thus conceived the evolution of the natural order to be a dynamical process. Aristotle, it must be admitted, speaks of a *μῖγμα Ἀναξιμάνδρου* (Met. 12. 2.), but he also mentions (Phys. 3. 4.) that Anaximander taught that the *ἄπειρον* was divine, embracing all and controlling all—a notion which best accords with a dynamical theory. The latter was more probably the theory of this Philosopher. It would, however, appear that Anaximander was not very explicit in his teaching as to the nature of the *ἄπειρον*, and that Aristotle was thus unable to set forth his doctrines with assured accuracy.

3. Anaximenes of Miletus, a successor of Anaximander, perhaps his pupil (about B.C. 528), held air to be the primary principle of all things. "As the soul within us," he says, "which is air, holds our being together, so does the breath and the air embrace the world."—(Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 296). This air, infinite in extension, is instinct with life, *i.e.*, it is not merely the material, it is also the efficient cause of all things. Out of this primary being, by the process of condensation (*πύκνωσις*) and rarefaction (*μάνωσις* or *ἀραίωσις*) are derived all other things—fire, wind, clouds, water, earth. The earth—a smooth mass of circular outline, and the earliest of the formations of the Universe—is supported by the air. Anaximines describes this infinite primal principle of things as the Deity, though he also speaks of other gods who have derived their being from it.

4. This view of Anaximenes, with regard to the first principle of all things, was also held by Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who lived in the fifth century before Christ. He holds the air to be the primary principle and permanent basis of all things. He discovers a proof that all substance is one in the fact of the assimilation by plants of the various elements of the earth's crust, and of the elements of the vegetable world by animal organisms (Simpl. in Phys. fol. 32 B). The same theories were held by another philosopher, Idæus of Himera, of whom nothing further is known.

Heraclitus of Ephesus.

§ 13.

Heraclitus, surnamed "The Obscure" (*ὁ σκοτεινός*), the most brilliant portion of whose career extended from B.C. 504 to B.C. 500, was a member of a noble family of Ephesus. His theory is hylozoistic, but his doctrine of the continual flux of all things gives special prominence to the restless activity of nature. We possess only fragmentary remains of his treatise, *Περὶ φύσεως*.

2. Heraclitus holds Fire to be the ultimate principle of all things, but understands by the term an ethereal fire. This ether he, at the same time, regards as a divine spirit, which has knowledge of all things, and directs all things. In his view, therefore, the activity of the primal principle of all things is not a blind exercise of force, it is guided by reason, for he considers the eternal Fire-Spirit to be Reason, *λόγος*. He seems to have reached this conception from a consideration of the order and regularity prevailing throughout the universe. Reason is not, however, with him a transcendental entity; it is merely a determining attribute of the eternal material basis of things—of Fire. On this point he is distinctly at variance with the later philosopher of nature—Anaxagoras.

3. With regard to the origin of the world, Heraclitus teaches that by condensation all things are produced from Fire, and that by rarefaction all things return to it again. The process of condensation he describes as the way downwards (*ὁδὸς κάτω*), the process of rarefaction as the way upwards (*ὁδὸς ἄνω*). The way downwards leads to Water and Earth, and so to Death; the way upwards leads to Air and Fire, and

thus to Life. On the way downwards, too, lies Evil, and hence all things in the region of the earth are filled with evils; on the way upwards lies Good. Both sides of the dual process are, however, everywhere found in conjunction.

4. The forces at play in this dual process, and which initiate and maintain it, are, on the one hand, Strife and Hatred, on the other, Concord and Peace. By Strife and Hatred things come forth from the Primal Fire; by Harmony and Concord they return thither. Strife, or Enmity is, thus, the parent of all things (*πολεμὸς πατὴρ πάντων*); the power of Peace and Concord, on the other hand, brings things into union, and guides them back to the principle from which they emanated. Both forces must, therefore, be regarded as cosmical powers, indwelling in the Primal Fire. The world itself is nothing more than the Deity differentiated.

5. In this theory, the whole course of nature is merely a continuous movement in a circle; the cosmical force Strife, brings things forth from the Primal Fire by the downward way; and then the cosmical force, Concord, restores them to the Ethereal Fire again. From such assumptions these conclusions are deduced:—

(*a.*) All things in the world are in perpetual *flux*; there is nothing permanent, nothing persistent. Everything is moving in a current (*πάντα ῥεῖ*). We cannot step twice into the same stream, says Heraclitus. No thing is at any one moment exactly the same thing that it was the moment before. The rotation of beginning to be and perishing is uninterrupted;—All things pass.

(*b.*) The world has come forth from the Primal Fire because of the preponderance of Strife over Concord; but the time will come in which Concord shall gain the ascendency, and then the world shall be absorbed again into the fiery Ether. Not that the process will then be at an end: Strife will again become predominant, and a new world will arise, to be consumed again as before. And so the round of changes goes on for ever. The Deity, in sport, is ever constructing worlds, which it permits, in due time, to end in fire, only, however, to renew them again.

6. The Soul of man is of the nature of fire; the driest element is the wisest and the best; it shoots through the body as the lightning through the cloud. The Soul is, as it were, a wandering spark shot forth from that Universal Fire or Universal Reason, which encompasses heaven and rules all things, and it is maintained only by constant accessions from the source whence it came. It derives no advantage from its union with the material body; the birth of man is a misfortune, inasmuch as he is born only to die. It is only when the soul returns again to the Primal Fire that its true life begins.

7. Man is possessed of the gift of Reason only in as far as he is united with the Universal (Divine) Reason, and shares therein. Hence it is only in his waking hours that he is really a rational being; during sleep he is an irrational being, for his share in the Universal Reason is then limited to the mere function of respiration. These notions lead Heraclitus to these further conclusions:—

(*a.*) The senses are deceptive, they are worthless for the attainment of truth; truth is in the reason alone. Hence the estimate of the individual is not the standard of truth; that alone is true which all acknowledge as such, for that alone is an object of knowledge to the Universal (Divine) Reason. Herein lies the criterion of truth. Divergence of one's own opinion from the universal reason is to be avoided, for in this is the source of error.

(*b.*) The Divine Reason is the universal immutable law as well of the physical as of the moral world. All human laws are upheld by the Divine law, "for this can do all that it wills, and it satisfies all and overcomes all" (Stob. Serm. 3. 84). The people should, therefore, defend the law as the wall of a fortress, and stifle self-asserting arrogance as they would a conflagration.

(*c.*) The *summum bonum* of man is Contentment (*εὐαρέστησις*) or Equanimity, a condition of mind arising from the conviction that events happen precisely as they have been predetermined by the supreme law. For "it is not best for men that what they wish should come to pass. Sickness makes health a pleasure and an advantage; hunger, in like manner, prepares for satiety, and labour for rest" (Stob. Serm. 3. 83, 84). Contented resignation to the universal and necessary course of events is the secret of human happiness.

Later Philosophers of Nature.

1. The later philosophers of nature substituted for the dynamical principle, which had been invoked to explain the origin of the physical world, a principle of the mechanical order. The hylozoism of the earlier philosophers entirely disappeared. But though some of the later philosophers contented themselves with a mere cosmical mechanism, others postulated, besides this, a higher co-operating cause, and this admission of a dual principle in their cosmogony indicates an important advance in philosophic thought.

2. Amongst the later philosophers of nature are to be reckoned Empedocles of Agrigentum, Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, and Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, with whom also we must connect Arcesilaus.

Empedocles of Agrigentum.

§ 14.

1. Empedocles was born at Agrigentum (about the year B.C. 500). His family belonged to the democratic party in the state, and for this party Empedocles, like his father, Meton, exerted himself successfully. He wandered through the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy in the several characters of physician, priest, orator, and worker of miracles. He proclaimed himself possessed of magical powers. Of his writings we know

the names of only two, which can, with certainty, be ascribed to him, *περὶ φύσεως* and *καθαρμοί* (Diog. Lært. 7, 77). Fragments of the first of these are still preserved.

2. Empedocles did not, like the older Ionians, assume a single primal matter from which all things are produced. According to him all things come from a mingling of the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire. This mingling or mixture he views in the light of the *causa materialis* of all things in nature. He does not explain the origin and dissolution of things by a process of condensation and rarefaction such as was adopted by the older Ionians. His process is purely mechanical—a mere separation and subsequent commingling of the primary elements or "Radical Principles" of all things. To account adequately for this separation and commingling, he assumes, in addition to the *causa materialis* already described, two active forces which he names, in symbolical language, Love and Hatred (*φιλότης καὶ νεῖκος*). Hate he makes the dissociating separating principle; Love the principle of mixture and of union.

3. This being premised, he explains as follows the origin of the world:—

(*a.*) At first the four elements all mixed together formed a great globe or Σφαῖρος (*εὐδαιμονέστατος θεός* Arist. Met. 3.) which held all things within itself, in which Love was predominant and Hate without power. But Hate forced its way from the periphery to the centre of the Σφαῖρος, it gained the mastery over Love; the elements were sundered and stood apart in separate existence.

(*b.*) It is clear that the undisputed supremacy of Hate would have entailed absolute separation of the elements which would have rendered it impossible for individual objects to come into being. But in the process of the world's formation Love strove against Hate and succeeded in uniting again the elements which had been separated. And so the several objects in this world were brought into existence.

(*c.*) It thus appears that the world can exist only as long as equilibrium is preserved between the rival cosmical forces. In the end, however, Love will gain the upper hand, the individual objects in the world will lose their individuality, and return to their first union. But at this stage Hate will again rise in its might to bring about the formation of another world—and so on through endless periodic changes. Of the whole cycle of changes Necessity is the only law.

4. The first outcome of the formative process above described is Heaven with its luminous bodies, the formation of which is followed by that of the earth, and finally by that of the animal kingdom. "Amongst organic beings, plants first germinated from the earth while it was yet in process of formation; animals followed, but their several parts were first separately formed and then united by Love. There have been beings which were all eyes, others which were all arms, and so forth; from the union of these resulted many monsters which perished. But there also resulted some other organisms fitted to live, and these maintained themselves in existence and propagated their kind" (Arist. de

coelo, 3. 2). "The influence of distant bodies upon one another as well as the possibility of mixture, Empedocles explains by admitting effluences (ἀπορροίαι) from all things, and pores (πόροι) into which these effluences enter." All things are animated.

5. The human soul, like other things, is a mixture of the four elements, with Love and Hate as moving forces. For as like alone knows like, it follows that the soul, which knows all the elements, must contain within its own being the "radical principles" of all things—the four elements—otherwise, not resembling them in nature, it could possess no knowledge of them. Perception by the senses is explained by the theory of "effluences" already described. In the act of vision, *e.g.*, two currents flow in different directions, there is an efflux from the visible objects to the eye, and an efflux through the pores of the eye of the internal elements, fire and water, and in the encounter of these currents the sense-image is generated. In analogous fashion the perceptions of the other senses are effected (Arist. de sensu, c., 2, 4. Theophr. de sensu, 9.) Empedocles ascribed Feeling and Desire to plants as well as to animals.

6. Empedocles describes the Deity as the self-satisfying, blissful Spirit. Its relation to the world is that of the One to the Many, of Love to Disunion. As a consequence of this view he frequently describes the cosmical force of unifying Love as God—the two notions seem to be identified in his theory. "In the doctrine of Empedocles God knows Himself alone as Union and Love, the opposite He knows not at all. Having his being and habitation outside the sphere of strife he cannot be troubled by aught unlike himself, by life in contention, by evil, by the plurality and differences of things." Since like can alone know like, it follows that the soul can know God only on condition of its possessing, besides the four elements, some element of the divinity. This element is Reason.

7. The ethical principles involved in the teaching of Empedocles are no more than a tracing of the moral notions, Good and Evil, back to the contrast between the cosmical forces. "As in the physical order the individual comes forth by separation from the unity of the Σφαῖρος, so in the moral order Evil is that which has fallen away from God, which has been separated from His friendship, and from harmony with His being." From this doctrine to the doctrine of Metempsychosis the transition was easy. "The souls that have fallen away from God are relegated to the earth where they pass through various corporeal forms till at last they are purged from Evil and return to the Divine Being again."

THE ATOMISTS.

LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS.

§ 15.

1. In the teaching of Empedocles we have had the first distinct outlines of a doctrine of Dualism. Not only does he assume, over and above

the *causa materialis* of Nature, certain motive and formative forces, but he further sets the One, the force of Love, above Matter, since he assigns to it the attributes of the Deity. In contrast with Empedocles, the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, denied all immaterial force; they admitted matter and nothing more. Moreover, their notion of matter was not that of the earlier Ionians, who represented it as a principle at once material and dynamical; to them it was material in the strictest sense of the term. Their attempt to explain the origin of things from such a principle necessarily brought them to a lower system than hylozoism, to pure Materialism and Casualism (*i.e.*, the doctrine which attributes the origin of things to chance, *casus*).

2. Little is known as to the time at which Leucippus lived, and as to the incidents of his life. It is not even known with certainty whether he was an inhabitant of Abdera, of Miletus, or of Elea. His pupil Democritus was born (about B.C. 400) at Abdera. The desire for knowledge, it is said, led Democritus to make long journeys into Egypt and the East. He was the author of many works, among which the **Μέγας Διάκοσμος** was the most celebrated.

3. According to Aristotle (Met. I. 4) the Atomists assumed as the fundamental principle of all things the Empty (κενόν) and the Full (πλῆρες), characterising the former as non-being (μὴ ὄν), the latter as being (ὄν), whence their dictum that non-being exists as well as being. Closer inquiry into the nature of these conceptions shows us that the Empty is another expression for the notion of boundless space, the Full another expression for an infinite number of atoms contained within it. These two principles of things the Atomists held to be sufficient for the explanation of the origin of the Universe.

To establish the existence of empty space Democritus adduced the following proofs (Arist. Phys., 4, 6):—1st. Motion requires a vacuum, for what is full cannot receive anything into itself. 2nd. Rarefaction and condensation are possible only on the supposition that empty interstices exist in bodies. 3rd. Growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the empty spaces of the organic body. 4th. A vessel containing ashes does not admit a quantity of water less by a volume equal to the space occupied by the ashes, the one must therefore in part enter into the empty interstices of the other.

4. The Atomists understand by atoms minute indivisible particles out of which all things corporeal are made. The atoms are all alike in specific character, but they differ in shape or conformation (σχῆμα). They differ also in size; the weight of each atom corresponds to its size. It is useless to ask any question as to the origin of the atoms—they are eternal and therefore are not dependent on a cause.

5. In explaining the origin of corporeal things from these atoms, the Atomists suppose them endowed with a primordial eternal motion. If we ask what is the cause of this motion we are answered that we must not look for any cause above themselves. Like the atoms themselves, their movement has no cause, their motion is a necessary condition of their existence, and for this necessity no ulterior reason can be assigned.

6. This movement it is which determines the existence of the world. Owing to the difference in weight the heavier atoms fall, and the lighter atoms rise, and the collisions of the atoms also give rise to lateral move-

ments. In this way an eddying motion (δίνη) is produced, which, extending ever further and further, brings about the formation of worlds. In the revolution many atoms unite permanently together, and in such wise too, that like is joined to like, a vacuum is created in the interstices of the aggregate thus formed, and so larger composite bodies, and finally whole worlds come to exist. In all this process there is neither Purpose nor Law, mere Chance governs the whole (Casualism). Worlds without number come into being in this fashion.

7. The differences between things in nature are explained by the Atomists on the same principles. In the countless worlds which come into existence, different combinations of atoms are formed, and these assume different shapes; the round, the angular, the hook-shaped atoms arrange themselves in combination to form various kinds of surfaces. These surfaces, affecting our organs of sense, occasion perceptions, which we style sensible qualities of things, but which in reality are nothing more than an arrangement of figures. The qualities of a given body are merely something corresponding to the figures which go to make up their surfaces.

8. "The earth was at first in motion, and so continued as long as it was small and light; gradually, however, it was brought to rest. Organic structures were evolved from the moistened earth, and are all alike animated. The soul consists of subtle, smooth, round atoms, which are also the atoms that constitute fire. Atoms of this kind are scattered through the whole body, but they exercise different functions in different organs. The brain is the region of thought, the heart of anger, the liver of desire. At every inhalation we draw in physical atoms out of the air, at every exhalation we give them out again; and life lasts as long as this process continues." The soul is not immortal. But it is, nevertheless, the noblest part of man; he who seeks the good of the soul seeks what is divine; who seeks the good of the body—the covering or tent of the soul, seeks what is human.

9. The perceptions of sense are due to an efflux of atoms from the objects perceived. These atoms form themselves into images (εἴδωλα), which strike the organs of sense, and find entrance through them. The knowledge which rests on sense-perception alone is an obscure knowledge (σκοτίη), from which we must carefully distinguish genuine knowledge (γνοσίη), which is the fruit of inquiry by the understanding.

10. The supreme good is Happiness. "This is attained by the avoidance of extremes, and the observance of moderation, not by any external good." A necessary means to the same end is a right insight into the nature of things. Knowledge seems the highest contentment. Our dispositions, not our acts, determine our moral character.

11. Among the many supporters of the atomist theories of Leucippus and Democritus, Metrodorus of Chios and his pupils, Anaxarchus and Hippocrates, are specially worthy of mention. These philosophers seem to have emphasised and developed the elements of scepticism involved in Democritus' theory of sensuous perception.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ.

§ 16.

1. While the Atomists, in their purely mechanical theory of external nature, were constructing a system of thorough-going materialism, Anaxagoras, adopting the notion of a mechanism in nature, was developing upon this basis the Dualism already outlined by Empedocles, and was thereby bringing about the transition from the mere philosophy of nature to the higher Ideal Philosophy of the Attic school.

2. Anaxagoras was born of a distinguished family of Clazomenæ, in Asia Minor, about B.C. 500. In his later life he removed to Athens, where he lived in intimacy with Euripedes and Pericles, till the political rivals of the latter made the opinions of the philosopher the ground of a charge of impiety against him. To escape the results of the prosecution, Anaxagoras retired to Lampsacus, where he soon after died. He is the author of a treatise, *περὶ φύσεως*, of which Plato (Phædo, p. 97) makes mention.

3. The theory of Anaxagoras regarding external nature rests upon five main principles :—

There is no beginning of things and no dissolution, in the strict sense of these terms. Nothing comes out of nothing. All that begins to be must come from something already existing. What we call the origin of things and their dissolution depends entirely upon a conjunction (*σύγκρισις*) and a separation (*διάκρισις*) of parts previously existing.

There are bodies which consist of homogeneous parts, and bodies of which the parts are heterogeneous. The constituent parts which unite to form bodies are not all of the same nature ; a radical difference exists between them, and this difference is primary, original, not secondary or derivative.

Again, each of the various constituent parts of which bodies consist is itself constituted by smaller homogeneous parts, so minute as to be indivisible. These minute parts differ from the whole into which they enter, in quantity only, not in quality.

Hence it follows that primary matter, the *causa materialis* from which all things come, is an infinite multitude of infinitesimally small particles, not specifically alike, but distinguished by essential differences of nature. These primary particles, thus distinguished (*χρήματα*), must be regarded as the ultimate constituents, the "seeds" (*σπέρματα*) of all hings.

From these ultimate constituents material bodies are thus formed : Homogeneously constituted bodies, *i.e.*, those whose constituent parts are all of like nature, as for example, Flesh, Blood, Bone, Gold, Silver, &c. are composed of primitive particles, like in kind to one another, homœomeriæ (*ὁμοιομέριαι*) ; heterogeneously constituted bodies, on the other hand, *i.e.*, those whose parts differ in kind from one another, as, for

example, organic structures, are composed of primary particles differing in kind.*

4. This being premised, Anaxagoras proceeds to explain the process of the world's formation:—

At first the primary particles, or "seeds," of things were promiscuously mixed together in one common mass, and as a consequence of this mixture, no one of them could exhibit itself in its proper specific character. Before the world could be formed, a separation of the primitive particles—homœomeriæ—had to be effected. On no other condition could they unite for the formation of the bodies which now actually exist.

The cause of this separation, and of the various subsequent combinations of primitive particles, was not in the primary matter itself, for material particles do not, of their own accord, separate or enter into union. We are therefore forced to admit a cause higher than matter, but exerting an influence upon it, and by this influence effecting the separation of the primary particles and their subsequent combinations. And since everything in the world is formed and arranged in accordance with a definite plan, and plan and order suppose Reason, it follows that the efficient cause which presides over matter must be Mind (νοῦς).

We have here two distinct principles contributing to the formation of the world, the material—a medley of all the "seeds" of things, and the efficient—the spirit or mind (νοῦς). This is the dualistic doctrine in all plainness. According to the teaching of Anaxagoras, Mind is distinguished from Matter by its simplicity, its independence, its knowledge, and its control over matter. All things else have some admixture of the particles of all other things; the mind alone is pure, unmixed, subject only to itself, the most subtle of all things.

The formation of the world was brought about by motion. After the primary matter had rested in its inertness through countless ages, it was at last set in motion by the Divine Mind, and by this motion the world was evolved from chaos. This movement was a movement of rotation, established by the Mind at a single point, but gradually taking in further and further masses, and extending its range through the infinitude of matter. Everywhere, however, this movement follows a definite plan, everything in the world is formed and disposed for a purpose, there is no Fate (εἱμαρμένη), no Chance (τύχη).†

* Homogeneously constituted bodies were called by Aristotle ὁμοιομερῆ, in contradistinction to the heterogeneously constituted, ἀνομοιομερῆ. These terms, originally applied to fully constituted bodies, were transferred to the constituent elements of the bodies. In this way the elements, or "seeds," of the homogeneous bodies of Anaxagoras came to be designated ὁμοιομερῆ by Aristotle. Anaxagoras himself does not appear to have used the term.

† It is, however, worthy of remark that Anaxagoras avoids the application of this principle of design in nature to particular cases. Individual phenomena he almost always tries to explain by purely physical causes, without recurrence to the plan of the Divine Mind—a procedure on which Plato and Aristotle comment unfavourably. Aristotle (Met. I. 4.) reproaches him with making the νοῦς a *Deus ex machina*, which he calls upon only when he is at a loss to find the natural cause of some phenomenon.

In consequence of the revolving motion, "Air and Ether were separated from the primary mass, and filled all space—there is no such thing as a vacuum—contrary elements, the rarefied and the dense, the hot and the cold, the bright and the gloomy, the moist and the dry, were severally separated from each other; the dense, the cold, the gloomy, and the damp sank to the region now occupied by the earth, while the others mounted to the sphere of the ether. Here they formed hard stony masses, which, set in due order, and raised by the revolving movement to a white heat, became stars; while, far below, the elements that had fallen downwards became solidified into earth and stones." The earth rests in the middle of the world. It is shaped like a short cylinder, and is borne up by the air. Plants and animals owe their being to the germs which the earth, while yet moist and slimy, received from the air, and which were developed in the bosom of the earth under the influence of celestial heat. Once brought into being they continued to propagate themselves.

5. Everywhere in his Cosmogony, Anaxagoras is careful to make the Mind pre-eminent, to keep it aloof from the processes of nature; the latter he strives to account for solely by that movement originally impressed upon things by the νοῦς. In his psychology, on the other hand, he shows no disposition of this kind. On the contrary, in his explanation of the psychical element in living beings, he feels driven to assume the indwelling in them of the (Divine) Mind, and so to make Mind the psychical principle of all living things. Whilst then the νοῦς in its relation to the *Makrokosmos* is merely an external motive force, in relation to organic beings it assumes the character of an intrinsic psychical principle. Moreover, its functions in the latter respect are not confined to men and animals, they extend to plants also; for they too, in the opinion of Anaxagoras, are animated, and have their joys and their sorrows. The "Soul" of the living thing is perfect in proportion to the perfection of the corporeal organism with which it is associated, or, to express the same thing in the language of Anaxagoras, the Divine Spirit manifests itself in the living thing in proportion as the organism is perfect. It follows that the most perfect ("greatest") soul is possessed by man; that in him God manifests himself most fully.

6. The sense-faculties of man are too weak to attain to truth; they are unable to distinguish sufficiently between the constituent elements of things. It is Mind that attains knowledge of things. All things are known to the Divine Reason; the mind of man, being a factor of the Divine Mind, can therefore attain to knowledge. The highest contentment is to be found in the knowledge of the universe obtained by thought. Whatever is good, just, or beautiful, is to be ascribed to the Spirit or Mind; evil, moral and physical, is from matter.

7. Along with Anaxagoras, we may include among the philosophers of Nature, Hermotimus of Clazomenæ (whom some writers make the teacher of Anaxagoras), who is said to have held similar views regarding the world-ordering mind; and Archelaus, the physicist (of Miletus, or, according to others, of Athens) a pupil of Anaxagoras, who seems to have held the primary mixture of all things to be equivalent to Air, and who also seems to have laid less stress on the contrasts between mind and matter, and thus to have again approached the teaching of the older Ionians. He is credited with the

doctrine that the distinction between Right and Wrong is not founded on the nature of things (φύσει), but is of human institution (νόμῳ). Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, was also a disciple of Anaxagoras. He is known by his allegorical interpretation of the Homeric Myths.

PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.

Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans.

§ 17.

1. About the time that Ionic Philosophy attained its highest development in Asia Minor, another phase of philosophical thought had its rise in the Greek Colonies of Italy. Here the inquiries of philosophers were no longer directed to the origin of things from Primary Matter, they turned rather on the Being or Essence of things in themselves. The Pythagorean school was the first to give this direction to philosophical investigation, but it made mathematics the basis of all its inquiries, and thus was led to certain mathematico-philosophical conceptions of the nature of things, which are altogether peculiar to the Pythagoreans.

2. Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, was born at Samos about the year B.C. 582. So many legends have become associated with his name that it is difficult to obtain a trustworthy account of his life and labours. Legends and traditions are, however, at one in representing him as a man of extraordinary knowledge. He is reckoned amongst the most remarkable of the founders of mathematical science. It is recorded of him that he succeeded in measuring the pitch of musical notes, and that he also made many discoveries in Astronomy. Some accounts make him the disciple of Pherecydes and Anaximander. It is probable that he travelled into Egypt, and there made acquaintance with the lore of the priests. About the year B.C. 529 he settled in Crotona, in Southern Italy, and there established a society whose aims were at once ethical, religious, and political.

3. In this Pythagorean association a rigid ethico-religious rule of life was enjoined. "A period of probation, during which the fitness of the candidate was tested, preceded admission into the society. The disciples were bound for a long time to mute obedience, and to unconditional subjection to the authority of the traditional teaching (αὐτὸς ἔφα); strict self-examination was required from all; it was forbidden to propagate the doctrines of the sect among the people." The members of the society were divided into classes, according to the extent of their initiation into the Pythagorean "orgies." Nothing certain is known regarding the names given to these classes, the terms Esoteric, and Exoteric, are usually employed to distinguish them.* They exercised themselves in gymnastics and music. They had their meals in common (συσσίτια), and they were subject to certain rules as to diet; for example, they were forbidden to eat beans, fish, or flesh. Hunting was not allowed amongst them.

4. In politics the Pythagorean sect belonged to the aristocratic party. Hence the Pythagorean doctrines gained supporters among the aristocratic classes in many Italian cities, and secured for the aristocratic party a certain intellectual standing. But these aristocratic leanings excited the opposition of the democratic party, and brought about the final extinction of the sect. Pythagoras himself, it is said, after twenty years' residence at Crotona, was expelled by a rival party under Cylon, and forced to retire to Metapontum, where he died soon after. The attacks of the democratic party on the

* According to Iamblichus the Esoterics were further divided into the class of the strivers (τῶν σπουδαίων), the class of the spiritualized (τῶν δαιμονίων), and the class of the divinized (τῶν θείων.)

Pythagoreans were renewed in subsequent times. A century after the death of Pythagoras, the Pythagoreans of Crotona were attacked by the "Cylonites" during a conference in the "house of Milo;" the house was set on fire, and all perished, with the exception of Archippus of Tarentum and Lysis. Soon after this the political importance and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end; in the time of Plato, however, the Pythagorean Archytas was at the head of the administration in Tarentum.

5. The following are named as the most distinguished of the ancient Pythagoreans: Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, the first to make public in a written work the system of the school; Simmias and Cebes, who, according to Plato's "Phædo," were friends of Socrates; Ocellus, the Lucanian; Timæus, of Locri; Ecchecrates and Acrio; Archytas, of Tarentum; Lysis and Eurytus; Alcmæon, of Crotona, a youthful contemporary of Pythagoras, who held the doctrine of contraries, of which he enumerated ten; Hippasus, of Metapontum, who held Fire to be the material principle of all things; Ecphantus, who combined the atomistic theory with that of the world-guiding Spirit, and who taught the revolution of the earth on its axis; Hippodamus, of Miletus, architect and politician. Epicharmus, the comic poet, and others, are stated to have held doctrines akin to those of the Pythagoreans.—(Cfr. Ueberweg.)

6. As for the sources from which our knowledge of the Pythagorean doctrines is derived, we have to rely chiefly on Aristotle. Pythagoras himself left no written work (the "Carmen Aureum" attributed to him is undoubtedly spurious). Nor has any work of the older Pythagoreans come down to us which we can trust as genuine. Böckh has collected fragments of a work by Philolaus. They would help us to a knowledge of the early Pythagorean teaching if we could be certain they were genuine; but they have been subjected to damaging criticism, and have been finally assigned to the last century before Christ. In the same way the fragments of Archytas of Tarentum, collected by Orelli, have been disparaged. The same may be said of the treatise of Ocellus Lucanus: De rerum natura, and of Timæus Lucanus. We have, therefore, to recur to Aristotle for our knowledge of the older Pythagorean system. Other accounts of the system we can accept only in so far as they are in accord with his.

7. All that we can with certainty trace back to Pythagoras himself are the doctrine of Metempsychosis, the system of Mathematico-theological speculation, and the fixing of certain ethical and religious rules of conduct. When, then, we speak of Pythagorean doctrines, we mean no more than the teaching of Pythagoras as developed by his disciples and followers. We have here to do not so much with the personal opinions of the philosopher himself, as with the tenets of the Pythagorean school.

8. According to Aristotle (Met. 1, 2, 5), the Pythagoreans contemplating the order of nature, and the regularity of natural formations, with minds formed to mathematical conceptions, were led to make numbers the essential constituents of things. It was the fundamental principle of their teaching that Number is the essence (*οὐσία*) or ultimate basis (*ἀρχή*) of all things. Every individual thing is a number, and the aggregate of all things is a vast system of numbers (Arist. Met. 1, 5., 6-12, 6., 8-13, 6). According to this view, all things are not only arranged in numerical order, numbers are not merely symbols of the cosmical system, they constitute the substantial essence of all things. Aristotle states expressly that the Pythagoreans did not conceive numbers to be actually distinct from things (Met. 1, 6-13, 6):

9. "Everything which is the object of knowledge includes Number; without this element it could not possibly be the object of thought or knowledge. Now truth is a peculiar innate attribute of Number; it is of the very nature of Number or Harmony to reject deception as inimical and antagonistic. It is its function to rule and regulate, and to teach the hitherto unknown. Hence the conclusion that what is the most

fixed and indefectible in our knowledge must also be the unchangeable essence of things in themselves." Things are therefore to be regarded as copies of numbers, because in them the universal nature of Number is reduced to individual existence.

10. The originating principles of Number are Indefiniteness and Limit. The union of both constitute Number, as well of the "monadic" (mathematical) order, as of the "geometrical;" in each case, Number is the outcome of the combination in harmony of the two principles. Number is either odd or even; the former is the symbol of the Perfect, the latter of the Imperfect. The Pythagoreans assigned specially prominent functions in their system to the numbers four (*τετρακτύς*) and ten (*δεκάς*).

11. If it be true that Number constitutes the essential being of all things, it follows that the generating principles of Number—Indefiniteness and Limit—are the ultimate principles of all things. Everything consists of an unlimited and a limited (limiting) element, whereby its being is constituted. The unlimited is the indeterminate basis of being (in Aristotelian phrascology, the Matter); the limit is the determining principle by which the indeterminate is reduced to definite being (in Aristotelian phrascology, the Form). These two elements when combined constitute the essence of the determinate object.

12. We have now to consider in what fashion the Pythagoreans applied these general principles to explain the actual being of things in themselves, and in their relation to one another. Here we come upon their teaching regarding the nature of bodies. Having assumed that the ultimate elements of all things are the Undefined, and the Defining or Limiting, the Pythagoreans, when investigating corporeal nature, seem to have regarded the Undefined as vacuum, the Limit or defining element as a multitude of points fixed in some way or other in this empty space. So that their general principle: "All things are either numbers, or consist of numbers that are contained in them," is in this connection transformed into the other: "All bodies consist of points or units in space, which when taken together constitute a number." This is an assertion of the theory that the constitutent parts of the corporeal substance are themselves simple elements, and on this theory only can their nature be explained.

13. True to their mathematical conceptions the Pythagoreans regarded material bodies as proximately formed of super-imposed surfaces; these surfaces as formed of lines, and the lines formed of points. These purely mathematical conceptions they transferred to the real order, and taught accordingly that the single constituent elements of the mathematical body were also the real constituent elements, or, to use the words of Aristotle, the *substance* of the body in nature (Met. 7. 2.) By the juxtaposition of several points a line is generated, not merely in the scientific imagination of the mathematician but in external reality also; in the same way the surface is generated by the juxtaposition of several lines, and finally the body by the combination of several surfaces. Points, lines, and surfaces are therefore the real units which compose all

bodies in nature, and in this sense all bodies must be regarded as numbers. In fact every material body is an expression of the number Four (τετρακτύς) since it results, as a fourth term, from three constituent elements (Points, Lines, Surfaces).

14. Simple points are not, however, enough of themselves to explain the nature of material bodies; we must also call to our aid the notion of vacuum, for it is by this that intervals of space are interposed between the points, without which they could not form lines, surfaces and bodies. If we suppose two points to co-exist without an interposed space, they coalesce and become one, and the formation of a line or body becomes impossible. Combinations of the unextended cannot produce extension unless we suppose intervals of space interposed, and this supposition becomes possible only when we assume the existence of a vacuum in which the points are distributed.

15. This vacuum is the Undefined which we must assume as the substratum of the defining element—the points. This vacuum affording intervals of empty space between the points, they are able to arrange themselves in juxtaposition and so to form bodies. In this way then do the Undefined and Defining constitute the very being of material bodies. Vacuum, the Undefined, is, however, something negative in character, it does not contribute positively to the formation of bodies, it is merely a condition pre-supposed in order to make it possible for the positive unextended units to combine in a natural formation and constitute a body. The positive elements in the body are these units—their "number;" they are the "substance" of all things corporeal.

16. It is thus that the Pythagoreans developed their principle that everything is Number in its application to material things, arriving in this fashion at a purely idealistic conception of the material world. Matter, as such, disappears, and there remain only ideal elements and ideal relations. The differences between bodies are explained by assuming different modes of combination on the part of the units, *i.e.*, different intervals of separation between them. In the same way are explained the several mathematical forms with which the Pythagoreans invested the several bodies, the Cube—the form of the Earth, the Icosahedron—the form of the Air, the Sphere—the form of Water, the Pyramid—the form of Fire.

17. It would also appear that the Pythagoreans not only regarded each individual body as a number, but furthermore regarded the entire world as a vast arrangement of numbers. This numerical system of the Universe was framed upon the number ten. As the number ten is the most prominent in the system of numbers, so the whole Universe consists of ten bodies, namely—the heaven of the fixed stars, the five planets, the sun, the moon, the earth, and the counter-earth.* The wholly unchangeable portion of the Universe is that which stretches from the heaven of the fixed stars to the moon.† A less perfect part of the

* By Counter-earth the Pythagoreans meant a hemisphere detached from that which we inhabit, and moving parallel to it.

† Beyond the sphere of the fixed stars lies the encompassing fire (περιέχον πῦρ)

Universe extends from the moon to the earth; here again we meet with defect and change in individuals, immutability only in genera and species.

18. In the centre of the Universe is the Middle Fire. This is the animating principle of the whole. It diffuses light and heat through the Universe and is the source of life to all things. The great bodies composing the world revolve round this Middle Fire. Their motion is not purely natural, *i.e.*, determined by a blind necessity of nature; the evidences which it gives of Reason and Purpose force us to attribute it to self-impulsion, and lead us to the conclusion that these bodies are endowed with Reason. In accordance with this reasoning the Pythagoreans reverenced the stars as gods.

19. An all-embracing harmony prevails throughout the Universe. For as the numerical system, reducing to unity a number of constituent parts, is harmony in itself, so must the Universe, which is the numerical system actualized, be regarded as a harmoniously arranged whole, and be described as the κόσμος in the veritable sense of the word. Admitting that the heavenly bodies are arranged in an order determined by mathematical relations it follows that their movements must contribute to this general harmony, that from their movements a musical harmony must result—the music of the spheres.

20. This peculiar notion of a music of the spheres was thus set forth in more detailed explanation by the Pythagoreans. The velocity of the celestial bodies in their motion round the Middle Fire must be proportioned to their distance from one another, and as every regularly vibrating body emits a note, it follows that harmony must result from the simultaneous movements of the heavenly bodies; that the sphere of the fixed stars must emit the deepest note, the sphere of the moon the highest, while the intermediate spheres will emit intermediate notes. Our ears are not sensible to the music of the spheres. But this arises either from the circumstance that we have been hearing it from our birth, and we distinguish a note only when we can contrast it with a previous silence, or because the harmony of the universe is a combination of sounds too intense to affect our sense of hearing.

21. Above the Universe, which is thus disposed in whole and in part according to number and measure, stands the Divine Monad, the Divine Spirit. As the unit is above all numbers, and is yet the basis of all numbers, so the Divine Being, though raised above all things which are numbered and measured, is yet the source of the being of all. God is the one, eternal, enduring, unchangeable Being, resembling only Himself, different from all other things, the one cause of all corporeal reality, who from eternity determines and upholds the universal order. Under the rule of this Divine Being, the world has subsisted from eternity, and will so subsist without end, for neither within it nor without it is there any other cause which can affect it. God is the ruler and guide of all things. He alone is wise. Nearest to Him in the perfection of its nature is that Fire which occupies the centre of the world. There is a sense, therefore, in which it may be said that the Middle Fire

is the home of God. Hence the Pythagoreans sometimes named it the Watch-station, or Citadel of Jove (*Διὸς φυλακή, Ζηνὸς πύργος*). The demons occupy an intermediate position between God and man.

22. In their view of the human soul the Pythagoreans are also influenced by their mathematical speculations. The Soul, too, is a number; it moves itself (Arist. de anim. I, 2). They hold it to be an efflux from the Middle Fire, and to share in the divine nature in the same way as the source from which it comes. By number and harmony it is bound to the body, which is at once its instrument and its prison. A distinction must be made between what is rational and what is irrational in the soul. The latter alone is possessed by brutes, man possesses both.

23. The soul is indestructible; it outlives the body. The present life must be regarded as a process of purification for the soul. This process is continued after death, the soul is fated to inhabit other bodies, animal or human (metempsychosis). With this theory is associated the doctrine of retribution. The souls that are incurable are at last flung into Tartarus, while those which purify themselves rise higher and higher in the scale of life, and at last attain to life incorporeal.

24. The Pythagoreans seem to have held the view that the supreme good for man was assimilation with God, and the bliss thence resulting. The means to reach this end is Virtue. Virtue is essentially Harmony. It consists in the harmonious equilibrium of the faculties of the soul, by which the tendencies of the irrational part of the soul are subordinated to Reason. To establish this interior harmony in himself is the task of man in life. He can effect it by striving after true knowledge (philosophy), and by ascetic exercises. To this end the ordinances and the rule of life of the Pythagoreans were directed. They all aimed at repressing the tendencies of the irrational soul, and bringing them under the control of Reason. The moral maxims which were expressed in the symbolical language of the Pythagoreans were no more than the commendations of virtue as the harmony of man's inner nature. The Pythagoreans also employed music to charm the passions to rest, and to excite healthy energy. Gymnastics served the same purpose. The essence of justice consists in retribution (*τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*). Justice is a number which taken an equal number of times is equal (*ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος*—square number).

3. The Eleatics.

1. The Eleatics resembled the Pythagoreans in this, that they applied themselves to investigating the being, or essence of things, rather than their origin. They differed from the Pythagoreans in abandoning mathematical formulæ, and conducting their speculations on lines more strictly metaphysical. They made no attempt to explain the being of things by speculations on their origin, they left the beginning of things completely out of sight, and by this method arrived at a theory of inert abstract Monism. The Ionians had fixed their thought exclusively upon the origin of things, and this exclusiveness had led them to deny all endur-

ing, unchanging being; the Eleatics, on the other hand, gave such prominence to the enduring, unchanging being of things, that a beginning of things came to appear to them impossible, a view which they distinctly asserted, at least as a speculative truth.

2. To understand aright the Monism of the Eleatics, we must, however, remark that the representatives of that philosophy, while asserting as a speculative principle the oneness of all things, added to this a physical theory which was at variance with the metaphysical principle, and which explained the origin of things from a certain primary matter. While the metaphysical speculation of the Eleatics denied a beginning of things their physical theories re-asserted it and sought to explain it. This inconsistency the Eleatics endeavoured to justify by maintaining that physical science is concerned only with the world of appearances, that its task is to explain things as they appear, and so far as they appear in the world of phenomena. Pure speculation, on the other hand, is concerned with real being which lies behind these appearances; it takes no heed of mere phenomena, and may thus deny a beginning of things, since this belongs to the world of appearances, not to the sphere of real being. It is not necessary to point out that the inconsistency cannot be got rid of in this way.

3. The leading representatives of Eleatic Monism are Xenophanes, who formed the doctrines of the school into a theological system; Parmenides, by whom they are expounded in metaphysical form as a theory of being; Zeno, whose exposition is chiefly dialectic—a defence of the teaching of the school against the vulgar belief in the plurality of things, and in their origin and dissolution; and Melissus, who in his teaching approached again to the views of the early Philosophers of Nature.

Xenophanes of Colophon.

§ 18.

1. Xenophanes was born at Colophon in Asia Minor about B.C. 569. As a wandering rhapsodist he visited many of the Hellenic cities, but finally settled at Elea in Lower Italy, where he founded the Eleatic School. Fragments of his poetical compositions have come down to us, but hardly anything of his philosophical writings has been preserved. What remains of his works has been collected and edited by Fulleborn (Fragmente aus den Gedichten des Xenophanes, und Parmenides, in den Beiträgen zur Gesch. der Phil., Stücke 6 and 7, Jena, 1795), by Karsten (Philosophorum Graecorum Veterum operum reliquiæ, vol. I, I. Xenophanis Colophonii Carminum reliquiæ, Amsterd. 1835), and by Mullach (Arist. de Melisso, Xenoph. et Gorgia disputationes cum Eleaticorum philos. fragmentis, Berol. 1845.) The principal philosophical didactic poem of Xenophanes bears the title *περὶ φύσεως*.

2. Starting with the principle that "nothing comes from nothing," Xenophanes arrives at the conclusion that things cannot begin to be, for if we suppose a thing to come into existence we must suppose it to come either from nothing or from something else. It cannot come from

nothing; *ex nihilo nihil;* it must therefore come from something else. But if it comes from something else there is no need why it should begin to be since it already existed. An origin of things is therefore unnecessary and inadmissible. It is wholly unthinkable. There is Being, but no Becoming.

3. The plurality of things depends upon a beginning of things. If there is no beginning there are no different things which begin to be. It follows, since existences do not begin, that no plurality of things exists. As there is a Being of things, but no origin of things, so there is but one Being of things, not a multiplicity. Hence the dictum of Xenophanes "All is One, One is All." This universal One is in itself undivided and indivisible, eternal and unchangeable, like to itself throughout, as a globe.

4. This One Being Xenophanes describes as rational, and names God. God is the One Only Being, existing tranquilly in himself, always like himself, excluding all new existence, multiplicity and change, perfect in himself; he is hearing, sight, thought, all eye, all ear, all intellect. On the strength of this theory Xenophanes assails Polytheism, as well as the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic conceptions of the deity adopted by Homer and Hesiod, and maintains the doctrine of one all-ruling God.

5. In the science of Physics, Xenophanes advocates empirical knowledge, which, however, he holds to be merely opinion, and to be unworthy of entire confidence. He believes Water and Earth to be the primary elements from which corporeal things have been evolved by a purely natural process. The principal of life in living things is a breath of ethereal fire. The Earth extends downwards and the Air upwards without limit. The stars are fiery clouds. The sea at one time covered what is at present the dry land. This is proved by the petrified remains of marine animals found on high mountains. We must, therefore, admit alternating conditions of mixture and separation between Earth and Water.

Parmenides of Elea.

§ 19.

1. Parmenides, whom Aristotle (Met. 1, 5.) makes a pupil of Xenophanes, was born at Elea about B.C., 515, or 510, and was therefore a younger contemporary of Xenophanes. Following in the wake of this philosopher he formulated in its fulness the metaphysical principle of the Eleatic doctrine, and in such fashion that the Monistic theory in his hands attained a thoroughly idealistic development. He appears to have exercised an influence for good on the legislation and on the morals of his native city. Plato pays the highest tribute to his moral character as well as to his philosophy. His principal work was a didactic poem περὶ φύσεως, of which fragments have been preserved by Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. 7, 111.), by Diogenes Laertius (9, 22), by Proclus (on the Timaeus of Plato), and by Simplicius (on Aristotle's Physics).

2. The speculative doctrines of Parmenides may be summed up in the following propositions:—

Being alone exists; Non-being is nothing. Hence there is no beginning of Being. How could that which exists begin to be? It could not come from the non-existent, for this is nothing; it could not come from the existent, for it is itself the existent.

Being is absolutely one; outside the unit of Being there is nothing, consequently the supposed plurality of things, and the changes of things dependent on this plurality are mere appearances.

Being is eternal and unchangeable, without birth or beginning, immutable, limited only by itself. In form it is a beautifully rounded sphere, one and eternal, the space within which is occupied without any vacuum.

Being is, furthermore, nothing else than the thought in which it is known. The thought itself is Being. Being and the concept of Being are one. In this sense all Being is pregnant with reason, and reason permeates all things.

Truth belongs entirely to thought. As Being alone is thinkable, so also that alone which is thinkable and thought is Being. The senses do not bring us truth. They only deceive us, and it is precisely this deception of the senses which seduces men into the belief in, and the graceful tricks of speech about the multiplicity and the changes of things.

3. In his physical theories Parmenides endeavours to explain (hypothetically) that phenomenal world which the operations of thought show to be unreal. In this explanation he sets out from two opposing principles which bear to one another in the sphere of appearances the same relation that exists between Being and Non-being. These principles are Light and Night, with which the antithesis of Warm and Cold, Fire and Earth, is connected. On the proportions in which these principles or elements are mingled depend the plurality and differences of things in the world of phenomena. The force at work in these processes is Eros, the oldest of the gods. The soul is a mixture of the four elements.

Zeno of Elea.

§ 20.

1. Zeno was born about B.C. 490-485, and was the friend and pupil of Parmenides. It is said that he took part in the efforts of this philosopher for the ethical and political amelioration of his fellow-citizens, but that having failed in an enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus, he was taken prisoner, and died under tortures heroically endured. In his philosophy he aimed at developing in dialectic form the idealistic Monism of Parmenides. He brought forward a number of "proofs" to show that the admission of plurality and change, as of motion or space, leads to inexplicable self-contradiction.*

* In the Parmenides of Plato mention is made of a prose work (*σύγγραμμα*) by Zeno, which was divided into series of arguments, each of which set up some hypothesis (*ὑπόθεσις*), which was then proved absurd, and so the Oneness of Being was indirectly established. On account of this method of demonstration Aristotle has styled Zeno the founder of dialectic.

2. The principal proofs adduced by Zeno in his attempt to give in dialectic form an indirect demonstration of the Monism of Parmenides are the following :—

Against the reality of motion he argues (Arist. Phys. 6, 2-9.) :—

(*a.*) Motion cannot begin, for a body cannot reach a new position without passing through innumerable intervening positions. The moving body must first pass through half the intervening space, and then again through half this space, and so on indefinitely.

(*b.*) Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise, for, no matter what the position he reaches, he will find that the tortoise has advanced still further.

(*c.*) The arrow, though flying through the air, is, nevertheless, at rest, for at every moment it is in some one place, now here, now there, but always, as long as it is in any one place, it is at rest.

(*d.*) The half of a given period of time is equal to the whole, for the same point moving with different velocities in passing through the same space will at one time occupy half the period, at another the whole.

As these contradictions cannot be explained away it follows that there can be no motion at all, and that what we call movement is merely an appearance.

Against the reality of space Zeno argued thus (Arist. Phys. 4, 3) :—

If Being exists in space this space itself should exist in another space, and so on without end. As this is impossible, it follows that there is no such thing as space.

Against the plurality of things Zeno adduces the following arguments (Simplicius in Phys. Arist. fol. 30, 6) :—

(*a.*) If a plurality of things exist the number of these things is either determinate or infinite. "These things are as many as they are, neither more nor less ; but if they are as many as they are, they exist in determinate number." On the other hand "if a plurality of things exist they must be infinite in number ; for between things that are different other things must be interposed, and between these again others, and so on till the number becomes infinite." The admission of a plurality of things thus involves a contradiction which it is impossible to solve.

(*b.*) Again if a plurality of objects existed, the aggregate should be at once infinitely great and infinitesimally small. Each object must have some magnitude. But magnitude is only possible when the component parts of the object are separated by an interval. The interval which must thus be admitted has itself a magnitude, and must therefore be separated by another interval from the things which it separates, and so on without end. It follows from this that every object must be infinitely great since it is composed of an infinitude of parts each of which has some magnitude. On the other hand, from the same premises we must conclude that every object must be infinitesimally small. For if the parts of a thing are infinite in number, *eo ipso* they must be infinitesimally small. But an aggregate of infinitesimally small magnitudes must be infinitesimally small In this way the admission of a plurality of things again leads us to a contradiction.

Against the truth of sensuous preceptions Zeno argues as follows :—

If a measure of corn in falling produces a sound, then each single grain, and each part of a grain, must also produce a sound. If this be not the case, then the whole measure, the action of which is only the sum of the action of its parts, cannot produce a sound. Here again we have a contradiction from which we cannot escape as long as we admit the truth of sensuous perceptions.

3. In his theory of physical nature Zeno is in accord with the other Eleatics. He admits four elements, the Warm, the Cold, the Dry, and the Moist—in which we recognise the familiar four elements. He furthermore admits a moving force which controls everything—Necessity, of which there are two species, Discord and Love. With regard to the soul he holds with Parmenides, that it is a mixture of the four elements. In this compound some elements may predominate, but none can be entirely absent. He seems to have made the purity and godliness of the soul consist in the preponderance of the purer elements over the impure.

Melissus of Samos.

§ 21.

1. Melissus, a native of the island of Samos, took an important part in the political concerns of his country. He was commander in a naval battle in which the Athenian fleet was defeated (B.C. 440). Simplicius has preserved several fragments of a work of Melissus *περὶ τοῦ ὄντος*, or *περὶ φύσεως*. Its purpose is to establish the principle of Eleatic Monism by direct demonstration. "Oneness seems, however, to him to consist rather in the continuity of substance than in the notional unity of being."

2. Being exists, says Melissus, for if there were no being it would be impossible to speak of it. It cannot have *become* what it is, for it could only have arisen out of Non-being or out of Being. From Non-being nothing can arise, and it cannot have come from Being, for thus it would already have existed, and would not have arisen. Nor can Being perish; for it cannot become Non-being; and if it again become Being it has not ceased to be. Being is therefore eternal. From this we may deduce the following essential attributes of Being:—

Being is infinite. Since it is eternal it has neither beginning nor end. And what is without beginning or end is infinite. (Observe this transition from infinitude of time to infinitude of extension).

Being is one. If there were two existent beings the one would limit the other, and Being, it has been shown, is without end or limit.

Being is immovable and immutable. It is immovable, for motion supposes a vacuum, and vacuum there is none, since vacuum is Non-being and Non-being has no existence. It is immutable for (*a.*) change would involve plurality. Suppose for example, from rarefied it became dense, or from dense rarefied, the first would involve its becoming more, the second its becoming less. (*b.*) In case of change the actually existent should pass away, and, in part at least, become non-existent. If in the course of thirty thousand years this happened to the whole, the whole would in that time have passed away.

Being is furthermore indivisible. This follows from its unity and its immutability. Since it is indivisible it has no parts, and consequently is not a body—a body without parts is unthinkable. It is, therefore, incorporeal.

3. What we see, hear and feel, is not true Being; otherwise it should have the attributes enumerated above. The multiplicity of things, motion and change are, therefore, appearances, not realities. In his physical theories Melissus does not differ materially from his predecessors of the same school.

The Sophists.

§ 22.

1. The period of pre-Socratic Philosophy ended with the Sophists. Neither the Philosophy of Nature nor the Idealism of the Eleatics could satisfy the human intellect; both would appear to have helped it along the way to Scepticism. The seeds of the sceptical doctrines were sown in the earlier philosophies. The teaching of Heraclitus which denied persistent, enduring being—in which alone knowledge can find its object, the Eleatic theory that everything represented in experience is

only delusive appearance, and the fallacies employed to combat the truths irresistibly forced upon our natural consciousness: all this must have misled the human mind with regard to truth, must have suggested the view that there is no knowledge of truth, and consequently no truth at all, and that the sceptical attitude of mind towards what claims to be such is alone reasonable and safe.

2. This was the view professed by the Sophists. Their philosophical teaching is nothing else than a Scepticism which at first hesitates to believe in the possibility of truth, and at length boldly denies it. Under the influence of this Scepticism the Sophists not only made profession of not having attained to knowledge themselves, but furthermore denied to the human mind the power to attain to it. The difference between them and the later Sceptics seems to lie chiefly in this—that they selected their formulæ with less caution, and were not careful to hide their real assumptions behind a pretence of speaking only for themselves. They boldly proclaimed that there is no such thing as truth, and they endeavoured to impart this conviction to others to save them a useless expenditure of labour in the search after it. When truth ceases to be a reality, Morality, Justice and Religion must lose their objective value; they too must perish in the abyss of doubt.

3. In an inquiry into the causes which gave rise to the peculiar teaching of the Sophists, we must not omit from view the social and political condition of Greece at the time. The unphilosophical and frivolous temper of mind of the Sophists could find favour only in an age when men had ceased to take a serious view of life, and to pursue serious aims. This was certainly the case in Greece at the time when the Sophists came into prominence. At the close of the struggle with Persia Athens found herself in a position of pre-eminence and power. A rapid advance in art and science followed upon this increase of her political importance. But avarice and sensuality were also stimulated into activity, and in proportion as these passions extended their ravages, morals became corrupt, the sense of religion became enfeebled, and the attitude of mind towards objective truth more sceptical. Such a spirit found its natural expression in a system of empty Sophistry which lightly set aside all Truth, Religion, Morality and Justice.

4. The causes which more immediately and directly contributed to create the system of the Sophists were connected with the rise and steadily growing power of the Athenian democracy—a movement which favoured the development of Rhetoric as the art of speaking. Oratory ceased to be the mere expression of the speaker's mind, seeking to convince by the substance rather than the form; it became an art of language designed to impress the listeners by the sound and pomp of mere words, and it encouraged the effort after captious devices of speech calculated merely for passing effect. In this field the labours of the Sophists were expended. They were the founders of the Schools of Rhetoric, in which young men were instructed in the Arts of Oratory. In this way they largely influenced education. Speech was for them only a means to gain over an audience by skilful exposition of the subject of discourse,

apart altogether from any consideration for the truth or falsehood, rightness or wrongness of the matter advocated. Their skill in oratory was mere deftness in defending or refuting any position whatever. This was expressed in the well-known saying: "They understood how to make the weaker reason (the worse cause) the stronger (the better), and contrariwise. They were skilled to assert and to dispute everything, and to represent things the most widely different as identical."

5. It was to be expected that the Sophists would make philosophical inquiry, which had hitherto sought objective truth, subserve the purposes of empty rhetoric, and use knowledge merely as a means to success in oratory. Objective truth, as such, was of no importance in their eyes. They were concerned to put forward as true or false that which it was their interest for the moment that their audience should accept as true or false. What more natural than to maintain as a theoretical axiom what was tacitly assumed in practice, and to assert that there is no objective truth at all, that everything is true which the individual, for the moment, takes to be true; that objectively there is neither Goodness nor Justice, that everything is good and right which the individual, for the time, holds to be such? In these principles the main doctrine of the Sophists was enunciated; it remained only to embody this doctrine in appropriate formulæ and give it further development. To do this was the whole effort of the Sophists in the field of Philosophy.

6. The teaching of the Sophists was destructive of that Philosophy which consists in the knowledge of objective truth. The Sophists went about from city to city advertising themselves as professional thinkers, and offering their knowledge for sale. Such a procedure could only be fatal to science. We must not, however, deny them all scientific merit. Their efforts after success in oratory naturally led them to the study of Language and of Logic, for readiness in exposition and in argumentative development and proof were indispensable for their purposes. That they did something to promote a study of the forms of speech and to establish a Scientific Method is not to be denied.

7. We may add that the Sophists helped also to further the progress of the empirical sciences. They were not mere talkers; they could boast, or at least the more distinguished could boast, attainments of a high order. Professing to be politicians they were obliged to have at command a store of historical knowledge, and to be acquainted with the various forms of government. In the case of many of the Sophists we are further told that they held an acquaintance with the ancient poets and a knowledge of the art of exposition to be essential to a man of cultivated mind. Many of them applied themselves to physical science. Arithmetic, Geometry and Astronomy, and Music were also in favour with individuals amongst them. They were the first to devise a system of Mnemonics or Art of Memory, and to fix the forms of expression adapted to the investigation and discussion of a given subject. But all these services rendered in other departments of knowledge cannot atone for the destructive influence which they exercised upon Philosophy proper.

8. The most remarkable amongst the Sophists are Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos.

Protagoras was born at Abdera about B.C. 486, and exercised his calling as teacher of oratory chiefly in Sicily, in Italy, and in Athens. He styled himself a Sophist (Σοφιστής), *i.e.*, a teacher of wisdom.* He did not undertake to teach any special science, he professed to instruct youth in the virtues becoming citizens and statesmen, eliminating from their education all useless learning. He was accused of impiety at Athens on account of a treatise which began with the words "Regarding the gods I have no knowledge whether they exist or exist not. There is much to prevent our attaining this knowledge—the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." His treatise was burnt, he himself escaped on board a ship, but perished, it is said, in the wreck of the vessel (B.C. 416). The principal points of his teaching may be thus stated:—

Starting with the notion of a flux in all things, as asserted by Heraclitus, and applying this to the thinking subject as such, he arrived at the principle: "Man is the measure of all things, of the existent as it is, and of the non-existent as it is not," by which formula he merely stated that for each individual things are what they appear to be, in other words truth is for each individual that which he holds to be true. Subjective truth is the only truth.

Even the axioms of geometry have no objective worth, for in the world which we perceive there are no straight and curved lines such as are assumed in these axioms.

No object has a fixed determinate nature; contradictory attributes may be predicated of everything; we can make no statement about anything which shall have objective value, nor on the other hand can any statement made be validly contradicted. All propositions are alike true, and alike false; one and the same thing can be true to one mind and false to another, or even to the same mind true at one time and false at another, for truth and falsehood are relative and subjective.†

Gorgias, who was born in Leontini, in Sicily, was an elder contemporary of Socrates, whom, however, he outlived. About the year B.C. 427, he came to Athens as Ambassador from his native city to obtain assistance from the Athenians against Syracuse. In later years he taught the art of oratory in various places with great success. But oratory was to him no more than the art of persuasion—the arts which undertook to teach virtue he laughed to scorn; he despised a virtue which he took no pains to cultivate in himself. The chief contents of his work, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως are to be found in the treatise

* The word Sophist acquired its meaning as a term of reproach owing to its use by Aristophanes, and after him by the Socratic Philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle, who styled themselves "Philosophers" in contrast with the "Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras were held in high esteem, although a respectable and well-to-do Athenian citizen would not become a Sophist himself, and earn money by public lessons.

† According to Diogenes Laertius (1, 3, 37 and 57) Protagoras composed a treatise on the State (Ἀντιλογικά, Ἀλήθεια or Καταβάλλοντες) from which Plato borrowed many of the notions embodied in his scheme of an ideal state.

"De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia" (Aristotle). His teaching is nihilistic; it may be summed up in the following propositions:

(*a.*) There is no Being at all. For if anything existed its being should be derived, or it should be eternal. Being cannot be derived either from the existent or the non-existent (as the Eleatics prove). Nor can it be eternal, for the eternal is infinite, and the infinite cannot be anywhere since it cannot be in itself, nor in anything else—and what is nowhere does not exist.

(*b.*) Even if anything existed, it could not be known. For if a knowledge of any being were possible, the thought should resemble this being, nay, should be the existent thing itself, otherwise the existent thing would not be known. Hence the non-existent could not be known. This being so, there could be no error; there could be no error, *e.g.*, in the assertion that a battle of chariots took place on the ocean—conclusions which are clearly absurd.

(*c.*) Lastly, even granting that being exists, and is the object of knowledge, this knowledge is incommunicable. For a symbol is something different from the thing symbolized. How can anyone by a word communicate his mental image of a colour—the ear does not hear colour, but sounds? And how can the same mental image be in two persons who are different from one another?

Hippias of Elis, a younger contemporary of Protagoras, was renowned for his Mathematical, Astronomical and Archæological knowledge. He was also remarkable for his ready eloquence; he boasted that he was able to say something new on any subject whatever, as often as he discussed it. Plato has ascribed to him a saying which exhibits distinctly the ethical standpoint of the Sophists, "The law is the tyrant of men, since it forces them to act against their nature." This is clearly an antinomy. Hippias does not appear to have insisted upon the application of the principle in detail.

Prodicus of Ceos was an eminent master in the art of dialectics. He applied himself to fixing the distinction between words allied in meaning, and herein he was the predecessor of Socrates who acknowledged him as his master. He was held in high esteem by the ancients for his hortatory discourses on moral subjects, *e.g.*, on the choice of a career in life ("Hercules at the cross-roads"); on External Goods and their use; on Life and Death, and on other such themes. In these discourses he exhibits a refined moral sense and much acuteness of observation.

Besides those whom we have here mentioned we have further to include among the Sophists: the dialectical jugglers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, the Rhetorician Polus, a pupil of Gorgias, Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Critias. These far surpassed the other Sophists in the boldness of their assertions. Callicles and Thrasymachus openly maintained that reckless gratification of passion is the law of nature. They proclaimed that right is on the side of the stronger, and that prohibitory laws are but a cunning device of those in power for the oppression of the weak. In a poem by Critias, the ablest, but at the same time the most unscrupulous of the Thirty Tyrants, belief in the gods is represented as the invention of crafty statesmen who have endeavoured to secure an easy obedience from the citizens by imposing on them this deception. He held the blood to be the seat of the soul. Lycophron, Antiphon, Hippodamus of Miletus, and Phaleas of Chalcedon are also named among the Sophists who propounded political theories.

SECOND PERIOD.

Socratic Philosophy.

§ 23.

1. We have now made acquaintance with the purely negative tendency of the teachings of the Sophists, and the destroying influence which they exercised on Philosophy. But their teachings were not without their positive effect on the progress of Philosophy in Greece. This positive service they rendered by provoking a reaction which not only brought about the downfall of their own system but initiated a new progressive movement which carried Philosophy in Greece to its highest stage of development. Out of the reaction against the procedure of the Sophists came the Socratic Philosophy, represented in its three masters, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who have won for themselves undying fame in the history of Philosophy.

2. Anaxagoras had, as we know, carried the Ionic Philosophy to Athens, Parmenides and Zeno had there represented the Eleatic School, while Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans were known at Athens by their writings, or it may be that some of the latter visited the city in person. In this way Athens became the centre in which the various schools of Greek Philosophy were brought into contact, and were enabled to influence one another. A first consequence of this conflux of philosophical doctrines was the breaking up of the several philosophical systems—a result which we observe in the teaching of the Sophists. But this disaster was soon followed by a new development of philosophic thought. The new movement was favoured by the circumstance that its leaders had before them philosophical systems whose defects and onesidedness they were warned to avoid, and were thereby incited to seek a new point of departure for philosophic inquiry. Athens thus became not only the central seat of Art in Greece, but also the home of Greek Philosophy in the period of its greatest glory.

3. If we inquire what was the new point of departure which Greek Philosophy adopted at this period we shall find that philosophic thought, instead of making external nature the only subject of investigation, turned back upon itself, and proclaimed that self-knowledge, theoretical and practical (ethical), was of more importance for the attainment of truth than the knowledge of Nature. Self-knowledge, the investigation of the moral order, had hitherto been neglected in favour of the study of the physical world; it was now accorded the first place in the estimation of the philosopher. Hereby a purer knowledge of the Divine Nature became attainable. And Attic Philosophy thus rose to a Theology that stands high above the opinions regarding God and things divine offered by the earlier philosophical systems of Greece. Theology now became the centre and the crown of philosophical science.

4. Socrates was the founder of Attic Philosophy, or, better, his labours may be said to have prepared the way for it. He did not aim at constructing a complete system of Philosophy. The instruction, to which he applied himself exclusively, was directed to incite his pupils to a deeper study of things, and to guide them in the right path of investigation. All his pupils did not, however, apprehend rightly the mind of their master; many of them fastened upon some one or other of the special points in his teaching, and devoted themselves to the development of the point so selected. These philosophers are said to have been "imperfectly Socratic." Plato, on the other hand, gave comprehensive development to the principles of his master, and, with his clear idealistic mind, brought to its fullest perfection the germs contained in the instructions of Socrates.* Plato was succeeded by his pupil Aristotle, who on many points is at variance with his master. But Socrates by his wonderful acuteness and penetration of mind, his quick power of observation, his vast knowledge, and his methodical procedure, was enabled to build up a system which is worthy to take an independent place by the side of Plato's.

Following the order here indicated,

5. We shall first treat of Socrates and the "imperfectly Socratic Philosophers," and then we shall set forth the Philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle.

Socrates.

§ 24.

1. In their sketches of the life of Socrates, Xenophon (Socr. Memorabilia) and Plato (Apolog.) are at one on all essential points. Socrates was born at Athens about the year B.C. 471. His father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and his mother, Phanaenarete, a midwife. In youth he was trained to his father's calling, and he is said to have shown some skill in the practice of it. It is probable, however, that he gave himself early in life to philosophical investigations. The story that he was a pupil either of Anaxagoras or of Archelaus rests upon no good authority. He seems however, to have been well acquainted with the earlier philosophical systems of the Greeks. The meeting between Socrates and Parmenides mentioned by Plato may be accepted as historically true.

2. Socrates served as a soldier in the military expeditions of Potidæa, of Delium, and of Amphipolis, but he declined to take any further part in political affairs. His mission he believed to be the education of youth, and this duty he believed to have been assigned him by an oracle. (Plato, Apol. p. 21.) He did not invite pupils, but allowed any one who

* Among the immediate disciples of Socrates we may further mention Aeschines an Athenian, Cebes a Theban, Simon a shoemaker of Athens, Xenophon an Athenian general and writer. The latter wrote a life of Socrates and contributed to the Philosophy of Education the well-known Cyropædia.

chose to listen to his instructions. His personal demeanour and his mode of life were calculated to attract attention, and to win favour. His external appearance bespoke his poverty and simple habits, while his peculiarities of face and manner, his practice of staring about him, and of halting suddenly as he walked, could not fail to attract notice. He esteemed it a desirable thing to have few necessities. By the dignity and the gentleness of his disposition he drew to himself a large number of youths and men, many of whom he formed to higher aims, and trained to become distinguished citizens. To the boastful Sophists he opposed his plain common sense, his "irony," and his strength of character; but for all this he was himself represented on the stage as a Sophist. He believed that he had by him a "Demon" whose warning voice directed him what to do and what to avoid.

3. In his old age, shortly after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, the democratic party, represented by Miletus, brought a charge against him which was supported by the democratic politician Anytus, and the orator Lycon. The charge was to the effect that Socrates had offended by rejecting the gods recognised by the state, and by introducing a new and strange Demon, and that he had furthermore offended by corrupting the young men. The charge was, therefore, the same as had been made at an earlier period by Aristophanes, in the *Clouds*. After a bold and somewhat haughty defence of himself, Socrates was declared guilty by the judges and condemned to die by poison. He submitted his conduct but not his convictions to the sentence of the tribunal. He refused the means of escape provided for him by Crito, and in the presence of his disciples, and friends who had assembled in his prison, he drank the poisoned draught (B.C. 399). His death, justly glorified by his followers, secured for his teaching an universal and enduring recognition.

4. Socrates pursued in his instructions a double purpose. His first object was to form his disciples to a higher morality, and to save them from the libertinism to which they were led by the teaching of the Sophists. For this end he insisted specially on self-knowledge, for he saw clearly that the man who knows himself is the only man who can bridle and control his appetites and passions. Hence the well-known maxim "Γνῶθι σεαυτόν," know thyself. Socrates was not blind to the necessity of self-knowledge as a means to the attainment of truth, but in framing this maxim he had in view primarily ethical considerations.

5. The second object of Socrates was to lead his disciples to a clear and certain knowledge of truth. In pursuance of this purpose he invented a peculiar method of instruction which has been called by his name, and the essential character of which is implied in the name *Euristic* (method of discovery) which is sometimes given to it. He did not lay down fully formulated principles, but endeavoured by continued questioning to lead his hearers to discover for themselves the principles he had in view. The tendency of the Socratic method was at once positive and negative.

Beginning with commonplace things and every day events, he interrogated his pupil regarding them, and out of every answer given drew

material for a new question, till he at last obliged him to confess that what he had taken for truth was not really true. Throughout the interrogatory, however, he was careful to express deference for the superior intelligence and wisdom of his pupil, till they finally gave way under the dialectical test applied to them. In this negative process consisted the Socratic "Irony" (εἰρώνεια). But his method led to positive results also. Socrates endeavoured by the same plan of continued questioning to lead his disciples to the discovery of positive truth. He named his method *Maieutic*, or intellectual midwifery, as it aimed at bringing truth into life in the minds of his pupils, and in this respect he found an analogy between his task and the duties undertaken by his mother.

6. We may observe that the method of Socrates is wholly inductive. In his questioning he endeavours to pass by induction from the particular to the general. The object of the entire method, as far as it aims at a positive result, is to gain clear and accurate notions of things as they exist, in order to attain thereby to objective truth—to universal principles. Aristotle has justly observed (Met. 13, 4) that we owe to Socrates the method of Induction and Definition (τοὺς τ'ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου). Induction from the particular to the general, and the clear definition of general notions to which this process leads, was established by the Socratic method, and in this consists its lasting importance to philosophical science.

7. With regard to the peculiar philosophical tenets of Socrates, we know only what his disciples have told us; he was not, as we know, a writer. As far as his teaching regarding the Divine Nature can be gathered from these accounts, he seems to have held with Anaxagoras that God is a spirit who rules the world. He grounds his belief in the gods on the teleological argument furnished by the structure of living organisms in which the parts serve the requirements of the whole, taking as the basis of his reasoning the principle that whatever exists for a useful end must be the work of intelligence πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι. (Xenoph. Memorab. I. 4, 4 sqq. IV. 3, 3 sqq.) Just as in our own actions we are ourselves guided by reason, so the entire world is guided by the Divine Reason. The Wisdom (φρόνησις) which rules in all that exists determines everything according to its good pleasure, it frames and upholds the universal order: τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντ ττων τε καὶ συνέχων. Socrates combats the belief which attributes human passions to the gods, but he does not seek to destroy the old mythology, or even to explain it allegorically. The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but their operations give unmistakable evidence of their existence. The gods are omniscient and omnipresent, they govern all things according to the rules of righteousness, and have their sufficiency in themselves. (Xen. Mem. I. 3, 3. IV. 3, 13.)

8. Regarding the immortality of the soul, Socrates expresses himself doubtfully, in the Apology of Plato. But his conviction that the present life would be little worth, and not at all preferable to death, if the life to follow did not furnish more favourable conditions for human

effort is proof of his leanings on this question. His own boundless trust in the care of the gods for the just man, and the unanimity among his followers on the point (Plato Phaed.; Xenoph. Cyrop. VIII., 7, 3 sqq.) sufficiently confirm the view that Socrates held the soul to be immortal. He expressed no definite view regarding the soul's condition after death; he was satisfied to maintain that the soul of the just man is set free by death from the embarrassments of the body and enters into the fuller enjoyment of truth.

9. The Supreme Good of man is happiness. Not a happiness that depends on some accident of fortune (εὐτυχία) but the happiness attained by action and knowledge (εὐπραξία). This happiness is attained through assimilation with the Divinity. External goods avail nothing; to have no need of anything is a divine attribute, to want as little as possible is the nearest approach to the Divinity. Scientific knowledge is a further condition of this assimilation with the Divine Nature. Practical excellence is identified with this knowledge. Both in one make Wisdom. Wisdom must therefore be the ultimate end of man's moral action. In his moral life he must strive after knowledge, and true knowledge is the knowledge of the Good—the knowledge of that Divine Reason which governs all things. This leads immediately to moral goodness, for theoretical knowledge and practical excellence are ethically one. What is good is at the same time useful.

10. In the light of these principles, the further ethical teaching of Socrates, especially his theory of Virtue, becomes easily intelligible. Virtue and Knowledge are one. The knowledge of what is right, and the doing of it, are inseparable, because they are identical. It follows that no man can knowingly do wrong: for if he knows what is good, he also chooses it. The man who acts wrongly does not act so with deliberation, but in ignorance: he is deficient in perfect knowledge of what is good. The evil doer is only involuntarily (ἄκων) wicked. It may even be said that the man who knowingly is guilty of lying, or other misdeeds, is better than the man who unwittingly lies, or otherwise does wrong (Xen. Mem. III. 9, 4: IV. 2, 20. Plat. Gorg., p. 461. Apol. p. 25. Prot. p. 345. Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. 3, &c.)* As a consequence of its identity with the knowledge of what is good, Virtue is one, and is a matter of instruction.

11. The State is of divine institution. The true rulers are those whose rule is guided by understanding. The laws are either written or unwritten. The latter are the rule and standard of the former; their divine origin is manifested by the fact that any violation of them entails a punishment determined by Nature itself.

"Imperfectly Socratic" Philosophers.

1. By the "imperfect" or "partial" followers of Socrates we mean those of his disciples who, failing to comprehend the whole mind of their

* The man who knowingly does wrong is in a better position than the man who does it unwittingly, for the reason that ignorance and neglect of knowledge are the greatest of all sins, and the source of all moral evil.

master, addressed themselves to one or other of the special points of his teaching, which they developed to the exclusion of the others. Two characteristics, we have observed, were strongly marked in the teaching of Socrates, the dialectical and the ethical. The former we may call the operative element in the instructions of Socrates, the latter the result in which his instructions culminated. These two elements became separated in the teaching of the "imperfectly Socratic" philosophers. One class devoted themselves mainly to the development of the dialectical side of the teaching of Socrates, the other gave exclusive prominence to the ethical, which they strove to develop in conjunction with certain principles borrowed from the pre-Socratic schools. To the first class belong the Megaric or Eristic, and the Elian or Eretrian Schools; to the second, the School of the Cynics, and the Cyrenaic or Hedonist School.

The Megaric and the Elian (Eretrian) Schools.

§ 25.

The founder of the Megaric or Eristic School was Euclid of Megara, who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathematician of the same name, who lived a century later. The story is told of him that in order to enjoy the society of Socrates he often came to Athens in the gloom of the evening, at the time when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under pain of death, to enter Athens. He was present at the death of Socrates (Phæd. p. 59, C). Soon after, the greater number of the disciples of Socrates quitted Athens to join him at Megara. He appears to have lived for several decades after the death of Socrates at the head of the school which he had founded.

2. The main end of the teaching of Euclid seems to have been to combine the ethical views of Socrates with the Eleatic theory of the One. Adopting unreservedly the principle of Parmenides, he represents the One, not under the concept of Being, but under the Socratic concept of the Good. Socrates had made the knowledge of the Good the basis and the principle of our moral life; Euclid gave an objective subsistence to this concept of the Good, and made the Good the only thing existent. He, accordingly, lays down the principle: The Good is One, though it is called by many names, such as Intelligence, God, Reason. Whatever is opposed to the Good, is non-existent. The Good is unchangeable.

3. This fundamental principle the Megarians tried, after the manner of the Eleatics, to establish by indirect demonstration. Dialectic best served their purposes in such an attempt. Hence they were led to give it special prominence in their teaching. They endeavoured, by dialectical devices, to show that merely empirical knowledge abounds in real or apparent contradictions, and that our notions of things, derived from mere experience, are wholly untenable. They thus sought to establish the Oneness of all Being in the Good by a method wholly similar to that of the Eleatics. This sophistical procedure procured for their

teaching the name "Eristic" (doctrine which contends against current opinions). The denial of the Many led them to the further view that there is no diversity between concepts; that the so-called difference between concepts is only a difference between the names of the One, or the Good, and that we have, consequently, no right to speak of one thing as differing from another.

4. The most remarkable of the followers of Euclid were Eubulides the Milesian, and Alexinus, noted for their invention of the sophistical arguments known as "the Liar," "the Concealed," "the Heap of Corn," "the Horned Man," "the Bald-head" (Diog. Laert. II. 108), and Diodorus Cronus, who brought forward new arguments against motion, and who also maintained the view that the necessary alone is real, and the real alone is possible. Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric doctrines with those of the Cynics. He combated the doctrine of Ideas. To him is ascribed the dialectical theory that a thing can be predicated only of itself, and the ethical principle that the wise man is superior to pain, and that the goal of all moral effort is Insensibility (ἀπάθεια). Stilpo is the most famous of the Megarians; he won renown not alone by his philosophy, but also by his firmness of character, his indifference to worldly possessions, his moderation, his evenness of temper, and his activity in public life.

5. The Elian or Eretrian School is another branch of the Megaric Philosophy. This school was founded by Phædo of Elis, a favourite disciple of Socrates—the same whom Plato, in the dialogue named after him, introduces as communicating to his friend Echecrates the last discourses of Socrates. After the death of his master he founded in his native city a school of philosophy, which seems to have had much in common with the Megarians. Menedemus, the Eretrian, a pupil of Phædo (352-278) transferred this school to Eretria, whence its later name. Soon after his death this school, like the Megaric, was absorbed by the Stoa.

6. We have little information regarding Phædo's doctrines. Of Menedemus, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 135), that he shared the views of Plato, but that he employed Dialectic only to play with it. Like the Megarians, the Eretrians declared Intelligence to be the only good. This is virtue also. Virtue, therefore, is one, as the Good is one.

The Cynics.

§ 26.

1. The founder of the Cynics was Antisthenes, an Athenian, a pupil first of Gorgias, and then of Socrates. After the death of the latter philosopher, he taught in the gymnasium, called Cynosarges (whence the name of his school), to which he was restricted, as not being of purely Athenian extraction.* The influence of the teachings of Gorgias was manifested in the rhetorical form of his dialogues. He resembled Socrates in external appearance, and he was bound to his master by the ties of an intimate friendship.

2. Antisthenes brought into special prominence the ethical element in the teaching of Socrates. He asserted that Virtue is the only, as it is the highest good for man; it is all-sufficient, it alone can give happi-

* He was the son of an Athenian father, but of a Thracian mother.

ness. Virtue is, therefore, in the theory of Antisthenes, the highest purpose of human life, and sufficient of itself to create perfect happiness. What is intermediate between Virtue and Wickedness is indifferent (ἀδιάφορον). The good is congenial to us (οἰκεῖον), the bad is something foreign (ἀλλότριον). Pleasure, sought as an end, is evil.

3. According to Antisthenes the essence of Virtue consists in Self-Control, and this is dependent on right understanding. It is, therefore, one in itself, and it can be imparted by instruction. The strongest bulwark is that knowledge which is founded on safe conclusions. The Self-Control, in which consists the essence of Virtue, is nothing more than independence of all casual needs, that sufficiency in self, which manifests itself in a contempt for conventional customs, as well as in the renunciation of every calling and pursuit in life. Once acquired, Virtue cannot be lost; the man who has once become virtuous can never cease to possess this perfection.

4. The virtuous man is wise, and he only is wise. Virtue and wisdom are to some extent identical. The wise man despises everything—noble birth, riches, fame, &c.; he has all he wants in himself. With regard to marriage, family, and the social life of the State, he is indifferent. No form of government existing, or possible, is suitable to him. He restricts himself to the inner consciousness of his own virtue, and withdraws from existing society, but only to become a citizen of the world. The faith of the multitude has as little binding force for the wise man as its laws. There is but one God (Cic de Nat. deor. 1, 13, 32). He cannot be known by images. Virtue is the only true worship.

5. Antisthenes was not wholly a stranger to dialectical investigations, though they seem to have chiefly furnished him with matter for sportive sophistries. He explains Definition to be an exposition of the essence of a thing (λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν). He admits as valid only identical judgments. He maintains, furthermore, that self-contradiction is impossible: "for in the propositions supposed contradictory, we either speak of the same subject, or we do not; if we are speaking of the same thing, we are really making identical assertions, for each thing has only one οἰκεῖος λόγος; if we are speaking of different things, there is, of course, no contradiction." (Arist. Met. V. 29). He combats the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.

6. To the School of the Cynics belong "Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes, with his wife Hipparchia, and her brother Metrocles, Menippus, a pupil of Crates, and others." Diogenes made himself ridiculous by his extravagance in applying the principles of his master. He is said to have accepted without protest the name "Dog (κύων) bestowed upon him. He was also called "Socrates gone mad" (Σωκράτης μαινόμενος). He rejected the immorality of his age; but he, at the same time, rejected its morality and its refinement. In its later development, Cynicism, so far as it was not lost in Stoicism, degenerated into mere insolence and indecency.

The Cyrenaics.

§ 27.

1. The founder of the Cyrenaic or Hedonist School was Aristippus (the Elder), described by Aristotle as a Sophist. He was a native of Cyrene (whence the name Cyrenaic given to his philosophy). The fame of Socrates attracted him to Athens, where he joined the circle of the philosopher's disciples. He would seem to have been acquainted, previously, with the philosophy of Protagoras, traces of which appear in his own teaching. The manners which prevailed in the wealthy and luxurious city where he was born, were not without influence in determining his love for pleasure. He is said to have been a frequent guest at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii of Sicily, and to have made there the acquaintance of Plato.

2. Aristippus gave special prominence to the theory of Happiness propounded by Socrates, but he interpreted it in a fashion which accorded with the peculiarities of his own disposition, and his own tendencies. He makes Happiness the supreme good of man, and the supreme end of human life. But Happiness, according to Aristippus, consists in the pleasure of the moment, and this pleasure is the sensation of gentle motion. The motion of which we have sensation is of three kinds: feeble motion, to which we remain indifferent; violent motion, which is in disaccord with nature, and which we describe as pain or suffering; and lastly, motion of the easy and gentle kind, which is congenial to nature, and which we describe as a movement of pleasure. Pleasure is, therefore, not merely the absence of pain, it consists in an active movement; it is the pleasure that passes—the pleasure of the moment. This alone can make us happy; it is the highest good of man. Our true duty is to enjoy the present, for that alone is in our power.

3. The details of this theory are in accord with these fundamental principles. The primary form of pleasure, according to Aristippus, is bodily pleasure, and every pleasure is accompanied by an affection of the bodily organism. Pleasure, as such, is never bad, though some pleasures are derived from causes which are evil. One pleasure does not differ from another in quality, nor is one superior to another, their intensity and their duration alone determine their worth. The difference between good and evil pleasures is therefore a question of custom; there is no intrinsic distinction in the things themselves.

4. But to enjoy aright the pleasure of the moment, we require Intelligence and Virtue. Intelligence must subdue the passions and prejudices which disturb enjoyment, and prevent men from giving themselves to pleasure at every moment, and at the same time it must enable the individual so to take advantage of passing circumstances, and so to direct them, that he shall be able to derive enjoyment from every situation in life. Virtue, on the other hand, being the same thing as Self-Control, must enable man to enjoy pleasure without becoming a slave

to it, must enable him to give himself to pleasure in such a way as not to bring upon himself suffering, sickness, or disease. Control of pleasure, in the midst of pleasure, must be secured by Virtue. Intelligence and Virtue are, therefore, valuable as means to pleasure. The man who possesses them for this end is truly wise.

5. In keeping with the Hedonistic ethics of Aristippus is his theory of cognition, which restricts all our knowledge to sensation. The Cyrenaics distinguish between subjective affection (*τὸ πάθος*) and the external object which produces this affection (*τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικόν*). The former belongs to the sphere of our own consciousness; the latter exists, but more than this we do not know regarding it. Whether the sensations of other men correspond with our own we have no means of knowing; the application of the same names to the same objects proves nothing. This, it is clear, is no more than a further development of the subjectivism propounded in the Protagorean theory of cognition.

6. To the Cyrenaic School belong Arete, daughter of Aristippus, and her son Aristippus the Younger, surnamed "the mother-taught" (*μητροδίδακτος*), who was probably the first to give systematic form to the hedonistic doctrines, and to whom we owe the comparison of the three conditions of sensation—trouble, pleasure, indifference, to the tempest, the gentle wind, and the tranquil sea; Theodorus, who was surnamed "the Atheist" because of his denying the existence of the gods and of moral law, and who held that a particular momentary pleasure was indifferent, that enduring joy (Cheerfulness) was the end to be sought by the truly wise; the pupils of Theodorus, Bio and Evemerus, who explained the belief in the gods to have arisen out of the custom of honouring men; Hegesias, surnamed the "death-adviser," who, despairing of positive happiness, taught that true wisdom consisted in indifference to pleasure and pain, and even to life itself, which he held to be valueless; finally, Anniceris (the younger) who endeavoured to give a higher interpretation to the theory of pleasure by making friendship, gratitude, love of parents and country, social intercourse, and the pursuit of honour, means to happiness: he is, however, careful to remark that every effort on behalf of others has its cause, and its purpose in the pleasure procured to ourselves by this benevolence; he thus continues to maintain the egoistic principles of Hedonism.

PLATO.

Plato's Life and Writings—General Character of his Philosophy.

§ 28.

1. We come now to the greatest and most renowned of the pupils of Socrates, for whom it was reserved to complete the work planned and begun by the master. We speak of Plato. The Socratic doctrines formed the basis of his philosophic system; but he did not confine himself to these; he borrowed also from Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, and Parmenides, such notions as he found suitable to his purpose. But Plato did not merely collect and reproduce for us the opinions of these philosophers, he constructed for himself an original philosophy. The final results of the philosophical investigations of others he took only as the materials for the structure which he had planned in his own mind.

The prominent feature of his philosophy is its thoroughly ideal character. "As the blood," says a modern writer, "flows from the heart to all parts of the body, and returns to the heart again, so in the Platonic philosophy everything proceeds from the Idea as from a centre, and everything returns thither again." Hence the great wealth of material which we observe in the Platonic Philosophy. With this wealth of material is united a grace of style and of exposition which has never been surpassed.

2. Plato was born at Athens, B.C. 428. He was originally named Aristocles. He was the son of Aristo, a descendant of Codrus, and of Perictone, who was a descendant of Dropides—a near relative of Solon, and who was also a cousin of Cretias, one of the Thirty Tyrants. He is said to have devoted himself to poetry in his youth, a statement which the graceful style of his later writings renders probable. The weakness of his voice rendered him unfit for the duties of the public speaker. The stories regarding his military service rest on slender foundation. He appears to have pursued philosophical investigations at the same time that he was cultivating the poetic art, for he made acquaintance with Cratylus while still a youth, and learned from him the doctrines of Heraclitus. But Socrates seems to have been the first to give an entirely new direction to his efforts. He was twenty years old when he attached himself to Socrates, and he continued till the death of his master to enjoy the benefit of his teaching, and to be ranked among the most faithful and most esteemed of the philosopher's disciples.

3. After the death of Socrates, Plato, with some other disciples of the philosopher, joined Euclid at Megara. His intimacy with Euclid must have exercised considerable influence on the system formed by Plato. After his stay at Megara he undertook his first great journey (probably not before returning to Athens and sojourning for some time in that city). He visited Cyrene in Africa, and there made acquaintance with the mathematician Theodorus. He next proceeded to Egypt to pursue the study of Mathematics and Astronomy under its priests, and thence he continued his journey to Asia Minor. After another sojourn at Athens, he undertook, at the age of forty, a journey into Italy, to make acquaintance with the Pythagoreans. Thence he travelled to Sicily, where he formed a close intimacy with Dion, brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius the Elder. His moral admonitions are said to have provoked the tyrant himself to such a degree that he induced the Spartan envoy, Pollis, to sell the philosopher into slavery in Ægina, as a prisoner of war. He was ransomed by Anniceris, and returned to Athens, where he founded, B.C. 387, his school of philosophy in the garden of Academus (Academy). His teaching, as we observe in his writings, and as we learn from an express statement in the *Phaedrus* (p. 275), took the form of dialogue; though he seems, at a later period, especially for his more advanced pupils, to have delivered sustained discourses.

4. In the year B.C. 367, after the death of Dionysius the elder, Plato undertook another journey to Sicily. He did so at the suggestion of Dion, who hoped that the teaching of Plato would influence the new ruler of Syracuse, Dionysius the Younger, and would help to induce a change in the government of Sicily to the aristocratic form. The plan failed owing to the weak and sensual temperament of Dionysius; he suspected Dion of aiming at the sovereign power, and he condemned him to exile. In these circumstances Plato could no longer maintain his position, and he therefore returned once more to Athens. He visited Sicily a third time in B.C 361, in the hope of effecting a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dion. But he failed in his purpose. His own life was in peril from the suspicions of the tyrant, and he owed his safety to the interposition of the Pythagorean, Archytas of Tarentum. Returning to Athens he again began to teach by writings and oral instruction, and to this task he devoted the remainder of his life. He died at the age of eighty-one in the year B.C. 348 (or 347).

5. "The works of Plato, which have come down to us, consist of thirty-six treatises, (the letters being counted as one), besides which others, pronounced spurious by the ancients, bear his name. Aristophanes of Byzantium, a grammarian of Alexandria, divided a certain number of the treatises of Plato into five trilogies, and the neo-Pythagorean Thrasyllus (of the time of the Emperor Tiberius), divided the treatises which he accepted as genuine into nine trilogies." In recent times many hypotheses have been framed regarding the order, and the succession in time of the dialogues of Plato The most important theories on this point are those of Schleiermacher, Hermann, and Munk.

(*a*) Schleiermacher assumes that Plato had a definite plan of instruction before him when composing his several works (his occasional treatises excepted), and that they were

composed in the order required by this plan. He accordingly divides them into three groups: elementary dialogues, mediatory dialogues, and constructive dialogues. In the first group he sets down as the leading dialogues: *Phædrus*, *Protagoras*, and *Parmenides;* subsidiary dialogues, *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*; occasional treatises, the *Apology* of Socrates and *Crito;* partly or wholly spurious, *Io*, *Hippias II.*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alcibiades II.* To the second group he assigns as the leading dialogues: *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Phædo*, *Philebus;* subsidiary dialogues: *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, the *Banquet;* partly or wholly spurious, *Theages*, *Erasta*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Menexenus*, *Hippias I.*, *Clitopho*. To the third group belong as leading dialogues: The *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Critias*, and, as subsidiary dialogue, the *Laws*.

(*b*.) On the other hand, K. F. Hermann maintains that there is no single plan traceable in Plato's works, that they are merely the expression of the philosophical development of his own mind. He fixes, therefore, in the literary career of Plato three periods, each of which has its distinguishing characteristics. The first period extends to the death of Socrates; the second covers the time of Plato's stay at Megara, and includes his subsequent travels in Egypt and Asia Minor; the third begins with Plato's return from his first visit to Sicily, and ends with his death. He assigns to the first period the dialogues: *Hippias II.*, *Io*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus;* and to the "transition stage" between the first and second periods: the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Hippias I.* To the second period he assigns the dialogues: *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides;* to the third: *Phædrus*, *Menexenus*, the *Banquet*, *Phædo*, *Philebus*, the *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Critias*, and the *Laws*.

(*c*). Munk is of opinion that Plato in his writings followed an order ideally representing the life of Socrates, the genuine philosopher, and that this order portrayed the several stages of the life of Socrates. Accordingly he distinguishes three series of treatises: (*a*) corresponding to Socrates' devoting himself to philosophy, and his attacks upon the current false teaching (B.C. 389-384); *Parmenides*, *Protagoras*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias I.*, *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, the *Banquet;* (*β*) corresponding to Socrates' teaching of true wisdom (B.C. 383-370): *Phædrus*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Critias;* (*γ*) corresponding to Socrates' defence of his own teaching by criticism of rival schools, and to his death (after B.C. 370): *Meno*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phædo*. Cfr. Ueberweg, Vol. I., p. 95.

6. The controversy regarding the arrangement and succession in time of Plato's dialogues is not yet ended; no certain result has yet been obtained. It seems to us that the hypothesis of Hermann is the simplest and most natural; all the more that there is observable in the dialogues of Plato an unmistakable development of philosophic thought. Whether the classification given by Hermann is perfect in all its details, may be left an open question. Without attempting to discuss it, we shall indicate briefly the substance of the several dialogues, adopting the order suggested by Hermann.

First series: *Hippias II.* treats of Free Will in Wrong-doing; *Io*, of Inspiration and Reflection; *Alcibiades I.*, of Human Nature; *Charmides*, of the virtue of Temperance; *Lysis*, of Friendship; *Laches*, of Courage; *Protagoras*, of Virtue—it is directed against the Sophists; *Euthydemus*, is a treatise on the same subject; the *Apology* of Socrates is a defence of that philosopher against his accusers; *Crito* treats of Right Action; *Gorgias* is a discussion upon Rhetoric, and a condemnation of the abuse of it by the Sophists; *Euthyphro* treats of Holiness; *Meno* of Virtue, and the possibility of its being taught; *Hippias I.* is directed against the Sophists.

In the second series: *Cratylus* contains philosophical investigations on Language; *Theaetetus* is an inquiry into the nature of Knowledge; it is chiefly a refutation of the Sophists, and contains little positive teaching; *Sophistes* is a treatise on the concept of Being; *Politicus* on the Statesman, what he should know, and how he should act; *Parmenides* treats of Ideas, and the notion of the One.

In the third series: *Phaedrus* treats of Love, and the Beautiful as the object of love; *Menexenus* of the Useful; the *Banquet* again of Love; *Phaedo* of the Soul and Immortality; *Philebus* of the Good, more particularly of the Supreme Good; the *Republic* is a treatise on Political Philosophy, but the ten books of which it is composed contain many important questions of large philosophic interest; *Timæus* is a treatise on Cosmogony; *Critias* is a pretended history of primeval political institutions; the *Laws*, a treatise, in twelve books, on the State; not an inquiry as to the best possible (ideal) state, like the *Republic* (πολιτεία) but a discussion as to that State which will best suit certain given conditions. (The genuineness of the *Meno* and *Epinomis*, which treat of Laws, is disputed.)

7. The writings of Plato were first published in a Latin translation in 1483-84; the translation was the work of Marsilius Ficinus. A Greek edition was published at Venice in 1583 by Aldus Manutius, aided by Marcus Musurus.

The edition of Oporinus and Grynaeus was published at Basle in 1534, followed by another edition in the same city in 1556. Then came the edition of Henricus Stephanus, accompanied by the translation of Serranus, Paris, 1578, the paging of this edition is inserted in the more recent editions, and is usually cited in quotations. Of the complete editions which have been published in recent times we have: the *Editio Bipontina* (1781-87) by Croll, Exter, and Embser; the Tauchnitz edition (1813-19) by Beck; the edition of Immanuel Bekker (Berlin, 1816-23); the editions of Ast, of Stallbaum, of Baiter, Orelli, and Winkelman (Zurich), of Schneider, and of Hermann.

Philosophy, according to Plato, is the science of the Unconditioned and the Unchangeable—of that which is the basis of all phenomena. The Unconditioned and the Unchangeable are for him the ideas of things, for these he holds to be really existent (ὄντως ὄν), and thus to stand in contrast with the changeable fleeting things of the phenomenal world. Accordingly he holds Philosophy, rightly defined, to be the science of Ideas, the science of the really existent. But Philosophy is not mere theory, in Plato's estimate, it essentially includes a practical element also; it directs the whole man, Reason and Will alike, towards the Ideal, and is thus the complement of man's intellectual and moral life. Perfect wisdom belongs to God alone; man can only be a striver after wisdom (φιλόσοφος), his business is to approach ever nearer and nearer to the perfect wisdom of God. This effort must spring from a love of the Good and the Beautiful, and from wonder at the great phenomena which the objective order of things sets before the mind as so many problems to solve. These feelings give rise to a desire for a certain knowledge of the ultimate reasons of all things, and all phenomena, and thus the efforts of the philosopher are called forth.

9. Plato distinguishes between Philosophy and the preparatory sciences. Among the latter he reckons Mathematics. The science of Mathematics is not a part of philosophy; for it assumes certain notions and certain principles without giving any account of them, taking them as if they were evident to all—a proceeding which philosophy as a pure science cannot admit. Furthermore it makes use, in its demonstrations, of visible images, though it does not treat of these, but of something which the mind alone perceives. It stands, therefore, midway between mere correct opinion and science; clearer than the one, more obscure than the other. But though Mathematics is not philosophy, it is nevertheless an indispensable means for training the mind to philosophical thought, a necessary step to knowledge, without which no one can become a philosopher. It is, in a certain sense, the vestibule of philosophy.

10. The *organon* proper of philosophical knowledge is Dialectic. Dialectic is the art of reducing what is multiple and manifold in our experience to unity in one concept, and of establishing an organic order and interdependence among the concepts so acquired. The dialectician is skilled to discover the several single concepts which underlie the many and varying objects of our cognition, and to arrange and classify these concepts according to their mutual relations. In the latter process the method he follows will be either the analytical method—proceeding from below upwards, or the synthetical—proceeding from above down-

wards. Dialectic will thus include the twofold process—ascent from the particular to the general, and descent from the general to the particular.*

11. How and to what extent this Dialectic is the organon—the operative factor in philosophical knowledge—we find indicated in the relations which, according to Plato, subsist between the concepts to which it leads, and Ideas—the really existent entities, which are the proper object of philosophy. Ideas are the objects of these concepts; in forming these concepts we are apprehending in them the ideas of things—we are apprehending the really existent, and are arriving at the knowledge which is the ultimate end of all the efforts of the philosopher. Dialectic is thus the real organon, the vivifying centre of all philosophy. Hence it is that Plato not unfrequently uses Dialectic and Philosophy as synonymous terms.

12. Mythical notions prepare the way for dialectical knowledge, and, where it fails, come in to supplement it. The myth is an aid to the mind in its efforts to form right conceptions, but it is, in itself, an imperfect way of representing things; the dialectical method is the only method which leads to philosophical knowledge. The myth must, however, be appealed to when dialectical knowledge is either unattainable, or very difficult of attainment. Plato himself makes use largely of the mythical form in his expositions; he very frequently introduces the ancient myths and legends in order to state his theories through them. To this circumstance the charm of his writings is largely due.

13. With regard to the division of the Platonic philosophy, we find that Cicero (Acad. post. I., 5, 19) ascribes to Plato himself the division into Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics. According to Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. VII., 16), this division was formally made by Plato's disciple Xenocrates, though Plato may be considered to have virtually (*δυνάμει*) established it himself. If this division is not expressly mentioned in Plato's writings, it is nevertheless practically adopted in his exposition of his theories. It will, therefore, be the most suitable for us to follow in setting forth Plato's doctrines. As, however, we have already indicated the general character of the Platonic Dialectic, it only remains for us to set forth, under the first head, Plato's theory of Ideas—the central doctrine of the Dialectic, and indeed of the entire Platonic philosophy, and his theory of Knowledge. We shall therefore treat in order, first, Plato's theory of Ideas, in conjunction with his theory of Knowledge, which arises out of it, and depends on it; next, his Physics; and finally his Ethics, in which we shall include his Political Philosophy.

* Plato himself describes these two methods, which together constitute the whole dialectical process (Phædr. 265), as, on the one hand, the union in intuition of several individuals, and their reduction by this means to unity of essence; and on the other the division of unity into plurality, in accordance with natural classifications. The first method leads to Definition—the knowledge of the essence of things; the second is the Division of the generic notion into the subordinate specific concepts.

Plato's Doctrine of Ideas and Theory of Knowledge.

§ 29.

1. It is, as we have seen, the function of Dialetic to form general (or universal) Notions, and to reduce them, when formed, to organic arrangement, in accordance with their mutual relations. The objects corresponding to these general notions are *Ideas*. By immediate apprehension we have knowledge of the individual object; by the concept we have knowledge of the *Idea*. The question naturally presents itself,—how are we to conceive of these Ideas in their objective state, and what relations are we to conceive them as holding to individual objects, and to God? Plato's manner of answering these questions determines the fundamental character of his whole philosophy.

2. To the first question: How we are to conceive of the Ideas in their objective existence? Plato replies:

(*a*) The objective correlatives of the Universal Concepts given in our thought, are Universal Ideas. The Universal, as such, is not therefore a mere product of dialectical thought; as Universal, it is objectively real. To the Universal in thought corresponds an Universal in objective reality, and this objective Universal is the Idea. In this wise Plato gives objective existence to the Idea not only as regards the things it represents, but also as regards the form of universality which belongs to our thought of these things—to our concept.

(*b*) This being so, Universal Ideas are not something indwelling in individual objects, *i.e.*, an Idea is not the *essentia* which enters into the being of the several individuals of the same species; since it is Universal, it must be held to transcend all merely individual objects. Universal Ideas, as such, have therefore an independent existence apart from the world of phenomena; the true essences of things represented in these Ideas have being above and apart from things as they exist individually. In a word, we must admit a world of Ideas, distinguished from and transcending the world of phenomena.*

* Plato discovers a proof of this (Tim. p. 51) in the difference between scientific knowledge and mere right opinion (*νοῦς* and *δόξα ἀληθής*). "If they are," he says, "two different kinds of knowledge, there must exist an order of Ideas having distinct existence, of which we have knowledge not by sense-perception, but by thought (*εἴδη νοούμενα*); on the other hand, if they are one and the same, as some have thought, ideas cease to have objective existence, and become mere subjective concepts. In point of fact, however, they are two different kinds of knowledge, and the difference is one of origin (the one being induced by conviction, the other by persuasion), as well as of nature (the one being certain and immutable, the other untrustworthy and changeable.) It follows that there are two classes of objects; the one class including all that is unchangeable, that does not come into being, and does not cease to be, that does not receive anything of alien nature into its being, nor pass itself into anything else, *i.e.*, all Transcendental Universal Ideas; the other class includes those individual objects which bear the same name and belong to the same species as the Ideas, which exist in a determinate place, which come into existence and cease to be, and are unceasingly in motion."

(c) The mutual relations subsisting between these transcendental Universal Ideas are the same as the relations subsisting between the corresponding general notions in our thought. As general notions form, in thought, a logical unity, so do the Ideas corresponding to them enter into union in the objective order. But this union is not, like the One Being of Parmenides, a lifeless, motionless thing; it involves a dialectical movement towards plurality. As in the process of our thought our concepts are differentiated, and thereby pass from the universal to the particular, so in the objective order of Ideas there is a differentiation of the Universal and the One into the Many. To every Idea belongs "identity with another thing" (*ταὐτόν*), *i.e.*, it is a member in one Unity of Ideal Being; to every Idea belongs also "difference from other things" (*θάτερον*), it carries within it a determinate character which distinguishes it from other Ideas, and by which it becomes other than these. The world of Ideas must therefore be regarded as unity in plurality, and plurality in unity. To admit unity without plurality would be to involve ourselves inextricably in contradiction; to admit plurality without unity would lead to a like result. Reason requires that we should assume both. (Parmenides, p. 137, s. 99; Sophist., p. 254, s. 99).

3. Turning now to the second question: How Plato understands the individual objects of the phenomenal world to be related to the Ideas, we find his teaching to be as follows:

(*a*) Ideas alone have real being; they alone are perfect, unchangeable, enduring, eternal, imperishable. Unchanging in itself, the ideal world moves in viewless majesty above the world of phenomena, representing within itself the full perfection of Being. The phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the sphere of imperfection, of change, of transition, the region where things exist in time, and begin to be. The existence of material things is a perpetual flux, there is nothing fixed or permanent in them; they are always passing out of existence. In the material world all things oscillate between Being and Non-being. Nothing ever attains perfection, for at each moment things cease to be what they were a moment before. All things are at the transition point from Being to Non-being, and from Non-being to Being; they are, and are not, at the same time. It follows that there can be no question here of Being in its perfection.*

* We may observe that Plato here endeavours to combine the principles set in contrast by the pre-Socratic philosophy—the principle of continual change or unceasing flux held by the Ionians, and the principle of unchanging Being held by the Eleatics. He adopts at once a sphere of immutable being, and another of continuous change, but makes the one distinct from the other, in order to preserve to each its characteristic attributes. Aristotle (Met. I., 6 and XIII. 4. 9.) describes Plato's doctrine of Ideas as the common product of Heraclitus' theory of constant flux, and the Socratic tendency to fixed concepts. The view that the world of sense is subject to ceaseless change was borrowed by Plato from Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, and was thenceforth maintained by him. Accordingly, when Socrates made him acquainted with these concepts of things which, once formed, can be held without change, he was precluded from referring these to sensible objects, and was thus forced to assume the existence of things of another order—special objects of conceptual knowledge—and those he named Ideas."

(*b*) Ideas, and the objects of the phenomenal world, are here set in contrast; they have, however, contact with one another (*κοινωνία*). The individual objects of the phenomenal order have part in the Ideas (*μετέχουσι*), each individual object has part in the Idea corresponding to it, and this participation makes it to be what it is (Phæd., p. 101). The Idea is as the real essence of the object; it follows that the object becomes the thing it is only by participating in the Idea corresponding to it. Thus it is that participation in these Ideas determines the proper being of individual objects, as well as the characteristics which distinguish them from one another. In this way things are good in the visible world by participation in the self-subsistent Good, beautiful by participation in self-subsistent Beauty, wise, holy, just, by participation in self-subsistent Wisdom, Holiness, Justice. (Phæd. 100, 6. sqq.; Meno. p. 73, &c.)

(*c*) But in what consists this participation (*μετέχειν*)? According to Plato it consists in "imitation" (*μίμησις, ὁμοίωσις*) by the phenomenal objects of the corresponding Ideas. The Ideas are the models, the prototypes (*παραδείγματα*); phenomenal objects are the copies, ectypes (*εἴδωλα ὁμοιώματα*) of these models. The Ideas reflect themselves in the objects as in so many mirrors, and by this reflection of themselves manifest their existence. But this reflection of the Ideas is all the while very imperfect. Sensible objects reproduce but imperfectly the models they represent. Ideas are reflected in them as in a dimmed mirror. For, in the first place, Matter is not in itself capable of reflecting the Idea in its fulness; and in the second place, the process of continual change which involves all things of the phenomenal world in a constant movement of generation and decay, disturbs the clearness of the representation. There is, therefore, no comparison possible between the lustre and grandeur of the Idea in itself, and the copy of it which appears in the world of phenomena. In the supersensible world all is pure and unclouded; in the sensible world, all is dimness and confusion. In the one we have completeness and perfection, in the other incompleteness and imperfection. Phenomenal objects hold, therefore, an intermediate position between Being and Non-being. They *are* inasmuch as they participate in real Being; they *are not* inasmuch as they participate in it imperfectly. They do not, however, stand without the realm of Being, for Being is present to them (*παρουσία*) as their true essence, even though it be not indwelling (immanent) in them.

4. To our third question: What are the relations of these Ideas to God, Plato's writings furnish this answer:

(*a*) The Idea of God seems in the mind of Plato—as far at least as his doctrine rests on mere Dialectic—to have been one with the Idea of the Good. To the Idea of the Good, as to every other Idea, he attributes real being, but he does not identify it with the other Ideas. It is not a logico-metaphysical unit including all Ideas; no trace of such a conception is to be found in the teachings of Plato. On the contrary, he assigns to the Idea of the Good a transcendental position above

all other Ideas. The oneness of an Idea Plato describes as *οὐσία*, meaning thereby that the Idea is the true essence (*οὐσία*) of the objects of sense; but he states expressly that the Idea of the Good is not *οὐσία* itself, but is of a higher order. (De Rep. VI. p. 508, VII. p. 517). He makes the Idea of the Good the sun of his world of Ideas. As the sun in this visible world not only renders things visible, but furthermore causes their generation, growth, and continued existence, without however being generated itself, so the Idea of the Good not only makes knowable all things that are known, but gives them also Being and Essence, not however becoming itself this Being or Essence, but surpassing them immeasurably in dignity and power. (De Rep. VI. 506-510, VII. p. 517, p. 540, p. 532.)

b) Respecting the relations established by Plato between the Ideas of mundane things and the Idea of the Good, *i.e.*, the Idea of God, two distinct views have prevailed. Aristotle asserts that Plato established a difference between the Ideas of things and the things themselves, and then attributed to the Ideas, thus isolated, independent existence; and on the strength of this interpretation he sets himself to combat this theory of separation (*χωρίζειν*). According to this interpretation, Plato not only assigns to Ideas an existence transcending all individual objects, but he gives them furthermore subsistence apart from the being of God. The later scholastic philosophers have, as a rule, adopted this interpretation. On the other hand, hardly any of the earlier Christian exponents of Plato's philosophy, hardly any of the Fathers of the Church, ascribe to Plato this doctrine of an order of Ideas subsisting apart from the Divine Mind. They assert, almost unanimously, that Plato located his world of Ideas wholly in the Divine Intellect, and regarded the so-called *κόσμος νοητός* as a system of Divine Conceptions.

c) For ourselves, we will not venture to take sides in the controversy. It seems to us highly probable that Plato regarded the Divine Intellect as the source, and if we may so say, the *habitat* of Ideas. For he employs, to describe the oneness of the Ideas, the terms *νοῦς*, *σοφία*, *λόγος*, and this he regards not as a lifeless thing, but as a living and moving being. (Phileb. p. 30, De Rep. VII., p. 517, Soph. p. 248). Moreover, he states expressly regarding the *νοῦς* that it can exist only in a *soul*, *i.e.*, in a spiritual being. Again Plato distinctly asserts that God is the First Author, the *φυτουργός* of all Ideas (De Rep. X., p. 597), and teaches that the *νοῦς* and *ἀλήθεια* are brought forth by that cause which is the cause of all things (Phileb. p. 30). These assertions seem to warrant the view that Plato did not attribute to Ideas independent subsistence apart from God, but rather regarded them as conceptions of the Divine Intellect. However, the authority of Aristotle in the matter cannot be lightly set aside, as is sometimes done; for he was the immediate disciple of Plato. It is not to be assumed that a man of Aristotle's wonderful acuteness of intellect failed to understand his master, and there does not seem to be any reason to believe that he wilfully misrepresented his teaching. It has indeed been asserted that Aristotle, not admitting Ideas into his own system, deliberately misrepresented

Plato's theory of Ideas in order the more easily to refute it. But this is an accusation for which no positive proofs can be adduced. We therefore hold as more probable the opinion that Plato regarded Ideas as conceptions of the Divine Mind; but, for the reasons assigned, we refrain from stating this opinion as absolutely certain.*

5. Plato's Theory of Knowledge is intimately connected with his doctrine of Ideas. Considering knowledge in its subjective aspect, we find that Plato distinguishes various kinds of knowledge according to the various objects. The prominent difference established in this connection is the difference between sensible and supersensible objects (*ὁρατὸν καὶ νοητὸν γένος*). Sensible objects are of two kinds—real bodies and the semblances of these bodies, such as are produced by art (*σώματα* and *εἰκόνες*). Supersensible objects are also of two kinds; they are either mathematical entities or Ideas proper (*μαθηματικά* and *ἰδέαι*).

6. Accordingly, we must first of all distinguish in human cognition between *δόξα* and *νόησις*. The *δόξα* is concerned with sensible objects; the *νόησις* with supersensible. Our sensuous perception must be described as *δόξα*, because sensuous perception can do no more than enable us to form an opinion; it does not issue in complete certainty. Opinion is not indeed absolute uncertainty, but neither is it complete certainty; it is something intermediate between both, partaking of the character of each, just as the sensible order with which it has to do is intermediate between Being and Non-being, and has something of the nature of each. On the other hand, *νόησις*, which is concerned with the supersensible, attains to absolute certainty of cognition; the mind in this stage passes out of the vacillating state of mere opinion, and reaches the light of true *γνῶσις*; *νόησις* is therefore the form of cognitive action which leads to scientific knowledge—*ἐπιστήμη*. There is, therefore, an essential difference between the two kinds of knowledge, the sensuous and the intellectual, a difference due as well to the essential difference between the objects of cognition as to the nature of the cognitive act itself.

7. We must make a further distinction still in the case both of *δόξα* and *νόησις*. As has already been observed, *δόξα* may be concerned

* In his old age Plato is said to have occupied himself in resolving Ideas into Ideal numbers. Aristotle is our authority for this. "In point of fact we find certain traces of notions of this kind in some of the dialogues, as for example in the *Philebus*, where Ideas are described as *ἑνάδες* or *μοναδες*, and (in Pythagorean fashion) *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* appear as their elementary constituents. According to Aristotle's account (Met. I. 6. 14, 1) Plato held that there were two elements (*στοιχεῖα*) of Ideas, as of all other things, a form-giving element (*πέρας*) and an element formless in itself, but receptive of a form (*ἄπειρον*). He appears to have assumed for every class of objects (Ideas, mathematical entities, sensible objects) *στοιχεῖα* of this kind, and to have considered every object as a third term formed out of the two combined (*μικτόν*). In sensible objects the *ἄπειρον* is matter, as described in *Timæus*, and the *πέρας* is Form and Quality; whereas in the *νοητά*, the *πέρας* is Unity (*ἕν*), and the *ἄπειρον* is the More and the Less, the Great and the Little. From these elements, says Aristotle (Met. I. 6) number arises naturally (*εὐφυῶς*). We can derive Ideas from them only when we reduce them to numbers. Plato distinguishes between those numbers which constitute Ideas, and Mathematical numbers. To the latter he assigns a place intermediate between Ideas and sensible objects. The one (*ἕν*) he identifies with the Idea of the Good." Cf. Ueberweg.

either with bodies or with the semblances of bodies. In the first case it becomes *πίστις*; in the latter it is mere *εἰκασία*. To *πίστις* a real something corresponds objectively; to *εἰκασία* only a picture of fancy—the one is Perception, the other Imagination. On the other hand, *νόησις* deals either with mathematical entities or with Ideas; in the former case it becomes *διάνοια* (*ratio*); in the latter, *νοῦς* (*intellectus*).

8. In accordance with these notions, Plato sketches (De Rep. VII. p. 534) the following scheme of human cognition:—

OBJECTS.

Νοητὸν γένος.		*Ὁρατὸν γένος.*	
Ἰδέαι.	*Μαθηματικά.*	*Σώματα.*	*Εἰκόνες.*

MODE OF COGNITION.

Νόησις.		*Δόξα.*	
Νοῦς.	*Διάνοια.*	*Πίστις.*	*Εἰκασία.*

9. These distinctions having been established with regard to human cognition viewed from its subjective side, Plato's Theory of Knowledge is further developed as follows:—

(*a.*) From our sensuous experience we cannot derive a knowledge of the supersensible. As long as our knowledge has to do with the phenomena manifested through the senses, so long are we like to men in a dream; like men inebriated or insane, we drift upon the current of mere phenomena, without light from any ray of higher knowledge. If we wish to rise to knowledge of true Being—of Ideas—we must withdraw from the sphere of mere sense; we must retire within ourselves, and there, with the pure, untroubled gaze of reason, contemplate the Ideal and the Divine. Sensible objects can help us to knowledge of the Ideal only in so far as the blurred reflection of the Ideas which manifest themselves in the world of sense move us to turn from these things and fix our gaze upon the objects of which they are the reflection. And this being so, sensible objects not being for us a means of reaching the Supersensible and the Ideal, the question at once arises, How is the chasm bridged over which separates us from the world of Ideas? In other words, How is contact of the human mind with Ideas—which, as such, are wholly transcendental entities—possible and conceivable?

(*b.*) To this question Plato cannot obtain from mere science an adequate answer. He is, therefore, obliged to recur to an hypothesis. This hypothesis he offers us in his doctrine of the antecedent existence of the soul. The soul, he teaches, has lived an extra-corporeal, purely spiritual life before its union with the body, and lived this life in the sphere of the ideal, not of the phenomenal world. In this state, Ideas were the immediate objects of its contemplation, and in this contemplation it found its happiness. But in consequence of its union with the body (how it came to be united to a body will be explained further on), it has forgotten the objects presented to its contemplation in that extra-corporeal existence. Yet it has not lost the faculty of recalling

them to memory. It is stimulated to remembrance of them when it is confronted by the dim and confused pictures of Ideas presented by the objects of the sensible world. The picture awakes in it the remembrance of the prototype, and thus revives the knowledge of the Idea which had been forgotten. The acquisition of knowledge by man is thus no more than a process of memory—a recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) "Discere est reminisci." (Phædo, p. 72. Meno, p. 81. Phædr., p. 249.)

Plato endeavours to support this hypothesis by certain scientific arguments. He adduces in its favour two principal proofs:

1. When we perceive objects in the world of sense, we form judgments regarding them, we judge them, *e.g.*, to be more or less like, or more or less good, or beautiful, and where there is question of human actions we judge them to be more or less just, holy, and so forth. But this clearly supposes that the notion of Likeness in itself, of Goodness, Beauty, Justice, Holiness, *in se*, existed antecedently in our minds; for we can judge of the more and less of Likeness, Goodness, Beauty, &c., in things only in so far as we compare them with Likeness, Goodness, Beauty, &c., *in themselves*, and determine whether they approach to or recede from the latter. Now man forms judgments of this kind at the moment that he first begins to use his reason; these notions must, therefore, have existed in his mind antecedently to all experience. It follows necessarily that the soul must have made acquaintance with the Ideas in question before its union with the body, that it has brought these notions with it into its present condition, and that the renewed knowledge of them in its present life is no more than mere remembrance. (Phædo, p. 74.)

2. The same conclusion is suggested by the Heuristic Method of instruction. In this method the learner is led by a series of questions, arranged in logical sequence, to the knowledge of a given truth. In this process the truth is not given him from without; he is led to find it in himself. The questioning is merely an aid to a discovery which he makes in his own mind, it is merely a condition of the re-awakening of knowledge in the mind of the learner. This being so, it follows that the truths which the mind thus draws out of itself must have been present within it antecedently to all teaching and to all experience, that the mind must have acquired them before its present life began, that it must, consequently, have brought them with it into this terrestrial existence, and that the renewed knowledge of them is no more than a recollection of what, at some previous time, was the object of the mind's contemplation. (Phædo, p. 73, Men. p. 82.)

10. Thus much with regard to Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Theory of Knowledge. We pass now to his Physics, in which are included his Theology, his Cosmogony, and his Psychology.

PHYSICS OF PLATO.

Theology, Cosmogony, and Psychology.

§ 30.

1. To begin with the Theological system of Plato; we find a threefold proof for the existence of Good:

(*a*) The older Philosophy of Nature took irrational Matter as the basis of all things, and held Reason, *i.e.* the rational soul of man, to be evolved from it. Against this assumption Plato protests. We must begin, not with inert Matter, but with the Rational Soul. Matter is not the cause of its own motion; its motion supposes a moving cause different from itself. This moving cause cannot itself be of such kind that it also requires to be moved from without; such an hypothesis would involve us in an endless series. It must, therefore, be of that kind which is self-moving. This self-movement is the essential characteristic of the spiritual or psychical being, as contrasted with the material. Matter, according to this reasoning, necessarily postulates the existence of a "Soul." This Soul is the Divine Spirit, or Divine "Soul." Atheism, as a theory, is therefore absolutely irrational. (De Leg. X., p. 893; Phædr. p. 245.)

(*b*) In the world Order and Design are everywhere manifest; they are observable in the lower regions of the universe, but more notably still in the regions of the stars. Order and Design, however, are not possible unless we suppose a Reason, and Reason (νοῦς) can exist only in a soul (ψυχή) or Personal Spirit. We are thus forced to admit a Personal Divine Spirit, which presides over the universe, and is the cause of the Order and Design which prevail in it. (Phædr. p. 30.)

(*c*) The ultimate elements of things are the Unlimited and the Limit, for it is only by limitation of the Indefinite that a determinate definite object is possible. But the determination of the Undefined by limitation supposes a determining cause, which, as such, is above the thing determined. This determining cause must be some supramundane divine principle. (Phileb. p. 23.)

2. We have next to inquire what are the attributes which Plato assigns to the Divine Being. We may sum up his teaching on the point as follows:

(*a*) The Divine nature is supremely perfect; it is endowed with every conceivable attribute; no perfection (ἀρετή) is wanting to it. God is, therefore, the Absolute Good—by no other notion is his nature more perfectly represented than by the notion of the Good, for this notion combines in itself all the perfections with which the Divine Nature is endowed. For this reason God is the cause of all that is good, and of that only which is good; wickedness, evil, cannot be attributed to Him as to its cause; He is the Author of good, and of good only. When the poets describe the gods as doing wicked deeds, they are dishonouring

the Divine Nature. God is, furthermore, the Absolute Truth; it is impossible that He should deceive men, or lead them astray; the mythological stories of deceptions practised on men by the gods are absurd.

(*b*) God, being supremely perfect in his Nature, is immutable. If God could undergo any change, the cause of that change would be within His own Being, or without Him. The latter alternative is not admissible, for the nature which is supremely perfect cannot be changed by another. The former is also inconceivable, for if God could change Himself, He should change either to a more perfect or to a less perfect state: the former He cannot do, since He is already absolutely perfect; nor can He effect the latter, for no being, and least of all the most perfect, changes of its own accord from a more perfect to a less perfect condition. God is, therefore, unchangeable; He does not take one form at one time, another at another, as the poets tells us; He retains throughout eternity one simple, immutable form. (De Rep. II., p. 380.)

(*c*) God is a Personal Spirit, and, as such, is transcendently raised above the world. As Personal Spirit, He rules all things, and directs and guides all according to Reason and Providence. He is a supramundane being, and is therefore above the temporal order. Time affects only things of earth; God is above Time; He is the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things; the Absolute Present. (Tim. p. 37; De Leg. IV., p. 715.)

(*d*) In addition to the sovereign Divinity, Plato admits the existence of subordinate gods, to whom he assigns an intermediate rank between the Supreme God and the world, *i.e.*, man. He teaches that these subordinate divinities are ministers through whom God exercises His providence and His guiding influence upon earthly things, and that through them also the prayers and sacrifices of men are transmitted to God—for which reasons men owe them reverence. The highest rank among the subordinate gods is held by the star-gods—the souls of the stars; next come the demons, amongst whom the æther demons, *i.e.*, those whose bodies are formed of æther, hold the first place; below these are the Air and Water demons, with bodies formed of air or water. (Conviv., p. 202; De Leg. X., p. 895; Tim. p. 39.)

3. We pass now to Plato's theory of Cosmogony. He assumes three principles as necessary to explain the origin and present existence of the world: Matter, the underlying basis of the physical world (*causa materialis*); God, the Demiurgos, or efficient cause (*causa efficiens*); and Ideas, the models or prototypes of things (*causa exemplaris*). Assuming the existence of these ultimate causes, Plato, in *Timæus*, explains the process of the formation of the world.

(*a*) Matter existed, and exists eternally, side by side with God. It was not produced by Him; it exists apart from Him, though side by side with Him. At first it was purely indeterminate, and therefore without any definite qualities. In this original condition it was without order—a wild, fluctuating mass, a chaotic thing, assuming, without rule or law, ever-changing forms. It was blind Necessity (ἀνάγκη), the antithesis of Mind acting by a plan (νοῦς).

(*b*) But God was good, and free from jealousy; He resolved that Matter should not be abandoned to this disorder. He fixed His gaze upon the eternal, unchangeable prototype (Ideas), and after this model fashioned Matter into a well-ordered world. Being Himself the Supreme Good, He made all things to be good, and to be like Himself. The formation of the world was accomplished in this order:

First God, as Demiurgos, created the Soul of the World. Combining two elements, one of which was indivisible and immutable, the other divisible and changeable, He formed a third or intermediary substance. In this way the World-Soul came into existence.* The Soul thus formed was placed by God in the middle of the world, and extended in the form of a cross through the entire universe.

The Demiurgos next invested the World-Soul with a body of spherical form, this form being the most perfect. This body is composed of the four elements, each of which has a mathematical figure peculiar to itself. The elements of cubical form made the Earth, the pyramidal formed Fire, while midway between these, in the order of geometrical figures, came Water, composed of icosahedral elements, and Air composed of octahedral.

The Architect of the Universe has distributed the nobler, the unchangeable element of the World-Soul along the line of the Celestial Equator; the less noble, the changeable element, along the line of the Ecliptic. The inclination of the Ecliptic is a consequence of the less perfect nature of the spheres beneath the heaven of the fixed stars. The intervals that separate the celestial spheres are proportional to the lengths of a vibrating string which emit harmonizing tones. The Earth is placed in the middle of the universe; it forms a sphere through which passes the axis of the world.

From these fundamental premises Plato deduces the following conclusions regarding the world:

The world, as such, is not eternal. It had a beginning, at the moment when God began to impress order upon Matter. Time began with the beginning of the world; it is, however, the image of eternity. The world, once formed, cannot come to an end.

The world, as at present constituted, is the only possible world; any other is wholly inconceivable. The whole system of Ideas, forming the *κόσμος νοητός*, and serving as the model or prototype of the material world, reveals itself in the world actually existent. There is no Idea of the *κόσμος νοητός* which has not its corresponding species existent in the world of phenomena. There is only one prototype, there is only one ectype.

The world, as it exists, is the most perfect world possible. A more perfect could not be. God, who is all goodness, and free from all

* Plato, in *Timæus*, describes the former element as *ταὐτόν*, the latter as *θάτερον*. As we have noticed above, he introduces these two elements into the world of Ideas, in order to make possible the transition from unity to plurality in the ideal order; here he seems to separate them, making *ταὐτόν* the Idea, and *θάτερον* Matter. In this explanation the World-Soul is not purely spiritual, it includes a material element as well.

jealousy, has made the world as like the ideal prototype as possible. He has made it to resemble Himself as closely as the nature of Matter permitted. Being the most perfect, and the most beautiful of all the things which have come into existence, the world must be endowed with life and reason, and this perfection is given it by the World-Soul; its motion is the most perfect, and the most constant — motion in a circle; it is in truth a second God.

4. Admitting that this world is the most perfect world possible, we are at once confronted with the question: How is it possible that evil can exist in the world, and what are the causes of this evil? In his answer to this question Plato has recourse to the nature of Matter. Good alone can come from God. But Matter is not only incapable of receiving to the full the action of the Divine, world-forming Goodness, it further withstands the formative and co-ordinating action of God upon it. In virtue of this resistance it becomes the principle of all disorder, wickedness, and evil in this world. It stands, to a certain extent, in opposition to God, and its activity in this opposition generates evil. The world, as the work of God, is perfect in good; but inasmuch as Matter withstands the action of God, evil must necessarily exist in the world. God cannot vanquish evil.

5. We pass now to Plato's Psychology. Plato discusses, in great detail, the problems of psychology, and endeavours, at all points, to find solutions in harmony with his theological and cosmological theories. He condemns emphatically the doctrine that the Soul is nothing more than a harmonious arrangement of the constituents of the body. For in such an hypothesis the strivings of the Soul against the tendencies of Sense would be impossible; and furthermore, since every harmony admits of increase and diminution, one soul would be more a soul than another — an assertion which is clearly absurd. Again, harmony is incompatible with its antithesis—discord; if then the Soul were merely harmony, it could not admit into itself the discord of evil or of vice. It follows that we must hold the Soul to be a spiritual substance, simple in its nature, and distinct from the body. The further argument used by Plato to establish this doctrine is analogous to the proof adduced above to prove the existence of God. Psychical, or spiritual being, is of its nature prior to the material and corporeal, for the latter can receive its motion only from the former. This principle must apply to the relations between Soul and Body. The psychical element in man's nature cannot be a product of the corporeal; on the contrary, the psychical element must exist as a *causa movens* antecedently to the body, for without a Soul as *causa movens* a living body capable of movement would be impossible. The Body being a composite substance, belongs to the same order of being as the things of Sense, whereas the Soul is a simple substance, allied in nature to that unchanging, simple Being which exists above the world of phenomena. The Body we know through the senses, the Soul through reason.

6. What are the relations subsisting between Soul and Body? This question Plato answers as follows: The Soul stands to the Body in the relation of a *causa movens*, and in this relation only. The Soul dwells

within the Body somewhat as the charioteer in the chariot; the Body is merely the organ which it uses to exert an external activity. The real man is the Soul only; in the concept "man," the notion "body" does not enter as a constituent element in the same way as the notion "Soul." Man is, properly speaking, a Soul, which uses a body as the instrument by which it exercises an activity on things without itself (*anima utens corpore*).

7. In accordance with this view of the relations between Soul and Body is the further opinion of Plato, that along with the rational Soul there also exists in man an irrational Soul, which is made up of two distinct parts; thus giving us, ultimately, three Souls in man.

The rational Soul, the λόγος, is the Soul proper of man. It is like to God, it may be called the Divine element in man; it has its seat in the head. To this Soul belongs all rational knowledge. Subordinate to this are two other Souls, dependent on the body, and subject to death (according to the *Timæus*), the one is called by Plato the irascible (τὸ θυμοειδές, θυμός), and this he locates within the breast; the other he calls the appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἐπιθυμία), and locates in the abdomen. The functions of these two Souls are purely sensuous; on them the life of sense in man is dependent. The appetitive Soul is found in plants, the irascible Soul is possessed by brutes.

The method which Plato adopts to establish the existence of this threefold psychical element in man is interesting. We notice, in man, he says, a conflict of opposing tendencies; the appetite strives after something which the reason forbids, and anger rises up in opposition to reason. No being which is really one can come into contradiction with itself; to explain the internal conflict of these opposing tendencies which clash within us, we are forced to admit internal principles of action really different from one another. And as these conflicting movements are of three different kinds, we are obliged to admit a triple Soul in man—the appetitive, the irascible, and the rational. (De Rep. IV. p. 456).

In what relation do these three Souls stand to one another? Plato is of opinion that the rational Soul and the appetitive are, as it were, two extremes, between which the irascible Soul takes its place as a sort of middle term. Plato compares the θυμός to a lion, the ἐπιθυμία to a many-headed hydra, and also to a perforated or bottomless vessel. Of its nature the θυμός is on the side of reason, and supports the reason against the many-headed hydra which is always in rebellion against it.

8. Regarding the origin of the human Soul, Plato, in *Timæus*, teaches that it is produced by God—in the same way as the World-Soul—by a mixture of those elements which he calls the "identical" and the "different."* This, however, applies only to the rational Soul. The irrational Soul is produced by the subordinate gods. It would be

* This seems to indicate that Plato did hold the human Soul, as well as the World-Soul, to be a being not purely spiritual, but containing some admixture of matter. How this can be reconciled with his distinct assertion of the immaterial nature of the human Soul, is not easy to understand.

unworthy of the Supreme God to create a merely mortal thing, so He entrusted to the subordinate divinities the task of forming the mortal Soul, and uniting it to the immortal. In *Phædrus*, p. 245, Plato seems to represent the Soul as not produced (*ἀγένητος*). We have already learned that the Soul is not united to the body in the first moment of its existence, that it has already existed in an incorporeal condition. We have now to inquire why it is united to a body with which it is not by nature destined to enter into union.

9. In *Phædrus*, Plato furnishes an answer to this question under the form of an allegory. The Soul, before its imprisonment in the body, lived an incorporeal life among the gods. Mounted upon heavenly chariots the gods career through that ultra-celestial region whose beauty no poet has ever worthily sung; in the midst of the gods, the Soul equipped with heavenly wings, and guiding a chariot drawn by two steeds, held its course through the ultra-celestial sphere, enjoying the vision of truth. But one of the steeds was restive and ungovernable, and it happened that many souls could not control this steed. In consequence confusion was created in their ranks; in the tumult the wings of many were injured, and they fell ever lower and lower, till at last they fell to the earth to the region of material substance, *i.e.*, to the corporeal condition. The Soul that in its previous state had enjoyed most fully the vision of Being, became the Soul of a philosopher; the Soul that stood next in rank became the Soul of a king, and so on through a graduated series of human conditions down to the tyrants and sophists who hold the lowest places of all. In this first generation Souls do not enter into the bodies of brutes.

10. The meaning of this myth seems to be that the Soul in its incorporeal state had committed some offence for which it was punished by imprisonment in the body. Hence it is that Plato everywhere speaks of its union with the body not as an advantage, but as an evil. He calls the body the grave in which the Soul is shut in as a corpse; he calls it a prison, in which the Soul is confined like a captive; a heavy chain which binds the Soul, and hinders the free expansion of its energy and its activity. The culpability which has been punished by the imprisonment of the Soul within the body must have consisted, as indicated by the myth we have quoted, in the tendency towards the objects of sense; for we can hardly understand the restive steed to signify other than the *ἐπιθυμία* which we have seen to be that part of our nature which is in continual revolt against the law of reason.

11. The immortality of the (rational) Soul is emphatically asserted by Plato, and in *Phædo* the theory is supported by several arguments. These arguments may be briefly stated thus:

(*a*) Everywhere opposites generate opposites. Death follows life, and out of death life is again generated. Man cannot form an exception to this universal law. As man, therefore, passes from life to death, so must he again awake from death to life. This would be impossible if the Soul, the principle of life, came to an end in death. It must, therefore, live on, that in its re union with a body man may wake to life again.

(*b*) Being a simple substance, the Soul is kindred in nature to that which is absolutely simple and immutable (the Idea) ; in the same way as the body, being a composite substance, is kindred in nature to things sensible and changeable. As then the body, because of this affinity with that which is destructible, is itself destructible, so must the Soul, because of its affinity with the indestructible, be itself indestructible.

(*c*) If the Soul has existed by itself before its union with the body, it follows that it must exist after separation from it. Now it is proved from the peculiar character of our cognitions that the Soul existed before its union with the body, it follows then that it will outlive its separation from the body.

(*d*) Furthermore, nothing can be at once itself, and the opposite of itself ; it is impossible that the same object should have a share in two contradictory Ideas at the same time. Now the Soul is essentially life, for life is self-movement, and self-movement is the very essence of the Soul. But if the Soul participates in the Idea of "life," and is a Soul only in so far as it participates in this Idea, it follows that it cannot admit into itself the opposite of life, *i.e.*, death. A dead Soul is a contradiction in terms. The Soul is, therefore, not merely immortal, its life is absolutely eternal, essentially excluding every possibility of dissolution.

(*e*) Again, the dissolution of any being whatever can be accomplished only by some evil antagonistic to the nature of that being. The one evil which is antagonistic to the nature of the Soul is vice, *i.e.*, moral evil. But this is clearly not capable of destroying the being of the Soul, consequently the Soul cannot be destroyed ; it is therefore incorruptible, immortal (De Rep. X., p. 608). This argument gains additional force if we consider that the destruction of the Soul by moral evil would mean that the wicked have no punishment to expect—a consequence which is wholly at variance with the Moral Order. (Phædo, p. 107.)

(*f*) Lastly, Plato, in *Timæus*, appeals in proof of the Soul's immortality to the goodness of God, who could not destroy a creature of beauty, even though it were a thing destructible by nature. In *Phædo* he appeals to the conduct of the philosopher whose effort after knowledge is a constant effort after incorporeal existence, a striving to die.

12. Plato always connects the notion of immortality with the notion of retribution after death. The latter principle he holds as firmly as the immortality of the Soul. The good are rewarded after death, the wicked punished according to their deserts. In his exposition of this doctrine, Plato frequently introduces the ancient myths ; for, according to him, nothing truer or better can be said on this theme than what is contained in these myths. The several myths which he introduces are not, however, always consistent with one another, and it would hardly be possible to explain away their differences. The fundamental notions which are put forth in these several myths may be stated as follows :

(*a*) The man whose life has been good and pleasing to God, and has been purified by philosophic effort, enters immediately after death into a condition of bliss ; those who have cultivated the merely social virtues

must pass through a previous process of purification; those who pass out of life answerable for some misdeeds, but only for such as can still be cured, have a temporary punishment to suffer; those whose misdeeds are incurable, are doomed to eternal reprobation. These who are not fully purified, retain after death something of corporeal being, which forms a shroud in which they hover restlessly over the graves of their bodies till their tutelary demons conduct them to the nether world.

(*b*) Souls, after death, do not remain permanently in the disembodied state, they enter into other bodies (metempsychosis), but into such as correspond to the moral condition in which they have quitted life. The good enter into the bodies of men; the less perfect into the bodies of women; the wicked into the bodies of beasts; the species of brute body into which each soul enters is determined by the species of vice or passion to which it was addicted in life.

(*c*) All these processes are accomplished within a period of ten thousand years. When this term has been completed, all souls return to the condition out of which they passed in their first process of generation, and a new cosmical period begins. Plato sometimes speaks of an earlier period, which may be described as a golden age. There was then no evil, and no death; the earth spontaneously brought forth food in abundance; man and beast lived together in friendly concord; there was no distinction of sexes; men were produced from the earth by spontaneous generation. All this came to an end at the beginning of the next great period—a period which was introduced by a great cosmical revolution. It was then that the world, as we know it now, first came into existence (Polit. p. 296.) It was then that the distinction of the sexes was first established, and that the human species was reproduced by carnal generation. We have here distorted traditions of a happier and more highly privileged condition of existence enjoyed by the first men.

Plato's Ethics and Political Philosophy.

§ 31.

1. We begin our account of Plato's ethical system with his inquiries into the nature of pleasure, and into its bearing upon man's moral life. In this connection Plato endeavours to establish a mean between the Hedonism of the Cyrenaic school and the doctrines of the Cynics. He distinguishes between true and false pleasures. The first are those which arise from virtue, and, in a special manner, from the knowledge of truth. False pleasures, on the other hand, are those which have not their source in virtue, and are, moreover, antagonistic to virtue, and destructive of it. True enjoyment, real pleasure, is pure, and does not affect the purity of the Soul; false pleasure is impure, and defiles the Soul.

2. It follows from this that all pleasures are not evil, nor to be

avoided as evil. The Cynics are not justified in their absolute condemnation of pleasure. But neither is it true that every pleasure is good, and a thing to be striven for. Hedonism with its unqualified exaltation of pleasure is as one sided as Cynicism. The truth lies between the two theories. To secure the pure and real pleasure which springs from virtue must be the object of human endeavour; such pleasure is the true good for man; but he must fly the impure and false pleasures which the senses supply, and which are at variance with virtue; they are an evil for him.

3. The relations which Plato further establishes between pleasure and virtue are analogous to those which he establishes between Matter and Ideas. Matter, by participating in the ideal order, takes form and orderly arrangement; analogously, pleasure receives from virtue its true significance and its rightful limitation. Pleasure is further like matter in this that it exists in a condition of continual change, that it is unstable and transient, and by virtue only is made to share in the good—*i.e.*, in the enduring. Not pleasure by itself, nor virtue by itself, is the true good of men, but only the combination of both—the union of virtue as the formal, determining element, with pleasure as the material and determined.

4. So much being premised, we are now in a position to deal with the further question—What, according to Plato, is the Supreme Good for man? To understand rightly Plato's teaching on this point, we must distinguish between the Supreme Good in the objective sense of the term and the Supreme Good in the subjective sense. This distinction being drawn, we find that Plato teaches:—

(*a.*) Man's Supreme Good, in the objective order, is the "Idea of the Good;" and as this is one with God, it follows that man must find his Supreme Good in God. Goods are either goods of the soul, or goods of the body, or external goods of fortune; the goods of the soul surpass all the others, but amongst these the Idea of the Good—God, holds the highest place. Man must, therefore, endeavour to rise to God, and find his Chief Good in Him.

(*b.*) Subjectively considered, the Chief Good of man is Happiness. The basis of Happiness is the assimilation of man with God. (De Rep. X., p. 613; Theæt. p. 176.) The assimilation with God is effected by knowledge and by enthusiastic love of God as the Supreme Good. In the knowledge and love of God as the Supreme Good consists, then, the supreme happiness of man.

5. The means by which man must reach his highest happiness in God is virtue. Plato's description of virtue resembles that of the Pythagoreans: virtue is Harmony, vice is Discord; man is virtuous if his inner nature is rightly ordered, if the parts of his Soul hold their natural relations to one another; man is wicked if this interior order is wanting, if the parts of his Soul are unnaturally at variance with one another. Virtue is, therefore, the health of the Soul; vice is its disease; in virtue consists its beauty and its strength; vice makes its weakness and deformity. Virtue must be loved for its own sake, not for sake of external goods.

6. Virtue, being the inner harmony of the Soul, is essentially one; it admits, however, of a division into four cardinal virtues, a division which is based on the distinction between the three parts of the Soul. The four cardinal virtues are Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice. Wisdom (*σοφια*) belongs to the rational Soul, and consists in true knowledge. Fortitude or courage (*ἀνδρεία*) is a virtue of the *θυμός*, and is exercised in resolute striving after the Good, without any regard for the attendant difficulties. Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) belongs to the appetitive Soul (*ἐπιθυμία*), and manifests itself in the control of the desires and their restraint within proper limits. Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) belongs at once to all three parts of the Soul, and consists in this, that each part of the Soul, occupying the position assigned it by nature, discharges its proper functions, without passing beyond its own sphere. Justice is thus the bond and union of the other virtues, the principle of order within the Soul. Justice, as applied to the relations of man and the gods, is called Piety (*ὁσιότης*).

7. The principal among the four cardinal virtues is Wisdom. The other virtues can be acquired by practice and habitual exercise; but if they are not associated with Wisdom, they are mere shadows of true virtue, and they must degenerate—Temperance into stupidity, and Fortitude into brutish impulse. Plato goes so far in his commendation of the virtue of Wisdom as to assert that the man who possesses this virtue possesses all the other virtues, and has no further need to acquire them by practice. He is thus led at last to the Socratic theory that the man who possesses true knowledge cannot do wrong. No one does wrong knowingly; the evil-doer acts in ignorance; ignorance is the real evil, and the source of all evil. We can now understand why and to what extent Plato holds that virtue can be imparted by instruction.

8. From these doctrines the conclusion follows that the effort to gain Wisdom (Philosophy) is the highest ethical duty of human life. This effort after Wisdom, sustained by the love of the good and the beautiful, has two aspects, a theoretical and a practical.

(*a.*) In its practical aspect it consists in the emancipation of the rational Soul from the body; for the body is only a hindrance to the Soul in its effort to attain true knowledge. The philosopher must give his first attention to the Soul; he must give thought to the body only in so far as extreme necessity requires. The life of the philosopher must be a continual effort to rid himself of the body, a constant preparation for death; nay, it should be, in a certain sense, a continual death.

(*b.*) In its theoretical aspect this striving after Wisdom consists in the constant endeavour of man to extend and to perfect his knowledge of truth. He must ever increase in the knowledge of things divine, until he at length attains to that contemplation of the divinity of which the Soul is deprived at its first entrance into the body. In this way man reaches assimilation with God, the Supreme Good, and becomes possessed of the bliss which it confers. In the present life he can never reach this goal; his perfection is to be attained in the life to follow.

9. The man who by virtue, and chiefly by the virtue of Wisdom, makes himself like to God, becomes thereby the friend of the gods. The gods love the virtuous man, and bestow favours upon him; the evils that overtake him are no more than punishments of previous faults. Virtue brings man into relation with the Divinity; and man is, therefore, not virtuous if he does not honour the gods. Irreligion is not only the most egregious folly, it is also the grossest immorality. Moreover, the attainment of virtue is a task of much difficulty; the aid of the gods is absolutely necessary in accomplishing it; virtue may, in fact, be regarded as a gift of the gods.

10. We pass now to the political philosophy of Plato. Here we notice that Plato emphatically rejects the notion of the Sophists that all right and all law are derived from the State, and exist only within it. He holds that there exist a natural right and a natural law, which have their validity without the concurrence of the State, and independently of the State. Nevertheless, he follows his leaning towards the absolutism of civil authority so far, that in his theory the rights of individuals are practically effaced by the rights of the State. In his opinion, the State, as the totality, has absolute power over individuals. The well-being of the whole is first in importance; the prosperity of individuals is admissible only as far as it comports with the well-being of the whole. Individuals are, therefore, bound to render to the State entire submission and unconditional obedience; private interests must be sacrificed to the public good, and nothing can be permitted which does not serve the common interests. In this portion of his system Plato has not succeeded in rising above that absolutism of civil authority which was recognised in practice by almost all ancient States.*

11. Beginning with these principles, Plato, in his work "De Republica," constructs his ideal State—*i.e.*, he sketches a State which would correspond perfectly to the Idea of the State. In this sketch we find he borrows many details from the Hellenic polities, in particular from the Doric system of legislation. After sketching the "perfect State" in the *Republic*, he proceeds, in the *Laws*, to describe the "second-best;" for he is aware that, in view of the actual circumstances of society, the "perfect" State can be realised only with great difficulty, if at all.

12. In his sketch of the Ideal State, we observe that Plato looks on the State as but the human individual magnified, and that he models his sketch on the nature of man. As the inner nature of man, the Soul, has three parts, so the State consists of three orders: the order of husbandmen, artisans, and traders (productive class), corresponding to the appetitive soul (*ἐπιθυμία*); the order of guardians or warriors (defensive class), corresponding to the *θυμός*; and the order of rulers, corresponding to the rational soul, *λόγος*. And as the perfection of the individual depends on virtue, the divisions of which correspond to the several parts of the Soul, so the perfection of the State consists in this, that the

* Plato exempts religion from this absolute jurisdiction of the State; it belongs to God only (*i.e.*, to the Apollo of Delphi) to regulate religious practices and concerns.

producing class is guided by temperance, the defensive class by valour, the ruling class by wisdom, and that, finally, the entire body politic should be controlled by justice—*i.e.*, that each order, according to its rank in the State, should faithfully and fully discharge its own functions, without passing out of its own sphere. In order that the State may reach this perfection, it must engage its citizens to the practice of the virtues becoming their position. This is the primary duty which self-interest imposes upon it.

13. Plato bestows little attention on the productive order, which he places lowest in the State; he assigns to its members little more than the duties of slaves. But he occupies himself at length with the defensive order, for from this order the rulers come. In this portion of his system he is an advocate of the principle of absolutism in government, and of absolutism of the socialistic type. He insists on a community of goods in the order of guardians; no individual shall possess property. All shall eat and lodge together. Money shall not be allowed. In the order of guardians Plato also requires community of wives; there shall be no marriage, no family. The rulers shall assign certain women to certain men; these shall cohabit for a period to be determined by law; the children generated must not know their parents; they shall be taken from them immediately after birth, and shall be brought up in common in a separate place, under the care of the State. Cohabitation may be allowed beyond the period fixed by the law, but any fruit of this intercourse must be destroyed in embryo.

14. The public education of children shall be continued till their twentieth year. In the first stage of this education, the development of the body must be the chief object of the educator; then follows the learning of myths; and then, in succession, gymnastics, reading and writing, poetry, music, mathematics, and finally military exercises. At this point a division of the pupils must be made: those who are less apt for knowledge, but adapted for deeds of valour, remain warriors; the others study the sciences till their thirtieth year. Then comes a second division. The less capable are devoted forthwith to the less important public offices; the more distinguished pursue the study of Dialectic from their thirtieth to their thirty-fifth year, and are then appointed to posts of command till their fiftieth. After this they finally reach the perfection of philosophy—the contemplation of the Idea of the Good; they become philosophers in the true sense of the word, and as such are admitted into the number of the rulers, and undertake the highest offices of State functions. The course of education is the same for boys and girls alike. It has been seen that poetry forms part of this system of education, but this must be understood of that species of poetry which is an imitation of the Good—*i.e.*, of religious hymns; the art which imitates only the world of phenomena in which good and evil are mingled together must be excluded, for it serves only to excite the passions. Poets who cultivate this species of art are to be banished from the State. This kind of imitative poetry is not real art, for the Good alone is really beautiful.

15. We see that Plato's Ideal State can be realised only when philosophers become rulers of the State or the rulers are guided by a sound philosophy. This requirement Plato abandons in the "second-best" State. Here the theory of Ideas is not introduced as the basis of the scheme for the rulers' education; stress is chiefly laid on training in mathematics; the mode of divine worship is more nearly in accord with the notions prevalent in Hellas; private property and marriage remain untouched.

The Platonic School.

§ 32.

1. It is customary to distinguish among the followers of Plato three, or in more detailed division five, successive phases or schools of thought: the Old Academy, the Middle, and the New. The Old Academy includes the first of the five schools; the Middle, the second and third; the New Academy, the fourth and fifth.

2. By the representatives of the Old Academy the central doctrine of Plato's system, his theory of Ideas, was interpreted, under the influence of Pythagorean notions, in combination with a theory of numbers. With this was associated a theology partly mystical, and partly popular, in which, at a later period, demonology occupied an important place. To the Old Academy belong:—

(*a.*) Speusippus, a son of Plato's sister, and his successor in his teaching functions (head of the Academy, 347-339). Speusippus is said to have maintained the doctrine that to define anything we must know everything, for in definition we must state the differences between things, and to do this we must discover all the resemblances and differences of things. (Speusippus himself is said to have attempted this in a work containing ten books). He asserted further that the Good and the Perfect *in se* cannot be the first basis of things or the One; that which is best and most beautiful does not exist at the beginning, it is the ultimate term of evolution from the beginning. His fundamental ethical principle is happiness, obtained by acting as nature directs.

(*b.*) Xenocrates of Chalcedon, successor of Speusippus as leader of the Academy (339-314), "endeavoured to reduce philosophical concepts to mathematical formulæ. In the effort to express, in all clearness, by numerical notation the manner in which God, by many intermediate stages and processes, enters into and manifests Himself in the world of phenomena, he was led into all kinds of sensuous, fantastic, and superstitious notions."

(*c.*) Heraclides of Pontus—"a distinguished astronomer, who discovered the diurnal revolution of the earth on its axis from west to east, and the immobility of the heaven of the fixed stars"—Philip the Opuntian—the reputed author of the *Epinomis*—Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, who devoted themselves mainly to ethical studies, and abandoned more and more completely the speculative or dialectical elements of the Platonic philosophy.

3. The Middle Academy is characterized by an ever-increasing tendency to scepticism. To it belong:—

(*a.*) Arcesilaus (315-241), a pupil of Crantor and Polemo, the founder of the so-called Second Academy. He combated the dogmatism of the Stoics, and professed the opinion that certain knowledge is not possible, and that the wise man should never give assent to any assertion. This attitude of mind he calls Forbearance (ἀποχή), *i.e.*, forbearance

from the exercise of judgment. Equally valid reasons can always be adduced in favour of either of two contradictory propositions. We cannot, therefore, know anything, not even the fact that we know nothing. Accordingly, Arcesilaus himself did not advance any proposition whatever, but permitted his disciples to dispute amongst themselves or with him. Certain knowledge is impossible, but probable opinion is attainable, and this is sufficient in order to act rationally. Arcesilaus was followed by Lacydes, Telecles, and Evander.

(*b.*) Carneades of Cyrene (214-129), the founder of the Third Academy, who, in the year B. C. 155, was sent as ambassador to Rome, in company with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic. He advanced still further in the path marked out by Arcesilaus. If, he says, we wish to decide whether a given perception be true or false, we must have some certain standard to judge by; this can be no other than the true perception; with this we must compare the perception of whose truth or falsity we wish to judge. But the true perception is precisely what we are seeking to find; sensuous perception cannot, therefore, be a criterion of truth. Neither can the concept of the intellect; for our concepts are derived from the perceptions of sense. There is, therefore, no criterion of truth. What we take to be truth is only the appearance of truth, is only a *φαινόμενον ἀληθές*, *πιθανὴ φαντασία*, *probabile visum* (Cic.). We can attain no more than probability. We experience certain perceptions repeated frequently, occurring in the same way, and in accord with one another. In consequence, a certain feeling of complacency or approval arises within us, and on this ground we hold them to be true, and we assert them (*ἔμφασις*); the perceptions of a different kind we hold to be false, and we deny them (*ἀπέμφασις*). In this probability there are, however, different degrees. We must distinguish three degrees of probability: the perception is either probable in itself only; or, when taken in relation to other perceptions, it is found uncontradicted and probable; or lastly, it is not only probable and uncontradicted, but is confirmed in all respects (Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 166). We have further to mention that Carneades was celebrated as an orator. Clitomachus was a pupil of Carneades.

4. The New Academy returned again to dogmatism. It includes:—

(*a.*) Philo of Larissa, the founder of the Fourth Academy, a pupil of Clitomachus, who lived in the time of the first Mithridatic war. He seems to have reverted to the older Platonic teaching, and to have given his attention chiefly to ethics, inclining in his views to the system of the Stoics.

(*b.*) Antiochus of Ascalon, a pupil of Philo, and founder of the Fifth Academy, who, in the effort to combine the theories of Plato with certain Aristotelian principles, and still more largely with principles adopted from the Stoics, prepared the way for the Neo-Platonists. He endeavoured to show that the scepticism of the later Academy was not justified by the Platonic doctrine, and that the chief points of the doctrine of the Stoics are to be found in Plato. He differed from the Stoics by denying the equality of vices, as well as by asserting that virtue, though it leads to a happy life, does not of itself produce the happiest life. Otherwise he is almost entirely in accord with them. (Cic. Acad. Part II. 43.)

4. ARISTOTLE.

LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE. GENERAL CHARACTER OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.

§ 33.

1. "With Aristotle the philosophy of Greece, which in the hands of Plato was in form and outline the philosophy of a particular people, becomes universal; it loses its special Hellenistic character; the Platonic dialogue is changed to a sober prose, and, instead of myths and poetic imagery, we have a fixed, unimpassioned, scientific language." A new

tendency of thought, radically different from the Platonic, enters the sphere of philosophy with Aristotle. Aristotle does not, like Plato, begin with the Idea, and from the standpoint thus assumed proceed to study the data of experience. He begins with the data of experience, the empirical, the actual, and thence rises to universal, ultimate reasons. He does not proceed synthetically and progressively, like Plato, but for the most part analytically and regressively; his method is not of the *a priori*, or deductive kind; it is rather *a posteriori*, or inductive. "Hence his deliberate examination of facts, phenomena, circumstances, and possibilities as a means of rising to universal truths; hence his marked predilection for physical science, for nature is that which is nearest to us, and most actual in our experience; hence, too, his tendency to push scientific investigation in every direction, for in his mind all facts have equal claims to consideration. This tendency led him to become the founder of sciences which were either unknown till his time, or had previously received little attention, such as Logic, Empirical Psychology, Natural History, *Jus Naturæ*."

Aristotle was born in the year B.C. 384 in Stagira, a Greek Colony of Thrace. His father, Nicomachus, was a physician, and was a friend of Amyntas, King of Macedonia. The former circumstance may have had some influence in determining Aristotle's love of natural science; the latter may have had something to do with his subsequent invitation to the Macedonian Court. He lost his parents while still young, and in his eighteenth year he came to Athens, where he followed for twenty years the instructions of Plato. Many stories are told of his intercourse with Plato. In one anecdote Plato is made to say of him that he needed the rein; that he was like a colt which kicks at its mother. He is charged with envy and ingratitude towards his teacher. What truth there is in the accusation we have no means of knowing. After the death of Plato (347), Aristotle, accompanied by Xenocrates, repaired to the Court of Hermias, Ruler of Atarneus, in Mysia, where he resided for three years, after which he went to Mitylene. In the year 343 he was invited by Philip, King of Macedonia, to undertake the education of his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. He was held in high honour by both princes, and Alexander subsequently assisted him in his studies with princely generosity. Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle returned to Athens, where he founded his school in the gymnasium, called the Lyceum (because dedicated to Apollo Λύκειος). Walking up and down in the shaded valleys (περίπατοι) of the Lyceum, Aristotle discoursed on philosophy with his disciples. His school was hence called the "Peripatetic." He presided over it for twelve years. In the morning he taught his more advanced pupils the more recondite truths of science (acroamatic investigations); in the evening he discoursed to a large crowd (exoteric discourses) on the sciences which belong to general culture (Gellius.) After the death of Alexander he was accused of impiety (ἀσέβεια) by the Macedonian party at Athens. He withdrew from the prosecution, and sought refuge at Chalcis, in Euboea, where he died soon after, B.C. 322.

3. The writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, and partly in scientific (acroamatic) form. The latter have, in large part, come down to us; of the former only fragments survive. The strictly scientific works of Aristotle, which were, with scarce an exception, composed during his stay at Athens, are divided, according to the nature of the subject-matter, into logical, metaphysical, physical, and ethical: in addition to which we have an incomplete treatise on Poetry, and a treatise on Rhetoric.

(*a*) The whole of the logical treatises of Aristotle are included under the title "Organon." To the Organon belong:—(1) the Κατηγορίαι, a treatise on the highest or fundamental concepts; (2) Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (de interpretatione) a treatise on Judgments and Propositions; (3) Ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα, on Inference, and Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα on Proof, Definition, Division, and the Knowledge of Principles; (4) Τοπικὰ treating of "dialectical" or probable conclusions; and (5) Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων on Fallacies, and the means of detecting them.

(*b*) The works called the "Metaphysics" of Aristotle received this name from the circumstance that in the arrangement of the writings of Aristotle one of the editors of

his works (most likely Andronicus of Rhodes), in view of the distinction drawn by Aristotle between the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* and the *πρότερον φύσει*, placed these books next in order to the Physics, and included them all under the title *τὰ μετὰ φυσικά*. Aristotle himself gave the name *πρώτη φιλοσοφία* to what we now call Metaphysics. The Metaphysics consist of fourteen books, which, however, do not stand in any strictly logical relations to one another; the second book is said to be spurious. We shall see later what, according to Aristotle, is the scope and subject-matter of Metaphysics.

(*c*) Of the works relating to Physics or Natural Science, the following are of special importance to philosophy:—(1) The *Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις* (de physica auscultatione, also called *φυσικά* or *τὰ περὶ φύσεως*) in eight books—a treatise on physical nature; (2) *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ* (de cœlo), on the heavens, in four books; (3) *Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς* (de generatione et corruptione) in five books—an exposition of the principles of generation and dissolution in nature; (4) *Μετεωρολογικά* or *περὶ μετεώρων* (de meteoris) in four books; (5) *Περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστοριαι* (de historia animalium) in ten books, of which, however, the tenth is said to be spurious—a natural history and comparative physiology of animals; to which are to be added (6) *Περὶ ζῴων μορίων* (de partibus animalium) in four books, and (7) *Περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως* (de generatione animalium) in five books.*

(*d*) The psychological treatises of Aristotle are usually included in the list of his treatises on physical nature. (1) First in this section comes his treatise *Περὶ ψυχῆς* in three books, in which Aristotle develops his theory of psychology. We have, in addition, a number of smaller treatises, dealing with special psychological questions; (2) *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητοῦ* (de sensu et sensili); (3) *Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως* (de memoria et reminiscentia); (4) *Περὶ ἐνυπνίων* (de insomniis); (5) *Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως* (de somno et vigilia); (6) *Περὶ μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις* (de divinatione per somnium); (7) *Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος* (de longitudine et brevitate vitæ); (8) *Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου* (de vita et morte); (9) *Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως* (de juventute et senectute).

(*e*) In the list of Aristotle's ethical and political writings we find: (1) The *Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, in ten books; (2) the *Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια*, in seven books; and (3) the *Ἠθικὰ μεγάλα* in two books. The Nicomachean Ethics is undoubtedly the work of Aristotle himself; the Eudemian Ethics is regarded as the work of his pupil Eudemus—not however an original work, but merely the lectures of Aristotle preserved and reproduced; the "greater ethics"—*Magna Moralia*—appears to be an extract from the two former works. We have furthermore (3) the *Πολιτικά*, a political philosophy based on the ethics, in eight books; the (4) *Οἰκονομικά*, and (5) the treatise *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* (de virtutibus et vitiis), judged by many critics to be spurious—an opinion which cannot be received without question. The treatise *Πολιτεῖαι*, an account of the Constitutions of 158 States, is lost. Lastly, we may class with the ethical writings the treatise *Περὶ ποιητικῆς*; the treatise *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* in three books: the *Προβλήματα*, a collection made on the basis of Aristotle's notes; and the *Μηχανικά*.

4. The writings here enumerated were not, it would appear, published by Aristotle at the time his lectures on the several subjects were delivered. This work of publication seems to have been done by his pupils. In some cases, as already noticed with regard to the Eudemian Ethics, the treatise would appear to have been written or compiled by the pupils on the basis of a written treatise or lecture by Aristotle. This may account for the fact that in many instances the exposition is interrupted or defective, and that we frequently meet with mutilated sentences. The chronological order of the several treatises cannot be determined with certainty. The earliest were doubtless the logical treatises, then followed in all probability the ethical, and after these the physical, the psychological, and the metaphysical.

5. According to Strabo (xiii. 1, 54), and Plutarch (*Vit. Sull.* c. 26) a strange fortune befell the works of Aristotle after the death of Theophrastus. "The library of Aristotle came first into the possession of Theophrastus, who bequeathed it to Neleus of Scepsis in Troas. After the death of the latter it passed into the hands of his relatives in his own country, and they out of fear lest the princes of Pergamus should take the books for their own library, concealed them in a cellar or pit (*ὀρυχεῖον*), where they suffered considerable injury. At last (about B.C. 100) Apellicon, of Tros, a rich bibliophile, discovered the manuscripts, purchased them, and carried them to Athens. He endeavoured, as best he could, to fill up the gaps, and then publish the works. The difficulty of filling up the hiatuses in the much disfigured manuscripts accounts for the defective

* The Treatises *Περὶ κόσμου*, *περὶ φυτῶν*, *περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως*, *φυσιογνωμικά* and *περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων*, are declared spurious by the critics, the genuineness of the *περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν* is also a matter of doubt.

condition of the text of Aristotle's works in subsequent times. Soon after this, on the taking of Athens by the Romans (B.C. 87), the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sylla. A grammarian named Tyrannion had access to them, and from him the Peripatetic Andronicus of Rhodes received copies, upon which he based a new edition of the works of Aristotle, arranging them in suitable order."

6. A Latin translation of the works of Aristotle, accompanied by the Commentaries of the Arabian philosopher Averroes (written about A.D. 1180), was printed at Venice in 1489; and again in the same city in 1496, 1507, 1538; and at Basle in 1538; the Greek text was printed for the first time at Venice, apud Aldum Manutium, in 1495-98, and then under the supervision of Erasmus and Simon Grynæus, Basileæ 1531; again at Basle in 1539 and 1550; and then in many various editions, among which we may note as specially important the editions of Fried. Sylburg, Francof. 1584-87; of Isaac Casaubon (with a Latin translation) Ludg. 1590; of Du Val (Greek and Latin) Par. 1629 and 1639. Many of the special treatises, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, were published in repeated editions up to the middle of the seventh century. After this, editions of the special treatises rarely appear, and no edition of the complete works is published till the close of the eighteenth century, when Buhle published a new edition (Greek and Latin), Biponti et Argentorati, 1794-1800. The most remarkable edition of the present century is that published by the Academy of Science, Berlin, Vols. I. and II.; Aristoteles Græce ex rec. Imm. Bekker, Berol. 1831, Vols. 3; Aristoteles latine, interpretibus variis, Ib. 1831, Vols. 4; Scholia in Arist. Coll. Christ. Aug. Brandis, Ib. 1836. We have further a valuable Parisian edition, Didot 1848-1857, and a stereotyped Tauchnitz edition, 1831-32, and 1843. (Cfr. Ueberweg.)

7. Aristotle, like Plato, makes no rigid distinction between philosophy and the other sciences. With him the notion of philosophy is one with the notion of science in general. He regards philosophy as the knowledge of facts and phenomena in their causes. But this definition refers only to such facts and phenomena as are unchangeably the same, or at least such as constitute the usual order of things. With the merely casual, the *casus fortuitus*, science is not concerned. The complete definition of philosophy, as understood by Aristotle, has been expressed by the later exponents of his teaching in the formula: Cognitio rerum necessariarum et immutabilium per veras et proprias causas."

8. But Aristotle goes further. He distinguishes between "First" and "Second" philosophy. Under the notion "Second" philosophy, he includes all the sciences which deal with special branches of knowledge; the "First" philosophy is the universal science, and, as such, is the only philosophy, in the stricter sense of the word. Each science selects for investigation a special province, a special department of Being, but there is none which deals with Being in general. We want, therefore, a science which shall take as the subject of its investigations that which the others assume. This science is the "First" philosophy. It deals with all Being, which it studies in its ultimate causes and principles. This is the ultimate basis of all the other sciences, inasmuch as it traces the principles peculiar to them back to the ultimate principles from which they are derived, and thus lays the ultimate foundation which all must rest on.

9. Philosophy is not pursued because of any advantage or utility external to itself. It is its own object; it is of such a nature that it can and must be sought for itself alone. It is rightly called divine wisdom, partly because God alone can possess it in perfection, partly because the highest point which philosophical knowledge strives to reach is God—the first and fundamental cause of all things. Philosophy

is the best and most excellent science. Other systems of mental discipline may be more necessary for certain special purposes, but there is none of greater worth or excellence; for philosophy has knowledge for its aim, and is no mere means to particular practical ends. It is the queen of sciences; all others are to it as hand-maidens.

10. Aristotle has not given us a complete division of philosophy, at least he has not established any such division as the basis of his system. He speaks indeed of different parts of philosophy, but he does not always enumerate the same parts, and he has not followed in practice any one of the divisions he indicates. He distinguishes between theoretical, practical, and poetical philosophy; and he includes in the first division Mathematics, Physics, and the "First" Philosophy—the logical studies of the Organon he appears to have regarded merely as a science of method preparatory to philosophy. Again, he speaks of philosophy as consisting of three parts: Logic, Physics, Ethics. But he does not follow either of these divisions in his exposition; he sets little store by such divisions.

11. In separating the several parts of philosophy in our exposition of Aristotle's teaching, we are not following any order traced by Aristotle himself. We are making our own division. We select, as the most appropriate order of treatment, first Logic and Theory of Knowledge, then Metaphysics, then Psychology, and finally Ethics and Political Philosophy.

Logic and Theory of Knowledge.

§ 34.

1. Plato dissociated intellectual knowledge from experience, and made the latter the occasion which gave rise to knowledge. Aristotle, on the other hand, makes experience the foundation of all intellectual knowledge, and lays it down as a principle that intellectual cognition has its source exclusively in experience. "Nihil in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu"—this is the fundamental principle of the Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge, as it is also the point at which the fundamental difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle begins. Without sense, intellectual knowledge is impossible. Experience is, therefore, the basis and source of all intellectual cognition, *i.e.*, of all science.


2. In experience, however, we have to do only with individual objects. The world of sense, which is the world of experience, consists wholly of single objects or individuals (ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων ἄρα τὸ πᾶν, Eth. Nic. VI. c. 12.) It follows that the individual is that which comes first in our knowledge, and that it is only in a second stage we pass from the individual to the general. Intellectual knowledge, knowledge properly so called, is concerned only with the general, and this knowledge has its source in experience; experience, however, brings us into

contact only with the individual; it follows that what in our knowledge is general, must be evolved from the individual. *Of its nature*, then, the universal takes precedence of the individual, and is more an object of knowledge; but *for us* the individual comes first, is more immediately the object of knowledge, and from it we must set out in order to reach the universal. Plato takes the universal, the Idea, as the point of departure in his attempt to explain by an *a priori* method the existence of individual things, and to form a philosophical conception of the world as a whole. Aristotle, on the contrary, begins with the individual, and endeavours by *a posteriori* methods to derive from this the universal, and thus to arrive at a philosophical comprehension of the universe. Herein we have a second fundamental difference between the systems of Plato and Aristotle.

3. It follows from the principles thus laid down by Aristotle that the universal is not something standing apart from the individual; in other words, the universal cannot be regarded as having being of its own really distinct from the being of the several individual objects. In such a supposition it would be impossible to derive the universal from the individual. The universal must be immanent in the individual; this is the only supposition on which a progress in thought from the individual to the universal becomes possible. Whilst, then, Plato separates the universal from the individual, and establishes a real distinction between them, Aristotle emphatically asserts the doctrine that the universal is in the individual, not without it. This constitutes the third fundamental difference between Plato's Theory of Knowledge and that of Aristotle.

4. The universal existing in the individual, not apart from it, it follows, according to the reasoning of Aristotle, that, as invested with the formal character of universality which it possesses in our thought, it cannot be objectively real. The universal is that which is common to the several individual objects, viz., that which can be predicated of all alike. It is not a single entity in itself, it is merely a "predicabile de multis." What we find existing in a number of different objects, what these objects all alike possess, and what we can, in consequence, predicate of them all, is an universal. If, then, we wish to define the universal, we must describe it as that which of its nature is such that it can be predicated of many individual things. We see then that whereas Plato holds the universal, taken formally in its universality, to be objectively real, Aristotle will admit the material entity represented under this form of universality, to be objectively real, but will by no means admit this objective reality to be a single universal being. And here we have the fourth essential difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge.

5. On the principles here set forth rest the whole Logic and Noetic of Aristotle. We proceed to the exposition of his logical and noetical system, as based upon these principles. It will be made clear to us as we advance, that Aristotle does not understand the principles quoted, in the sense of the empiricist or nominalist, though this might appear at first sight to be the case. It will be seen that his theory of knowledge


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avoids Empiricism and Idealism alike, and finds a middle course between the two extremes, which secures at once the rights of Reason and of Experience.

6. The psychological assumption underlying Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge is the essential difference between Sense and Intellect, between sensuous perception and thought (*αἴσθησις* and *νόησις*.) Sense and Intellect, sensuous perception and thought, are not to be made one; they must be taken as essentially different functions; Sense is concerned with the sensible (*τὸ αἰσθητόν*), Intellect has to do with the supersensible (*τὸ νοητόν*); Sense has for its object the individual, Intellect, the universal. The two classes of objects being essentially different, the corresponding faculties must be regarded as essentially different sources of knowledge.

7. This being premised, the question arises: In what way does the Intellect pass from the individual object which appears in the sensuous perception to the universal? To answer this question Aristotle has recourse to the distinction between the *οὐσία πρώτη* and the *οὐσία δεύτερα*, and with the help of this distinction he unfolds his theory as follows:

(*a*) First in order, says Aristotle, we have substance (*οὐσία πρώτη*)—that which does not exist in anything else, and which cannot be predicated of anything else, but in which all else exists, and of which all else can be predicated. This notion, it is clear, can be applied only to the individual object, for the individual is not a predicament, but is rather the subject in which the predicaments have existence; what does not exist in the individual has no existence at all. The individual must therefore be described as the *οὐσία πρώτη* (substantia prima.)

(*b*) Examining more closely this *οὐσία πρώτη*, we distinguish in each individual two constituent elements—a real substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) of being, and another element by which it is made to be that individual which is actually presented to us (*εἶδος*). The former is the determined element, the latter the determining. The former is the substratum of the Idea, the latter is the Idea itself as realized in the individual. The former is Matter (*ὕλη*), the latter is Form (*μορφή*). United they form the constituent principles of individual being, of the *οὐσία πρώτη* Without these two principles the *οὐσία πρώτη* is unthinkable.*

(*c*) Keeping in view the distinction here laid down, we are led at once to the notion of the *οὐσία δεύτερα*. The Form, being that by which the individual is made to be what it is, is the thing which we call the Essence of the individual. This essence is something more than the permanent unchanging element in the being of the individual; it is, at the same time, the basis of all its attributes; it is of the essence that all the properties or attributes which in any way belong to the individual

* It is clear that Aristotle understands by *μορφή* or *εἶδος* when he uses the term to signify c[illegible] principles of individual objects, not the outward form or species of the indivi[illegible] itself to the senses, but the inner form or species which the intellect alone can perceive. Aristotle is, however, careful to make his meaning unmistakab[illegible] *εἶδος* and *μορφή* in the sense of their inner forms or species, he adds the [illegible] *λόγον*."

are predicated. It thus becomes identified with the Substance of the Individual. This Substance of individual being, which is identical with its Essence, is the *οὐσία δεύτερα*.

(*d*) The notions *οὐσία πρώτη* and *οὐσία δεύτερα* being thus defined, the question next arises: What are the relations of the one to the other? If the *οὐσία δεύτερα* be no more than the determining principle in the individual being, it follows that the question what the individual is can be answered only by assigning its *οὐσία δεύτερα*. The latter, in the words of Aristotle, is therefore the *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* of the former, or its *quiddity* (quid est). Hence the notions *μορφή*, *εἶδος*, *οὐσία δεύτερα*, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, as applied to the individual, represent, according to Aristotle, one and the same thing.

(*e*) Comparing several individuals, in point of quiddity or *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, we find several individuals to have the same quiddity—to be such that the same *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* must be asserted of all of them. Thus, for example, all human individuals, when compared together, are found to have the same quiddity, the same *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, the same *οὐσία δεύτερα*, for each man stands on the same level of nature with all other men, possesses a being determined by the same essential characteristics. From this it follows that the same quiddity or *οὐσία δεύτερα* can be common to several individuals in this sense that each of these individuals has a like quiddity or *οὐσία δεύτερα* with the rest.

(*f*) On the other hand, the second constituent principle of the *οὐσία πρώτη*, Matter, is of such a nature that it can never, in any way, be common to several individuals. Matter, as the substratum of the quiddity or determinate being of a given individual, belongs exclusively to the individual in question; it can in no wise be shared with another, and precisely for the reason that the Matter belonging to the individual is exclusively its own, is the individual distinct from all other individuals, and possessed of completed being in itself.

(*g*) From this it follows that in the individual Form (the *οὐσία δεύτερα* or *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*) is the principle of Specification; Matter, or the *ὑποκείμενον*, the principle of Individuation. The Form or quiddity being the same in several individuals, unites these individuals into one *species*: Matter being different in each individual, determines the individuality of each to the exclusion of all the others. On the Form or quiddity—the principle of specification, depends the unity of several individuals in one species; on the Matter—the principle of individuation, depends the plurality of individuals within the same species.

(*h*) We are now in a position to give an answer to the question: How does thought rise from the particular to the Universal? The faculty of sense puts before us the individual object as it appears individually in the world of phenomena; thought penetrates to the Form, *οὐσία* or quiddity, underlying the individual, abstracts this from the individual, and makes it the object of its thinking activity. The *οὐσία* thus apprehended as an abstraction, we again predicate of the individual, attributing it to the individual as its proper quiddity. We next come to perceive that this quiddity belongs not to one individual merely

—that a number of individuals possess a quiddity like the first; this quiddity, which our thought thus represents as common to many individuals, we naturally conceive of as predicable of many individuals, *i.e.*, we conceive of it as *universal*, and we unite under this common concept all the individuals of which the **οὐσία** in question is predicable. By this perfectly natural process are we led from the individual to the universal.

8. In this process three further points are worthy of note:

(*a*) In the first place it is clear that according to the mind of Aristotle the universal is not merely an *ens rationis*, a purely notional entity: the thing represented in the concept is objectively real in the several individuals, for it is nothing else than the *οὐσία* or quiddity of these individuals. It is only in so far as this *οὐσία* is thought as *universal*, that it can be called a product of thought, and even in this respect the procedure of thought cannot be said to be arbitrary, for it rests upon that likeness of the *οὐσία* in the several individuals which exists as an objective fact.

(*b*) In the second place it becomes evident how and in what sense Aristotle was led to assert that the universal is inseparable from the individual; that it is indwelling (immanent) (*ἐνυπάρχον*) in the individual. For the *οὐσία δεύτερα* has not independent existence, it exists in the individual or *οὐσία πρώτη* as the quiddity of the latter; and this *οὐσία δεύτερα* is the thing represented in the universal notion.

(*c*) In the third place it becomes apparent why and in what sense Aristotle asserted that the universal, taken objectively, is not one single being, that in the objective order it manifests itself only in different individuals. For every individual, owing to the material element included in it, is a being completed in itself, and the common possession of the *οὐσία* by several individuals, is not to be regarded as constituting oneness in being, but only as implying a likeness of *οὐσία* between many individuals.

9. Having now set forth the fundamental principles of Aristotle's theory of Knowledge, we pass on to his Logic. What we have first to notice here is the place assigned to the Concept. The Concept (*λόγος*), according to Aristotle, has to do with the Essence (*οὐσία*) of things. When our thought represents the Essence of things *in abstracto*, it represents it in the form of a Concept. It follows that the universal, *as such*, exists only as an universal Concept in the thinking mind. The determination and exposition of the Concept (*ὁρισμός*) is effected by Definition. Definition is, therefore, nothing more than the exposition of the Essence of a thing.

10. If we consider closely any concept which represents the Essence of certain things to the exclusion of all others, we shall distinguish in it two elements, a general and a special. The general is possessed by the individuals included under the given concept in common with certain other individuals, the special element is peculiar to the former individuals and serves to distinguish them from the latter. The general element is the common element, the special is the differentiating element (Difference). The general is the indeterminate, the special is the determining element; and they may, therefore, be regarded as standing to one another in the relation of Matter and Form.

11. It is owing to this distinction between the elements of our concepts that our conceptual knowledge does not stop at the first specific differences of things; we are led to subordinate particular concepts to more general concepts. For the characteristics which are common to several concepts can be conceived, *per abstractionem*, only as themselves forming a concept, and thus we have a higher concept under which the

first are subsumed. In this way we proceed from the Specific to the Generic concept, from the Species to the Genus. If we push this process of abstraction to the utmost limit permitted by our concepts, we arrive at ultimate generic notions which cannot be subordinated to (subsumed under) any others: *i.e.*, we arrive at the so-called Categories.

12. Aristotle enumerates ten categories, or ultimate generic notions (suprema genera): Substance (*οὐσία*), Quantity (*ποσόν*), Quality (*ποιόν*), Relation (*πρὸς τί*), Place (*ποῦ*), Time (*ποτέ*), Position (*κεῖσθαι*), Possession (*ἔχειν*), Action (*ποιεῖν*), and Passion (*πάσχειν*). Everything that can be predicated of the objects of cognition falls under one or other of these concepts, and for this reason Aristotle regards them as the most universal or highest generic notions, and describes them as the Categories of things. It is, however, only in the book "On the Categories" (*Κατηγορίαι*) that they are distinctly set forth to the number of ten. In other places Aristotle reduces the Categories to a smaller number. For example, in the Analyt. Post. I. 22, we find the *οὐσία* contrasted with the remaining Categories as with so many accidents, *συμβεβηκότα* (accidentia). And in Met. XIV. 2 only three are mentioned: *τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί* (substances, attributes, relations).

13. From the Concept our thought proceeds to the Judgment. In a judgment we effect the union or the separation of two concepts by affirming or denying the one or the other (*κατάφασις* and *ἀπόφασις*). It is in judgment that truth or falsity in our knowledge first appears; we can predicate neither truth nor falsity of the unconnected concepts. The truth of our knowledge consists in the accord of our judgment with the objective order of things, in the fact that things are in objective reality as we judge them to be. The falsity of our knowledge consists in the contradiction between our judgment and the objective order, in our judging things to be what in reality they are not.

14. When a judgment has once been formed, another judgment may be derived from it—this is the process of Inference. From judgment, then, we proceed to inference. Inference is defined by Aristotle (Top. I. 1) as *λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερον τὶ τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων*—a discourse in which from certain premises, and by means of these premises, something different from the premises necessarily follows. We must, however, distinguish between Syllogistic and Inductive Inference.

(*a*) The Syllogism draws a particular conclusion from an universal major premise by means of a third proposition (minor premise), evolving in this process a proposition which was already virtually contained in the universal. In other words, by means of the Middle Term it connects the Major Term as predicate, with the Minor as subject. In his teaching regarding the syllogism, Aristotle has in view only the categorical syllogism. He distinguishes three syllogistic Figures (*σχήματα*) according as the Middle Term (*ὅρος μέσος*) is subject in one premise and predicate in the other, or as it is predicate in both premises, or as it is subject in both premises. (The Fourth Figure was introduced at a much later period.)

(*b*) Inductive inference, on the other hand, follows an opposite direction; it proceeds from particular to general propositions: it concludes from the fact that a certain concept belongs to all those members of a class of which we have experience that it belongs to the entire class, and is an essential attribute of the class. In other words, Induction (ἐπαγωγή, ὅ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμός) concludes "that a concept of greater extension is predicate of a concept of smaller extension, from the fact that it is predicated of several or of all of the objects included under the latter." (Anal. Prior. III. 23.)

(*c*) The syllogism is, *of its nature*, antecedent to the Inductive process, for it proceeds from that which is first in order of nature (the Universal) to that which is subsequent in nature (the particular). But *for us* the Inductive Inference comes first, since it proceeds from what is first in our experience (the individual) to that which we attain to subsequently (the universal). *In itself* the syllogism is a more rigorous and a clearer form of inference; *for us* Induction is the form more immediately within reach, and it is therefore the clearer and more convincing.

15. The syllogism, in its turn, is the means of Proof. Proof consists in the demonstration of the truth of one proposition from the truth of another; and as this can be effected only by deducing the one from the other, it follows that Proof is not possible without this syllogism. The syllogism, regarded as the means of Proof, is of different kinds:

(*a*) The Apodictical (Demonstrative) Syllogism, when our conclusion is drawn from true, certain, and indisputable premises.

(*b*) The Dialectical Syllogism, which draws its conclusion from merely probable premises, ἐξ ἐνδόξων, ex probabilibus.

(*c*) The Eristic Syllogism draws its conclusion from premises which have only an alleged or apparent probability (ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων). (Top. I. 1.) *

16. Proof, as obtained by the syllogism, cannot be carried back indefinitely. It must ultimately arrive at the undemonstrable, and here come to an end. For if proof were to continue indefinitely, it could never be completed—the endless can never be traversed—and we should thus have no proof at all. In such a supposition proof would become wholly an impossibility. The undemonstrable, which fixes the limit of the process of proof, must, therefore, consist of certain propositions which do not admit of proof, and which, moreover, do not need it, their truth being self-evident to the intellect. These propositions are, in the first place, the truths of Immediate Experience; and, in the second, the First Principles of Reason (ἀρχαί). Without these no proof is possible, they are the basis of all demonstration.

17. The First Principles of Reason belong to the νοῦς. The mind arrives immediately at the knowledge of them on comparing together the highest or most general concepts, which it obtains by the process of abstraction, from the individual objects presented to it. They differ in

* The Sophistical Syllogism is a fallacy, a conclusion obtained from false premises, or by means of an illegitimate combination of the members of the syllogism.

kind, just as the ultimate concepts from which they are formed differ in kind. The highest of these principles is the Principle of Contradiction: *τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό* (Met. IV. 3): at the same time, and under the same respect, a thing cannot at once be and not be. Next in order comes the principle of Excluded Middle. These principles are not only the first or highest in the order of thought, they are also the highest in the order of Real Being. Thought follows Being, and what is first in order of thought must be first also in the order of Being. These principles, then, control not only the whole domain of Logic, but also the whole domain of Metaphysics.

18. The syllogism being the means of proof is also the instrument or operative element in science. Knowledge is acquaintance with the causes from which phenomena necessarily result; we have knowledge of an object only when we understand why it is thus, and not otherwise. It is the task of science to penetrate to the ultimate causes and reasons of phenomena, to deduce and explain phenomena from these causes. This task can be accomplished only by the use of the rational syllogism, which reasons from the result to the cause, or from the cause to the result. The syllogism is, therefore, the indispensable instrument of science. Hence three important consequences:—

(*a*) In the first place, science, considered in its subjective aspect, holds a middle place between immediate experience and the first principles of Reason—these being the opposite extremes in human knowledge. Neither mere experience, nor a knowledge of first principles, can be called science. Scientific knowledge is intermediary between both, it is established by the rational syllogism, on the basis furnished, to which Experience and the principles of Reason alike contribute.

(*b*) Scientific knowledge, properly so called, is attainable only in the case of those phenomena which are of constant, or at least usual occurrence, not in the case of those which appear only occasionally or accidentally; for the former permit us to argue the existence of a cause uniformly effective; the latter warrant no such conclusion.

(*c*) Lastly, since the truths reached by the scientific syllogism are necessary truths, it follows that not only has science to deal with the unchangeable and necessary elements of things, but further that its aim is to obtain knowledge of that which is necessary. Hence the general maxim: Scientia est de necessariis.

19. We may sum up our exposition of this part of Aristotle's philosophy in the words of the philosopher himself (Anal. post. I. 18): There are two means to intellectual knowledge—Induction, or rather the abstraction obtained through Induction, and the rational Syllogism. Everything that we know scientifically we know by the one means or by the other. Induction—which enables us to reach general notions by a process of abstraction—conducts us immediately to the concepts of widest universality, and mediately to the First Principles which result from comparing these concepts together. The rational Syllogism, on the other hand, adopting as its basis both Experience and the First Principles of Reason, conducts us to the causes of phenomena, and aiding us to reach the ultimate and highest causes of all Being, lifts us at last to Philosophy—the crown of intellectual knowledge, the queen of all the sciences.

Metaphysics.

§ 35.

1. We have already indicated what Aristotle conceives to be the province of Metaphysics, or the First Philosophy. It deals with Real Being as such; it investigates the principles or ultimate causes of Being. The first question which Metaphysics has to answer is this: What are the common principles of all Being. In answering this question, Aristotle first replies indirectly, examining and refuting the opinions of earlier philosophers. He then replies directly, setting forth his own teaching on the subject.

2. With regard to his refutation of other philosophers, we shall here confine ourselves to his arguments against Plato's theory of Ideas. Ideas, in Plato's sense of the word, he says, are not the principles of Being; nay, such Ideas are not admissible at all; and this for the following reasons:—

(*a.*) In the first place, the Platonic Theory of Ideas is wholly barren: "These ideas are only a meaningless duplication of sensible objects (a kind of *αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια*, eternal sensibles)," and do not in anywise help to explain the existence of individual objects. They contain only the forms of things, and these must be combined with Matter in order to give the things actual existence. This combination can only be effected through motion; and Ideas are not the moving principles of things. (Met. I. 7, 9; XII. 6; XIII. 5.)

(*b.*) Ideas are said to represent and to contain the essences of things. Now, it is altogether impossible that the essence of a thing and the thing itself should exist apart from one another. This the more, that such an admission leads to manifest contradiction. For "if an universal idea, *e.g.*, 'animal' exists apart from the 'man' and 'horse' contained under this universal idea, we may ask whether this idea as it is in the latter is numerically one and the same in all, or are there different ideas in the different objects? The first alternative cannot be admitted, for a notion cannot remain numerically one in things that are different, otherwise the generic concept would be simultaneously determined by the specific differences of several species, *i.e.*, by opposite attributes—an evident contradiction. Nor can the second alternative be accepted, for in this case the genus would be really multiplied in the species, and thereby the unity of the concept would be destroyed—and it is Plato's aim to maintain the unity of the concept." (Met. VII. 14.)

(*c.*) "Again, these Ideas, described as distinct from the objects which participate in them, either have nothing in common with these objects beyond the name, or they have a certain community of nature with them. In the first case, they are entirely without effect for the knowledge of the objects in question; in the second, the community of nature supposes participation in a third entity common to both"—*i.e.* the Ideas and the corresponding individual objects require a third common prototype, on which both shall be modelled; *e.g.* the individual man and the Idea of man require a "third man" (*τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*), Met. I. 9; VII. 13. (This argument of the "third man" seems to have become proverbial among the opponents of the Platonic theory.)

(*d.*) Plato calls the Ideas "prototypes" of the objects of sense, and describes the relation in which the latter stand to them as a "participation." But these are empty words, mere poetical metaphor, which explains nothing, and, besides, entails absurd consequences. For, since one and the same object is frequently included under several different concepts—*e.g.* Socrates is included not only under the concept 'man,' but also under the concepts 'animal' and 'biped'—it follows that for one and the same object we must have several prototypes, and that Ideas are not prototypes of sensible objects, but are derived from them in the same way as the generic concepts are derived from the species. Met. I. 9; XIII. 5.

(*e.*) The fact that there is such a thing as scientific knowledge is no argument in favour of this theory; "we may, indeed, conclude from this fact that the universal has a real existence, but not that it has a separate existence. If the latter consequence followed, other consequences would follow which the Platonists would not and could not

admit. For example, it would follow that there exist Ideas corresponding to works of art, and even to things which have no substantial being, such as attributes and relations, for we have single concepts of each of these things (*τὸ νόημα ἕν*).*

3. From the negative side of Aristotle's teaching we pass to the positive. The principles of all Being, as given by Aristotle, are four: Matter (*ὕλη*), Form (*μορφή* or *εἶδος*), Efficient or Moving Cause (*τὸ κινητικόν*), and Final Cause or End (*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*). These are the necessary assumptions, the ultimate basis of all Being, and are not themselves derived from anything else; they are, therefore, Principles (*ἀρχαί*) of things (Phys. I. c. 6, 2); they are also Causes (*αἴτια*), inasmuch as the Existence as well as the Being of things is dependent on them (Met. I. 3; Phys. II. c. 3, 1, *seq.*). "The earlier Greek philosophers," remarks Aristotle (Met. I. 3, *seq.*), "investigated only the Material Principles of things; Empedocles and Anaxagoras inquire into the Cause of motion; the Formal Principle has not been clearly indicated by any of the earlier philosophers, the nearest approach to it has been made by the authors of the Theory of Ideas; lastly, the Principle of Final Causes has been understood and recognized by the older philosophers only in a relative, not in an absolute sense."

4. The first of the four principles of Being is Matter. Matter is that which is indeterminate in itself, but capable of determination. As such, it is the substratum of all that comes to be—that out of which all things are made. Everything that comes into being arises out of a condition the opposite of that on which it enters, and everything that perishes passes into a condition the opposite of that in which it existed. Out of Non-being arises Being; the Existent passes in turn into the Non-existent. This process is impossible unless we suppose an underlying substratum in which the origin and the dissolution of things are accomplished; this substratum is Matter. Matter is not, therefore, a determinate Being; it is merely the indeterminate substratum of all determinate Being.

5. The second principle of Being is Form, a principle in immediate relation with Matter. Matter is the indeterminate but determinable element; Form is the determining element—*i.e.* it is a principle, within the object, giving it determinate character. Matter is that out of which a thing is made; Form is that into which it is made. What comes to be comes to be something, and the element by which it comes to be this determinate something is its Form. Form, as conceived by Aristotle, is not merely external shape or conformation, it is an intrinsic principle of Being, by which the inner nature of the object becomes what it is.

6. The union of Matter and Form constitutes the Substance—the concrete Being of the object. Neither Matter by itself nor Form by itself is, properly speaking, a being; it is only the union of both that can be so designated. Matter and Form united constitute the specific nature, which, being realized in the individual, comes before us as

* It is observable that, in his refutation of the Platonic theory, Aristotle assumes throughout that Plato regarded Ideas as possessed of independent existence, apart from sensible things, and apart also from the Being of God. This assumption being granted, his arguments are conclusive. But this could not be said of them if we assume the right explanation of Plato's theory to be that he regarded Ideas only as conceptions of the Divine mind.

Substance or determinate being. Considering Matter and Form in their relations to the determinate being that results from their union, we are able to fix still more distinctly their relations to one another.

(*a.*) Matter is naturally destined to receive a Form; hence its tendency towards Form resembles the tendency of the female to the male. This lack of Form in Matter does not mean mere negation; it is the want of something which should be present, it is Privation (*στέρησις*). Privation (*στέρησις*) is the peculiar characteristic of Matter considered in itself, apart from Form. Taken thus by itself, it appears to possess merely negative characteristics. There is, however, a positive characteristic involved in the notion before us; namely, its disposition to become determinate by means of a Form; without this disposition the lack of the Form could not be called Privation.

(*b.*) The privation of Form as applied to Matter can be understood in two senses—absolutely and relatively. A substance which already possesses definite Form may stand in the relation of Matter to a higher substance, inasmuch as it may receive a higher Form, and thus become a higher substance. In this case, the privation which affects the Matter in question is merely relative, involving only the want of that higher Form to which the Matter can and should attain. We can, however, in thought, separate Matter from any and every Form, and consider it as entirely formless. In this case the privation is absolute. Matter considered as subject to this absolute privation, represented in thought as deprived of all Form, is called "Primal Matter" (*ὕλη πρώτη*), *Materia Prima*. This is Matter *κατ' ἐξοχήν*; whenever we speak of Matter without qualification we must be understood to speak of "Primal Matter."

(*c.*) That Form may be realized in fact, Matter must be presupposed; the actual reality, however, depends upon the union of Form with Matter. In a substance composed of Matter and Form, Matter may thus be regarded as the Potentiality (*δύναμις*), Form as the Actuality (*ἐντελέχεια*). The element which constitutes the possibility of the substance is Matter; the element constituting its actuality is Form. Matter apart from Form, in the order of actual existence, is therefore wholly unthinkable. We must, indeed, suppose a Matter without any Form whatever, as the basis of all existent substances, but, as such, it is itself never actually existent, and can never so exist, for the reason that it is in itself mere potentiality. The predicate of Being can be attributed to it only if we understand it to be in the order of possibility, not in the actual order.

(*d.*) Form, or *ἐντελέχεια*, is the actuality of things; but we must draw a distinction between *ἐντελέχεια πρώτη* and *ἐνέργεια*. The *ἐντελέχεια πρωτη* is the actuality of the object, the complement or completion of the substance in the order of actual being; the *ἐνέργεια*, on the other hand, is its Activity, of which the actual substance is the principle and the source. Form, it will be observed, can be called Entelechy only when understood to be one with the *ἐντελέχεια πρώτη*; *ἐνέργεια*, on the other hand, is dependent on the Form, for Form is the principle of actuality. Aristotle does not, however, maintain strictly this distinction between the two concepts; he not unfrequently describes Form as *ἐνέργεια*.

7. The third principle of Being is Efficient (or Moving) Cause. It is a fact of experience that there is movement in the world about us. Movement supposes a moving cause; without this it is unthinkable. The moving cause, whatever be its nature, cannot be conceived as mere potentiality, it must always be an actual being; for only the actual being can exert an *ἐνέργεια*, or, in the present instance, actively produce movement. Every movement, then, supposes an actual cause, an entelechy proper, from which the movement proceeds.

8. With regard to motion itself (*κίνησις*), the following are the chief points of Aristotle's teaching:—

(*a.*) Motion, in general, is the actualization of the possible, *ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, ᾗ δυνατοῦ ἐντέλεχεια* (Phys. III. 1). It is, therefore, the transition from the possible to the actual. Wherever a process of transition from possibility to actuality is in progress, we can say of the thing involved in the process that it is in motion.

(*b.*) There are, however, different kinds of motion. We must distinguish between the motions which suppose a fully constituted, determinate object, and are accomplished in this object, and the motions which affect the existence or non-existence of the object. To the former class belong quantitative, qualitative, and local motions; that is to say, increase and diminution (*αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις*), change or alteration (*ἀλλοίωσις*), and locomotion (*φορά*). To the second class belong origin or generation (*γένεσις*) and dissolution or corruption (*φθορά*).*

(*c.*) Quantitative, qualitative, and local motions differ from generation and corruption in this, that they involve only a transition from one condition of the subject to another, whereas in generation and corruption we have a transition from non-existence to existence, or conversely. In generation the *terminus a quo* is non-existence, the *terminus ad quem* is existence. In corruption we have the converse process. Matter, however, cannot, as we have already seen, exist without some form or other. Non-existence, therefore, can apply to the two cases we have been considering only in a relative sense; *i.e.* the *terminus a quo* in generation is not absolute non-existence, but only the non-existence of that which is generated. The same, in its measure, holds good with regard to corruption. There is not, then, any absolute origin of things, nor any absolute destruction. Everything that begins to be comes into existence by the corruption of something else, and everything that perishes passes into another being—"Generatio unius est corruptio alterius, et corruptio unius est generatio alterius."

(*d.*) The first and most excellent form of motion is locomotion. On this all the others depend. But locomotion introduces two further notions, *Space* and *Time*.

* The word *κίνησις* is sometimes employed by Aristotle (*e.g.* Phys. III. 1) as equivalent to *μεταβολή* (change), since every movement involves a change. He says, however Phys. V. 1), that, although every *κίνησις* is a *μεταβολή*, every *μεταβολή* is not, conversely, a *κίνησις*: for example, such as affects the very existence of the object, *i.e.* *γένεσις* or *φθορά*. Accordingly, *γένεσις* and *φθορά* should, properly speaking, be included, not under the notion *κίνησις*, but under the notion *μεταβολή*. This has not been noticed above, as Aristotle does not uniformly maintain the distinction.

(*a.*) Place (*locus*, *τόπος*) is defined by Aristotle as the first immovable limit of the enclosing body (*τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρώτον*, Phys. IV. c. 6. 15, 24) a definition which makes an empty place impossible. Enlarging this notion of the *τόπος*, and extending it to the great bodies of the universe, we obtain by this means the notion of universal space. The universe, taken as a whole, cannot, it is evident, exist in space (or in a place), for there is no enclosing body by which it could be surrounded. Space exists only within the world; outside it there is no space. Space extends only to the outer limits of the world.

(*b.*) Time is defined by Aristotle as the measure of motion in order of antecedence and consequence (*ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*, Phys. IV. c. 16, 7). The unit of time is the present, and from the motion of this unit time is produced. Time has neither beginning nor end; it is eternal in both directions, for every present supposes a past and a future, and thus no point can be found at which time could arrest its course. Time is measured by uniform movement; to this purpose circular movement is particularly adapted.

9. Lastly, the fourth principle is the End or Final Cause. The End is that to which the motion issuing from the Efficient Cause is directed. Movement without this term to which it is directed is inconceivable; the End must, therefore, be one of the necessary principles of actual Being. It is, indeed, possible that in a given movement a result may ensue which was not intended, which is the effect of some collateral cause attaching to the means employed to attain a certain end—this is *τύχη*, chance, *casus fortuitus*. But this does not in any way prejudice the notion of purpose as belonging to motion; on the contrary, chance, *τύχη*, necessarily presupposes this notion. The End is always a Good, to be obtained by the motion; the *Ratio boni* cannot be dissociated from the notion of End.

10. Having laid down these general principles regarding the notion of the Final Cause, we may now proceed to examine the notion in its special applications:—

(*a.*) When we apply the notion of End to that movement which we have called generation, we observe at once that the End to which this movement tends and the Form are one and the same thing; in other words, the Form is not only the result, it is also the end or purpose of the generative process. The realization of the Form in Matter is the scope of the process. Thus, the Form is not only the principle of determinateness and actuality in the substance, which consists of Matter and Form, it is further the end or purpose intrinsic to the substance.

(*b.*) The relation already pointed out between Matter and Form leads us further to observe that, in substances of the kind under consideration, Matter is the irrational element, whereas Form, being the element on which plan or purpose is based, betokens Reason, and is the object of a mental concept. Matter is, therefore, the *ἀνάγκη*, or blind necessity; Form is the end or purpose, the rational element in the thing (*λόγος*).

(*c.*) In the generation of things Form and Final Cause are one; it may also happen that the Moving Cause and the Final Cause become identical. This occurs when the Moving Cause occasions movement, not by physical impulse, but as an object of desire. In this case, the Moving Cause is unquestionably the End towards which the movement excited is directed. The *κινητικόν* and the *οὗ ἕνεκα* are, therefore, one and the same.

11. Thus much regarding the principles of Being. On the basis thus established, Aristotle proceeds to construct his theory regarding the World and God. A prominent point in his teaching on the first of these points is his doctrine of the eternity of the world, which he strives to establish by the aid of the foregoing metaphysical principles. In his reasoning he proceeds as follows:—

(*a.*) Matter cannot have had a beginning. For Matter, as we are aware, is the basis of all things, necessarily antecedent to the origin of all other things. It is the potentiality of everything having actual existence; what comes into being must come from Matter. If we suppose Matter to have itself come into being, we are driven to assume another Matter, which shall be the basis or potentiality out of which it shall arise; in other words, Matter must be supposed to exist before it existed. This is self-contradiction. Matter, then, has not begun to be; that is to say, it is eternal.

(*b.*) Again, we know Matter cannot exist without Form. If, then, we admit that Matter is eternal, we must admit that Form also is eternal. We cannot, in consequence, allow that Matter was at first shapeless and formless, and has gradually assumed its present form and condition, as Plato thinks; we must, on the contrary, assume that, as regards both Matter and Form, all things have been without beginning; in other words, that the world, as it is, is eternal.

(*c.*) We are led to the same conclusion when we consider the nature of Motion:—

(1.) If Motion had a beginning, there could have existed previously to this beginning only the possibility of Motion. To account for the beginning of Motion, we must suppose this possibility to have been rendered actual. But this could be effected only by Motion. Motion must, therefore, have existed before its beginning—an evident contradiction.

(2.) Furthermore, Time, as has been shown, has had no beginning. But Time is inseparably identified with Motion, for it is nothing more than the measure of Motion in the succession of 'before' and 'after.' It follows that, if Time is eternal, Motion is also eternal.

Now, if Motion is eternal, so also is that which is moved. As the thing moved is the world, the world, like Motion, must be without beginning; it also must be eternal.

(*d.*) The world is thus proved eternal *a parte ante*. That it is eternal in this sense is proof that it is also eternal *a parte post*. For, in the first place, Time, as it is without beginning, is also without end; it follows that Motion and the thing moved, both of which the notion of Time supposes, must be without end. In the second place, all corruption is transition from one Form to another, since the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, Matter the while, not being liable to change, as it is wholly incorruptible. This being so, it is impossible that the Forms existent in the world, taken in their totality, should be subject to corruption. Matter cannot exist without Form; the corruption of all existing Forms would, therefore, involve the corruption of Matter—which has already been shown to be impossible. The world, being one

aggregate of things which consist of Matter and Form, is thus shown to be without end; the notion of generation is inapplicable to the world, so also is the notion of corruption.

(*e*) Generation and corruption take place only *within* the world. And even here, generation and corruption only affect the individual, they do not reach the species or the genus. Individuals alone come and go; species and genera are eternal. If a species were to perish, then would one determinate Form disappear from the world—a consequence which is inadmissible, since it has been proved that existing Forms, taken as a whole, are incorruptible. As regards individuals, the succession of generation and dissolution is from eternity like the world itself. Within the world, the process of the rise, origin, and destruction of individuals, has not had a beginning, nor will it have an end.

12. Aristotle further seeks to prove that the world is one—that there can exist only one world. This he proves from the principle already laid down, that the basis of all plurality in things within any one species is Matter. If there were more worlds than one, each should have Matter peculiar to itself. But Matter, as the substratum of all generation and corruption, is absolutely one; if this were not the case, there would be no one substratum in which the origin and dissolution of things could be effected. There can, then, be only one Matter; and this being so, there cannot be several worlds, with several different material substrata. There is, therefore, only one world, and beyond this no other world is possible.

13. Thirdly, the world is limited or finite. We must distinguish two kinds of infinitude. A thing may be either potentially or actually infinite. It is potentially infinite when it is capable of indefinite increase; actually infinite when it excludes all augmentation, and all capability of increase. Now it is clear that the world cannot be actually infinite, for let us imagine its extent to be as great as we will, it is always possible to suppose it still greater. The world can therefore be only potentially infinite. But what is potentially infinite—for the reason that its infinitude is only potential—must always be actually finite, be its actual extension what it may. It follows that the actual world must always be finite or limited. The same holds good of space; for space, as we have already seen, extends only to the outside limit of the world.

14. In his teaching regarding God, Aristotle is guided by the metaphysical principles here set forth. His proofs for the existence of God first claim our attention. These proofs are as follows:

(*a*) It has been shown that motion is eternal. Now every motion supposes a moving cause. If this cause derives its motion from something else, this something else must in its turn have a moving cause, and so on successively. But the series of moving causes cannot be infinite, for the infinite cannot be traversed, and besides, what is actual is always finite. We must, therefore, assume a Primal Motor, which does not receive motion from anything else, and from which, in the last resort, all motion proceeds. This Prime Motor (*πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*) is God.

(*b*) Furthermore, the actual is, of its nature, antecedent to the potential. For the potential supposes a cause which can give it actuality, and this cause must itself be actual, otherwise it could not be productive. Potentiality is, therefore, not conceivable apart from an antecedent actuality. Now, Matter is eternal, but Matter is mere potentiality; we must therefore admit an eternal actuality, an eternal entelechy, which, as such, is antecedent to Matter, and which we name God.

15. It is now easy to determine what are the attributes of God. As to the Being of God, Aristotle teaches:

(*a*) God is pure actuality, pure entelechy. He excludes all composition of Matter and Form. If the Divine Being were a compound of Matter and Form, it should have had a beginning of existence, and it could begin to exist only by the action of a higher cause moving the Matter to union with the Form. In this supposition God would cease to be the Prime Mover. God is, therefore, pure Form, pure Quiddity, pure Energy.

(*b*) God is further an absolutely Simple Being, essentially excluding all plurality of parts. For if the Being of God were composed of parts, it would have magnitude. This magnitude would be either finite or infinite. It could not be infinite, for an infinite magnitude actually existent is an impossibility. Nor could it be finite, for in that case the might of God would be finite, and He would be unable to furnish motion through unending time, *i.e.*, keep in motion an eternal world. It follows that the Divine Being excludes all plurality, all parts; it is absolutely simple, and therefore immutable.

(*c*) Finally, God must be One. For the principle of plurality is Matter—the basis of individuality within the same species. But Matter is wholly foreign to the Being of God. Hence there can be no question of a plurality of gods. In the same way we may show that to the Divine Being there is no opposite term. For opposition can occur only in the case of two beings having a common Matter, within which opposite Forms exist. To admit that anything could stand in opposition to God would be to admit Matter in the Being of God—an admission we have seen to be unwarrantable.

16. With reference to the activity of God, we must hold as a primary truth that God, as absolute actuality, is also absolute life. As absolute life, He is all-sufficient in Himself, and possesses in Himself perfect bliss. For His happiness He needs not any external goods; He is Himself the Highest Good, and is therefore happy in Himself. But the further question arises: What are the definite characteristics of this absolute life of God? Aristotle answers:

(*a*) The life of God is not an operative life. We cannot admit in Him activity of Will, productive of effects external to Himself. If we admitted such an activity of Will in God, we should then be forced to admit that God has need of goods external to Himself, and that He seeks to obtain these goods by the activity in question. This admission is incompatible with the principle that God is absolutely sufficient to Himself.

(*b*) The life of God is a life of contemplation, and of contemplation only: God lives by thought, and by thought alone. God is reason (νοῦς), and only reason. He is a purely contemplative spirit; and, as such, excludes all volitional action.

(*c*) But what is the object of this contemplative action? Aristotle's answer to this question is as follows:

(1) The object of the Divine Thought is not anything external to the Divine Being. For the thing known is to this extent superior to the knowing subject, that the latter is dependent on it. If, then, God were to have knowledge of things external to Himself, He would be dependent on these things, and there would exist something superior to God. This conclusion is inadmissible. To which we may add that there are many things apart from God which it is better not to know—things so base that they are not worthy objects of knowledge.

(2) Hence it follows that the sole object of the knowledge of God is God Himself. God is the only worthy object of the Divine knowledge; it is, therefore, restricted to Him. Man attains his happiness by attaining knowledge of other things; God is made happy only by the knowledge of Himself. In the vision of His own Being, then, consists that contemplation which makes the absolute immanent life of God.

(3) This Divine self-knowledge is not of the same kind as our knowledge of ourselves. In us being and knowledge of the being are different things. In God the knowledge and the thing known are absolutely one and the same. God's self-knowledge is not merely νόησις, it is νόησις νοήσεως—absolute identity of thinking and object thought. (Met. XII. 9.)

17. The relations of God to the world can be deduced from what has here been laid down. Aristotle's doctrine on this point may be summarised as follows:

(*a*) God is not indwelling (immanent) in the world; He exists above it—the Absolute Substance, the Absolute Archetype. His relation to the world is that of the general to his army. As Prime Mover he is not at the centre of the world, but without its utmost boundary. For the more rapidly a thing moves the nearer must it be to the Prime Mover. The motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is the most rapid; it follows that this heaven is nearest to God, and since this heaven forms the uttermost limit of the world, God must be beyond this extreme limit. Aristotle, it thus appears, had no knowledge of the omnipresence of God.

(*b*) God, as the Prime Mover, communicates motion necessarily and eternally. The motion which proceeds immediately from God must, therefore, be necessary and eternally continuous. It must further be one, for on the oneness of the motion which proceeds from God depends the oneness of the world. This motion must be locomotive, for it is only a motion of this sort which can be continuous and one. Not all locomotion, however, has these properties; but only the motion which proceeds indefinitely in a straight line, or motion in a circle. The former of these cannot exist, for it supposes an infinite space. There remains only motion in a circle. We thus conclude that the motion proceeding immediately from God is motion in a circle.

(*c*) Action upon things external to Himself cannot be attributed to God; it follows that He cannot communicate motion to the world by physical impulse. He can excite motion only as an object of desire. He is at once the archetype and the ultimate end, and chief good of all things in the world; He is, consequently, an object of desire to these things, and, as such, He gives the world its motion. God being the supreme good, and the object of desire, standing above all things, all things move towards Him, and by their motion seek to share in His eternity and immortality. According to the different position held by each object in the mundane order, is the mode of its motion towards this end. Hence the differences of motion.

(*d*) Although God's relation to the world is that of Prime Mover, yet there cannot be question of a Divine Providence, in the sense that God provides immediately for each and every thing in the world. Such a Providence supposes that God knows all things in the world. But we already have seen that this is not the case; God does not, therefore, exercise a providence over the world. The motion which God communicates to the world assures the existence and the order of the universe, the permanence of the celestial spheres, and of the genera and species of things on the earth. Individuals, as such, are merely transient phenomena, which appear on the stream of time only to sink into it again. They are not subject to any higher guiding providence.

18. His teaching with regard to God is undoubtedly the weakest point in the system of Aristotle. He regards God merely as the Prime Mover of the world, and assigns Him no other relations to the world than those which depend on the motion he communicates. As this motion is necessarily communicated by God, it is clear that Aristotle makes Necessity control all things. He knows nothing of Ideas within the Divine Mind, which are the archetypes of created things; he recognises no Divine Providence which guides the universe, no Divine Will, which, of its free accord, gave origin to the world. Under the stern law of Necessity nature runs its eternal course, and individual things are but products of the necessary evolution of nature, appearing for a moment, and then disappearing again. Motionless, though communicating movement, God is separated from the world. What occurs in the world, takes place without concurrence from Him; He does not even know what is taking place. In his theological notions, Plato is clearly far in advance of Aristotle; his teaching regarding God is nearer the truth than Aristotle's theory of the "Prime Mover."

Physics and Psychology.

§ 36.

1. In his physics Aristotle distinguishes between simple and composite bodies. He reckons as simple the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, Fire. Fire has a natural tendency upwards; the Earth

naturally tends downwards, *i.e.* towards the centre of the world. Water and Air are intermediate between these extremes. The Earth occupies the lowest position; above it is Water; above Water, Air; and above Air, the sphere of Fire. In addition to these four simple elements, we have a fifth—the Æther, extending from the heaven of the fixed stars to the moon, out of which the celestial spheres and heavenly bodies are formed. Composite or natural bodies are formed from the four first simple substances, and every composite body contains all four elements combining in different proportions. Aristotle rejects the World-Soul.

2. The Earth is at rest, and occupies the centre of the world. Beyond the sphere of Fire, which forms the extreme limit of the terrestrial region, the celestial spheres begin. The lowest of these is the sphere of the moon; then follow the spheres of the sun and of the planets; and lastly, forming the boundary of the celestial region, comes the sphere of the fixed stars. These celestial spheres revolve eternally round the Earth. The most rapid in its movement of revolution is the sphere of the fixed stars. As we descend the revolving movement becomes slower, and the lower spheres revolve in a direction contrary to the higher. The sphere of the fixed stars alone receives its motion immediately from the Prime Mover. The lower spheres have each its own mover, who, analogously to the Prime Mover, must be a pure entelechy, and therefore a **νοῦς**, or Intelligence.

3. The celestial spheres are not subject to any process of generation or corruption, to any increase or diminution, or alteration. For the heavens are formed of the fifth element, and so do not contain any opposing elements which could render change possible; all change must therefore be excluded from them. It follows that what we style increase and diminution, alteration, generation and corruption, is wholly confined to the terrestrial or sublunary region. Nevertheless, the movements of the several parts of the universe affect one another. The motion of the lower celestial spheres depends upon that of the higher, and all generation, corruption, alteration, increase or diminution occurring in the sublunary region is dependent on the determining influence of the lowest of the celestial spheres, *i.e.* on its motion. The end of this common movement throughout the universe is to bring all things, each according to its position in the whole, to likeness with the Eternal Archetype. The heavens, by their eternal movement, most nearly attain to this perfection; it is attained in the lowest degree by sublunary things, the movements of which are imperfect and limited.

4. The sublunary region is the domain of what we call Nature. In all the changes which take place within it, Nature is working with a plan; it strives in every case after a determined end, and at all times aims at what is best. For this reason there is in its products a continuous gradation. Lowest in its scale are the inorganic, inanimate bodies; then follow organic beings with merely vegetable life (plants); next come organic beings with animal life (brutes); at the top of the scale stands man, superior to all other beings by his gift of reason, and by his reason sharing in the attributes of God. He is the ultimate end and purpose

of Nature. The principle of life in organic beings Aristotle calls the Soul. The question naturally arises, What is the nature of the Soul in general, and what, especially, is the nature of the human Soul? Here we arrive at the Psychology of Aristotle.

5. In his treatise Περὶ ψυχῆς, Aristotle, according to his custom, first refutes the opinions of earlier philosophers regarding the nature of the Soul.

(*a.*) He refutes the opinion that the Soul is merely a Harmony between the parts of the body; his principal argument being that, in this case, the Soul could not be the principle of movement.

(*b.*) He refutes the opinion that the Soul is formed from one of the four natural elements, or by a combination of all four; his chief argument being that, in this case, the Soul would be capable only of those modifications which are characteristic of the four elements, whereas the activity and modifications of the Soul are of a wholly different kind.

(*c.*) He combats Plato's view that self-movement constitutes the essential being of the Soul, and this chiefly on the ground that, in this case, the Soul would occupy space, and would, therefore, be a corporeal being, and free to quit the body at pleasure.

6. So much being premised, Aristotle proceeds to give in positive terms his own notion of the Soul. He begins with the principle that every being of specifically determinate nature consists of Matter and Form. Accordingly, he holds that, in the case of the living being, the principle of life, or Soul, is the Form; the Body is the Matter. Form, as we have seen, is the entelechy—the first, not the second, entelechy. The Soul, being the Form, is, therefore, the first entelechy of the Body. Not every body, however, can become the Matter in which a Soul is received, but only a physical body, and among physical bodies only such as are capable of sustaining life. To this class belong only organized bodies, for the unorganized, as such, exclude vitality. The Soul must, therefore, be defined as *the first entelechy of a physical body, having life potentially*, or briefly, *the first entelechy of a physical organized body* (ἐντελέχεια *πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος δυνάμει*; or, ἐντελέχεια *πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*. De Anim. II. c. 1.)

7. The Soul, being the Form or first entelechy of a physical organic body, it follows that it is also the end, as well as the moving principle, of the latter. It is the end; for, as has been remarked, the Form, in the case of individual things, is always the end of their being, their οὗ ἕνεκα; it is the moving principle; for, as has been shown, the first entelechy is, in every case, the principle of energy or activity in the individual, and therefore, in the case of the living being, the vital energy is dependent on and arises from the first entelechy or Soul. The Soul, being on the one hand the end of the body, and on the other its moving principle, it becomes apparent that the body is the organ or instrument of the Soul; hence the thorough adaptation of parts observed in the bodily organism.

8. Having determined thus the general characteristics of the Soul as such, we must distinguish the various kinds of souls. There are as many different kinds of souls as there are different kinds of organized, living, animated beings. Lowest in this scale is the Soul of the plant. The functions of this Soul are purely vegetative. A degree higher is

the brute Soul. This is the immediate principle of the animal functions in brutes. And, since it is the general law that the higher power virtually includes the lower, the brute Soul includes the virtue of the vegetative Soul, and is, therefore, the principle of the vegetative or organic functions of brute life. Highest in order comes the Soul of man, with which we have chiefly to concern ourselves.

9. Aristotle assigns five principal faculties to the human Soul: Vegetative Power (*τὸ θρεπτικόν*), on which the maintenance of the corporeal organism depends; Appetitive Faculty (*τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*), which is exerted in striving after what is good and agreeable, and in repelling what is disagreeable (*ὄρεξις καὶ φυγή*); the faculty of Sensuous Perception (*τὸ αἰσθητικόν*), by which the objects perceptible by sense are represented in our cognition; the Locomotive Faculty (*τὸ κινητικόν*), by which we are enabled to move the body and its members, and make use of them for external action; and lastly, the Reason (*τὸ διανοητικόν*).

10. The four faculties first named belong to brutes as well as to man. Reason, on the other hand, is the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes. The Vegetative Power is not subject to the control of the Reason. The Appetitive Faculty is so connected with Reason, that its tendencies can and must be brought into accord with the requirements of Reason. This Appetitive Power is of two kinds—the Concupiscible (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*) and the Irascible (*τὸ θυμητικόν*), according as it merely strives for what is good, or rises in opposition to the hindrances which stand between it and the attainment of the good it is seeking. External movement is dependent on the Locomotive Power of the Soul, though it is executed by the bodily organs in which the Soul has its seat. In man this faculty also is subject to the controlling influence of Reason.

11. With regard to the faculty of Sensuous Perception (*τὸ αἰσθητικόν*), we must distinguish between Simple *αἴσθησις* (Perception by sense), Imagination (*φαντασία*), and Memory, including Reminiscence (*μνήμη καὶ ἀνάμνησις*).

(*a.*) In Sensuous Perception (*αἴσθησις*) we must suppose the existence of a perceptible object, which exerts its influence on the Sense. In this process Sense is passive. Under the influence exerted by the object on Sense, there arises in Sense a sensuous image (*εἶδος αἰσθητόν*) of the object, which represents the sensible Form of the object, without the Matter; and through the Form thus presented the faculty of Sense has cognisance of the object. Each sense has its proper (formal) object, but the same (concrete) thing may be perceived by several senses. The sense of Touch is the fundamental and most important sense; it is much more perfect in man than in brutes. Besides the External Senses, there is an Internal or Common Sense, underlying the former, and forming a common centre in which they all unite. Each of the several senses judges of the objects corresponding to itself; the Common Sense distinguishes between the objects of the several senses, and passes judgments regarding them.

(*b.*) By the faculty of Imagination man is enabled to retain and reproduce the *εἴδη αἰσθητά* of sensible objects without the immediate presence of these objects. The action of the Imagination is necessary for intellectual cognition, inasmuch as we must keep the object of intelligence before us under a sensuous image, and this sensuous image (*φάντασμα*) is presented by the Imagination.

(*c.*) The Memory (*μνήμη*) preserves the sensuous forms as the wax preserves the impression of the seal; and this is necessary to make possible the recollection of an object previously perceived. This recollection may be either involuntary, as in brutes; or it may be voluntary, *i.e.* the representations of things may be deliberately recalled to consciousness. The latter process is Reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*), and is peculiar to man.

The primary function of Memory is to preserve the *sensible* forms of things; but inasmuch as the objects of intelligence are presented under sensuous images, it happens that intellectual concepts also may be stored up in the memory.

12. To make possible the action of the Intellect (νοῦς), a previous sensuous perception is necessary. The intellectual operation consists in this, that it divests the objects presented in sense of their material adjuncts, and apprehends the intelligible forms which attain actual existence under sensible conditions. As a result of this operation, there is generated in the Intellect an intellectual form (εἶδος νοητόν), which represents the *intelligible being* of the object, and by means of which the Intellect knows the object, and knows it, moreover, in its inner nature. It is evident that, in this process, the Intellect is not, like Sense, altogether passive, that we must distinguish in this connection its active from its passive (receptive) functions. We are thus led to distinguish between the Active Intellect and the Passive (*intellectus agens* and *possibilis*).

(*a.*) The Active Intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) renders *actually* intelligible the objects of sense, which, in themselves, are only *potentially* intelligible; and this it effects by a process of abstraction, which divests these objects of their material envelopment, and thus renders knowable the intelligible being of the object. It is a light rendering cognizable the intelligible being of things, in the same way that light in external nature renders sensible objects visible. The Active Intellect is pure energy without any potentiality; its activity is continuous.

(*b.*) The Passive Intellect (νοῦς παθητικός), on the other hand, receives the intelligible forms evolved by the abstractive process of the Active Intellect, and through these apprehends the intelligible being of the sensible objects. The Passive Intellect is thus, in a certain sense, moved to action by the Active Intellect, and holds towards the latter the relation of potency to activity. It is, so to speak, the *locus* of the intelligible process—of the εἴδη νοητά. And, inasmuch as it receives into itself the intelligible form of the object, it becomes, ideally, the thing which it apprehends, for it takes into itself the form of the object apprehended, and is put in action by it.

13. In this way the Intellect arrives at Concepts, and through these attains to the knowledge of First Principles, which are involved in the ultimate or highest concepts. The foundation is thus laid for the process of Inference, by which the mind, from knowledge possessed, advances to further knowledge. Inference is the function of the διάνοια or Reason. The διάνοια differs from the νοῦς only in a relative sense. One and the same faculty is Intellect in one respect, Reason in another.

14. All the faculties of the Soul, other than the νοῦς, are essentially connected with the bodily organism, and their functions can be exercised only by means of the organs in which they are located. It is otherwise with the νοῦς. This power does not act in combination with the bodily organism; it is a free faculty, and exercises activity without a corporeal organ. The reasons for this view are evident:

(*a.*) If the νοῦς, like Sense, acted in combination with a bodily organ, the νοῦς, like

Sense, would be impaired and corrupted by too strong an impression of its proper object. The contrary, however, is found to be the case: the more intelligible the object represented in its cognition, the more fully and more perfectly is it able to apprehend the object.

(*b.*) If the νοῦς, as such, were immanent in the bodily organism, and could not act independently of the body, it would be touched by the affections of Sense, such as heat, cold—an evident absurdity.

(*c.*) The functions which are exercised in combination with the body become impaired in proportion as the body grows weaker and more enfeebled. The νοῦς, on the other hand, is neither altered nor enfeebled. If age and sickness sometimes exert a disturbing influence on the νοῦς, this arises from the circumstance that the powers of sense on which it depends for its knowledge are yielding to progressive decay; in itself the νοῦς is not affected by suffering, it is incapable of pain.

15. This is Aristotle's account of the psychical faculties in man. The results of his inquiry into the nature of the Soul's faculties enable him to determine with greater exactness the relations of the Soul to the Body. The following are the propositions which he lays down in this connection:—

(*a.*) The Soul (ψυχή), regarded merely as the principle of vegetative and sensitive life, abstracting from the νοῦς, is inseparable from the body. For, apart from the circumstance that it can exercise no function without the body, it is the entelechy of an organized body, and cannot, therefore, have actual existence apart from the body, of which it is the entelechy. It is separable from the body in our concept, but not in reality; it is not the body itself, but is σώματός τι, *i.e.*, it belongs necessarily to the body. The νοῦς, on the other hand, is *separatus et immixtus*: as it possesses an activity of its own distinct from the activity of the body, so does it possess actual being distinct from, and independent of, the body.

(*b.*) The Soul (ψυχή), as the principle of vegetative and sensitive life, is produced by generation. In generation the male communicates the κινητικόν, the female gives the *Materia*. The body is thus derived from the female parent, the soul from the male, the element derived from the male parent being the entelechy of the element derived from the female. But the νοῦς is not produced by generation, it comes to man from without, and unites itself with him (λείπεται δὲ, τὸν νοῦν θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, De Anim. II., c. 3.)

(*c.*) The Soul, as the principle of vegetative and sensitive life, is mortal; it comes into existence with the body, and it decays with the body. But the νοῦς is incorruptible and immortal. Not having its origin with the body, and in the body, it cannot be dissolved with the body; it has actual being independent of the body.

16. These principles at once suggest a question as to the relations subsisting between the ψυχή and the νοῦς. The views of Aristotle on this point are not expressed with clearness, and in consequence two different interpretations of his teaching have been given by his later interpreters.

(*a*) One section—the earlier interpreters of Aristotle, who in this matter are followed by the Arabian philosophers of the Middle Ages—assume that Aristotle makes the νοῦς something distinct from the individual soul, that he regards it as a principle

distinct in being from the individual, a thing universal in nature, communicating itself to individual men, and thereby rendering them rational, without, however, losing its own essential unity. The reasons adduced in support of this interpretation of Aristotle are:

(1) Aristotle describes the *νοῦς* as *ἕτερον γένος ψυχῆς*, and teaches that it is not intrinsic to the soul, but comes to it from without, that it is in a certain sense implanted in the soul (*ἐγγίνεσθαι*). (De Anim. II., c. 2. 11, I. c. 5. 5.)

(2) This is the only interpretation which gives the *θύραθεν εἰσιέναι* of Aristotle intelligible meaning.

(3.) Aristotle holds the lower faculty to be included in the higher, and hence will have the virtue of the vegetative soul to be included in the sensitive; but this principle he will not allow to have any application in the case of the *νοῦς* and sensitive soul. (De Anim. II., c. 3, 9. 10.)

(*b*) Those who adopt this interpretation are further divided into two classes: the older interpreters, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, assume that Aristotle, in this teaching, is dealing only with the *νοῦς ποιητικός*, and that he makes the *νοῦς παθητικός* a faculty of the individual *ψυχή*. They base this view on the fact that Aristotle asserts (De Anim. III., c. 6, 5), that the *νοῦς παθητικός* is corruptible (*φθαρτός*), whereas he asserts of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* (De Anim. III., c. 6, 4), that it alone is *χωρίσθεις* (separate), and, as such, is *ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀΐδιος* (immortal and everlasting). Later interpreters, as for example, Averroes, separate both *νοῦς ποιητικός* and *νοῦς παθητικός* from the individual soul, and consider both to form one universal being, transcending all individual souls.

(*c*) The Christian Scholastics of the Middle Ages, on the other, unanimously adopt the view that Aristotle understood the *νοῦς* to be a faculty of the individual soul; and that when he describes it as *separatus et immixtus*, he only means to signify that it is not essentially dependent on the corporeal organism. His statements regarding the corruptibility, generation, &c., of the soul, they held only to apply to the sensitive soul, as such, not to the rational human soul; to the latter they considered his doctrines of the *νοῦς* to refer. In support of this interpretation they point out that Aristotle describes the intellect as a part of the soul, by which the soul thinks and becomes wise, that he asserts the soul reasons by means of the intellect—a thing which would be impossible if the intellect were not an essential faculty of the soul.

17. We will not undertake to decide between these two views of Aristotle's teaching; they can each claim reasons in their favour. We may, however, point out, as somewhat remarkable, the circumstance that Aristotle, in his psychology, nowhere speaks of a personal immortality of the Soul; nay, the denial of such immortality appears to be involved in his assertion that the (active) Intellect, although immortal, preserves no memory of former events, *i.e.*, individual thought and consciousness cannot be ascribed to it. (De Anim, III., c. 6, 5.) Even in his Ethics, where the doctrine of a personal immortality of the Soul would be of peculiar importance, no passage is to be found in which the doctrine is unequivocally laid down. On the contrary, we find it stated there (Eth. Nic. III., c. 9), that death is terrible, because it is the end of all, and because neither good nor evil awaits the dead beyond the grave. It is therefore, at best, highly doubtful whether Aristotle held the Soul to be personally immortal. On this point, again, he falls far behind Plato. If we hold that Aristotle does not teach a personal immortality, we must accept the view of his teaching taken by the older interpreters.

18. In conclusion, we must add a few words as to Aristotle's doctrine regarding the seat of the Soul. He is of opinion that the Soul is placed in the heart, for this, he thinks, is the centre of the body, and to this all the organs of sense converge. The Soul animates the body by

means of the vital warmth, which has its source in the heart, and is maintained by the process of breathing. The more intense the animal heat in the living being, the more excellent is the Soul by which it is animated. Death is the extinction of this animal heat.

Ethics and Political Philosophy.

§ 37.

1. In his Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between the two parts of the Soul—the rational part and the irrational—of which, however, the latter participates in the former. The rational part is the Reason (*διάνοια*); the irrational the Appetitive Faculty (*ὄρεξις*). He further distinguishes the Speculative from Practical Reason; the former is concerned with truth in itself and for its own sake; the object and end of the latter is the guidance of human actions. He also distinguishes between *βούλησις* and *προαίρεσις*. The *βούλησις* is directed towards the (essential) end. In this respect man is not free; the end, which is one with the good, is necessarily desired by man, for the reason that man cannot strive for anything but the good. The *προαίρεσις*, on the other hand, is concerned with the means to the end. With regard to the means of attaining the end man is free; between the several means he can exercise a choice. In the *προαίρεσις*, or Election, the two faculties, the *διάνοια* and *ὄρεξις* always co-operate with one another; the former exercises consideration and deliberation, the latter the act of choice. There are thus two causes, under the influence of which an act may cease to be free—Ignorance and Violence.

2. The goods which are the object of desire Aristotle divides into three classes—the morally good, the useful, and the agreeable (*καλὸν*, *συμφέρον καὶ ἡδύ*), according as a good is desirable for its own sake, or merely for sake of another good, or lastly for sake of pleasure. He further distinguishes between goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods, according as they benefit the soul, or the body, or enhance our external condition. Lastly, he distinguishes between the highest good and subordinate goods, understanding by the highest good that which is desired for its own sake, and for sake of which all other things are desired, and by subordinate goods all those which are desired as means to the attainment of the highest.

3. These preliminary notions being defined, Aristotle sets himself to determine wherein the highest good consists. He observes, at the outset, that he does not, like Plato, understand by this term that good which is absolutely the highest, but only the good, which *relatively to man*, is the highest; that good, to wit, which it is possible for man to reach by his efforts in this life. Now it is evident that the highest good, in this sense of the word, is happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), for experience teaches us that in all that we do, and leave undone, we are ever striving

to attain this object. But in a discussion of this question, the important point is to define happiness, to determine what is involved in this notion—What is the nature of happiness?

4. The teaching of Aristotle on this question is directed to show that the happiness of man does not consist in mere passive enjoyment—for this the brute possesses—but rather in action (*ἐνέργεια*), and in action of that kind which is peculiar to man, as contrasted with other living beings—intellectual action. It is not, however, intellectual action of any kind whatever which constitutes happiness, but only virtuous action, that action which springs from virtue, and is in accordance with its laws (Eth. Nic. X. c. 6), for this alone is appropriate to the nature of man. It follows that the highest happiness corresponds to the highest virtue. Though happiness does not consist in pleasure, but in virtuous action, we are not to conclude that pleasure is altogether excluded from happiness. Virtuous action gives rise to the highest form of pleasure, and to the keenest enjoyment. We must, therefore, include pleasure in our concept of happiness, in so far as it is a result of virtuous action, and is thus, in a certain sense, the ultimate complement of our notion of happiness.

5. This analysis of the notion of happiness indicates only the essential elements of the concept; happiness, to be complete, requires further:

(*a*) That it be enjoyed not merely for a short time, but through a life-time, which shall reach at least the average length; "one swallow does not make a summer," neither does the bliss of one day make happiness.

(*b*) That man shall be provided with the goods of the body, and with external goods; for it can hardly be said of a man whom fortune has entirely deserted, and who is the victim of bodily pain, that he is truly happy.

(*c*) Lastly, that man shall have friends; for intercourse with friends effectually encourages and promotes virtuous action, and thus leads to a happy life.

6. Since happiness consists in virtuous action, it is evident that virtue is a necessary means to attainment. We are thus led to seek a definition of the notion of virtue. Virtue, says Aristotle, may be defined as a habit (*habitus*, *ἕξις*), by which man exercises the proper functions of his nature with ease, with promptness, and with steadfastness. It follows that virtue cannot be learned, but must be acquired by practice. Virtue is not one; there are as many kinds of virtue as there are different ends to which the rational activity of man can be directed.

7. In classifying the virtues, Aristotle bases his classification on the distinction already indicated between the rational part of the soul and that part which is irrational, though participating in reason. He distinguishes two kinds of virtue—the ethical and the dianoetical; the former belong to the appetitive faculty (*ὄρεξις*), the part of the soul which is itself irrational, though participating in reason; the latter belongs to the rational part of the soul.

8. The ethical virtues are, in part, concerned with the *πάθη*, Passions, or sensuous affections, in so far as these are governed and guided by reason; in part they have to do immediately with external action, in so far as it is controlled by reason. It is characteristic of all ethical vir-

tues that they maintain a just mean between two opposing vices, one of which denotes excess (*ὑπερβολή*), the other defect (*ἔλλειψις*). This just mean is that which each man fixes for himself by rational deliberation (medium rationis). It is only in the case of Justice that the medium rationis (the mean of reason) is the medium rei (the objective mean.)

9. According to Aristotle, the ethical virtues can be reduced to the following cardinal virtues: Fortitude (*ἀνδρεια*) maintains the mean between fear and rashness (*μεσότης περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη*); Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) guards the mean between pleasures and pains (*μεσότης περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*), but refers to pleasure rather than to pain, and chiefly to those pleasures which are lowest in kind, and which are common to men and to brutes; Liberality (*ἐλευθεριότης*) and Magnificence (*μεγαλοπρέπεια*) preserve the mean in giving and receiving (*μεσότης περὶ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν*), avoiding the extremes of prodigality and niggardliness. Liberality is concerned with small values, magnificence with great. Highmindedness and Ambition (*μεγαλοψυχία καὶ φιλοτιμία*) observe the proper mean in matters respecting honour and dishonour (*μεσότης περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν*); Mildness preserves the proper mean in the seeking of revenge (*μεσότης περὶ ὀργήν*); Truthfulness, Readiness in social intercourse, and Friendliness (*ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπέλεια, φιλία*) preserve the mean in the use of words and actions in society (*μεσότητες περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν*). The first of these three virtues regards veracity (*ἀληθές*) in words and actions, the two others are concerned with the agreeable *ἡδύ*—the one *εὐτραπέλεια* having its place in social pastimes (*ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς*), the other *φιλία*, in all other social relations (*ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις*). A further virtue is Shame.

10. But the most important and the most excellent of the ethical virtues is Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*). In the widest sense Justice is the practice of all the ethical virtues towards our fellow-men, in which sense it is equivalent to the observance of law. In a narrower sense, as a special virtue, it is concerned with equality (*ἴσον*) in the matter of gain or disadvantage. In this sense it is of two kinds: either it deals with the distribution (*ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς*) of honours or possessions among the members of a community (justitia distributiva), or it deals with the transactions of men *inter se* (*ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν*). This equalising process is partly voluntary, partly involuntary; to the first kind belongs justice in contracts (justitia commutativa); to the second belongs justice in inflicting punishment (justitia vindicativa.*) Equity (*ἐπιείκεια*) is

* "Distributive Justice (*τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς δίκαιον*) rests upon a geometrical proportion: As the several persons in question are to one another in moral worth (*ἀξία*), so must be that which is allotted to each. Commutative Justice (*τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον*, or *τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις, καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις*) is also an equalising principle (*ἴσον*), but rests on an arithmetical rather than on a geometrical proportion; for the moral worth of the several persons is not, in this case, taken into consideration, but only the gain secured, or the loss suffered. Commutative justice removes the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession which results from loss (or gain), by causing a gain (or loss) equal to the diminution (or the increase). The original condition thus re-established is a mean between the less and the greater, according to arithmetical proportion."

connected with Justice. Rights are of two kinds, natural and positive (*δίκαιον φυσικὸν καὶ νομικόν*). Equity applies to positive rights established by legal enactments, and is an emanation from or complement of legal justice to meet the needs of individual cases. The provisions of the law must be general and applicable to the normal condition of things; individual cases do not always accord with this common standard; in such cases equity makes good the defects of the law, it prescribes a course of action conformable to the intention of the law-giver, such a course as he would require were he present himself.

11. The Dianoetic Virtues are of two kinds, those which belong to the Practical Reason, and those which belong to the Speculative Reason. In the first class are included Art (*τέχνη*) and Practical Wisdom (*φρόνησις*, of which the former regulates the action directed to produce some extrinsic result (*ποιεῖν*); the latter fixes the right method in attaining the goodness intrinsic to actions in themselves (*πράττειν*). To the second class belong Understanding (*νοῦς*, Science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and Wisdom (*σοφία*). Of these Understanding has to do with the knowledge of first principles, Science with the demonstration of truth, and Wisdom with speculative inquiry into the ultimate causes of all being.

12. In order of importance these virtues are related to one another as the faculties of the Soul to which they respectively belong. Lowest in the scale are the ethical virtues. Above these are the virtues of the Practical Reason, and highest in order the virtues of the Speculative Reason. Among the virtues of the Speculative Reason, Wisdom holds the first place. We have seen that happiness consists in virtuous action, and that in the highest virtue is found the highest happiness. This being so, it is clear that it is not in the active life, in which the ethical virtues are exercised, that the highest happiness is attained, but in the contemplative life, in which the dianoetic virtues, Understanding, Science, and Wisdom, are practised.

13. From this it follows that it is in pure speculation, *θεωρία*, that the highest degree of happiness is reached. Thought of this kind springs from the highest virtue; it is furthermore concerned with the highest object of our knowledge, and thus results in the highest kind of pleasure. The happiness which this *θεωρία* brings with it does not suppose any busy activity, it can be enjoyed in rest and retirement. Moreover it does not require to be supplemented by external goods so largely as the happiness of the active life. By the *θεωρία* man approaches the divinity; for since the happiness of the gods consists in *θεωρία*, *i.e.*, the knowledge of themselves, man's happiness attained by *θεωρία* is of the divine order. In this condition of happiness man lives, in a certain sense, a divine life. Everything that goes to make up the notion of supreme happiness is found in this *θεωρία*. All men, however, cannot attain to it; the bulk of mankind must content themselves with the happiness of the active life.

14. In the attainment of that happiness which is the end of life, the individual man is forced to depend on his fellow-men. Man is, of his nature, destined for society. The social bond begins in

the family, and is perfected in the State. It is only in the State that man's moral duty can be adequately fulfilled. This brings us to Aristotle's political philosophy.

15. Aristotle teaches that the State is above the individual in the same sense in which the whole is above the part, or the end above the means. But for this very reason it is only in the State that the individual attains his true worth, his true importance. The individual thing, in so far as it is a member of the whole, has its work and its importance only in the whole and by the whole; and the principle holds as applied to the individual in his relation to the State. The State is its own end; the individual exists for the State. The whole worth, and whole destiny of the individual is attained if he is a good citizen, a worthy member of the body politic. (State Absolutism.)

16. The duties of the individual towards the State, and of the State towards the individual, can now be easily determined:

(*a*) It is the duty of the individual to make himself a capable and useful citizen. The means by which he may attain this end are indicated by Ethics. Ethical Science is, therefore, a department of Political Philosophy. The happiness which it proposes to man as the object of his efforts can be attained only in civil society. It is only the good citizen who can be a happy man. Hence the notion of virtue in general, and of civic virtue, are one and the same.

(*b*) It is the duty of the State, on the other hand, to lead the citizen to that happiness which Ethical Science sets before him as the object of his efforts. It has to take thought for the well-being of all. There is, however, only one way of discharging this duty, and that is by educating all who belong to the State, so as to make them good and virtuous citizens; for in virtuous action primarily consists the happiness of men. As, however, material goods and the external goods of fortune are requisite to the perfection of this happiness, the State must, further, provide for the external well-being of its citizens. The question how the State must be constituted, and after what manner it must direct its action in order to secure the ends here specified, it is the province of the Science of Politics to determine.

17. In dealing with the first part of the question—how the State should be constituted in order to secure its end—we must distinguish its social from its political constitution.

(*a*) In the social constitution, Aristotle does not, like Plato, propose the abolition of the family or of private property. Both must be upheld and protected in the State. According to Aristotle the family is, of its nature, antecedent to the State; the State, must, therefore, maintain it intact. Liberty of marriage should, however, be restricted by law. More than this: children of defective bodily formation should not be reared, a maximum number of births should be fixed by law, any excess beyond this number should be destroyed in embryo. Private property, which, of its nature, is likewise antecedent to the State, must also be inviolate; the State, should, however, reserve a certain amount of public property for public uses.

(*b*) It is specially worthy of remark, in connection with the social philosophy of Aristotle, that he is distinctly an advocate of slavery. According to him the individual who is formed for obedience, not for intelligence, is by nature destined to be a slave. The slave is merely an animated instrument; a sort of detached portion of the body of his master, and has no rights whatever as against his master. He should, of course, be treated with humanity, but the master who fails so to treat him does him no injustice.

(*c*) With regard to the political constitution of the State, Aristotle distinguishes three usual forms of government: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy (*πολίτεια*). Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy (in the sense of ochlocracy, or as it is sometimes styled, mobocracy), are the respective corruptions of these forms. Of these corruptions, tyranny is the worst, as being the corruption of the form which is the best—the monarchical. The characteristic difference between the good and the bad form of government is found in the end which the governing authority pursues; the good government seeks the common weal, the evil seeks private interests. The constitution which embraces elements of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, is the most enduring, but in particular cases the form of government must conform to particular needs.

18. In reference to the second question—what must be the action of the State, in order to attain its end?—the general good, as far as it depends on the action of the State, must be secured by the law and by the administration of the law. The law, as the expression of reason, must be supreme in the State; the ruler is merely a living law. A special object of the legislator's attention must be the education of the young. The final purpose of all education is, of course, virtue. Things which subserve external ends can, however, be subject of instruction, but only in so far as they do not render the learner vulgar (*i.e.*, a pursuer of external gain for its own sake.) Grammar, Gymnastics, Music, and Arithmetic are the subjects of an elementary general education.

19. The political philosophy of Aristotle is an advance on that of Plato, inasmuch as it does not push the theory of State Absolutism to the length of Socialism. On the other hand, the ethical teaching of Aristotle is inferior to that of Plato, for it does not fix any higher end to which the moral action of man is to be directed, but confines man's destiny wholly within earthly life, and the sphere of earthly aims. There is no prospect put before him of a higher retribution after death.

20. If, in conclusion, we glance at Aristotle's teaching on the subject of Art, we find that he holds it to consist in the imitation (*μίμησις*) of nature. This imitation "is not, however, a mere copying of individual objects in nature, with their manifold defects, it looks rather to their essential being, and the perfection to which nature tended in their formation, so that while preserving likeness, it is the function of Art to idealise; it imitates, but it improves in the imitation." The purpose of Art is threefold—delight and recreation; the calming, purifying,

and ennobling of the affections (*κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων*), and ultimately ethical culture. Tragedy, a special form of Art, is the artistic dramatic representation of some incident which excites pity and fear.

The Chief Peripatetics.

§ 38.

1. The disciples of Aristotle, during the two or three centuries following his death, for the most part abandoned metaphysical speculation, and devoted themselves, some to physical science, and others to the popular treatment of Ethics, from the naturalistic standpoint. The later Peripatetics, on the other hand, returned again to the genuine views of Aristotle, and rendered service chiefly by their interpretation of his writings.

2. Prominent among the older Peripatetics are:

(*a*) Eudemus of Rhodes, and Theophrastus of Lesbos, the latter of whom is said to have been appointed by Aristotle himself as his successor, and for thirty-five years presided over the Peripatetic School. Eudemus seems to have followed Aristotle with fidelity: Theophrastus exercised more independence in his teaching. In the details in which they differ from Aristotle, it will be observed that Eudemus shows a tendency to be theological, Theophrastus to be naturalistic. In Logic, Eudemus and Theophrastus gave fuller development to the doctrine of Problematical Judgments and the Syllogism.

(*b*) The chief merit of Theophrastus lies in the extension he gave to natural science, especially to botany (phytology), and in his life-like delineation of human character. His chief work: *Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες*, is on the latter subject. In metaphysics and psychology he shows a disposition to adopt a theory of immanence, in the solution of problems to which Aristotle had applied the notion of transcendence. But he remains faithful, in the main, to the Aristotelian views. He holds the *νοῦς* to be the better and more divine part of man, and to come from an external source; he asserts it possesses a certain separateness in existence (*χωρισμός*), and yet he will have it to be in some way or other congenital with man's nature (*σύμφυτος*). It is not clear what is the precise drift of his teaching on this point. The activity of thought he describes as motion (*κίνησις*), but not a motion in space. In his ethics he lays special stress on the "Choregia" secured to virtue by the possession of external goods, without which, he thinks, happiness is not attainable.*

Praxiphanes, a pupil of Theophrastus (B.C. 300), gave special attention to the study of Grammar.

(*c*) Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the "Musician," and Dicæarchus of Messene. The former held the soul to be the Harmony of the body. The latter assumes that individual substantial souls do not exist, but that a single living sensitive force is diffused through all organic beings, which is transiently individualized in corporeal forms (Cic. *Tusc.* I. 10.) He exalts practice over theory, and holds speculation to be of little moment. Phanias, Clearchus, and Demetrius follow him.

(*d*) Strato of Lampsacus, the "Physicist," who succeeded Theophrastus in his teaching functions about B.C. 288 or 287, and presided over the school for eighteen years. He transformed the teaching of Aristotle into a consistent system of Naturalism. He abandons the Aristotelian notion of a *νοῦς* distinct from Matter, and he asserts that in everything which is produced, we have no more than the mere natural effects of

* Cfr. Meuten. *Peripateticorum Philosophiæ moralis secundum Stobæum.* Wismar, 1859. In later times, Theophrastus was frequently reproached with having approved the maxim of the poet: *Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia;* but it would appear that he admitted the principle only in reference to external goods. Theophrastus distinctly holds that virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and that without virtue all external goods are worthless (Cic. *Tusc.* 5, 9; *De Leg.*, 1, 13). A slight departure from moral virtue, Theophrastus would permit, and even enjoin, when it is necessary to aid a friend, to avoid some great evil, or attain some important good.

gravity and motion. Nature is merely the comprehensive concept of the divine powers, which work unconsciously in the physical world. There is no difference between Perception and Thought; the seat of Thought is in the head, between the eyebrows; there the 'material' traces (*ὑπομονή*) of the images of perception persist—to revive again when memory is exercised.

A similar line of speculation seems to have been followed by Plato's successors:—Lyco, his pupil, Aristo, Critolaus, Diodorus, Staseas, and Cratippus.

3. The most remarkable of the later Peripatetics are:

(*a*) Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of the writings of Aristotle (B.C. 70); Boethus of Sidon (about the time of Julius Cæsar); Nicolas of Damascus (under Augustus and Tiberius). These writers rendered important service in promoting the study of Aristotle's writings, and helping to make them understood. Andronicus, in his exposition of Aristotle's teaching, began with Logic. His pupil, Boethus, was of opinion that Physics is the science which first presents itself to us, which is more intelligible to us, and with which, therefore, philosophy should begin. The followers of these philosophers include Alexander of Ægæ, Nero's tutor (A.D. 50); Adrastus of Aphrodisias (A.D. 100); Aspasias (A.D. 150), and Herminus.

(*b*) Aristocles of Messene, and his pupil Alexander of Aphrodisias, the "Exegete" (A.D. 200). In Aristocles we find a tendency to Stoicism—an eclecticism which prepared the way for the fusion of the chief philosophical systems in Neo-Platonism. Alexander of Aphrodisias, was the most famous of the interpreters of Aristotle; he is the Exegete *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. He distinguishes in man a *νοῦς ὑλικός*, a *νοῦς ποιητικός*, and a *νοῦς ἐπίκτητος* or *νοῦς καθ' ἕξιν*, but identifies the *νοῦς ποιητικός* with the Godhead, as already indicated.

(*c*) From the Neo-Platonist school came also some distinguished interpreters of Aristotle, *e.g.*, Porphyry (in the third century); Philoponus and Simplicius (sixth century.)

The celebrated physician, Galenus (born about A.D. 131), may be included amongst the interpreters of Aristotle. He was indeed an Eclectic, but his views are, on the whole, in accord with the Peripatetic teaching. We shall, however, have to notice him again when we speak of the Eclectics.

THIRD PERIOD.

Decay of Greek Philosophy.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

§ 39.

1. The golden age of Greek Philosophy closes with Aristotle. The freedom of Greece was lost in the battle of Chæronea (B.C. 338). The military power which rose on the northern frontier of the Peninsula, laid its iron hand upon the free land of Greece, and stifled the life which had hitherto pulsated within it. It was in vain that the great orator, Demosthenes, a "particularist" in the best sense of the term, strove to rouse the Greeks by his potent eloquence to watchfulness and to union against the danger. Philip of Macedon was able to paralyse his efforts. He was able to form in Greece itself a party which withstood the efforts of the great Demosthenes, dissolved the bonds of union among the Greeks, and so prepared the way for the final blow at Chæronea.

The party of Aeschines triumphed over the patriotism of Demosthenes, and made Greece a prey to the Northern State.

2. The loss of liberty and independence was followed by its natural result—the torpor of the creative powers of the Greek mind. Under a military tyranny Art and Science cannot flourish. This was signally exemplified in the philosophy of Greece. The Greek mind, held in thrall by the Macedonian power, could no longer attempt an independent solution of speculative problems. It contented itself with returning upon the results attained by earlier thinkers, and reproducing these in new guise for philosophic study. In executing this task the philosophers of this period were not so much guided by love of pure speculation as by practical aims. To discover the conditions and methods by which the individual may reach happiness here below, was the chief end they proposed to themselves. The theoretic elements which the philosophers of this period adopted from earlier systems were utilised chiefly to establish and to justify the practical doctrines regarding subjective happiness on earth, which the several philosophers professed. The lofty mystical flights of Plato, the preference for the *θεωρία* over practical philosophy, which we observe in Aristotle, are not to be found in this period; the Greek mind was no longer capable of this elevation of thought.

3. We cannot be surprised to find that the sum of truth contained in the systems of Greek Philosophy subsequently to the time of Aristotle is reduced to a small compass, and to observe that the ideal or supersensuous element finds no place in the philosophy of this period. The lofty speculative ideas of Plato and the sharply-defined metaphysical conceptions of Aristotle are succeeded by the realistic pantheism of the Stoics and the dull materialism of the Epicureans. Plato's mystical view of the nature of knowledge and Aristotle's well-marked distinction between intellectual and sensuous cognition disappear, and we have instead Empiricism and Sensualism. Virtue is no longer connected with a higher spiritual destiny of man, as in the Platonic system; it is either made its own end, as in the system of the Stoics, or regarded merely as a means to pleasure, as in the view of the Epicureans. The primitive philosophical notions, beyond which the Socratic systems had advanced, were again brought into prominence, and thus a retrograde movement began, which must be described as a decline of philosophy. In due course the scepticism which this relaxation of the earnest philosophical spirit was sure to call forth, made its appearance, and its wasting action utterly destroyed the diminished sum of truth still remaining. This scepticism was the expression of the utter impotence of the philosophical spirit, the death of philosophy, the quagmire in which the current of Greek philosophy was lost.

4. The old spirit of Greek independence and liberty seemed to revive for a time in Sparta when Cleomenes restored the constitution of Lycurgus, and again in the Ætolian and Achaian Leagues, under Aratus and Philopœmen (B.C. 210). But soon another military power—that of the Romans, took the place of Macedon. By the fall of Corinth

(B.C. 145) Greece became subject to Rome, and was reduced to the condition of a Roman province. A consequence of its subjugation was that the language, literature, and refinement of Greece were introduced into Rome. At an earlier period (B.C. 155), three Greek philosophers, Critolaus (a Peripatetic), Carneades (an Academic), and Diogenes (a Stoic), had visited Rome as ambassadors of Athens, and had taken advantage of their visit to recommend by their discourses the philosophy and science of Greece to the Roman youth. After the conquest of Greece, this kind of intercourse between Greeks and Romans was more actively carried on. But no higher development of philosophical speculation was attained by the Greeks, nor did the leaven of Greek civilization introduced at Rome give rise to an original Roman philosophy.

5. The Romans were a people of a practical turn, devoted to practical political aims, and took little pleasure in philosophical speculations. Such mental occupations they held to be useless, aimless, and undignified. The concerns of his country, the promoting of its prosperity at home and of its glory and power abroad, were the only objects which the Roman thought worthy of his efforts. Moreover, he had an interest in preserving Roman principles and Roman morals from the corrupting influences of the later philosophy of Greece. His national pride, too, disdained to imitate the despised *Græculi* in their scientific labours. All these causes combined to prevent the growth of an independent philosophy in Rome. The philosophy of the Romans is merely a more or less modified reproduction of the philosophical theories of Greece; and in their choice of systems the Romans confined themselves almost exclusively to those of later origin, chiefly to those of the Stoics and Epicureans. The systems of Plato and Aristotle, which involved profound and far-reaching speculation, were not to their taste. We find in much favour amongst them a certain Eclecticism, which borrowed from the different systems what appeared to be most probable in each.

What is called the philosophy of Rome is merely an offshoot of Greek philosophy transplanted to a foreign soil, which occasionally assumes a somewhat peculiar character, but which cannot be regarded as a creation of the Roman mind. In the time of the Cæsars, Epicurean notions affected more and more profoundly the life of the Roman people: but this is to be attributed to the profound moral corruption which grew and spread abroad under the Empire.

6. In accordance with the general outlines which we have here traced, we proceed to treat first of Stoicism, then of Epicureanism, and lastly of Scepticism and Eclecticism. Roman philosophy we shall not treat apart; we shall refer to the several Roman philosophers when dealing with the school of Greek philosophy to which they happen to belong. For since Roman philosophy is no more than an offshoot from the Greek, it can be rightly treated only in connection with the latter.

THE STOICS.

Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.

GENERAL REMARKS.

§ 40.

1. The School of the Stoics was founded by Zeno of Cittium (in Cyprus), a pupil of Crates the Cynic, of Stilpo the Megarian, and of the Academics Xenocrates and Polemon. He lived between B.C. 350 and B.C. 258. Zeno was the son of a merchant, and was himself, for a time, engaged in trade. It is said that he was compelled to take up his residence in Athens in consequence of a shipwreck. At Athens he attached himself successively to the philosophers named above. Shortly after the year B.C. 310, he founded his own school in the στόα ποικίλη—a portico adorned with the paintings of Polygnotus, whence the title "Stoic," bestowed on his school. He is said to have taught for fifty-eight years. The Athenians held him in high esteem. His writings (on the State, on Life in accordance with Nature, &c.) have all been lost. His pupils were: Persæus of Cittium, Aristo of Chios, Herillus of Carchedon (Carthage), and, most remarkable of all, Cleanthes.

2. Cleanthes of Assus, in Troas, the successor of Zeno in his teaching functions, was originally a pugilist, and during the period of his instruction by Zeno earned his livelihood by working during the night, carrying water and kneading dough. "It was only slowly and with difficulty that he mastered philosophical theories, but when he had once mastered them, he held them tenaciously, for which reason Zeno compared him to a hard slab, on which it is difficult to make an impression, but which preserves indelibly the lines traced on it." Cleanthes has left us a "Hymn to the Most High God." His other writings have perished. Sphaerus of Bosphorus, Boethus, and Chrysippus were his pupils.

3. Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus, in Cilicia (B.C. 282-209), was the successor of Cleanthes in his school. By his thoroughly systematic development of the doctrines of Stoicism, he deserved to be reckoned the second founder of the Stoic school. He was a very prolific writer. He is said to have written 500 lines daily, and to have composed 750 books. These works contained many quotations from other writers, specially from the poets, and contained also many repetitions and corrections (Diog. Laert. VII. 180). The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon—the same who has been mentioned in connection with the embassy to Rome. After these the next head of the school was Antipater of Tarsus.

Thus much with reference to the "older" Stoics, who founded and developed the system of the school. The "later" Stoics we shall have occasion to notice further on. We shall occupy ourselves for the present with the doctrines of Stoicism.

4. The Stoics regarded philosophy as primarily a practical concern. Regarded in this light, it was for them a striving after virtue, after that which is alone worthy of our desires, and on which the whole happiness of man is based. In a secondary sense, it had a theoretical character. Considered from the theoretical point of view, they regarded it as right insight, depending on a knowledge of things divine and human. The theoretical aspect was, however, subordinate to the practical and found in the latter its end and purpose. For right insight must teach us that Virtue is the highest good, and must show us the way by which we can and must attain to Virtue.

5. These principles being premised, the Stoics divided philosophy into three parts: Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Theology is included in Physics. For this reason Physics would, of itself, take precedence of

Ethics. As a matter of fact, however, it is subservient to the latter. The Logic of the Stoics is their theory of the λόγοι, *i.e.* of thoughts and language; and they therefore divide it into Dialectic and Rhetoric. Dialectic includes the Theory of Knowledge, Logic (in the Aristotelian sense), and Grammar. To Grammatical Science the Stoics rendered important services, but it would be beyond the scope of our present work to follow them into this field of study. We shall confine ourselves to an exposition, first, of their Logic and Theory of Knowledge; then, of their Physics; and lastly, of their Ethics.

Logic and Theory of Knowledge of the Stoics

§ 41.

1. The Stoics teach that all intellectual knowledge takes rise in sensuous perception. The soul, at first, is like a sheet of blank paper, on which representations of things are afterwards delineated by the senses. The beginning of all knowledge is, therefore, the αἴσθησις (perception of sense). This, as soon as we are conscious of it, becomes a Representation (φαντασία) or mental image. During the formation of this Representation the Soul is purely passive, the Representation is like the impression of a seal on wax (τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, for which Chrysippus, to modify the doctrine, substituted ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς, an alteration in the Soul). According to this view, the object of itself produces its Representation on the subject, and this Representation manifests itself, and in itself the corresponding object, to the subject. When we have apprehended an object, the remembrance of this object remains after the object has been removed. A large number of memories of this kind constitute experience (ἐμπειρία).

2. In the further progress of the process of thought, Concepts are formed from these Representations. The formation of Concepts is effected in two ways. Some are formed spontaneously and without conscious co-operation on our part (ἀνεπιτεχνήτως). Others are the outcome of a deliberate and methodical process of thought. A number of similar Representations having been produced within us, there arise, spontaneously and without any reflex thought on our part, certain universal notions, which form a basis for the reflex and methodical formation of Concepts. These notions are called by the Stoics προλήψεις or κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι. In a second stage, the reflex activity of thought is exercised. It detects resemblances and analogies, transforms and combines notions, and so forms artificially reflex Concepts, called by the Stoics ἔννοιαι. For the ten categories of Aristotle the Stoics substitute, as ultimate universal concepts (γενικώτατα), Substance (or Substratum), Essential Quality, Accidental State or Condition, and Relation.

3. Judgment and Inference depend upon Concepts. The Stoics added to the theory of inference their doctrine regarding the hypo-

thetical syllogism—a form of reasoning which Aristotle did not specially investigate. By inference, say the Stoics, we are able to advance from one truth to another, and thus are in a position to investigate the causes of phenomena. In this way Science (ἐπιστήμη) is created—the highest form of human knowledge. The right formation both of Concepts and of Judgments and Inferences is regulated by certain rules, which it is the province of Dialectic to lay down.

4. With regard to the relation subsisting between Concept and Being, the Stoics seem to have adopted the view which, in the Middle Ages, was known as that of the Nominalists. They combat alike the Platonic and the Aristotelian doctrine of the objective reality of Concepts; they assert that the Concept is something purely subjective, formed by a process of abstraction, to which, however, no real being corresponds in the objective order. The individual, as such, is the only thing which has real existence; the universal concept is a purely subjective product of the process of thought, whether we consider the form of the thought, or the thing given in the thought. In this doctrine we have distinctly brought before us the purely empirical character of the Stoic Theory of Knowledge. For in this theory Concepts are deprived of all relation to the essential being of things, and are thus reduced to mere generalized sensuous perceptions.

5. The Stoics, in their Theory of Knowledge, occupy themselves largely with the question of a criterion of truth. They find this criterion in the κατάληψις (Apprehension). This κατάληψις is attained when the object is represented in the mind with such clearness, force, and energy of conviction, that the truth of the representation cannot be denied. In such circumstances, the representation, and in the representation the object, is grasped or apprehended (καταλαμβάνεται) with absolute certainty. A representation thus clear, and thus forcing conviction (φαντασία καταληπτική), is necessarily recognised as indubitably true, while the representation which does not exhibit this clearness or carry this force of conviction (φαντασία ἀκατάληπτος) does not give the same certainty, and must, therefore, be regarded only as more or less probable.

6. In accordance with these principles, the Stoics define Knowledge as (Stob. Ecl. Eth. II. 128) κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου—certain and indisputable apprehension by means of a concept, and define Science as a system from such apprehensions. According to Cicero (Acad. II. 47), Zeno compared Perception to the extension of the fingers, Assent (συγκατάθεσις) to the hand half-closed, the Apprehension of the object (κατάληψις) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and Knowledge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it is more strongly and securely closed. Knowledge, according to this account of the theory, is κατάληψις perfected. It is, however, to be remarked that on the point here in question the several Stoics differ widely from one another.

Physics of the Stoics.

§ 42.

1. Empiricists in their logical teaching, the Stoics are realists in their views regarding physical nature; that is to say, they maintain that all real being is corporeal, that there is no incorporeal existence. In their physics they do no more than largely develop the doctrine of Heraclitus that Fire is the ultimate principle of all things, and the further doctrine of the perpetual flux of generation and decay.

2. For the four Aristotelian principles of things the Stoics substitute two—*τὸ ποιοῦν* and *τὸ πάσχον*, the active principle and the passive, Matter and Force. In order that a thing may come to exist, there must be a Matter, *ὕλη*, out of which the thing is formed, and a Force, which communicates to it the form it receives. Matter is, in itself, without motion and without form, but capable of receiving any motion and any form. Force, on the other hand, is the active, moving, formative principle. It is inseparably united with Matter.

3. On these notions are constructed the theological and cosmological systems of the Stoics. To explain the origin of the world, two principles, they think, must be assumed—Matter, out of which the world is formed, and a formative principle. The latter is God. These two principles, God and Matter, must not, however, be regarded as substantially different from one another. God, being the active force, is substantially one with the passive principle—Matter. The relation of God to the world is the relation of soul to body. The world is the body of God. This pantheistical view, which unites God and the world in one being, is resolutely maintained by the Stoics.

4. But, we may ask, what is the nature of this God, who is the active formative force of the universe? To this question the Stoics reply:—

(*a*) God, as the Efficient Cause in the Universe, must be conceived as of the nature of Fire or Æther, who under the form of heat pervades the universe, and thereby gives it actual existence (*τὸ πῦρ τεχνικόν*, the creative or forming fire). For experience shows us that being and life in nature are dependent upon internal vital heat. Under this aspect, God appears as universal energy in nature (*φύσις*), pervading, animating, and vivifying the world; hence we sometimes find that the Stoics use interchangeably the notions "Nature" and "God."

(*b*) God, as the formative principle of the world, is to be regarded as an universal cosmical Reason, which forms the universe, and establishes it in order, in obedience to the inherent law of His being, which obliges Him to act according to plan and purpose. That the divine nature must be regarded as a Living Reason, is evident from the facts:

(1) That beauty, order, and purpose, prevail throughout the universe, and these suppose a reasoning cause;

(2) That certain parts of the universe of things are possessed of consciousness, an impossibility, if the universe, as a whole, were not conscious; for the whole, as such, must always be more perfect than any of its parts.

(*c*) The divine nature is, therefore, to be conceived as a rational, artistically working Fire, which is at once the Soul and the Reason of the universe. As Universal Reason, God contains within Himself, in the rational state, the germs of the objects which constitute the world (λόγος σπερματικός, "seminal reason"); these germs receive actuality, and become manifest in the individual objects of the real world by the action of God as the Soul of the Universe.

5. After this statement of general principles, the Stoics further distinguish two aspects of the divine nature. The Divine Fire manifests itself, on the one hand, as vital heat; as such it is wholly sunk in material nature; in another of its manifestations it is, to a certain extent, liberated and independent. This nobler portion of the Divine Being is the pure luminous Æther, the proper region of which is the higher parts of the universe. This luminous æther is, therefore, the ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος, or governing part of the Godhead, the Zeus of mythology, the proper principle of universal Reason, the highest wisdom, and the supreme law of all things.

6. Having thus explained the nature of God—the creative and formative principle in the universe—the Stoics next describe the process by which the universe was formed. The Divine Primal Fire was first condensed into Air and Water; the Water in part turned into Earth, in part remained Water, and in part was rarefied into Air, which again returned to the state of Fire. The two more condensed elements, Earth and Water, are chiefly passive, the two more rarefied, Air and Fire, are chiefly active. This theory, like that of Heraclitus, involves the universe in a cycle of perpetual changes. By continual condensation, the elements are ever coming forth from the Primal Fire, and by continual rarefactions they are returning to it again. The denser elements give rise to individual objects, in which the λόγοι σπερματικοί attain actual existence.

7. From the principles here laid down are readily deduced the attributes which the Stoics assigned to the world. Considered as forming one being:

(*a*) The visible, or, as we may say, corporeal world, is indeed the body of God; but the world, taken in its entirety, is God himself. In essential intrinsic nature, it is nothing more than the Being of God, evolving itself into a visible world.

(*b*) The world being, in a certain sense, God rendered concrete, is furthermore the best and most excellent world conceivable. All the predicates which express the highest perfection, may therefore be attributed to it. It is rational, wise, provident, and the fulness of beauty. How could rational beings form part of it, if it were not rational itself?

(*c*) The world, as a whole, is God; its parts considered as forming subordinate wholes, in which the Divine Force manifests itself, must be regarded as subordinate gods. This is more especially true of the Stars

and the Elements. By the aid of this principle the Stoics endeavour to explain the whole mythological system.

8. In its material aspect, *i.e.*, viewed as it manifests itself to our experience, the world, according to the Stoics, is a well-ordered unity, limited in extent, and spherical in shape. Beyond the world there is only an endless vacuum. Time is the range of the world's motion; it is without limit in the past, and without limit in the future. Individual objects in the universe are all different from one another. No two leaves, no two living things, are perfectly alike.

9. Turning from the consideration of the constitution of the universe as a whole, and directing our attention to the course of its existence, *i.e.*, to the succession in time of the events that are accomplished in the world, we meet with another notion, to which special prominence is given in the system of the Stoics—the notion of Providence (*πρόνοια.*) Since God is the Reason of the universe, it follows that the whole series of events accomplished in the world is controlled and guided by the Divine Reason. Here we arrive at the notion of a Providence. This Reason acts according to plan and purpose, and guides all things with intelligence and wisdom.

10. Owing to their pantheistical conceptions, the Stoics could not admit a theory of Providence which would leave room for liberty, and for the occurrence of merely casual incidents in the world. Their notion of Providence led immediately to the notion of Destiny or Fate (*εἱμαρμένη.*) They taught that all things happen from necessity, and this necessity, they explained, rests upon an inexorable Fate. God Himself is not free. He must act according to the necessities of His nature; the same necessity must control the course of events in the world, for the world is nothing more than the evolution of the Divine Nature. This necessity is called Fate. To the dominion of Fate all things are subject.

11. It is clear that the liberty of the human will could not be reconciled with these fatalistic notions. Hence we find that it was peremptorily denied by the older Stoics. Chrysippus, however, endeavoured to assert it in a modified form. He distinguished between a man's individual acts, and his general inner character, from which these individual acts proceed. The general inner character, according to which a man is obliged to act, is, in every case, determined by Fate, and to this extent is pre-determined, but in individual actions man determines himself, and in this sense acts with freedom.

12. Man must, therefore, be compared to a stone rolling down a mountain. The stone, once set in motion, rolls downwards of itself without a further impulse; so the human will, once determined by Fate, accomplishes the individual acts in which its general character manifests itself, without need of a further impulse from Fate. This is sufficient for freedom. If we fancy at times that we are acting with absolute freedom, *i.e.*, without any pre-determination whatever, this is because, in certain cases, we are not conscious of the motives which influence our will.

13. The course of events in the world comes to an end when, after a certain period, the Godhead absorbs all things into itself. This is accomplished by a general conflagration, in which all things perish in fire. But after every such catastrophe a new world is again evolved, which in all its parts resembles the old—the all-controlling Necessity not permitting a difference. These successive processes of the destruction and renewed creation of the world continue without end.

14. The human soul is a part of the Deity, an emanation from God, between whom and the soul there is mutual action and re-action. The soul, like God, is of the nature of fire; it is the warm breath within us; the heart is the centre from which its influence radiates. It is generated at the same time as the body. It consists of eight parts—one principal part *ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος*, to which Reason belongs, located in the heart; five Senses; the Faculty of Speech; and the Reproductive Faculty. The last-named parts may be described, in contrast with the first or rational part, as the irrational parts of the soul. These extend like so many polyps from the central part, and ramify through their respective organs.

15. The soul is, of its nature, destructible; it can, however, survive the body. Whether the soul does actually outlive the body, is a point on which the Stoics are divided. Cleanthes asserted that all souls survive till the conflagration of the world; Chrysippus allowed this privilege only to the souls of the wise. Panætius (Cic. *Tusc.* I. 32), appears to have denied all immortality to the soul. He would, however, seem to have been alone in this opinion. Those who held that all souls exist till the conflagration of the world, taught further that only the souls of the wise lived after this life in the condition of pure fire; the souls of fools, they held, retained a kind of body after death.

16. Man is the most perfect product of nature. He stands at the top of the scale of natural beings; the gods alone are above him. All things else exist for the gods and for man; man's destiny is to contemplate and admire the universe. The human race, in conjunction with the gods, forms a sort of divine polity, the fundamental law of which is that Natural Law which reveals itself on all sides in the world. This leads us to the Ethical System of the Stoics.

Ethical System of the Stoics.

§ 43.

1. In accordance with the fundamental principles of their physical theories, the Stoics taught that the supreme duty and highest purpose of man's life is "to live according to Nature." By Nature they did not here understand the individual nature of man; they used the term in its wide and universal sense. In Nature the eternal and divine law manifests itself, and as this law is the measure to which all things in the

universe must conform in their action, it is the standard to which human action must conform, the standard according to which man must live if he would fulfil the purpose of his existence. The expression, "to live according to Nature" (*ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*) means no more than the accord of man's conduct with the sovereign law of Nature, or the accord of man's will with the Divine Will. The fundamental law of human conduct may therefore be expressed in the formula: "Thou shalt live according to Nature, *i.e.*, according to the Divine Law which manifests itself in Nature."

2. The highest purpose of human life is not, then, to be found in *θεωρία* (contemplation), but in action, and in that action which is according to Nature. Virtue consists in thus living according to Nature. The man who acts in accordance with right understanding is the only man who acts virtuously, and the man who acts according to the natural law, as manifested to reason, is the only man who follows right understanding. We have found it to be the ultimate destiny of man that he should live according to Nature; we may now substitute the notion of Virtue in the formula, and say that to strive after virtue, or to be virtuous, is the highest duty of man.

3. If Virtue is the ultimate destiny of man, it follows that Virtue is to be sought not for sake of anything apart from itself, but for its own sake only. Virtue is its own end. If it were directed to a higher purpose, it would, by the fact, cease to be the ultimate destiny and the highest purpose of human life. Man must be virtuous for Virtue's sake.

4. We must not, then, make Pleasure or Self-gratification the end of our actions. Pleasure is merely an accessory of our action—not the end after which we must strive. The instinctive impulse of nature is not directed to gratification or pleasure as to its end, but to self-preservation, to integrity and health of body, to true knowledge and science, &c.; in all these cases pleasure accompanies the satisfaction of nature's tendency, but is not the end at which nature aims. Much more should this be the case when there is question of a rational action. Virtue is here the only end.

5. This being so, it follows further that Virtue is the supreme good of man, as well as his highest end. The supreme good must be that good which is sought purely for its own sake, which cannot serve as a means for the obtaining of something else. From what we have said, it is manifest that Virtue is an ultimate good of this kind, for it is essentially its own end. Virtue is, then, the highest good of man, and the true and highest happiness of man can only be found in Virtue.

6. More than this: Virtue is not only the highest good, it is the only true good of man. There is, in fact, only one good, the *καλόν*, *i.e.*, that good which is desirable for its own sake, not for sake of the advantage which it confers, and this good is Virtue, and Virtue only. Everything other than Virtue which men regard as good, is merely an *ἀδιάφορον*—something indifferent, not a good in the proper sense of the term. Such things cannot contribute to happiness. Virtue alone is the measure of happiness.

7. We must, however, make a distinction between various kinds of indifferent objects. Some are to be preferred (*προηγμένα*), others not to be preferred (*ἀποπροηγμένα*); others again not worthy of preference or rejection, indifferent in the strictest sense of the word. There are, therefore, certain things of value (*ἀξίαν ἔχοντα*), and certain things of no value, and worthy rather of contempt (*ἀναξίαν ἔχοντα*), and lastly, things that are not of the one class or the other. Things in the first of these categories are to be preferred, things in the second to be rejected, things in the third are absolutely indifferent.

8. The *προηγμένα* accord with the natural desires of man, and can, therefore, be the aim of his efforts; but they do not contribute to real happiness, and must, therefore, be included in the category of things indifferent. On the other hand, the *ἀποπροηγμένα* have no power to disturb or diminish the happiness of the virtuous man. This, with greater reason, is true of things which are absolutely indifferent. The true and highest good is, therefore, Virtue. Virtue alone is not subject to abuse; everything besides can be abused.

9. Virtue is essentially one. If a distinction is drawn between virtues, the difference is a difference of relation—that is, it is a question of one and the same virtue manifesting itself in different ways. In this sense we may distinguish between cardinal and secondary or derivative virtues. In the first class are included Prudence or Practical Wisdom (*φρόνησις*), Courage, Temperance, and Justice. In their definition of these several virtues the Stoics follow the teaching of Aristotle. In the second category are included Magnanimity, Continence, Patience, Diligence, Deliberation. All these virtues depend upon right understanding, and can, therefore, be communicated by teaching.

10. The principles here established as to the nature of Virtue lead to the following conclusions:

(*a*) The person who possesses one virtue possesses all; for virtue being essentially one, each single virtue includes in itself all the others.

(*b*) There is no difference of degree in virtue, *i.e.*, virtue cannot be attained in a higher or lower degree. The nature of virtue does not admit of a *more* and a *less*. A man cannot live according to nature in a greater or less degree—and the essence of virtue consists in living thus. The good actions of virtuous men are, therefore, all equally good; in the goodness of actions *more* and *less* are not admissible.

11. The opposite of Virtue is Vice. A man is vicious who lives not in harmony with the law of nature, but at variance with it. What is true of virtue is true analogously of vice.

(*a*) The man who is stained with one vice is stained with all vices. As a man cannot be virtuous in one respect, without being virtuous in every respect, so he cannot be wicked in one respect without being wicked in every respect.

(*b*) In the same way, there cannot be a distinction of degree in vice any more than in virtue. A man cannot be wicked in a higher or lower degree; as all virtuous men are equally virtuous, so all wicked men are equally wicked. And for this reason all evil deeds are equally evil (omnia peccata paria), there is not in this matter a *more* and a *less*.

12. Furthermore, the Stoics teach that there is no mean between

Virtue and Vice (*ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία*). There is indeed such a thing as an approximation to virtue. But the individual who only approaches virtue, is still without virtue quite as much as the absolutely wicked. A middle state does not exist. Man either possesses virtue, or does not possess it. In the former case he is virtuous, in the latter wicked; he is not, and can never be, neither virtuous nor wicked.

13. In human actions, considered in themselves, the Stoics distinguish between *κατόρθωμα*, or complete fulfilment of duty, and *καθῆκον*, or mere right action. A rightful, befitting action is, no doubt, conformable to nature, and is therefore justifiable; it is not, however, performed from a purely virtuous motive, but for the attainment of some ulterior end to which it leads. An action is the perfect fulfilment of duty *κατόρθωμα*, when it is performed purely out of a virtuous disposition, and for sake of the good done. The *κατόρθωμα* alone fulfils the requirements of virtue, for virtue essentially excludes the notion of a further end.

14. No act is, in itself, praiseworthy or reprehensible; all acts, even those which are accounted wicked, are good if performed with a righteous, virtuous disposition. With a contrary disposition every action is evil, even though, in outward appearance, it seem good. The wicked man sins in every action; the virtuous man in every action is doing good. "Unnatural love, prostitution, violation of tombs, and the like deeds, are no longer immoral in themselves; it is no longer forbidden to eat the flesh of men; the deeds of Oedipus and Jocasta become indifferent in character." The virtuous man, as such, is incapable of wickedness; the wicked man, as such, is incapable of good.

15. The emotions (*πάθη*), be they of what kind they may, are aberrations from the right practical judgment as to what is good and evil. The principal forms of emotion are Fear and Anxiety, resulting from the apprehension of a future or present evil; Desire and Delectation, which result from the apprehension of a future or present good. The emotions proceed from a false practical judgment; they are not, therefore, in any case, in accordance with nature, and thus they cannot be reconciled with virtue. The virtuous man must yield to no emotion or *πάθος*, he must be raised above them all.

16. In keeping with these ethical principles is the Ideal of the Sage which the Stoics put before us. The true sage is the man who possesses virtue. As such he is indifferent to everything except virtue, for he understands that other things are not truly and really good. He is indifferent to pleasures and desires, for he knows that neither any pleasure nor any desire is in accordance with nature and with virtue. He is indifferent to all pain, to all fear, and to all anxiety, for he knows that these things cannot trouble the happiness which he possesses in virtue. He frees himself from all passions; and if, in certain cases, he cannot help feeling pain or pleasure, he does not permit himself to be influenced by these feelings, but remains always unmoved and immovable. In every gratification and success, in every misfortune and accident of life, he maintains imperturbable equanimity; no sickness

can trouble this evenness of mind, no fear can disturb him, no fate, however hard, affect him—in a word, he is ἀπαθής (without feeling). In this ἀπάθεια consists the ideal perfection of the sage.

17. The sage is thus the really free man, the really rich man, the true king and ruler, the true priest, prophet, and poet; he unites in himself all perfection; in intrinsic dignity he is second to no rational being, not even to Zeus himself, except that he is not, like Zeus, immortal. He is a god after his fashion. All that he does is good, he cannot lose his virtue. "Notwithstanding this moral independence, he is yet in practical communion with other rational beings. He has his part in the affairs of the State, and this part is the larger the nearer the State approaches the perfection of that one ideal State in which all men are embraced. But he exercises towards other men, as towards himself, not forbearance, but justice. He is permitted community of wives. He is master of his own life, and of his own choice can put an end to it; suicide is allowed him."

18. The fool is, in all respects, the contrary of the sage. We may assert of him the contrary of all that we have attributed to the wise man. The fool, not possessing virtue, is subject to the influence of every emotion and every passion; he is a slave in the true sense; a godless being, who sins in every action that he performs. Between the sage and the fool a chasm intervenes, so wide that we can institute no comparison between them. As there is no middle state between the condition of virtue and the condition of vice, it follows that all men are either sages or fools, either perfect in goodness (σπουδαῖοι) or thoroughly wicked (φαῦλοι).

19. It must be allowed that the later Stoics abandoned to some extent this extravagant exaltation of the wise man, and this exaggerated contrast between the condition of the sage and of other men. They taught that no individual attains to the ideal state of the wise man, that in actual fact the only distinction existing is the distinction between the state of fools and the state of those who are advancing to wisdom (προκόπτοντες).

20. Such, in brief, is the ethical system of the Stoics. It is noticeable that this system, though it denies the very basis of moral life—liberty, immortality, &c.,—increases nevertheless the measure of man's moral obligations exorbitantly. Herein it is unreasonable and unnatural, and leads finally to excesses, with which its first principles are in glaring contradiction. The demands made upon the Stoic sage become wholly unnatural in their extent, and are wholly irreconcilable with the needs of practical life. Yet the only ultimate result is that the sage proudly exalts himself to an equality with the gods, and looks down with contempt on all men who have not reached the level he has attained; that he is permitted every licence, even the most shameful, and that ethical antinomies are made the laws of morals. The principles which underlay the system of the Stoics, notably their thoroughly pantheistical doctrine of Necessity, and denial of Immortality, could lead to no more than a caricature of ethical science, and it was in the nature of things

that such a system should at last degenerate into unrestrained immorality.

21. We have now to notice briefly the "later" Stoics, followers of the older school, who either maintained its principles intact, or accepted them with some modification. To the later Stoics belong:

(*a*) Panætius of Rhodes (B.C. 180-111), a pupil of Diogenes. He modified somewhat the rigid character of the Stoic teaching (Cic. *De Fin.* IV., 28), and gave it that special form which secured it favour among the Romans. He himself won for the Stoic school such Roman nobles as Laelius and Scipio. "He aimed at a less rugged, and a more brilliant exposition of the Stoic philosophy; and in his exposition he appealed not only to the older Stoics, but also to Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dicaearchus, and by this method prepared the way for Eclecticism." He rejected the astrological soothsaying and divination which had been in favour with the older Stoics, in consequence of their fatalistic notions; he abandoned the doctrine of a conflagration of the world, and with Socratic modesty disclaimed all title to perfect wisdom. His work (*περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*) is the foundation of Cicero's work, *De Officiis.* (Cic. *De Off.* III. 2.)

(*b*) Posidonius of Apamea, in Syria (B.C. 90), held his school at Rhodes, where, amongst others, Cicero and Pompey attended his lectures. He was esteemed the most learned (*πολυμαθέστατος καὶ ἐπιστημονικώτατος*) of the Stoics. He inclined to Eclecticism, blended Platonic and Aristotelian with Stoic doctrines, and delighted in a lofty rhetorical style.

We may further mention: Apollodorus of Athens (B.C. 144); Athenodorus of Tarsus, President of the Library of Pergamus, and, at a later period, friend and companion of Cato the Younger (Uticensis), who strove to confirm the Stoic doctrines by the example of his own life; Antipater of Tyre (B.C. 45), a teacher of Cato the Younger; Apollonides, a friend of Cato; Diodotus (B.C. 85), one of Cicero's instructors, later a member of his household, and his friend; and lastly, Athenodorus, the teacher of Octavianus Augustus. *Cfr.* Ueberweg.

(*c*) Under the Roman Empire immorality and corruption were ever on the increase. The men who set themselves to struggle against the prevailing evils, turned for the most part to Stoicism, seeking from the calmer study of this philosophy consolation and tranquillity of mind, or borrowing from it a haughty virtue to resist the masters of the State. It thus came to pass that, at this period, the philosophy of the Stoics began to assume a political character, to render those who professed it objects of suspicion, and even to expose them to persecution. The most remarkable amongst the Stoics of this period are:

(*a*) L. Annæus Seneca, a native of Cordova, in Spain (B.C. 3 to A.D. 63), the tutor of Nero. He directed his attention to Ethics rather than to Physics, and he was more concerned to exhort to the practice of virtue than to inquire into its nature. His views on the latter point do not differ materially from those of the older Stoics. Of his philosophical writings the following have been preserved: *Quæstionum Naturalium*, Libri VII., and a number of religious and moral treatises: *De Providentia; De Brevitate Vitæ; De Otio aut Secessu Sapientis; De Animi Tranquillitate; De Constantia; De Ira: De Clementia; De Beneficiis;* and the *Epp. ad Lucilium.* He exalted the Stoic Sage above the gods; for the independence of the Sage, he holds, is the work of his own will, and this is not the case with the gods. Nevertheless he is profuse in despairing lamentations over the corruption and misery of human life, and he makes large concessions indeed to human weakness. The same contradiction he exhibited in his private life. In theory a gloomy Stoic, looking down with contempt on all things human, he was in practice a dainty courtier, by no means averse to the pleasures of the table and other like indulgences.

(*β*) Following Seneca, we have L. Annæus Cornutus (B.C. 20 to A.D. 66), the Satirist A. Persius Flaccus (B.C. 34 to A.D. 62) a pupil and friend of Cornutus, and C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinium, a Stoic whose views corresponded with those of Seneca. Musonius Rufus was banished from Rome by Nero at the same time as the other philosophers (A.D. 65); he was recalled at a later period, probably by Galba; he was exempted from the order of banishment issued against the philosophers by Vespasian, and was personally acquainted with Titus. His pupil, Pollio, composed the *ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου* (Memoirs of Musonius), from which Stobæus has probably derived what he tells us of the life of Musonius. To him is attributed the maxim: "If thou doest good under difficulty, the difficulty will pass, but the good will endure; if thou doest evil with pleasure, the pleasure will pass, but the evil will endure."

(γ) Epictetus, a native of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, was first the slave, and afterwards the freedman of a soldier of Nero's body-guard. He was a pupil of Musonius Rufus, and subsequently taught philosophy in Rome till the philosophers were banished from Italy by Domitian (A.D. 94.) He then retired to Nicopolis, in Epirus, where Arrian became his pupil, and wrote down his lectures. According to Epictetus, the whole duty of man consists in living entirely for God, in reverencing God, and being obedient to Him rather than to man. The god within us (θεός or δαίμων) we should reverence most. The efforts of the Sage are directed to make himself independent of all external goods which are not under his own control; man must endeavour to have all his fortune in himself. He will attain this perfection by self-denial and patience. Hence the rule of life: "Bear and forbear." (ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου.)

(δ) Lastly, we must mention here the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Stoicism had hitherto been only on the side of those who were discontented with the circumstances of the time, and the general condition of society; but with Marcus Aurelius it took possession of the imperial throne. The treatise of this prince (τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν), the last remarkable outcome of Stoic philosophy, contains short proverbs and aphorisms, in which the doctrines of philosophy are applied to the concerns of practical life. In this teaching a certain tendency to mysticism betrays itself, revealing an affinity between this form of the Stoic doctrines and the Neo-Platonism, which was soon to succeed them. Theoretical views are adopted by the Emperor merely as a basis for some religious or moral precept. We also notice that concentration in self, and an abandonment to the will of the Deity, are the dispositions of mind which his moral teaching requires from man.

Epicurean Philosophy.

1. Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean school, was born at Gargettus, near Athens, in the year B.C. 341. He passed his youth at Samos, whither an Athenian colony had been sent, to which his father, a schoolmaster, was attached. Epicurus is said to have turned his attention to philosophy at the age of fourteen. The story goes that he gave himself to this study on finding that the teacher who was instructing him in grammar and literature, not being able to give him a satisfactory account of the Chaos of Hesiod, referred him to philosophy for an explanation. He began his new studies with the works of Democritus, and these works made such an impression on him that he never afterwards abandoned the principles of the system of Democritus. Nausiphanes, a philosopher of Democritus' school, whose lectures he attended, may also have helped to this result. At the age of thirty-two he appeared as a teacher of philosophy in Mitylene. Thence he passed to Lampsacus, and finally to Athens, where he founded in a garden (whence his pupils were called οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων) the school over which he presided till his death (B.C. 270). His doctrines may be broadly described as a modified form of the Hedonism of Aristippus, combined with the Atomistic theory of Democritus.

2. In the school of Epicurus a cheerful, social tone prevailed. He reduced the fundamental principles of his philosophy to short formulæ (κύριαι δόξαι) which he gave to his pupils to learn by heart. In the composition of his exceedingly numerous works he showed great carelessness, thus proving in practice the truth of his own maxim: "It costs no trouble to write." The one merit allowed his writings is, that they are easily understood; in other respects their form is generally condemned—notably by Cicero *De Nat. Deo.*, I. 26. He is said to

have composed, in all, 300 volumes. Diogenes Laertius gives a list of his works (X. 27.) Of these a few fragments, collected by Orelli (Leipzig, 1868) remain.

3. Epicurus defines philosophy, considered from its practical side, as "the art of securing a happy life." It follows that philosophy, considered in its theoretical aspect, must also be directed to this end. The scope of theoretical philosophy is to procure that understanding of things which will enable man to secure for himself a happy life. Epicurus divides philosophy into Canonic (Logic), Physics, and Ethics. Canonic is subservient to Physics, and Physics to Ethics. We shall treat the philosophy of Epicurus in the order indicated in this division.

Canonic of Epicurus.

§ 44.

1. Canonic lays down the laws (canons) according to which knowledge is acquired, and assigns the criteria of truth. This science, then, holds in the Epicurean system the place assigned in other philosophies to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. Epicurus rejected Dialectic in the strict sense. His Canonic, too, is restricted to a very few principles, which he holds to be enough for the attainment of truth.

2. In his theory of human cognition, Epicurus is thoroughly sensualistic. Sensuous perception is produced by certain material images (εἴδωλα) detached from corporeal objects (ἀπορρόαι), and penetrating the channels of the senses. These images are detached from the outer surfaces of bodies, and make their way through the intervening air to our eye; they pass in through the eye, and so occasion Perception (αἴσθησις).

3. But it is not Perception alone which depends on these material images; they, furthermore, give rise to Thought in the understanding. These images penetrate through the senses to the understanding, and excite in it the thought corresponding to their nature. Not only are our perceptions effected by means of these images, it is by them also that we think (Cic. De Fin., I. 6.) What we call our faculty of thought is passively recipient of these images, quite as much as our faculty of perception. This theory, it will be observed, is wholly sensualistic.

4. Out of the individual perceptions there arises gradually in the understanding a persistent universal thought-image, due to our memory of several similar perceptions of external things. It comes into consciousness at the mention of the word by which the object in question is designated. These universal thought-images (or, better, representative images) are the so-called προλήψεις. The πρόληψις, in the Epicurean theory, is no more than that one common image, under which the imagination subsumes a number of similar perceptions. This notion is in keeping with the general sensualistic character of the Epicurean teaching.

5. The αἴσθησις and πρόληψις form the basis of the ὑπόληψις or Judgment. In a judgment something is always assumed; a judgment, therefore, always expresses an opinion (δόξα), hence the ὑπόληψις and δόξα are identical with one another. But an opinion of this kind may be either true or false. The question then arises: What is the criterion by which we distinguish the true from the false?

6. Epicurus holds that the criterion of first importance is the αἴσθησις, or immediate perception. Perception, as such, is always true. There is nothing which can disprove a perception. For neither other perceptions, nor reason, which has its rise in perception, have any higher authority. It follows that the only opinion to be esteemed true, is that opinion which is corroborated by the testimony of the senses, or at least not disproved by them, and that those opinions are to be held false, against which the senses give testimony. Second in order, as a criterion of truth, is the πρόληψις. This is to be regarded as a criterion of truth, for the reason that it is a product of sensuous perception. What has a common image of this kind as evidence in its favour is true. What has evidence of this kind against it is false. In the category of criteria we must also include the feelings (πάθη). The feelings of pleasure and of pain are the criteria of practical action, *i.e.*, they indicate what is to be sought and what to be avoided.

7. It may be objected that all perceptions are not true; for instance, a tower in the distance appears to us round and small, while, in reality, it is angular and large. To this Epicurus replies, that in our perceptions we, strictly speaking, perceive not the objects themselves, but the material images that are detached from them. An image of this sort, in its passage through the air, may lose its first outlines and dimensions, and this actually takes place in the case of the tower referred to. As it penetrates our senses in this altered form, our perception exactly corresponds to the image, and is therefore true. The false opinion arises from the circumstance that we do not restrict our judgment to the image, but extend it to the object.

8. Epicurus dispenses himself from stating any theory regarding Judgment and Inference; he considers that artificial definitions, divisions, and syllogisms cannot take the place of perceptions.

Epicurean Physics.

§ 45.

1. In his physical theories, Epicurus is, in the main, at one with Democritus. He admits no transcendental Divine cause to account for the origin and dissolution of things. In Matter he finds the adequate cause of all things. Everything that comes into existence has its physical cause; there is no need of any higher agent to explain the phenomena of our experience. We may not, in each case, be able to

assign the physical cause with complete certainty, but this is not a reason why we should recur to the notion of a higher Divine Cause. This side of the Epicurean theory is distinctly Atheistical.

2. Starting with the general principle that nothing is produced from nothing, and that no being of any kind can be reduced to nothing, Epicurus assumes as the primary principles of things vacuum and atoms. We must assume a vacuum, or space; for the bodies, of whose existence sensuous perception assures us, must have being and motion somewhere. Atoms, too, we must assume, since bodies are composite, and therefore divisible. Continuing the division of the composite mass, we must at last come to parts which are indivisible and unchangeable, unless things be said to be reducible to absolute nothing. These ultimate indivisible corpuscles are atoms (*ἄτομα*). Space and atoms exist from eternity.

3. These atoms are of different dimensions, but they are all, alike, too minute to be visible. Size, form, and weight are their only attributes. Other qualities, such as heat, colour, &c., are produced by the union of the atoms. The number of these atoms is infinite. But how are bodies formed from these atoms? To this question Epicurus answers:

4. The atoms move in space, with a downward vertical movement, determined by their weight, all moving with the same velocity. In this movement a certain number of atoms deviate from the perpendicular line of descent. This deviation brings about collisions with the other atoms. These collisions sometimes lead to permanent combinations of the atoms, sometimes, by the rebound of the atoms from one another, they produce upward or lateral movements, which uniting to form rotatory motion, produce, in turn, new combinations of atoms. In this wise are formed bodies, which, it will be seen, are no more than complex arrangements of atoms.*

5. The aggregate of the bodies thus formed, united into a definite whole, constitute a world. The number of such worlds is infinite, for the number of atoms is without limit. The earth, and the stars visible from the earth, form one world. But an infinite number of other worlds also exist. These worlds are involved in a continuous process of formation and dissolution. But among the many worlds some are found which are possessed of life, and these endure for a longer time; the others pass quickly away.

6. The stars are not animated. Their real size is the same as their apparent: "for if their (real) magnitude were (apparently) diminished by distance, the same diminution should be effected in their brilliancy, which is, evidently, not the case. Animals and men are produced from the earth; man has been evolved, by successive stages, from a lower form."

7. The movement of the atoms, and the origin of the world thereby brought about, is, as has been said, a result of mere chance (Theory of Casualism). There is, therefore, in nature, neither final cause, nor any

* The explanation of the collision of the atoms by their deviation from the perpendicular line of descent is peculiar to Epicurus; Democritus does not make this assumption.

εἱμαρμένη, or Fate, resulting from a fixed necessity. Chance alone rules everything.

8. The existence of the gods is not to be denied; for we have a clear evidence of their existence in the fact that they frequently appear to men in dreams, and leave representative images of themselves (προλήψεις) behind in the mind. Moreover, since there are so many finite and mortal things in existence, the law of contraries requires that there should also exist beings which are eternal and blissful. Men are, however, in error when they picture to themselves the gods as supremely happy, and nevertheless assign to them the task of governing the world, and endow them with human feelings. These things are perfectly irreconcilable. It is only the ignorance which fails to find an explanation of natural phenomena in the forces and laws of nature itself which has recourse to the gods. The gods inhabit the spaces interposed between the stars, and lead there a happy life, not troubling themselves about the world, or the concerns of men. The wise man does not reverence them out of fear, but out of admiration for their excellence. As for their nature: they are compacted of the finest atoms.

9. The human soul is a corporeal substance; for if it were incorporeal it could neither act on the body, nor be acted on. Moreover, it is in contact with the body; but it is only the corporeal which can maintain contact with the corporeal. But the soul is a very refined, subtle body, composed of very minute smooth and rounded atoms, otherwise it could not permeate the entire body. Besides, if the soul were not so constituted, the body would lose something of its weight after death. The psychical atoms are of various kinds: some are of the nature of fire, others of the nature of air, others of the nature of wind or breath; according to the preponderance of one or the other kind, is the temperament of the human individual.

10. There are, however, in the soul atoms of an unknown and unnamed fourth quality, in virtue of which man is capable of feeling and thought. These atoms constitute the λογικόν (rational element) which is located in the breast, whereas the other atoms form the ἄλογον, which is distributed through the whole body, and is the medium through which the mutual action of the λογικόν and the body is maintained. At death the atoms of the soul are dispersed; and since sensation becomes impossible when the combination of atoms is dissolved, it follows that the immortality of the soul is a mere chimera. But we have no need of immortality; for when death has come we are not present, and as long as we are here death has not come, so that death does not at all affect us. "*Tota res ficta est pueriliter.*" Cic.

11. The Will is stimulated by the images in the mind, but it is not necessarily determined. As there is no εἱμαρμένη, we are not controlled in our actions by an extrinsic force, our acts are our own, *i.e.*, we are free. Without this liberty, praise and blame would have no meaning. Freedom of will is nothing more than chance applied to human actions. In the world everything is subject to chance, *i.e.*, uncontrolled by necessity. The acts of human beings are like other things in this respect.

Epicurean Ethics.

§ 46.

1. In his Ethics, Epicurus follows, in the main, the teaching of the Cyrenaic school. He holds Self-gratification, Pleasure, to be the Supreme Good of man, and Pain to be the Supreme Evil. In proof of this doctrine he appeals to our own consciousness, which informs us that pleasure is what man is seeking, and that pain is what he avoids. He deduces the same conclusion from the fact that all living things, from the first moment of their existence, seek sensuous pleasure, and find enjoyment in it, while they strive as far as possible to escape from pain. The contrast between this teaching and Stoicism, both in method of argument and ultimate conclusion, need hardly be pointed out.

2. In the detailed exposition of this fundamental principle of his system, Epicurus distinguishes the Pleasure of Motion (*ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή*) and the Pleasure of Rest (*καταστηματικὴ ἡδονή*—between *Voluptas in Motu* and *Stabilitas Voluptatis* (Cic. *De Fin.*, II., c. 3). In the first division are included all the pleasures which are accompanied by a stimulus of sense; in the second is signified that condition which is free from all pain or unpleasant feeling.

3. Epicurus teaches that the highest happiness cannot be obtained by the pleasure of motion. In this view he is at variance with the Cyrenaics, who, as we know, regarded the pleasure of motion as the highest good. According to the opinion of Epicurus, the highest happiness is attained in that condition which is called the "Pleasure of Rest"—in freedom from all pain or unpleasant feeling—in a word, in the condition of painlessness (*ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία*). When man has attained this summit of happiness, he experiences, indeed, a variety and a succession of pleasurable feelings, but the measure of his happiness is not increased thereby.

4. We have now to inquire how this condition of painlessness may be arrived at. Epicurus, on this point, gives us the following answer: "Pain is the disagreeable feeling experienced under the pressure of some need or some desire; pain is absent either when we can satisfy the needs or desires we have, or when we have no needs or desires which call for satisfaction. We can, therefore, attain to painlessness either by satisfying all the needs and desires we have, or by restricting our needs and desires to that measure which it is in our power to satisfy."

5. "The first means here suggested is not possible to man; firstly, because he has not at his disposal the means to satisfy all his needs and desires; and, secondly and chiefly, because his needs and desires are, in themselves, unlimited and insatiable. There is, then, nothing left for those who would attain to the state of freedom from pain, except to restrict their needs and desires to that measure which it is possible to satisfy. Considered from the point of view we have now reached, Pain-

lessness may be said to be the absence of all needs or desires which we are not in a position to satisfy."

6. From this exposition it appears that the highest good of the Epicureans is not something wholly negative (Painlessness), but that it has its positive side also; for this Painlessness is attained by satisfying the desires, that is to say, by positive pleasure. It is true this positive factor must be restricted within certain limits; *i.e.*, the satisfying of the desires must be effected in determined measure, otherwise the state of Painlessness cannot be reached. In the light of this conclusion, we may state the fundamental law of life, according to the Epicurean Philosophy, in the following formula: "Restrain your needs and desires within the measure in which you will be able to satisfy them."

7. This principle furnishes an explanation of the further tenets of the Epicurean Ethics, such as the following:

(*a*) We must distinguish between those desires which are natural and necessary, those which are natural but not necessary, and those which are neither natural nor necessary. Due moderation in the satisfying of our desires demand that we should refuse satisfaction to the desires of the last class, and restrict ourselves to desires of the first and second kind only.

(*b*) There are cases in which pleasure arises from pain, and other cases in which pain follows from pleasure. "We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to be carried away by the excitement of present pleasure, nor permit ourselves to be blinded and misled by the desire of the moment; we must renounce pleasure when it would be followed by a greater pain, and accept pain when it would be followed by a greater pleasure." Moderation in satisfying our desires requires that we should act thus.

(*c*) There is a spiritual pleasure as well as a bodily pleasure, just as there is pain of mind as well as pain of body. For the purposes of human life spiritual pleasures are of far higher worth than bodily. The body experiences only the pleasure which is actually present; the soul has the gratifying remembrance of its pleasures past, and the enticing prospect of pleasure to come. Spiritual is, therefore, to be preferred to bodily pleasure. Spiritual pleasure, however, has its ultimate cause in the pleasures of sense, for it consists in the remembrance or anticipation of the pleasures of sense. Epicurus was, therefore, warranted by his own theory in saying (Diog. Laert. X. 6) that he had no notion of any good apart from the pleasures derivable from taste, hearing, sight, and the gratification of sexual tendencies.

(*d*) But he is willing to admit that bodily pain is assuaged by the psychical pleasure derivable from pleasant memories and from hope, in the same way that sensuous pleasure is diminished by unpleasant memories and by fear. And thus we again find indicated the rule already laid down, that the one class of feelings must be moderated by the other, in order to secure complete absence of pain.

8. On these doctrines is based the fundamental law of Epicurean Ethics. "Calculate the pleasure and pain that are so closely linked in human life, so that you may procure from your life the greatest possible sum of pleasure, and the smallest possible amount of pain." To this end Epicurus particularly recommends frugality, the cultivation of simple habits, abstinence from costly and extravagant enjoyments, or at least a sparing participation in them, in order that health may be preserved, and the relish for enjoyment may remain unimpaired. He also specially recommends intercourse with friends; friendship, according to Epicurus, being the best means of assuring every pleasure of life.

9. The function which Epicurus assigns to virtue in man's moral life is now apparent. Virtue is not good or praiseworthy in itself, as the

Stoics maintained. It is good and estimable merely because it is useful in securing the happiness of life. It is, therefore, essentially directed to pleasure as a means to an end, and it is of importance only in so far as it subserves this purpose. The virtues, according to the reckoning of Epicurus are four in number: Prudence, Temperance, Courage, and Justice.

(*a.*) Prudence (*φρόνησις*) is the chief of the virtues. It has a theoretical as well as a practical side. In the first sense, it is that knowledge of the true causes of things which delivers men from foolish fear of the gods, and of their judgments, and of death, and which thus makes possible a happy life. In the second sense, it enables us so to regulate our pleasures that one pleasure shall not hinder another, nor any pleasure be so intensified that it shall pass into the opposite pain, and it furthermore enables us to maintain our enjoyments at suitable intensity, contrives that they shall mutually enhance one another, and brings within our reach not only the pleasures actually present, but also past pleasures which we remember and future pleasures to which we look forward.

(*b.*) To Temperance it belongs to keep our enjoyments within due bounds, and to exercise self-control in the enjoyment of the several pleasures. Courage consists in "excluding the disturbing and distressing emotions which Prudence perceives to be unwarranted, in foregoing pleasure and accepting suffering as often as prudence warns us that this will contribute to happiness, and finally in putting an end to life when it can afford no more pleasure, but has only pain in store for us."

(*c.*) As regards Justice, Epicurus holds that all right is based upon a compact or engagement existing between men not to hinder one another. Justice consists in observing the law of the general safety founded on this compact. Justice contributes to a happy life, inasmuch as the just man has no punishment to dread, can count upon the protection of the law, can acquire property, and gains the good will and confidence of his fellow-citizens; all which give earnest of a happy life.

10. The virtuous man is the true sage. He alone reaches the goal of perfect happiness, and he alone cannot miss it. Virtue is the only way to happiness, it is also the certain way. The sage is, therefore, always happy. The duration of existence does not in any way affect the measure of happiness.

11. The Epicurean doctrines present us with a system of Materialistic Hedonism, which, however, full of contradictions, flatters and favours the sensual tendencies of man. We cannot, in consequence, be surprised to find that this doctrine was in high favour under the Roman Empire, when the stern morality of the older Romans was perishing under despotic rule. It contained no principles of morality strictly so-called. If there is nothing intrinsically good or bad in our actions, no immutable objective law according to which the morality of our actions is determined; if pleasure and profit are the only standard according to which we are to act; if pleasure of every kind is good in itself and becomes an evil only in the injury it may possibly entail upon the individual; then is there an end of everything which could give a moral character to our acts. The Epicurean Philosophy is a theory of effeminate ethics, wholly incompatible with an earnest morality. Cicero calls special attention to the fact that the notion of honour finds no place in the Epicurean teaching. The reproach is deserved. But it is by no means the most serious objection which can be urged against the system.

12. The doctrines of Epicurus received little development from subsequent philosophers. The most remarkable of his followers were: Metrodorus of Lampsacus,

Polyaenus the Mathematician, Hermarchus of Mytilene, who succeeded Epicurus in his school, Polystratus the successor of Hermarchus, Timocrates, Leonteus, Colotes, Idomeneus, Apollodorus, the author of four hundred volumes, Zeno of Sidon the pupil of Apollodorus (born B.C. 150), who was the teacher of Cicero and Atticus, and whom Cicero distinguishes among the Epicureans for his logical, dignified, and ornate style, and on whose lectures were based the works of his pupil Philodemus, the two Ptolemies of Alexandria, Demetrius of Lacon, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phaedrus an earlier contemporary of Cicero, and lastly Titus Lucretius Carus (B.C. 95-52) who in his didactic poem, *De Rerum Natura*, gave a complete exposition of the Epicurean system with the purpose of convincing his readers of the truth, and delivering them from fear of the gods and of death.—*Cfr. Ueberweg.*

Scepticism and Eclecticism.

§ 47.

1. The Stoics and Epicureans had endeavoured to secure a scientific basis for their theory of happiness by assuming certain fundamental theoretical principles. Scepticism abandoned this method, asserting that the supreme good and highest happiness could be attained by man only under condition of foregoing all dogmatical principles, and withholding all definitive judgment as to the nature of existent things. To disclaim all knowledge was therefore a first principle with the Sceptics.

2. There were three successive schools of Sceptics, or three sections of philosophers whose teaching was sceptical in its tendency: (*a.*) Pyrrho of Elis and his early followers; (*b.*) the so-called Middle Academy, *i.e.*, the Second and Third Academic Schools; and lastly (*c.*) the later Sceptics, subsequent to Æenesidemus, who again reverted to the teachings of Pyrrho. We shall notice the representatives of these three schools of Scepticism in order.

3. Pyrrho of Elis, who lived about the time of Alexander the Great (B.C. 330), followed the teaching of Democritus, and despised the other philosophers as Sophists. He held the view that speculative thought cannot lead to any result. "In reality," he said, "there is nothing beautiful and nothing hateful; in itself everything is just as much the one as it is the other, everything depends on human institution and custom." (Diog. Laert., IX. 61.) This is the celebrated οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, which became a shibboleth among the Sceptics. According to Pyrrho's teaching, "things are inaccessible to our faculties of knowledge, inapprehensible (ἀκαταληψία) and it is our duty to abstain from all judgment regarding them (ἐποχή). This ἐποχή is the first condition of happiness, for happiness consists in imperturbable peace of soul (ἀταραξία). "All the external circumstances of human life are of their nature indifferent (ἀδιάφορον), it becomes the wise man to preserve in every event complete tranquillity of mind and to permit nothing to disturb his equanimity."

4. Among the friends and pupils of Pyrrho were Philo of Athens and Nausiphanes of Teos, and, more remarkable than the others, Timon of Phlius (B.C. 325-335). He was the author of certain satirical poems

(*σίλλοι*) in three books, in which he treated the Dogmatic Philosophers as sophists and babblers. His own peculiar views may be thus stated:

(*a.*) Perception and mental apprehension give us no certain knowledge of things. For in order to decide conclusively with regard to objects apprehended by our minds we must not only perceive what things are and how they exist, but we must also know what is their relation to us and what their influence upon us. But neither knowledge is possible to us. Not the former, for there are no fixed differences between existing things, they are unstable, and therefore beyond the reach of knowledge. Not the latter, for the senses themselves are deceptive. We have therefore no means of deciding whether an object possesses the properties which are manifested to us or not. We cannot, in consequence, trust either our perceptions or mental apprehensions of things.

(*b.*) Nor is any certain judgment regarding things possible. For in favour of every proposition which we enunciate, and in favour of its contradictory, the grounds are equally cogent, *i.e.*, there are as many reasons against the proposition as for it. Certain knowledge is therefore, unattainable, we cannot even know with certainty that we have no certain knowledge of things.

(*c.*) Nothing then remains but to refrain from all judgment, to take up a position of non-decision (*ἀφασία*). This is the position assumed by the wise man. By this means, and by this means only, he secures that tranquillity of soul (*ἀταραξία*), which is the highest good. This state follows the suspension of judgment (*ἐποχή*) as the shadow follows the body. We must renounce the craze of knowledge, and spare ourselves the futile labour of inquiring into the nature of things; it is only by acting in this wise that we shall attain to tranquillity of soul, and the true happiness which it involves.

5. We have already spoken of the Scepticism of the Middle Academy (p. 94). It will be observed that the Scepticism of this school is not so radical as that of Pyrrho. The Academics acknowledged at least an apparent knowledge, and in this knowledge they furthermore recognised differences of degrees. The Middle Academy directed its teaching chiefly against the dogmatism of the Stoics. It refused to admit the Stoic *Catalepsis* as the criterion of truth, but it set up no other criterion instead; it renounced certainty altogether, and acknowledged only probable opinion.

6. The Scepticism of Pyrrho was revived at a later date by Ænesidemus of Gnossus, who, as it appears, taught at Alexandria towards the end of the last century before Christ, or in the beginning of the first century of the new era. He composed the *Πυῤῥωνείων λόγων ὀκτὼ βίβλια* (Diog. Laert., IX. 116). His theory is not a thorough scepticism. The purpose of his sceptical teaching was to establish the Philosophy of Heraclitus. Scepticism was, in his view, not a system in itself but the introduction to a system (*ἀγωγή*). The distinctive character of Scepticism consists, according to Ænesidemus, in this, that whereas the Dogmatists maintain that they have found truth, and the

Academics assert that it is impossible to find it, the genuine Sceptic does not assert the one or the other; he refrains from judgment on this question.

7. To justify this Scepticism Ænesidemus invented the ten "grounds for doubt" (*τρόπους τῆς σκήψεως*). They are the following :—

(*a.*) The first ground for doubt is found in the general differences existing between animated beings and more especially in the structural differences in their organs of sense. The same object must appear differently to these different beings according as their organs are differently formed, and there is no means of determining which of them perceives the object aright or whether it is manifested to any one of them all as it really exists.

(*b.*) The second reason for doubt is furnished by the differences between men both as to body and as to soul. As a result of these differences sensation and mental apprehensions are different in different men, and we can never decide in which case they represent things as they really are.

(*c.*) The third reason for doubt is given us by the differences of sense in the same subject. The different senses perceive one and the same object differently, or perceive different qualities in the same object, and we have no means of determining which is the true sensation, or whether the object really possesses the qualities which we perceive.

(*d.*) The fourth reason for doubt is taken from the differences caused by passing changes taking place in the knowing subject, owing to which a certain knowledge of the object is impossible.

(*e.*) The fifth consists in this that the objects according to their different position and distance present to us wholly different appearances, and thus the conclusion is again arrived at that a certain judgment is impossible.

(*f.*) The sixth reason for doubt is supplied by the circumstance that with all our sensations is mingled some element derived either from other objects or from the sensitive subject itself.

(*g.*) The seventh consists in this that objects excite different sensations and mental apprehensions according as their quantity and structure change.

(*h.*) The eighth is given in the fact that we perceive things as they are related either to the subject knowing, or to other things, and that all our knowledge is thus relative.

(*i.*) The ninth is drawn from the circumstance that things appear differently to us according as the sensation and the object are something habitual or something unusual.

(*k.*) The tenth reason for doubt is furnished by the opposition prevailing amongst human opinions as to justice and injustice, good and evil, religion and law, &c., as well as by the opposition between philosophers in their opinions. By this, as by the other reasons, the conclusion is warranted that there is nothing certain in our knowledge.

8. In addition to these general reasons for Scepticism Ænesidemus (according to Sext. Empir. *adv. Math.* IX. 207) adduces special reasons against the principle of Causality. "Cause," he says, "belongs to the category of Relation, and relation is not anything real, it is something created by our thought. Furthermore, the cause must be synchronous with the effect, or it must precede the effect, or follow it. It cannot be synchronous with it, otherwise both would exist together, and there would be no reason why one should be called the producer and the other the product. The cause cannot precede the effect, for it is not a cause so long as its effect does not exist. It is clear that it cannot follow it. The notion of causality is thus wholly meaningless."

9. To the later Sceptics belong Agrippa, Menodotus of Nicomedia, and notably Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 200). Saturninus was the pupil of Sextus. The grammarian and antiquarian Favorinus of Arles (under Hadrian) belongs to the same school. The later Sceptics reduced the "reasons for doubt" laid down by Ænesidemus to five :—

(*a.*) The differences of opinion among philosophers.

(*b.*) The necessity of a *regressus in infinitum* in every demonstration, since every proposition has to be proved from another proposition.

(*c.*) The relativity of all our notions, since the object appears different, according to the constitution of the individual perceiving it, and according to its relations to other objects.

(*d.*) The arbitrary character of the assumption by the dogmatists of certain first principles, which they assume in order to escape from the *regressus in infinitum*.

(*e.*) The circle which is unavoidable in every demonstration since the proposition on which the proof rests (major) requires for its truth the truth of the proposition to be established (conclusion).

The later Sceptics directed their attacks in a special manner against the teaching of the Stoics regarding God and Providence. The existence of Evil, which God either will not remove or cannot remove, they held to be at variance with the very notion of God.

10. With regard to Sextus Empiricus, two works are still extant in which he has expounded his Sceptical theory: Pyrrhon. Institut., Libri. 3.; and Adv. Mathematicos., Libri. 11. He examines critically the dogmatic systems of Greek Philosophy, and endeavours to show that all their principles are untenable. He makes a large use of sophisms in this criticism. These works of Sextus Empiricus are, however, of much importance for the student of the history of Greek Philosophy.

11. Along with Scepticism we find in this period of the decline of Greek Philosophy an Eclecticism which borrowed from the several systems what seemed most probable in each. We have called attention to the eclectic tendency manifested by many of the philosophers we have noticed, notably by some of the Stoics. But the most distinguished representative of this phase of thought was Cicero.

12. M. Tullius Cicero (B.C. 106-43) had pursued the study of philosophy at Athens and at Rhodes. In his early youth he attended the lectures of Phaedrus the Epicurean, and of Philo the Academician, and was intimate with Diodotus the Stoic; subsequently he followed the teaching of the Academician, Antiochus of Ascalon, of Zeno the Epicurean, and of Posidonius the Stoic. We are not concerned with his career as an orator and a statesman. In his old age he again devoted himself to philosophy; it was the chief occupation of the last three years of his life.

13. Of the philosophical writings of Cicero the following have come down to us: (*a.*) Academicarum Quæstionum, Libri 4, of which, however, only the first and fourth books are extant; (*b.*) De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Libri 5; (*c.*) Tusculanarum Quæstionum, Libri 5; (*d.*) De Natura Deorum, Libri 3; (*e.*) De Divinatione, Libri 2; (*f.*) De Fato, of which only a part is preserved; (*g.*) De Legibus, an unfinished treatise of which only fragments, in three books, are preserved; (*h.*) De Officiis, Libri 3; (*i.*) Cato Major seu De Senectute; (*k.*) Laelius sive De Amicitia, and Paradoxa Stoicorum sex; (*l.*) Consolatio, of which only fragments are extant; fragments of the Hortensius; (*m.*) and lastly De Republica, Libri 6, of which only a third part has come down to us, first published by A. Mai from a palimpsest in the Vatican Library. We may add to this list the rhetorical works: De Oratore, Libri 3; Brutus sive De Claris Oratoribus, Liber 1; and Orator, Liber 1.

14. Cicero's services to philosophy consist less in original inquiry than in the zeal and ability which he exhibited in rendering Greek Philosophy, especially the Stoic doctrines, acceptable to his countrymen,

and introducing it among the cultured classes at Rome. To effect this he modified Greek theories in many material points, softened down some of their more repulsive tenets especially those regarding the Highest Good, and the character of the Sage, and in his exposition was at once easily intelligible and attractive. He admits that knowledge is valuable for its own sake, and that it confers genuine pleasure on its possessor, but he is at the same time convinced that the end to which it leads is action, and that action is therefore of more importance than theory.

15. In his theory of cognition Cicero follows the Middle Academy. The differences between philosophers on the most essential points lead him to despair of certainty in knowledge, and to content himself with probability. According to his view, probability is enough for the purposes of practical life. Probability, he holds, may be best attained by a comparison and criticism of different views. Hence his Eclectical Method, his comparison of the opinions of the several philosophers, and his adoption of the view which seems to him most probable. He is not, however, without certain guiding principles in his choice of opinions. He holds fast by the evidence of the senses and of consciousness, and in the domain of higher rational knowledge he appeals to the immediate evidence furnished by the moral faculty, to the *consensus gentium*, and to certain fundamental principles which, according to his view, are innate in man (notiones innatæ, natura nobis insitæ).

16. In Physics, Cicero's attitude is one of doubt; he admits, however, that investigation on this subject is an agreeable and worthy field of exercise for the human mind. He asserts the existence and the spiritual nature of God, and insists that everything unworthy of the gods shall be excluded from mythology. He esteems highly the belief in the providence of God and in His government of the world. He sets forth, indeed, the grounds on which the Academy rejected the belief, as well as the grounds on which the Stoics adopted it, but he is distinctly in favour of the latter. He regards the human soul as a being of supramundane origin, and enters at length into the proofs of its immortality.

17. In his Ethics Cicero is a Stoic, but he blends the rigid theories of Stoicism with Platonic and Peripatetic elements after the fashion of the later Stoics, and thus mitigates their severity. The question whether virtue is of itself sufficient for happiness he is inclined to answer affirmatively, but remembering his own weakness and that of mankind generally he hesitates, and seems to look with favour on the distinction made by Antiochus of Ascalon between the *vita beata* assured by virtue in all circumstances, and the *vita beatissima* which is enhanced by the enjoyment of external goods (De Fin., V. c. 26). Virtue, however, he holds to be the good compared to which all others are only of secondary worth. "He combats the Peripatetic doctrine that virtue is nothing more than the reducing of the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ to due order; he holds with the Stoics that the wise man has no $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$." In political philosophy his ideal of government is a constitution which combines monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements—an ideal which he finds to

have been approximately realised in the Roman State (De Rep., I. 29; II. 23).

18. He also asserts the freedom of the human will. He would rather admit that a proposition may be neither true nor false, than admit that everything happens by Fate. Without liberty there could be no room for praise or blame, for reward or punishment. If you object that the freedom of the will contradicts the principle that nothing happens without a cause, he answers that the freedom of the will only excludes an external antecedent cause of our actions, but not all cause, for the will is itself the cause of our actions. Cicero will, however, permit such concessions to popular superstition as auguries and the like.

19. An Eclecticism of the same kind as Cicero's was adopted by the Sextian School founded by Q. Sextius (born about B.C. 70). Amongst the followers of Sextius were his son Sextius, Sotion of Alexandria the teacher of Seneca, Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and Papirius Fabianus. This school seems to have held an intermediate position between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. Abstinence from animal flesh, daily self-examination, metempsychosis, exhortation to moral excellence, to fortitude of soul, and to independence of all external things seems to have been the chief points in their teaching. The school had only a short existence. Cfr. Ueberweg and Sigwart.

THIRD SECTION.

Graeco-Oriental Philosophy.

General Character of this Philosophy.

§ 48.

1. Greek Philosophy found its way, at an early period, into the East. The immediate causes of its extension in this direction were the conquests of Alexander the Great. In consequence of his intercourse with Aristotle, Alexander took a personal interest in the encouragement and the spread of philosophical knowledge. This interest passed to the men who divided his kingdom after his death. The rulers of the several states which were created by the partition of the Macedonian Empire protected and favoured Greek learning and Greek art, and endeavoured to make them known and appreciated by the peoples they governed. This remark applies equally to the Seleucidæ in Syria, to the Attali of Pergamus, and the Ptolemies of Egypt. Institutions for the advance of science and learning were founded in Syria, the most noteworthy being those of Antioch and Tarsus, and also in Pergamus; but these cities were all surpassed in scientific renown by the Alexandria of the Ptolemies. Under the reign of these monarchs Alexandria became not only the mercantile centre of the civilized world, but the centre also of the science and art of the age.

2. Ptolemy Lagus (Soter) invited learned Greeks to Alexandria, and collected works of science from Greece, Italy, Asia, and Africa. His most important service to learning was, however, the founding of the so-called museum. This museum was a portion of the royal palace provided with gardens and porticoes, where men of learning lived together, forming a sort of community. A special fund was devoted to the maintenance of the museum; it had its own president, appointed by the kings of Egypt, and at a later period by the Roman Emperors. The various departments of learning were there represented; it included philosophers, grammarians, critics, poets, mathematicians, astronomers, geographers, physicians, naturalists, of whom all, with few exceptions, were Greeks or the descendants of Greeks.

3. The museum also contained a library of Greek, Roman, Jewish, Persian, Æthiopian, Babylonian, Phœnician, and Indian literature, which increased to such proportions that the temple of Serapis—Serapeum—was assigned to it. When Julius Cæsar burned the Egyptian fleet, the museum and the portion of the library contained within it were destroyed by fire, but the library of the Serapeum was preserved, and Marcus Antonius endeavoured to repair the loss by purchasing the library of the Kings of Pergamus. At a later time the Emperor Claudius founded a new museum. Alexandria thus possessed all the conditions which favoured a new development of science in general, and of philosophy more especially.

4. At an earlier period a society of learned men, of Jewish race, appeared in Alexandria side by side with the learned Greeks. Judea was a part of the Egyptian kingdom, and it was to be expected that close relations should be established between the home of the Jewish race and Alexandria. Under Ptolemy Philadelphus (B.C. 280), the Greek translation of the Old Testament, which is known as the "Septuagint," was made by certain learned Jews in Alexandria. The Ptolemies were favourably disposed towards the Jews, and, in consequence, Alexandria became a favourite resort of Jewish *savants*, and a centre of Jewish learning.

5. The course of events led to a revival of the ancient philosophy in the East, and more especially in Alexandria. If we examine the character of this revival we shall find that it is essentially a syncretism (blending) of the philosophical conceptions of Greece with the tenets of the oriental religions. In the East, and especially in Alexandria, Greek philosophy was brought into contact with the oriental religions, and the form in which it now appeared was largely determined by this contact. The attempt was made to blend philosophy and religion, to embrace in a higher unity the mind of Greece and the mind of the East.

6. In making this effort it was assumed that the religious notions of the East and the philosophy of Greece were derived from a common source—from a primeval religious tradition, which had its origin in a divine revelation. The founders of the Alexandrine philosophy set themselves to determine exactly what was contained in this tradition, in order to make this the basis of their philosophical teaching. The entire

Græco-Oriental philosophy thus came to be essentially a philosophy of religion, for it made use of philosophical concepts and principles only for the purpose of giving philosophic form, and establishing, by philosophic proof, what it rightly or wrongly regarded as primeval religious tradition.

7. This philosophy of religion had a practical as well as theoretic aim. Its disciples used it to prepare the way for, and to effect, a reform of the popular religion. In the heathen world, corruption of the grossest kind had undermined the religious and moral life of society. The public religion commanded no faith, and inspired no reverence; the public worship was neglected, religious doctrines and ritual were often the objects of contempt and mockery, and frivolity and vice prevailed as perhaps they have never prevailed at any other period.

8. To counteract these evils, the religious philosophers of the period endeavoured to recover the teachings of the primitive tradition, and uniting these with the notions of Greek philosophy to bring about a religious reform, by which the contradictions of the popular religion might be reconciled, and a broad and comprehensive system established, which should include in it all the elements of truth within the popular creed. In this wise they hoped to check the spreading corruption, and at the same time to oppose to Christianity, which was already growing into prominence, a power which would dispute its empire over the minds of men.

9. The strain of mysticism and theosophism which pervades this philosophy and forms one of its characteristic features, is in keeping with this design. Apart from the natural tendency to mysticism of the Eastern mind, the effort after religious reform by the religious philosophy of Alexandria was calculated to develop this characteristic. To reform religion, man, it was believed, should be again brought into close communion with God. But this, it was thought, could only be achieved by making mystical union with God, in contemplation, the aim of human life, and this union was in turn made possible by a system of mystical asceticism. Mystical contemplation was at once the beginning and the end of human knowledge, the source whence light was diffused over every region of human thought. In this doctrine we have the principles and the germs of mystical theosophy.

10. The religious and mystical character of the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophies adapted them specially to the aims of this movement. We must, therefore, be prepared to find the philosophers of this period devote themselves chiefly to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato. The idealism of Plato was specially congenial to the imaginative Eastern mind. But the Alexandrian philosophers did not confine themselves to the school of Plato. They borrowed from other systems, from the Aristotelian, and even the Stoic, what they found suited to their purpose, and embodied all in their own teaching. The Alexandrians extended very widely this eclecticism.

11. Thus much as to the general character of this philosophical movement. In the broad stream we have, however, to distinguish dif-

ferent currents. In the first place we find a combination of Greek philosophy with Jewish religious doctrines, which had its rise in Alexandria, the scientific metropolis of the age, and which attained to a very wide development. Of the Græco-Jewish religious philosophy, Philo is the chief representative. In conjunction with this school we find another —that of the Neo-Pythagoreans and Pythagorean Platonists—who held to the old beliefs of heathenism, but who, following the method of the Græco-Jewish school, strove to combine into one system the teachings of Pythagoras and Plato, and the doctrines of the heathen faith. This system, likewise, had its origin in Alexandria. It reached its perfection, as a system of heathen philosophy, in Neo-Platonism, the principal non-Christian system of this period.

12. We shall, in our treatment of this subject, deal first with the Græco-Jewish philosophy, then with the Neo-Pythagorean doctrines and Pythagorean Platonism, and lastly with Neo-Platonism.

Græco-Jewish Philosophy of Religion.

Philo the Jew.

§ 49.

1. We observed above that under the Ptolemies not only the Jewish element of the population secured a footing and obtained protection, in Alexandria, but also that Jewish men of learning settled in the city, and cultivated there the sacred lore of their nation. Here they made acquaintance with the philosophers of Greece, and this circumstance could not but affect their system of thought. They had, indeed, too high an esteem for their ancient traditions, and were too firmly persuaded of the divine origin of these traditions, not to believe them the ultimate source of all wisdom. But they could not refuse their admiration to the great works of Greek philosophy which confronted them. They were obliged to seek out a method which would permit them to maintain the superiority of their sacred books to all philosophy, and, at the same time, to secure for philosophy its rightful place in the realm of knowledge.

2. As a first step in furtherance of this object, the following principles were laid down:

(*a*). Revelation is the highest philosophy and, as such, includes within itself all the tenets of Greek philosophy, and this with a perfection and a fulness of truth not found in the Greek systems themselves.

(*b*). The Greek philosophers have derived their wisdom from the revealed doctrines of the Jews, that is, from the sacred books. The ultimate source of their lofty doctrines is, therefore, not human reason but Jewish tradition.

(*c*). The difference between the revealed doctrines of the Jews and the philosophy of the Greeks consists chiefly in this, that in the sacred

books of the Jews truth is expressed by symbols and figures, whereas Greek philosophy puts the figure aside and sets before us the thought which was expressed under the figure.

3. These assumptions formed the basis of the whole Græco-Jewish philosophy. It was the aim of this philosophy to develop these notions in every sphere of philosophical knowledge. It strove to show that revelation and Greek philosophy corresponded, part for part—that revelation contained all that was found in Greek philosophy, though in more perfect form. In this wise the Jewish religion, it was presumed, would maintain itself in the face of Greek philosophy; and at the same time a deeper insight into its teaching, and a reform of the Jewish religion (meaning thereby a more spiritual and more ideal view of its tenets), would be brought about.

4. It is clear that this end could be attained only by accommodating the doctrines of the Jewish faith to the principles of Greek philosophy, that is to say, by interpreting these doctrines in accordance with the philosophical notions of the Greeks. This was essentially the method pursued by the Græco-Jewish philosophers of this period. They endeavoured to adapt the Scriptures to the doctrines of Greek philosophy, and by the light of this philosophy to determine their meaning. Looked at from the standpoint of revelation this method was rationalistic.

5. Another aspect of this philosophy remains to be noticed. On the supposition that it is characteristic of the Sacred Scriptures to present us with truth in images or figures, it would follow that the only method of arriving at the truth they contain is to seek the meaning that lies hidden under images, to strip the truth of the figures which envelop it. This must be effected by determining the allegorical sense of the Sacred Scriptures. Hence it is that we find the allegorical sense of Scripture occupying so prominent a place in the Græco-Jewish philosophy. The literal meaning of the text was abandoned, and the allegorical substituted, not only in cases where this was required by the subject-matter, but frequently also even in cases where the subject-matter demanded that the literal sense should be maintained. On other occasions literal and allegorical meanings were simultaneously maintained. In a word there was no limit to the liberties which interpreters permitted themselves.

6. In this way it came to be assumed that under the *sensus obvius* of the Sacred Scriptures a deeper meaning was concealed, and that this deeper meaning alone was the genuine sense of the Scripture. Thinkers who held to the mere letter (the *sensus obvius*) were of no account; only those were credited with wisdom and knowledge who were privileged to penetrate the hidden meaning of the Books of Revelation. This was the method adopted to bring about a reform of the Jewish faith in accordance with the requirements of the times.

7. As early as the second century B.C., the way had been prepared for the combination of Jewish theology with the doctrines of Greek philosophy. In this century arose the three Jewish sects—the Essenes, the Therapeutæ, and the Sadducees. The Sadducees were a school of

materialistic free-thinkers, while the Essenes and the Therapeutæ adopted a course of mystical asceticism. Among the Therapeutæ certain Pythagorean notions seem to have found favour, and it is among them, perhaps, we are to seek the first beginnings of the Græco-Jewish philosophy.

8. In Aristobulus (about B.C. 160) we have distinct evidence of an union already effected between Jewish theology and Greek philosophy. "He appealed to certain (spurious) Orphic lays, into which he had introduced certain points of Jewish doctrine, in proof of his contention that the Greek philosophers and poets had derived their wisdom from an early translation of the Pentateuch." He composed a commentary on the Pentateuch, fragments of which are preserved by Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* I., VI.; and by Eusebius, *Præpar. Evang.* VII., VIII., IX., XIII. He asserts the inspiration of Scripture, but he adopts the allegorical meaning. God, he teaches, is invisible, His throne is in heaven, He is not in contact with the earth, He influences it only by His power (δύναμις). He created the world out of pre-existent matter. To justify the keeping of the Sabbath, Aristobulus appeals to the Pythagorean argument from the symbolism of numbers. After Aristobulus we may mention Aristeas, to whom is ascribed a (spurious) letter to Philocrates, in which is told the story of the translation of the Sacred Scriptures by the seventy interpreters.

9. The chief representative of the Græco-Jewish philosophy is, however, Philo, who was the first to give it completeness as a system. He lived in Alexandria, and was descended from one of the most distinguished families of the country. According to Eusebius and Jerome, his family was of priestly rank. In the year B.C. 40 he was sent to Rome as delegate from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor. He was equally conversant with the various systems of Greek philosophy and with the ancient traditions of his own people.

10. His writings are very numerous. The names of his works are as follows:—(a.) *De mundi opificio;* (b.) *Legis Allegoriarum. Lib.* 2; (c.) *De Cherubim;* (d.) *De Sacrificiis Abeli et Caini;* (d.) *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat;* (f.) *De Agricultura;* (g.) *De Plantatione Noe;* (h.) *De Temulentia;* (i.) *De his verbis:* '*Resipuit Noe*'; (k.) *De Gigantibus;* (l.) *Quod Deus sit immutabilis;* (m.) *De Confusione Linguarum;* (n.) *De Abrahamo;* (o.) *De Migratione Abrahami;* (p.) *De congressu quaerendæ eruditionis gratia;* (q.) *De Profugis;* (r.) *Quis rerum divinarum hæres sit;* (s.) *De Josepho;* (t.) *De Somniis;* (u.) *De Vita Mosis, Lib.* 3; (v.) *De Caritate Mosis;* (w.) *De Creatione Principis;* (x.) *De Fortitudine;* (y.) *De Decalogo;* (z.) *De Specialibus Legibus;* (aa.) *De Circumfusione;* (bb.) *De Monarchia;* (cc.) *De Sacerdotum Honoribus;* (dd.) *De Victimis;* (ee.) *De Victimas Offerentibus;* (ff.) *Mercedem meretricis non esse recipiendam;* (gg.) *Quod omnis probus liber;* (hh.) *De vita contemplativa;* (ii.) *De nobilitate;* (kk.) *De Præmiis et Pœnis;* (ll.) *De Execratione;* (mm.) *Quod mundus sit incorruptibilis;* (nn.) *In Flaccum;* (oo.) *De Legatione ad Caium;* (pp.) *De Nominum Mutatione;* (qq.) *Quod a Deo immittantur somnia.*

11. Adopting the principle that the prophets were merely the instruments through which the Spirit of God spoke, Philo makes free use of the allegorical sense. To hold to the mere literal meaning of Sacred Scripture he considers undignified, unbecoming, and superstitious, and he stigmatises his opponents as "infected with an incurable passion for

logomachy, and blinded by the delusions of custom." "God cannot, in the strict sense, go hither and thither, nor has He feet to walk with. These anthromorphic methods of expression are used by Sacred Scripture for the advantage of the sensual man; at the same time it explains to the spiritual man that God is not like man, nor like heaven, nor like earth." This, no doubt, is undeniable. But Philo goes further, and applies his allegorical interpretation to other things, especially to historical incidents which are narrated in the Scriptures. We must, however, allow that he does not always reject the literal meaning. In the case of many historical narratives he admits a literal as well as an allegorical meaning; but he will never allow that the latter is absent.

12. But Philo's censure is not reserved for the "literalists" only. He is equally severe upon the "symbolists," whose teaching threatened Judaism as a system of positive religion. The symbolists attributed a figurative meaning not only to the teachings of the Law, but also to the ordinances of the Jewish ceremonial, and held that the observance of these ordinances according to the letter was superfluous, that no more was necessary than to observe the moral precepts which they typified. Philo is ready to acknowledge that even in these ordinances there is a recondite and higher sense as well as a literal sense, but the precepts must be observed in accordance with the latter sense, since the two are united as soul and body. Allowing that circumcision signifies restraint upon passion and the renunciation of luxury and impious thoughts, we must not for this interfere with the established practice; otherwise we should have to give up the worship of the Temple and a thousand other necessary solemnities.

13. After this exposition of fundamental principles, we may now proceed to examine Philo's system of doctrine We must observe, at the outset, that in this system there is scarcely any trace of unity of plan and harmony of principles. Philo's aim is to bring the revealed doctrines of the Jews into accord with the teachings of Greek philosophy, in other words to make the latter supply the interpretation of the former. In doing this, his eclecticism reaches to every system of Greek philosophy, and he uses them all for his purpose. He incorporated the Platonic doctrines in his system, side by side with the Aristotelian or the Stoic, as the one or the other seemed to serve for the interpretation of a given passage. In this way the several systems are introduced together in all parts of his writings, and unity and harmony thus rendered impossible.

14. God, the First Cause of all things, is above everything created. We argue His existence from a consideration of His works and by a conclusion, thence warranted, to the author of these works. But it is not given us to comprehend His Being, or express determinately what He is. God is above our comprehension, and above our powers of expression. He alone has comprehensive knowledge of Himself. For our part, we describe Him but by that name which He bestowed upon Himself, when He said, "I am who am" (ὁ ὤν). No attribute, no perfection can be predicated of God in the proper sense of the term.

He is above everything. He is not Wisdom, nor Virtue, nor the Good, nor the One; He is more than all these.

15. However we are not debarred from speaking of God after our own manner. In the order of our conceptions God comes before us as the Unbegotten (ἀγένητος), a Being who contains within Himself the ultimate cause of His own existence—the fulness of perfection and bliss, the Eternal, the Unchangeable, the Imperishable. In Him there is no before and no hereafter, no past and no future, all things are present to Him. He is simple in His nature, not restricted to any part of space, and is, therefore, at once everywhere and nowhere. He is all-sufficient in Himself, and has no need of anything outside Himself. God alone is free, *i.e.* independent of everything not Himself.

16. The world is the work of God, but the world is not God. To identify the world with God is to commit the error and the wickedness of maintaining that God has created all things out of nothing (ἐκ μὴ ὄντων). It follows from this that the world is not eternal. It has had a beginning. The reason for the Creation was the goodness of God, the ultimate purpose of the Creation the manifestation of this divine goodness. The duration of the world is dependent on the exercise of God's conserving power. It is everlasting, God's goodness having assigned it an unending duration. But God did not Himself directly create matter and reduce it to form and order; it was not fitting that He, the supremely Pure, should come into immediate contact with matter. The world comes mediately from God. He created it by His *Logos* (Word). We have now to examine Philo's doctrine of the *Logos*.

17. The *Logos* of Plato is the aggregate in which all Ideas are comprehended—the intelligible world which, in this respect, Philo describes as the region of Ideas. Before the creation of the world God formed in His intellect its ideal prototype. This prototype of the world is the *Logos*, created things are the ectypes of this *Logos*. As the seal is impressed upon the wax and is represented in it, so the *Logos* is the original mould or stamp of created things and is represented in all their various forms. And here it is to be remarked that all the ideas contained in the *Logos* find actual expression in the world, the most perfect expression, too, of which they are capable. It follows that the world is the only world possible, and also the best possible.

18. Philo goes still further. He distinguishes between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, and this distinction he borrows from the λόγος in man. In man we distinguish between the *indwelling reason*, which is the active faculty of thought, and the *extrinsic word*, in which the thought finds expression. We may describe the former as the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, and the latter as the λόγος προφορικός. An analogous distinction must be applied to the divine *Logos*. It is a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, inasmuch as it is constituted by the aggregate of all ideas indwelling in the mind of God; it is a λόγος προφορικός, as expressed in things created—the ectypes and outward expression of the ideas contained in the divine mind.

19. The λόγος προφορικός of Philo appears to be a divine power or

force which pervades all things, giving them life and form. The λόγος ἐνδιάθετος he seems to regard merely as the ideal conception of the world; but the λόγος προφορικός is the creative, formative power by which God produces and forms the universe. Under the influence of this notion he makes the several ideas contained in the *Logos* so many distinct forces, which proceed like rays of light from God, but in such wise that they are all united in the *Logos*. In this way the *Logos*, with its various distinct forces, becomes the organ or instrument by means of which God, who cannot Himself come into immediate contact with the defilements of matter, creates and fashions the world.

20. This theory enables Philo to assert that God is present in all things, not by His Being, but by His power. Philo, is in the same way led to regard the *Logos* as the differentiating element in the universe, as the power which gives to matter its different forms, as the architect of the universe, working from within outwards, effecting the formation of the world: as the λόγος σπερματικός, inasmuch as the ideas it contains manifest themselves in the several objects by its formative energy; as the bond which unites all things in the universe; as the universal and unchanging cosmical law; as the universal World-Reason or Providence which pervades and governs all things, guiding and controlling the course of the universe. The universe is, so to speak, the garment by which the *Logos* is enveloped.

21. This, however, is not the whole of Philo's doctrine regarding the divine *Logos*. With him the λόγος προφορικός is not merely a divine power, it appears ultimately in his teaching, as a personal being. Thus conceived it becomes a kind of intermediate nature between God and the world, separating the one from the other, but at the same time bringing them both into relation with one another. The *Logos*, in this capacity, is neither a thing ungenerated and without a beginning, nor yet is it generated and produced as all other things. It is the Son of God—the eldest, first-begotten Son, the world being the younger Son of God. The Divine Wisdom (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) is the Mother of this Word, God is his Father. He may be called God, not in the strict sense of the term, but only in so far as in his action he appears as the representative of God. He is intermediary between God and man, he conveys the commands and ordinances of God to men, and is on the other hand intercessor with God for man. In the former character he is the "Angel of God," in the latter "the High Priest."

22. But the *Logos* is not, according to Philo, the only power by which God creates, fashions, and maintains the world. Philo speaks of other Divine Powers distinct from the *Logos*, though subordinate to it. He does not appear to have formed a definite opinion as to the number of these powers. At one place he speaks of two powers—the creative and the controlling; at another he mentions five such powers—the creative, the ruling, the commanding, the forbidding, and the forgiving. Furthermore, Philo's conception of these powers or potencies is somewhat undetermined. At one time he seems to conceive of them as attributes of God, or modes in which the divine power manifests itself, as, for

example, when he identifies the creative and ruling powers with the omnipotence and goodness of God, and says that God, in virtue of the one attribute, is called Lord, in virtue of the other God. Again, however, he seems to represent them as personal beings; for example, when he describes them as ministers of God in the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, and puts them under the control of the *Logos*, as steeds under the guidance of a charioteer.

23. In accordance with the latter conception is his further assumption of the existence of other beings intermediate between God and the world. In this category he reckons the stars, which, after the Platonic fashion, he endows with reason, and makes akin to the Divinity, and the angels, to whom he assigns the atmospheric region as an abode. These beings also fulfil, after their manner, the functions of intermediaries between God and man; they execute the Divine commands, and intercede with God on man's behalf. The series of beings is thus brought down without interruption from the highest to the lowest, from God to man, and the universe thus resembles a great state in which the supreme authority is held by God, but exercised through subordinate powers.

24. In his physical theories, Philo for the most part follows Aristotle. The six days in which, according to Sacred Scripture, the world was created, must not be regarded as actual periods of time; they merely mark the order in which things followed one another in the Divine conceptions. This order is based upon the number six, for this is the most perfect number. The cause of the imperfections, of the evil, and the wickedness which prevail in these sublunary regions is to be found in matter, which opposes itself to the formative energy of the *Logos*. It would be blasphemy to assert that God was Himself the author of evil or wickedness.

25. In his doctrine regarding man, Philo draws, at the outset, a distinction between the ideal man and the man of our experience. He endeavours to justify this distinction by an appeal to the Scripture. In the first chapter of Genesis it is said that God created man to His own image and likeness. According to Philo, it is the ideal man of whom there is question in this passage. The second chapter recounts that God created man out of the slime of the earth, and breathed into him a living soul; here there is question of the man of our actual experience, the earthly man. Philo describes the ideal man as the primal man, and this concept he ultimately identifies with that of the *Logos*.

26. In man as actually known to experience, Philo, like Plato, distinguishes the rational soul—a simple, indivisible, immortal essence—from the irrational soul, which he locates in the blood. The former he describes as the true man within man, the *ego* proper in man. In the irrational soul he, at one time, distinguishes with Aristotle between the vegetative, the concupiscible, and the irascible parts; at another time he inclines to the Stoic doctrines, and distinguishes in the soul (the rational soul included) eight parts. He adopts now one of these distinctions, now another, according to the requirements of the subject he is treating

27. Explaining in further detail the nature of the rational soul, Philo, adopting the Stoic notions, regards the soul as an *ἀπόσπασμα* (a shred) of the Divinity, and accordingly describes it as a Divine spirit. When God breathed into man a living soul, something of the Divine Being was in the act, transfused into man, and this something is the rational soul. This is the Divine impression which stamps man as the image of God. The body, with its irrational soul, is the creation of inferior powers. It would be unworthy of God to give existence to the body, for it is the seat of concupiscence, and concupiscence is the source of all evil, vice, and unrighteousness.

28. The souls of men do not differ specifically from the angelic nature. Before their union with human bodies they lived an angelic life among the angels, and it is in consequence of their own faults that they are degraded to union with matter. Some angels always hold themselves aloof from contact with corporeal nature; others on the contrary inclining to contact with it, sink down into the corporeal element, and become human souls. The Platonic theory of pre-existence of the soul could hardly fail in a theory such as Philo's.

29. With regard to the human faculties of cognition, Philo distinguishes between the *αἴσθησις*, *λόγος* and *νοῦς*. The *αἴσθησις* is concerned with sensible objects, the *λόγος* is the reasoning faculty; the *νοῦς* is the faculty of immediate intellectual contemplation. The *νοῦς* is the eye of the soul in the strict sense, it is to the *λόγος* what the Divine *νοῦς* is to the Divine *λόγος*. The knowledge which the *λόγος* obtains discursively or by reasoning, is uncertain and unstable; perfect certainty is attainable only by intellectual contemplation as accomplished by the *νοῦς*. This contemplation, however, is dependent on the irradiation of the *νοῦς* by the Divine light. God alone can bestow the knowledge of contemplation, and He bestows it when we pray for it, through the *Logos*. God is thus the sun of our souls; the *Logos* is the dispenser of wisdom, the food of the soul, the manna on which it subsists.

30. In this contemplation of the Divinity consists, moreover, the supreme happiness of man; it is the highest purpose of his life. To attain to it, the soul must detach itself from the body and withdraw within itself; for the operations of sense are a hindrance to the soul in its upward flight towards this highest end of life. But this is not enough. The Reason must not only abandon the *αἴσθησις*, but it must renounce the *λόγος* also, and reduce it to silence, if it will attain to the height of its destiny. Nay, more, the Reason must, to a certain extent, renounce itself, must go out of itself to become wholly one with the Divine Wisdom, if its contemplation is to be perfect. In a word, the highest attainment of man is only possible in mystical ecstasy. By this means alone does man become really divine. Sense must be absorbed in the *λόγος*, the *λόγος* in the *νοῦς*, and this in its turn in God, if man is to attain that bliss which is the highest end of life.

31. In accordance with this teaching, Philo distinguishes the active from the contemplative life. The active life has, no doubt, its justification in the fact that it is a necessary condition of human society; the

contemplative life, however, is of a much higher order. The latter is the true priesthood; contemplation is the true and proper sacrifice, for it is possible only when man renounces his individuality, and offers it in sacrifice to God. The active life is human, the contemplative life is divine. From the eminence of mystical contemplation, the spirit looks forth as from a watch-tower upon the universe, viewing it not from the periphery inwards, but from the centre outwards.

32. Virtue is the path which leads to the highest end of life. We must, however, distinguish between the virtues which belong to the active and those which belong to the contemplative life. To the former class belong the four cardinal virtues: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. In defining these virtues, Philo at one time adopts the notions of Plato, at another those of Aristotle. The virtues which belong to the contemplative life either prepare and purify, or confer perfection. To the former belong faith, hope, piety, penance; the virtue conferring perfection is wisdom—that virtue which is founded on the contemplation of the Divinity. All virtues exist in ideal fashion in the Divine *Logos*. He is, therefore, the dispenser of all virtues, He bestows them by His grace.

33. The true sage is he who, devoting himself to the contemplative life, attains to mystical contemplation. All other men are fools. Sensuality has no power over the true sage. He cannot be drawn to evil by the solicitations of concupiscence; for the Divine *Logos* dwells within him, and so long as he is the dwelling-place of the *Logos*, so long is he protected against the contamination of matter. The sage is not only the truly wise, he is also the truly free, for the possession of wisdom rescues him from the dominion of matter. The fool, on the other hand, is the victim of ignorance, and is, by this fact, the slave of sensuality and passion.

34. The character of Philo's system being thus purely mystical, we naturally expect to encounter in it the principle of (Oriental) Quietism. This principle has, as a matter of fact, its place in the system. Philo teaches expressly that whereas the active life demands man's own energies, in the contemplative life everything depends exclusively on the action of God—on the Divine grace. Man's will has no part in the mystical elevation of human nature; it is not our work, it is wholly the work of God. Nay, it is a fundamental requirement in the elevation of man to mystical contemplation that he should cease to act himself and permit God to act in him. This absolute Quietism is essential to the attainment of man's highest end.

35. The history of man's first state and subsequent fall, as narrated in Scripture, Philo reduces to an allegory. The first man, whom God created "after his own image and likeness," is, according to the explanation already given, the ideal man. The difference between this first man and man as he is now created is infinite. Man, as now created, is a being of sense, possessed of different qualities, composed of body and soul, is either male or female, and is of his nature mortal. The first man, on the other hand, was a pure spirit, without a body, sexless, immortal by nature. This was the heavenly man, as distinguished from the earthly man, or "Adam." Paradise, in which man was placed by God, was not a part of space allotted to man; by the term we must under

stand the λόγος, that is to say we must understand the term to signify that God in giving Reason to man, bestowed upon him, at the same time, dominion over all subordinate creatures. The Tree of Life was the Wisdom bestowed upon man, and the Four Rivers were the four Virtues which flow from Wisdom.

36. As for the Fall, the narrative of Scripture is thus explained as an allegory. Woman is Sense, man is Reason, the Tree of Knowledge is the good of Sense, which conceals evil under a fair exterior. The serpent which approached the woman to deceive her, and through her to seduce the man, is sensual pleasure, arising out of the faculties of sense, and seducing Reason itself. In this way sin was committed, and in this way the sin of the first man furnished the prototype, and tells the story of every sin which man has since committed. Philo gives also another interpretation of the Scripture narrative. As soon, he says, as the woman was created and presented to the man, mutual love was enkindled in both. Evil desires grew up within them, they were drawn towards one another like separated parts of a single whole, and at last their desires found satisfaction in carnal intercourse. Thus sensual desire, consummated in carnal intercourse, was the first sin, and as it was the first sin, so it has been through all time the source of all unrighteousness and of all evil.

37. But Philo does not regard the fall of man as something wholly abnormal or exceptional. He is of opinion that there is nothing fixed or stable in the universe, that everything is subject to change and transformation, and thus that the natural course of things required that man should meet with opposing influences, and that he should, in consequence, fall from a higher to a lower grade of existence. Everything loses its perfection in proportion as it recedes from its prototype. So it is with man. Philo assumes, as a consequence of this view, an ever increasing degeneracy of the human race in body and spirit. In reference to the doctrine of the Messiah, Philo is satisfied with the view current among his contemporaries, he expresses a hope that the Jewish laws and constitutions will one day be adopted by all nations, and that thus a sort of universal Jewish kingdom will be established.

38. This system, it will be observed, covers a very wide field of theory, but the notions which are here blended together are very diverse in character. It is not, therefore, surprising that in subsequent times the system of Philo failed to exercise any far-reaching influence. We shall see later how the heretics of the first centuries of Christianity, as well as the Fathers of the Church, borrowed from Philo, though with different meanings and with different purposes. Perhaps we should also take into account, in this connection, the attractive and pleasing form in which Philo expresses himself in his writings. The undoubted ingenuity shown in many of his allegories had certainly its effect.

2. Neo-Pythagoreans, and Eclectic Platonists.

1. Cicero mentions, as the restorer of the Pythagorean teaching, P. Nigidius Figulus, who lived in Alexandria during the latter half of the century preceding the birth of Christ. Many works, written in the time of Augustus, and ascribed to the older Pythagoreans, contain Neo-Pythagorean ideas. About the same period, Sotion, pupil of the Pythagorean Eclectic, Sextius, flourished in Alexandria. But the principal representatives of the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy were Apollonius, of Tyana (in the time of Nero) Moderatus of Gades (also in the time of Nero), and Nicomachus, of Gerasa, who lived before the age of the Antonines. Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) would also appear to deserve a place among the philosophers of this school.

(a.) Apollonius of Tyana, in his travels through the Roman Empire, and especially through the East, appeared in the character of a worker of miracles. He was a man of action rather than of systematic thought. His chief purpose was to revive the doctrines of Pythagoras in their purity, and to blend the lore of the East with the theories of the West. Eusebius (Præp. Ev. 13) has preserved a fragment from a treatise of Apollonius on sacrifice: "Apollonius here distinguishes between the one God, who is separated from all else, and other gods. No sacrifice should be offered to the former. He should not even be mentioned by name, but only thought of by the νοῦς. All things of earth, because of their material state, are unclean, and unfit to come in contact with the supreme God. To the subordinate gods Apollonius seems to have assigned bloodless sacrifices!"*

(b.) Moderatus of Gades, who lived about the same time as Apollonius, endeavoured to justify the introduction of Platonic and new theological notions into the Pythagorean teaching, by contending that the older Pythagoreans had purposely expressed the highest truths in symbols, and had for this purpose made use of numbers. The number One was the symbol of unity and similarity, the principle of harmony and of the constitution of all things; the number Two, on the other hand, was the symbol of diversity, of dissimilarity, of separation, and of change.

(c.) Nicomachus of Gerasa, in Arabia, appears to have lived about 150 B.C. In his work *Arithmetica. Libri* II., he taught the existence of numbers in the mind of the Creator antecedently to the formation of the universe; these numbers gave the plan after which all things were fashioned. In this wise Nicomachus makes the numbers of Pythagoras what Philo had made his *Ideas*—conceptions of the Divine mind. Furthermore, he holds the number One to be itself the Divinity, Reason, the Principle of form and goodness; the number Two is the Principle of dissimilarity, of change, of matter, and of evil. The ethical duty of man is to withdraw from contact with the impure, and to attain again to union with God! †

2. Eclectic Platonism had its rise in the first century of our era, and attained a considerable diffusion in the second. Its aim was to combine in one system the *Ideas* of Plato and the *Categories* of Aristotle, and further to establish a harmonious accord between the philosophy of Greece and the religious and mythical notions of the East. It strove, in particular, to renew and propagate the transcendentalism of Plato in opposition to the pantheism of the Stoics and the naturalism of the Epicureans. This system was the forerunner of Neo-Platonism, and led up to it.

* A century later Philostratus, at the instigation of the Empress Julia, wife of Alexander Severus, composed a treatise on Apollonius, which purports to be a biography. This work is a romance at once philosophical and religious in character, and written for a purpose. In the person of Apollonius the Neo-Pythagorean ideal is sketched with the design of setting another ideal and wonder-working personage in opposition to the person of Christ, and of thus maintaining the repute of the heathen religion against the advance of Christianity. In this work we are told of the wonders which befel at the birth of Apollonius; for example, a streak of lightning which sank into the earth, rose again into the air, and there disappeared. We are told of the great piety of Apollonius, and of the higher knowledge he possessed, and by which he was enabled to read the future, and to speak in tongues which he had never learned. We are told how he journeyed to India to converse with the Brahmins, and to interchange knowledge with them. His miracles are described at length. He is said to have cast out devils, to have raised a dead girl to life, and to have learned from the whining of a tame lion that it possessed a human soul—the soul of Amasis, King of Egypt, and so forth. We are also told that he travelled into Egypt and there confounded the wisdom of the Gymnosophists. Apollonius enjoyed the personal acquaintance of Vespasian and Titus. Under Domitian he suffered imprisonment in consequence of an unguarded prophecy regarding Nerva's succession to the Empire. But he escaped miraculously from prison, and announced at Ephesus the death of Domitian at the moment that the Emperor died in Rome. His own death was accompanied by miracles. Some say he entered the temple of Athene, in Lindus, and there disappeared; others assert that he went into the temple of Athene, in Crete, and thence raised himself into heaven, an unseen choir of maidens singing the while: "Rise up from earth: ascend to heaven." Philostratus relates these and other fantastic stories, professing to found his narrative on a written document left by a certain Damis, a pupil and companion of Apollonius; but of this document there is no further trace. The design to raise Apollonius to the position of a heathen saint and worker of miracles, and to set him against Christ, in order to drive Christianity from the field, is unmistakable.

† To Secundus, of Athens, the "silent philosopher," who lived under Adrian, are attributed certain answers to philosophical questions put by the Emperor, which are in accord with the notions of the Neo-Pythagoreans. These answers are found in the philosopher's "Life"—a work which dates from the second century.

3. Among the Eclectic Platonists, the most renowned are Arius, Didymus, and Eudorus (in the time of Augustus); Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (under Tiberius, A.D. 30); Theon of Smyrna, Plutarch of Chæronea (under Trajan, A.D. 100); Maximus of Tyre (under the Antonines, A.D. 170); Apuleius of Madaura in Numidia; Alcinous, Albinus, and Severus (about the same period); Calvisius Taurus (A.D. 150), and Atticus (A.D. 174), the physician Galen (A.D. 175); Celsus, the antagonist of Christianity (A.D. 200), and Numenius of Apamea (A.D. 170).

(*a*). Eudorus of Alexandria wrote a commentary upon the *Timæus* of Plato, as well as upon the works of Aristotle, and composed a treatise on the Divisions of Philosophy. Arius Didymus, a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon, wrote a work, περὶ ἀρεσκόντων Πλάτωνι, and others besides. Thrasyllus of Egypt (A.D. 30), to whom we owe an arrangement of the Platonic dialogues, combined with his Platonism Pythagorean speculations about numbers, and Chaldean doctrines regarding magic. Dercyllides was the first to divide the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies. Theon of Smyrna composed a work on the mathematical principles involved in the Platonic theories.

(*b*) Plutarch of Chæronea regarded it as the chief end of philosophy to instruct men in their moral and religious obligations, and so came to consider as chief in importance the doctrines which affect the character and temperament of the learner. In the exposition of his views he professes to follow Plato, even where he is very distinctly at variance with Plato's teaching. He combats the Monism of the Stoics, and returns to Plato's assumption of two cosmical principles, God (the Monas), the author of good, and matter (the Duas), on which depends the existence of evil. God is in Himself, unknowable, it is only His creative action which comes within reach of our knowledge. Intermediate between God and matter, Plutarch places Ideas. This lower world, the soul of man included, appears to him a being debased by the disturbing influences of matter. He holds the existence of an evil World-Soul, as well as a good. His ethical doctrines are lofty, temperate, and pure.

Maximus of Tyre, who lived about half a century later than Plutarch, followed the same lines, but shows himself more inclined to religious syncretism and a superstitious demonology.

(*c*). Apuleius of Madaura holds God, Ideas, and Matter to be the primary principles of all things. He distinguishes between the sensible and super-sensible world. The latter includes God, Reason, or the Unity of Ideas, and the Soul; the former rests upon matter as its basis. Alcinous likewise holds God, Ideas, and Matter to be the ultimate principles of being; but he confounds in one system the notions of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics. Severus denies that the world had a beginning. Atticus protests against the combination of Aristotelian and Platonic theories, and is a vigorous opponent of Aristotle; that the world had its beginning in time he holds to be established.

(*d*). Claudius Galen, the celebrated teacher of the medical art, who first traced the connection between the nerves and the brain, devoted much attention to philosophy, and occupied himself with the exposition of the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. He esteems philosophy, which for him is the same thing as religion, as the greatest of the benefits conferred by the gods. To him we owe the Fourth syllogistic Figure. He inclines to the Platonic notion of an immortal soul, but he is unable to conquer his doubts upon this point as upon all others where experience is not available. He lays special stress on the general religious belief in the existence of the gods, and the rule of a Providence. Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, is known to us by the refutation with which Origen met the arguments against Christianity which he had put forward in his Λόγος ἀληθής.*

* As to the substance of Celsus' work—it is remarkable that his first objection to Christianity is, that it aims at becoming not a national religion, but a universal religion. All the heathen creeds were national, the claim of Christianity to be a universal faith was unintelligible to the pagan world. Celsus despised the Jews as heartily as he despised the Christians, but he held that the Jews had an advantage over the Christians in this, that they possessed a national religion. He furthermore reproached the Christians with insisting always on blind faith, and refusing all rational inquiry into their articles of belief. He failed to understand the nature of Christian faith and its relation to reason. He denied the supernatural manner of the birth of Christ. The Jewish fable of the Roman soldier Pantheus and his relations with Mary he accepts without question. The whole life of Christ seems to him to be a refutation of the Christian belief in His divinity. He cannot reconcile the lowliness and poverty of the Saviour with his own epicurean conceptions of the happiness and immunity from suffering enjoyed by the gods. He makes mockery of the god who hid

(*e*). The most unmistakable forerunner of Neo-Platonism is, however, Numenius of Apamea. He traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the lore of the East, and speaks of Plato as the Attic Moses. There can be no doubt that he was well acquainted with Philo, and with the Jewish theosophy of Alexandria. He formulated a distinct system of Tritheism. He distinguishes the Platonic Demiurgos from the Supreme Deity, making the former subject to the latter, and thus proceeds: The first God is goodness in itself and of itself, he is pure activity of thought (*νοῦς*), and the ultimate reason for all existence (*οὐσιας ἀρχή*). The second god (*ὁ δεύτερος θεός*), the Demiurgos, is good by participation in the being of the first, he contemplates the super-sensible archetypes of things, and so acquires knowledge; he exerts his activity upon matter, fashions it after the archetypes he has beheld, and thus becomes the creator of the world. The world, the creation of the Demiurgos, is the third god. This doctrine Numenius ascribes to Plato, and even to Socrates. He holds that the soul has been degraded from a previous incorporeal state of existence in punishment of a fault. Harpocration and Cronius seem to have held similar views.

3. Neo-Platonism.

Introductory Remarks.

§ 51.

1. It has already been made clear that ancient philosophy in the first centuries of our era had altogether ceased to receive original development. Nothing new was added. The great conceptions of earlier times were discussed and modified with, perhaps, more erudition than insight. This was the whole work of the philosophers of the time.

2. One system only could claim to form an exception to this rule—the system of Neo-Platonism. It might have seemed that the brilliant epoch of Greek philosophy was to be revived in Neo-Platonism. But it was only an appearance; for at bottom Neo-Platonism was no more than a system in which the religious notions of the East were blended with the conceptions and doctrines of the older Greek philosophers, though it differed from the other eclectic systems in this—that the fusion was more intimate and complete. For this reason Neo-Platonism could not maintain its position against the rising sun of Christianity. It combated Christianity, but in so doing it was working its own overthrow. Neo-Platonism was merely the last violent flickering of the light of ancient philosophy which immediately preceded total extinction.

3. Neo-Platonism, described by its fundamental characteristic, may be called a theory of emanation. This notion of emanation is essentially an Oriental concept. We find no trace of it in the history of Greek philosophy. There is no room, therefore, to doubt that Neo-

himself when the Jews accused him, who wandered about the country, was betrayed by one of his disciples, taken prisoner, and crucified. He altogether denies the resurrection of Christ. He laughs at the evidence in favour of the resurrection. If Jesus really meant to display his divine power, he would have revealed himself to his torturers and executioners; but he did not appear to them: he showed himself to a foolish woman, and then to his own companions. Moreover, how could the Son of God descend from heaven? Such a thing could not be accomplished without effecting a change in God himself from a better state to a worse. And if he came to bring the true religion into the world, why did he not come sooner? In a word, Celsus maintains that the whole teaching regarding the person of Christ is no more than an attempt to deify a dead man: it is no better than any other heathen apotheosis. Finally, what do the Christians mean by the resurrection of the body? Such a belief is wholly irrational; for the body is altogether unclean, and subject to every kind of misery, &c., &c.

Platonism borrowed it from the East. But the scientific form in which this notion was put forward was drawn from the Greek systems, especially the Platonic. They furnished the scientific principles which helped out in detailed development the system of emanation. In this respect Neo-Platonism is the most remarkable representation of that union of Eastern and Greek thought, which is the characteristic of this period of ancient philosophy.

4. A further characteristic feature of Neo-Platonism, and one which stands in close relation to the former, is its mysticism—a mysticism of the extreme type. This again is of Oriental origin. Its combination with Greek philosophy was made all the more easy by the fact that Plato's writings had already given evidence of a mystical tendency. In Neo-Platonism mysticism was pushed to the extreme limit. A consequence of this exaggerated mysticism was that the superstitions of theurgy; magic, and necromancy found their way into the system, and were there established and justified by scientific methods.

5. Neo-Platonism has three representative schools—the Alexandrino-Roman, to which the system owes its origin and thorough development; the Syrian, which was chiefly occupied with a fantastic theurgy, and lastly, the Athenian, which returned again to saner methods. With the last-named school we may associate the Neo-Platonist commentators of later times. We proceed to take a survey of these three schools in order.

Neo-Platonism in its Earliest Form.

Plotinus.

§ 52.

1. The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, of Alexandria (A.D. 176-250). He is said to have been brought up as a Christian by his parents, but to have returned to paganism in maturer life. The nickname, Saccas, refers to the trade by which Ammonius at first procured a livelihood. His teaching was all delivered orally. We have no further account of him. He is said to have maintained that there was no essential difference between the doctrines of Plato and of Aristotle. This, however, is not beyond doubt.

2. The most remarkable of his disciples were Origen,* Errenius, Longinus the physiologist, and, most famous of all, Plotinus. We have no precise account of Origen and Erennius. Longinus is rather a grammarian than a philosopher; he has, however secured a place among philosophers by his treatise "On the Sublime," (Περὶ ὕψους), which abounds in acute and striking observations. He, moreover, maintained,

* We must distinguish this Neo-Platonist from the early ecclesiastical writer, Origen. The latter was, however, a pupil of Ammonius, as will be seen later.

in opposition to the other Neo-Platonists, the doctrine that ideas exist apart from the νοῦς. But the chief disciple of Ammonius was, as we have stated, Plotinus—the philosopher who gave to Neo-Platonism its scientific form and scientific basis.

3. Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) always declined to state where he was born or to give any information regarding his parents or the date of his birth; these things he despised as mere earthly matters; according to his pupil, Porphyrius, he felt it a humiliation to be burdened with a body. (He was born in Lycopolis, in Egypt.) When twenty-eight years old he turned his attention to philosophy, but he could not satisfy himself with any of the then celebrated teachers in Alexandria, until at length he found in Ammonius the teacher he sought for. At the age of forty-eight he arrived in Rome. Here he began to teach, and soon secured pupils. He even carried his success so far as to win to belief in his theories the Emperor Gallienus, and his wife, Salonina. His writings show that he had made acquaintance with all the schools of Greek philosophy by a study of the chief works of each. The writings of Numenius exercised much influence upon him.

4. It was not until his fiftieth year that Plotinus set himself to commit his teaching to writing. According to the statement of Porphyrius, Origen, Erennius, and Plotinus entered into a compact not to publish the doctrines of Ammonius. But Erennius having broken the engagement, the others held themselves released from their promise. The manuscripts of Plotinus were revised after his death by his pupil, Porphyrius, the style amended and the whole published in six *enneads*. These six *enneads* are the source from which we draw our knowledge of the teaching of Plotinus. In his exposition, Plotinus lacks the æsthetic grace of the Platonic dialogues, and still more their dialectical power, but he appeals to us by his earnest trust in his own thoughts and the enthusiasm with which he expresses them.

5. As the starting point of his system, Plotinus takes the One, which he also describes as the Good. We cannot begin with the νοῦς. For in knowledge we always have duality—the act of cognition and the object known (νοῦς καὶ νοητόν). This duality is inseparable from the νοῦς, for if we separate the νοητόν from the νοῦς, there is no νοῦς left us, there being no object of knowledge. We cannot, however, start with duality, for duality presupposes unity. The νοῦς is, consequently, not the primary element. For this element we must look higher than the νοῦς. We must not then begin with reason or with the νοῦς, but with the One or the Good, which, as such, is above the Reason. This is the first or ultimate principle of all things.

6. The primal One (primal Good) is absolute unity, simplicity, and infinity. In itself it is absolutely devoid of definite form. No attribute, in the proper sense of the term, can be predicated of it. It is above all attributes and all designations: there is no expression for it in language. It is only by denying all forms and attributes in regard to it that we can bring it in any degree within reach of our intelligence. It is not that which is (τὸ ὄν), not οὐσία, not life, not beauty, not νοῦς; it is above being, existence, life, beauty, reason, &c. Even the predicates of unity and goodness are not applicable to this first principle in their strict sense. It transcends even these, it is the One and the Good in a transcendent sense.

7. From this primal One, as from an ultimate first principle, is evolved the multiple. This evolution is not to be understood in the sense that the primal One loses its transcendent unity while the many are evolved, and becomes a ἓν καὶ πᾶν. Plotinus energetically rejects such a notion. The One does not become All, it ever remains above all

(*πρὸ πάντων*). The One may be said to be All, in the sense that all things proceed from it, but it is not one out of the number of all things; because all things exist subsequently to it, and after their existence it continues to transcend all. Still less can the multiple be formed from the One by a process of division, for in this the unity of the One would be wholly destroyed.

8. The evolution of the multiple from the One must be regarded as a process of emanation, of such a nature that the One, while permitting the multiple to emanate from it, loses nothing of what is its own in the process. The possibility of this emanation is given "in the transcendent virtue of the One, which as a being of supreme excellence admits the evolution of a lower excellence from the fulness of its perfection, without containing this lower excellence formally within itself." That this emanation is actually effected is due to the fact that this first principle is not only the primal One—it is also the primal Good. Now, it is the nature of the good to diffuse itself. The good would not be the good if it did not bestow itself on something other than itself. The primal One, as being the primal Good, must, therefore, bring forth something other than itself; that is, cause something else to emanate from itself. This act is neither a free act nor a necessary act; such terms have no application to the primal One. The something else thus produced is not unity—it must be plurality—for it is not the first principle, it is a consequence of the existence of the first principle.

9. The immediate emanation from the primal One is the *νοῦς*—the image (*εἰκών*) of the One. It is diffused around the One, like an ocean of light. In itself it is essential being (*οὐσία*), but this essence produced by the One, turns itself to the One from which it derives its origin, and in the act attains knowledge, that is to say, becomes the *νοῦς*. This *νοῦς*, therefore, as such, has knowledge of itself. In this *νοῦς* we find a duality already established. For, although in its self-knowledge the subject knowing and object known are one in fact, they are yet distinguished in thought. A principle of differentiation (*ἑτερότης*) is thus inherent in the *νοῦς*, for in it there is at least an ideal distinction between the knowing subject and the thing known. If then the primal One be the first or Supreme God, the *νοῦς* is a second divinity—the Son of the Supreme God.

10. If we inquire, in what relation this *νοῦς* stands to the world of Ideas, Plotinus, in distinct opposition to Longinus, tells us that Ideas do not lie without the *νοῦς*, but rather are implanted in it. When Plato in the *Timæus* asserts that Ideas are objects of contemplation to the *νοῦς*, it might be supposed that Plato held Ideas to exist without the *νοῦς*; but, remarks Plotinus, "If this were the case then the *νοῦς* would have within it merely a perception of that which really is, not the reality itself, and thus would not possess the truth which, as such, would be beyond its reach. This, however, cannot be admitted. The Divine *νοῦς* cannot err. But if it possessed within it, not the genuine being (*ἀληθινόν*), but only images (*εἴδωλα*) of this being, it would err, for it would deem itself to possess the truth, and yet would not possess it."

Ideas, then—the *νοητόν* in this strict sense—must be indwelling (immanent) in the *νοῦς*; this, it cannot be doubted, is the genuine teaching of Plato.

11. Accordingly, the *νοῦς* as *οὐσία*, is to be regarded as the union of all *νοητά*—of all intelligible essences, that is, of all Ideas. This *νοῦς* turns its thought upon itself, and in this act of thought the unity is differentiated and a plurality of Ideas arises. Thus, then, the *οὐσία*, taken in its original unity and as known immediately in itself, is the Indeterminate—intelligible matter—but by thought the indeterminate becomes determinate, that is to say, reduced to a plurality or difference of Ideas. These Ideas are, therefore, in respect of the intelligible matter which underlies them, so many intelligible forms. The intelligible matter is thus seen to be that element which Plato styles "the one and the same," for it is contained in every particular idea; whereas the intelligible forms, by means of which the one *οὐσία* is differentiated and a plurality of ideas created, is that element which Plato names "the other." But this development of the one into the many does not proceed beyond the sphere of Universals, for the universal alone is really existent, and this, therefore, can alone find place in the *νοῦς*.

12. But although plurality, as has been explained, is given in the *νοῦς*, there is not any dissociation of the things so differentiated. For as the *νοῦς* is not itself separated into parts, so the elements which differ from one another within it are inseparable. The *νοῦς* is the one Universal Reason, and, as such, is an indivisible entelechy. The separation of the differentiated elements can be accomplished only in the world of phenomena, and in this sphere such separation must be accomplished, for matter can exhibit and manifest ideas only in a state of separation from one another. In this severance, the ideas manifest themselves not only as archetypal causes, but also as efficient and formative forces. For as the *νοῦς* is itself an active vital principle, so also must the ideas it contains be vital principles which exhibit their activity as soon as they appear in matter.

13. Nevertheless, ideas cannot become immediately active in matter as operative and formative principles; an intermediate element must be interposed. This element is the soul. The soul is, therefore, the third principle, following the primal One and the *νοῦς*.* It is an emanation from the *νοῦς*, as the latter is an emanation from the One; and as the *νοῦς* is an image of the One, so is the soul an image of the *νοῦς*. The soul, therefore, is not a body, nor the inseparable entelechy of a body; it is an immaterial substance, distinct from everything corporeal. The product of the *νοῦς*, in one aspect of its being it communicates with the *νοῦς*, in another aspect it communicates with that product which emanates from itself—with matter. In this wise it possesses an ideal indivisible element within it, as well as a divisible element which enters into matter, for it may be said to pervade the material world. In this sense,

* These three principles, the One, the *νοῦς*, and the Soul, constitute the threefold divinity of the Neo-Platonists.

Plato might with truth assert that the soul is made up of an indivisible and a divisible element.

14. There is a real plurality of souls. But all stand in close relation to the supreme soul—the universal soul, or the world-soul. The relation of the latter to the former is not that of a whole to its parts. The world-soul is a sort of universal entity which includes in itself the several individual souls, undistinguished from one another, and which brings these souls forth from itself by emanation, in the same way as the One produces the νοῦς, and the νοῦς produces the world-soul itself. The world-soul is no more separated from the νοῦς than the νοῦς is separated from the One. It exists in the νοῦς as the latter exists in the One. But it at the same time exists in the world, for it is the soul of the world. The One and the soul form the extreme limits of the divine or super-sensible world; beneath this we have the sensible or material world.

15. Below the state of existence represented by the soul the process of emanation issues in the corporeal order. The substratum of all corporeal things is matter. Matter must therefore stand last in the series of emanations. In the process of emanation, says Plotinus, there must be a last member as well as a first. This last which produces nothing below itself, but in which the productive force is wholly exhausted—this ultimate member of the series—is matter. Matter is, in a certain sense, the dregs or precipitate of the process of emanation; it represents the ultimate enervation of the Ideal, in which, so to speak, the Ideal becomes extinct and issues in its contrary. It is no more than the shadow which the light of the higher emanations flings back to its uttermost boundary.

16. Accordingly, Plotinus describes matter as absolutely indeterminate and unlimited, as wanting in form, quality, and quantity. It is being without essential character, non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) in contradistinction to that which really is (the Idea); ἀνάγκη (necessity) in contradistinction to the λόγος (rational energy); privation in contradistinction to reality; darkness as opposed to the light of the λόγος. Matter is not corporeal substance, but the unseen substratum, the shadowy βάθος (deep-lying element) of the corporeal. Thus, matter at every point stands in distinct contrast to the ideal.

17. The ideal is not only the really existent, it is furthermore that which alone is good. Into this sphere, too, its contrast with matter is carried. Matter is evil and the source of evil. It is, no doubt, receptive of the Form communicated to it, and, to this extent, it may be called good, but in itself it is absolutely evil (κακόν). Hence, all evil, in the last resort, comes from matter. Matter is evil itself, and defiles everything with which it comes in contact.

18. Between matter, which thus forms the utmost limit of the process of emanation, and the cosmic soul, there is interposed, as a sort of third principle, the sensible world. Its constituent principles are matter and the cosmic soul in so far as by the latter, ideas, which, are the determinative principles, are infused into matter. The world-soul has, so

to speak, one aspect of its being turned towards the νοῦς, from which it receives ideas (λόγους); while, in another direction, it is in contact with matter, and, in this direction, becomes the universal world-soul, the universal principle of life and nature. Plotinus also styles this soul of Nature the ἔσχατον ψυχῆς. It is in this wise that the forming of matter into the sensible world becomes possible.

19. The soul being identified with the νοῦς receives ideas from the latter, and by its formative activity as cosmical soul gives them existence in matter. By this formative action of the world-soul the ideas become forms (εἴδη) realised in matter, and manifest themselves in the entelechies of individual objects. These individual objects are the things perceptible to sense, of which the sensible world is made up. This explains the origin of the sensible as contradistinguished from the intelligible world.

20. The world of sense is thus a universal likeness of the supersensible world or νοῦς. But this likeness, it must be allowed, is very imperfect. For, apart from the circumstance that the νοῦς is not represented as that unit of being which it is, but by the plurality of ideas which it contains and which manifest themselves in the world of phenomena, representing only the λόγοι σπερματικοί of the νοῦς, it is further to be noted that matter is, in itself, but little adapted to represent the ideal, partly because, at every point, it is opposed to the ideal, and partly because it is in a state of constant flux.

21. This being so, the further question arises: What of the *reality* of the world of sense? The answer to this question reveals to us the essential character of the Neo-Platonic Philosophy. It is clear that, at this point, matter can no longer be regarded as a *real* substratum of the objects of sense—the conception under which it was represented in the Platonic system proper. For here matter is no longer something apart from, though co-existent with, the ideal; it is itself made part of the process of emanation, described as its last product—a notion which leads to the conclusion that its attributes are all of the negative kind. But if matter is not the real substratum of the sensible world, then the sensible world itself ceases to be intelligible as a reality. The reality of the phenomenal world disappears, and objects of sense are reduced to mere appearances.

22. How just these deductions are, appears from the manner in which Plotinus explains the nature of corporeal substance. On this point, he asserts that, taken in the entirety of their being, bodies consist of qualities which are of the intelligible not of the sensible order. The accidents which are peculiar to bodies, as such, for example, quantity, density, shape, &c., &c., are, in themselves, purely concepts of the intelligence. Now, if we take away from a body all these accidents, there is nothing left which we can call a body; the whole body, as such, disappears. It follows, therefore, that what we call a body is nothing more than the result of the combination of certain accidents, which, in themselves, are purely of the intelligible order. From the combination of these accidents arises the appearance of corporeal nature, which, however, disappears as soon as thought comes to bear upon it, and the pro-

cess of abstraction dissolves the combination in which those accidents are held together. We may say, then, that corporeal things are no more than appearances; that there is, in fact, nothing corporeal; what is, is ideal only.

23. In this theory, we find it clearly intimated that the ideal, as far as it appears in the world of sense under corporeal appearances, is in a state at variance with its true nature. The ideal is here found in a condition of degradation from its higher nature—in a condition of alienation from its transcendental origin. The existence of the world of sense supposes, therefore, a degradation or fall of the ideas from the world of intelligence. This downfall of ideas to the material order is, at the same time, their fall from the unity and perfection which belonged to them in the νοῦς. This downfall can alone explain the fact that the sensible world, though it mirrors in itself the ideal, is, nevertheless, in itself, unreality and nothingness, and cannot bear comparison with its prototype.

24. Hitherto we have been considering merely the general principles of Neo-Platonism. Let us now glance at its system of psychology. Plotinus adduces many arguments to establish the incorporeal and immaterial nature of the soul—following Plato for the most part and reproducing his reasonings. The soul, he says, is the principle of life; it cannot, therefore, be an outcome of the action of the body, it must come before the body, and, therefore, it must be something incorporeal. Furthermore, the soul has cognizance of the intelligible and immaterial, but this it could not have if it were not itself of the intelligible and immaterial order. The soul perceives an impression made upon the body at the point where the impression is made. It must, therefore, be present in all parts of the body at once, but this, again it could not be if it were not immaterial, &c.

25. The individuality of the soul depends upon its union with the body. This is the principle of individuation. The soul permeates the body as fire permeates the air. It is whole in the entire body, and whole in every part. It is the soul which binds the body together and holds its parts united; it would, therefore, be more appropriate to speak of the body as being in the soul than to speak of the soul as being in the body. The soul is united to the body in one respect only; in another respect it is free. It is free so far as it is active in thought, for this function not only has no need of a sensible organ, it wholly excludes it. The soul is in union with the body in so far as it is the principle of vitality and sensation; for in these functions the organs of the body are a necessity. And yet, even the faculties of sense are not, strictly speaking, located in the body, they are present within it only in so far as the soul bestows upon the organs of the body the energy which is required for their several functions.

26. The soul is not, of its nature, destined to union with the body. This union is merely the consequence of its downfall from the supersensible world. The soul, in its original state, was above the corporeal state, but inclining downwards towards matter it forgot its higher

dignity, and fell, in consequence, to the state of union with the body. The body is, therefore, an outward adjunct of the soul—a mere accidental accretion—it is no more than the instrument of the soul. But the soul has not lost its freedom of action in its fall, and hence its return to the Absolute is possible.

27. The universal world-soul is intimately united to the νοῦς, from which it derives its origin, and through this union is endowed with reason; this being so, the divine νοῦς must be immanent in human souls which have their being in the universal soul, and to this indwelling of the νοῦς, they, too, owe their possession of reason. The νοῦς is thus the centre of the soul—the basis of its personality. But the νοῦς in its turn is derived from the One, and maintains its existence in the One as the source of its being; through the νοῦς, therefore, the soul is brought into contact with the ultimate first principle—the One—and is intimately united to it in vital union.

28. These principles determine the theory of cognition held by Plotinus. Plotinus, like Plato, makes no account of sensuous cognition as a means of attaining truth. Sense perception is no more than a dream of the soul. To attain the cognition of intelligible truth, the soul must retire from the avenues of sense and fall back upon its own centre—the νοῦς. Here it already possesses truth *a priori*, and it needs only to call this truth into consciousness and to develop it there. This, as has been said, it can do only when it withdraws from sense and concentrates itself in the νοῦς, as in the central point of its being.

29. Cognition, in this theory, is not an appropriation of objective truth by the mind, it is the drawing out of truth by the mind from within itself. The whole process of cognition is accomplished by a certain self-contemplation of the νοῦς within the soul, and involves a consciousness of the identity of subject knowing and object known. But as the soul rises to the sphere of intellectual knowledge, it enters upon a path which leads to a still higher order of knowledge, namely, the contemplation of the One. For the νοῦς—the universal reason—being in union with the source of its being—the primal One—and contemplating the One, is enabled to rise from its act of self-contemplation in man to the contemplation of the One. And this explains how it is that man, through the νοῦς that dwells within him, can attain to the contemplation of the Supreme Being.

30. This perfection, however, is not attainable unless the One sheds into the soul of man a special light, and thereby opens his eyes to higher contemplation. This light man cannot secure by any dialectical efforts; it must come to him suddenly. But when it shines within him, then apprehension, self-consciousness and thought disappear: in a word, all the lower degrees of knowledge are absorbed into this contemplation of the One, and man is raised to the state of ecstasy. It is only in this ecstatic condition that contemplation of the primal One is possible; this ecstatic contemplation is thus the highest stage of human cognition.

31. The basis is here laid for the teleological doctrine regarding man. Everything comes from the primal One, or primal Good, and

everything must return to it again. Hence, we observe that all things—and men more especially—necessarily strive after good. The highest good is the primal Good or first principle; the highest good of man is, therefore, attained in the knowledge of the primal Good. Now, this knowledge is attainable only in the state of ecstasy. Hence, the ecstatic contemplation of the primal Good is not only the highest degree of man's knowledge, it is also the highest form of his happiness. Plotinus is at a loss for words in which to depict the bliss which is secured by this ecstatic contemplation.

32. Ecstatic contemplation, as we have seen, can be reached only by withdrawing the soul from the things of sense. This principle leads us at once to the ethical duty of man. Mystical asceticism must be practised if man is to attain to the height of his destiny. By this asceticism the soul must combat the bodily nature with its sensual impulses and tendencies, and so deliver itself from the body and sensuality. The body hangs round the soul like a heavy burden, which weighs it down; in fact the soul has found its way into the body only in consequence of a fault committed—an all-sufficient reason why it should crush more and more completely the energies and tendencies of sense, in order to rise again into the pure atmosphere of the intelligible world. The man who gives himself effectually to this asceticism, and, as far as may be, delivers his soul from the body, not only attains to mystical contemplation, he furthermore enters into a higher relation with the gods and with the super-sensible forces that are at work in nature, and is enabled by this communication to perform miracles and to read the future. He becomes a thaumaturgus and a prophet.

33. From the same principles Plotinus deduces his theory of moral evil. As has been observed, evil, generally speaking, has its origin in matter; it is, therefore, in the strict sense, a cosmical force. Now, man's body is composed of matter; in man, therefore, the source of evil is the body. It thus appears that moral evil consists in this: that the soul follows the impulses and tendencies of the body, surrenders itself to their control; whereas moral goodness, on the other hand, is founded on the deliverance of the soul, by ascetical practices, from the dominion of the body.

34. Connected with these notions of moral good and moral evil, we find another, which, however, is in the last analysis, identical with the former. The soul we have been told, is individualized by its union with the body, and this union with the body not being the connatural state of the soul, the same may also be said of its individuality. We may, therefore, describe the essence of moral evil as the assertion of its individuality by the soul. The soul becomes wicked by its effort to assert its own individuality and its own will, in contradistinction to the universal existence within which it has its being. It becomes good when it raises itself above this individuality and merges itself in the universal.

35. In these theories we notice an unmistakable effort after a genuine morality, and to this extent Neo-Platonism may be regarded as a protest against the moral depravity of the paganism of the age. But

the asceticism which Neo-Platonism sought to promote rested upon an entirely false principle and was, in consequence, powerless to effect any great moral reformation. This principle was that the body is the source of all evil. Based upon this notion, Neo-Platonic asceticism could not fail to assume a stern and hostile attitude towards the body and the outer world, and the earnestness of character which it was calculated to develop tended to become exaggerated beyond what a right conception of the natural order would warrant. The Neo-Platonic asceticism being directed against corporeal nature as evil and antagonistic in itself, was liable to degenerate into a wholly unnatural system, and so to lose all power for the regeneration of paganism. And further, it was the distinct scope of this Neo-Platonic asceticism to attain union in contemplation with the primal One, and by this means to become capable of working wonders. So far as this end was assumed to be attained, the system could lead only to arrogance and folly—a result largely produced among the Neo-Platonists. But arrogance and folly are opposed to morality.

36. Plotinus gives various definitions of virtue. Looking to the end attained by it, he defines it as "likeness to God"; considering the character of virtuous conduct in itself, he holds it to be "action in accordance with the nature of things" (ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), or "obedience to reason." He distinguishes between social, purifying and deifying virtues. The first class are concerned with external social relations, and in this class are included the four cardinal virtues: prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. The purifying virtues (καθάρσεις) are concerned with the freeing of the soul from sin (ἁμαρτία), by divorcing it from the things of sense; the deifying virtues are those by which men return again to the Absolute, and, in a certain sense, become one with God.

37. There are three classes of men. One class are held captive by sense, they esteem pleasure good and pain evil, they strive to attain the one and avoid the other, and herein is their wisdom expended. Another class—capable indeed of a certain elevation, but unable to see what belongs to higher spheres—give themselves to the practice of social virtues, devote themselves to practical pursuits, and strive to make a right choice among these lower objects. But there is a third class of men of diviner sort, endowed with higher energy and keener vision, who turn to the light that shines from on high, and rising towards the source of that light, are lifted above the regions of gloom, men who despise the things of earth and make their dwelling-place in that region where they may participate in true joy. They cannot, indeed, remain always in this state. Not having freed themselves wholly from the earth, they easily turn to it again. And thus it happens that it is but seldom even the wisest, best, and most virtuous men, enjoy the contemplation of the supreme God. (Plotinus himself, during the six years in which Porphyry, his disciple, was his associate, succeeded in reaching this height of contemplation on four occasions only.)

38. Plotinus uses the same arguments as Plato in proof of the immortality of the soul. The Platonic notion, that souls which quit the body, imperfectly purified, take with them a kind of corporeal vesture, in which they afterwards appear, is found among the doctrines of Plotinus. So, too, the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, the theory of successive generations, and the doctrine of demons. The demons are to be reverenced as well as the gods. With their aid, too, wonders may be worked. The same may also be effected by magic.

39. The most remarkable of the disciples of Plotinus were Amelius and Porphyry. Little is known regarding Amelius, but Porphyry holds an important place among the Neo-Platonists. He lived from A.D. 233 to 304, and from the year 263 onwards was a pupil of Plotinus in Rome. He professes to explain and defend the teaching of Plotinus, not to develop it. This teaching he holds to coincide with that of Plato, and to be the same in substance with that of Aristotle also. He composed a great many works. Of these the *εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰς (Ἀριστοτέλους) κατηγορίας*, is usually prefixed to editions of Aristotle's Organon. His sketch of the system of Plotinus is set forth in a series of Latin aphorisms. We have already mentioned his arrangement of the treatises of Plotinus in six Enneads. In all these undertakings, his extensive learning and his subtle intelligence, which enabled him to enter into views the most divergent, as well as his readiness and grace of exposition, stood him in good stead.

40. The doctrine of Porphyry is distinguished from that of Plotinus by possessing a practical rather than a religious character. Porphyry defended necromancy, theurgy, and the worship of demons, but he advised caution in the use of them. He maintains that the world has not had a beginning, and he appears to have taught the emanation of matter and of the world-soul more distinctly than Plotinus himself. He combated the doctrines of the Christians, in particular the Divinity of Christ, in fifteen books *κατὰ Χριστιάνων* many refutations of which were written by the Fathers of the Church.*

Syrian School of Neo-Platonism.

Iamblichus and his Disciples.

§ 53.

1. Iamblichus of Chalcis, in Cœle-Syria, was a pupil of Porphyry and died in the reign of Constantine (A.D. 330.) By his disciples he was credited with the power of working miracles, and was by them named "the divine" *ὁ θεῖος*. They narrate that in prayer he was raised into the air ten ells high; that his garments shone with golden light, and his face assumed an expression of celestial beauty. He was the author of several works, the most remarkable of which, in point of philosophical

* Porphyry held Christ in contempt because He was born of a woman, and in the end crucified. Like the other pagans, he laid the blame of all public calamities upon the Christians. They were ruled, he said, by an assembly of aged matrons, and the priestly dignity among them was conferred by the favour of women. He was particularly offended by the doctrine of the resurrection of the body—a doctrine wholly incompatible with the Neo-Platonist view that the body is essentially evil and impure. He attacks the sacred writings of the Christians, and decries and discredits the exegesis then in vogue.

We may here mention another controversial work against Christianity—the *Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιάνους* published A.D. 303, by Hierocles, governor of Bithynia, one of the most cruel of the persecutors under Diocletian. The polemical portion of this work, so far as we can gather from Eusebius' "Book" against Philostrates, is a tissue of falsehoods and calumnies directed against Christianity. Even these are not original, but for the most part copied word for word from Celsus. Every effort is made to exalt Apollonius.

interest, are the treatises, Περὶ τοῦ πυθαγορικοῦ βίου, λόγος προτρεπτικὸς εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, and the Θεολογούμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς.

2. In the system of Iamblichus, philosophy, as a science, loses its place, and becomes a mere device for the support of polytheism. He devotes his chief inquiries to the details of an elaborate demonology, in which all the gods of Greece and the East (the Christian God excepted), as well as the gods of Plotinus and many others, find a place. He also treats of theurgy, by which he understands the procuring of mysterious effects which God is pleased to accomplish, as also the power of bringing down the gods into communication with men by means of certain ineffable symbols, known only to God. In this connection we find certain Pythagorean mystic numbers play an important part. Plotinus taught that the soul could lift itself to that eminence of wisdom and virtue where it might be united with God. Iamblichus taught that this union might be accomplished by a contrary method—that man, by means of mystical practices, ceremonies, and words (σύμβολα, συνθήματα) could draw down the gods to himself (δραστικὴ ἕνωσις). In the mind of Iamblichus, theurgy is the complement of philosophy.

3. Above the One (ἕν) of Plotinus, Iamblichus sets another—the Absolutely First—in which there are no contrary elements of any kind, which is not the Good, but something which, being absolutely without distinctive characteristics, is higher than the Good. Under this One comes the One of Plotinus. The latter produces the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός) and this in turn produces the intellectual world (κόσμος νοερός). The former includes the objects of thought (Ideas), the latter all thinking essences. The elements of the former are πέρας, ἄπειρον and μικτόν, the elements of the latter are νοῦς, δύναμις and δημιουργός. Next in succession comes the psychical world, which is again divided into three orders—the world-soul, and, produced from it, two other souls. To this world belong the gods of the popular polytheism, angels, demons, and heroes, a whole host of whom Iamblichus makes us acquainted with, and whom he arranges according to certain numerical combinations derived from Pythagorean sources. Last, in the order of existence, stands the sensible world.

4. It is worth noting that Iamblichus endeavoured to introduce a formal worship of Pythagoras, the religious reverence for Apollonius being already antiquated. His work, Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ βίου, is written after the manner of the "Apollonius" of Philostrates, only that Pythagoras is put in the place of Apollonius. Iamblichus endeavours to show that the contemporaries of Pythagoras, with whom he came in contact, esteemed him a god who had come from heaven to teach men wisdom. He narrates a number of prodigies regarding him, and exalts his piety, which was set as an example to all men. That in this teaching Iamblichus had in view the doctrine of the Incarnation of God, which is the basis of Christianity, appears evident. Paganism also wanted its heaven-sent Messiah, and since Apollonius would not serve the purpose any longer, Pythagoras was substituted.

5. Iamblichus is probably the author of the work *De Mysteriis Ægyp-*

tiorum. The mention of this work gives us occasion to call attention to another characteristic of Neo-Platonism, especially of the Syrian School of that Philosophy. Since the time of Porphyry, Neo-Platonism had progressively assumed an attitude of greater hostility to Christianity. It had set up in Pythagoras a Messiah in opposition to the Messiah of the Christians, and it then endeavoured to secure divine authority for his teaching. The Christians had their Scriptures which they attributed to Divine revelation and Divine inspiration, the reformed Paganism of the Neo-Platonist school would have its Scriptures also, to be on a level with Christianity. These Scriptures were actually produced. Such were the "*Chaldaic Oracles*," the "*Orphic Poems*" and the "*Works of Hermes*," to which appeal was made and which, it was contended, were inspired by the gods.

6. The *Chaldaic Oracles* seem to have been a selection from the maxims of the different Chaldaic seers and astrologists, who were very numerous at this time. The Neo-Platonists of the fifth century made great account of this fund of Chaldaic wisdom. The *Orphic Songs*, which had already been known at an earlier period of Grecian history in connection with the Orphic religion (see above p. 29.) were also included in the category of sacred writings. The *Writings of Hermes* (Mysteria Ægyptiorum) received their name from Hermes—the Egyptian god, Thot or Taut—and were supposed to contain the secret lore of the Egyptians. They were ascribed to Hermes in the sense that the doctrines they contained purported to rest on the authority of the Egyptian priests, who had received them from the god, Thot. There exists a considerable number of these writings, and the number was still greater in earlier times. They treated of questions of medicine, and chemistry, as well as of religious and philosophical subjects. They enjoyed a high reputation. For Egypt was regarded as a holy land, which the gods had chosen for their abode, when they descended in visible form to impart divine wisdom to men. It was, therefore, to be expected that the writings of Hermes would become the sacred book or Bible of the heathens.

7. The most important of these writings—so far as religious and philosophical questions are concerned—are the *Poemander* and the *Dialogue of Asclepius*. The latter is an epitome of the notions current during the rise of Neo-Platonism, a medley of Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and mythical doctrines, reduced to one system, and set forth, not in the form of philosophical investigation, but in authoritative dogmatic fashion. These dogmas are put into the mouth of Hermes Trismegistos. The Poemander has not any consecutive order in its parts. It consists of fourteen treatises in which widely different and unconnected elements of doctrine are laid down.

8. Among the immediate disciples of Iamblichus was Theodorus of Asine, who sketched the system of Triads in greater detail than Iamblichus, and thus prepared the way for Proclus. Between the (One) Primal Being and the psychical he interposes a triad of beings—the intelligible, the intellectual, the demiurgical. We may also name among the disciples of Iamblichus, Sopater of Apamea whom Constantine put to death on suspicion of his having used magical arts to deprive the Corn-fleet of a favourable wind; Dexippus, Aedesius of Cappadocia, successor of Iamblichus, and teacher of Chrysanthus of Sardis, of Maximus of Ephesus, of Priscus of Molossus, and of Eusebius of Myndus who were the instructors of the Emperor Julian the Apostate,* Sallust, the companion

* Julian the Apostate, is known as the last persecutor of the Christians. This is not the place to dwell upon his efforts in the cause of persecution. He composed a work "Against the Christians," which is not now extant, but the leading ideas of which have been preserved to us by Cyril, in his reply *Contra Julianum*. Julian holds the view that there is one supreme God, but that under him, there are a number of inferior divinities, who rule the several parts of the created world. On this principle he explains the diversity of nations. The differences between nations, he thinks, are accounted for by the differences between the gods who preside over these nations. As a consequence of this view he recognises only national gods and national religions. He has no sympathy with the notion of one universal religion exhibited in Christianity. It is on this ground that he combats Christianity and justifies polytheism. The God of the Jews is, in Julian's view, a merely national God, and if the Jews were wrong in recognising only their own God, and denying those of other nations the same charge is doubly true of the Christians. Christianity, in Julian's estimate, is not only a false—it is also a pitiful religion, which cannot sustain comparison with the glory and greatness of the paganism of the past. The doctrine of the Divinity of Christ he considers a mere invention of Christ's followers. He exalts the civilisation of the pagans, contrasting it with the ignorance of the Christians, and taunts them with having produced from their schools no man of enlightened or vigorous character.

of Julian in his youth, and author of a compendium of Neo-Platonic Philosophy; also Eustachius, of Cappadocia. These men devoted themselves, for the most part, rather to the practices of theurgy than to philosophical theories. In proportion to the insignificance of their achievements in philosophy was the growth of their reverence for the chiefs of their school, and principally for Iamblichus. Commentaries upon the writings of the older philosophers were the principal works of the period. In this connection Themistius, of Paphlagonia, surnamed Euphrades, rendered considerable service to philosophy. We may further mention, as connected with the school, Aurelius Macrobius, author of the Saturnalia, the elder Olympiodorus, and the lady-philosopher, Hypatia (murdered A.D. 415).

Athenian School of Neo-Platonism.

Proclus.

§ 54.

1. The efforts of the Neo-Platonists to reform the religion of Paganism and to hold in check the growth of Christianity, had not the effect which was expected. The pagan religion had had its day, it could not be upheld, it fell before the Divine power of the Christian faith which was everywhere extending its sway. Its hour was come. Even the Neo-Platonists were at last forced to recognise this. Having failed to effect their aims against Christianity by material methods, and having failed to revive the old worship and the old beliefs, the representatives of Neo-Platonism addressed themselves with renewed zeal to scientific expedients, among which the study and exposition of the writings of Plato and Aristotle were of chief importance. This plan was followed in a marked way by the Athenian School. To this school belong Plutarch, son of Nestorius (died A.D. 433); his pupil, Syrianus, who expounded the writings of Plato and Aristotle; Hierocles of Alexandria, who devoted himself to the exposition of the Pythagorean writings; his pupil, Syrianus, of Alexandria; and, most remarkable of all, Proclus (A.D. 411-485), the pupil of Olympiodorus (the elder), of Plutarch, and of Syrianus. He was the most renowned of the later Neo-Platonists —the "scholastic of the Greek philosophers." He collected and arranged and gave dialectical form to the philosophy which had come down from the past, adding to it from his own resources, and reducing the whole to a kind of system which presented the appearance of strictly scientific method. He taught at Athens. Among his writings are found :—*Procli in Plat. Timæum Comment.*, Bas. 1534; *In theologiam Platonis libri sex una cum Marini vita Procli et Procli instit. theolog.*, Hamb. 1618; *Excerpta ex Procli Scholiis in Plat. Cratyl.*, Lips. 1820; *In Plat. Alcib. ed. Creuzer*, Francof. 1820-1825; *In Plat. Parmenidem. ed. Stallbaum*, Lips. 1839. *Opp. omnia. Ed. Cousin*, Paris 1820-25.

2. According to Proclus, the One is the absolute first principle. From this everything comes forth, and to this everything is striving to

return. The thing produced is at once like the producing cause and unlike it. In virtue of its likeness it remains in its cause, in virtue of its unlikeness it is separated from it. By establishing in itself a resemblance with its first principle, the separated product returns to that principle again, and the return has the same number of stages as the preceding evolution. The One is also the Ineffable; it is above all affirmation and negation. Even the notion of Oneness describes it inadequately, for it is higher than this notion also. But everything coming forth from this one principle is differentiated in a series of successive triads. The oftener this process is repeated the more differentiated and imperfect is the result —that is to say, the farther things recede from the first principle, the more complicated in their structure and restricted in their sphere of action do they become.

3. The first emanation from the Primal One are the Henades (ἑνάδες). The absolutely first being has no relation with the world, but the Henades —their number is not definitely fixed by Proclus—exercise an influence upon the world; they are the gods in the highest sense of the term; to them belong the functions of Providence. They are elevated above being, life, reason, and knowledge, but among themselves they have a certain order of rank, some being nearer the primal entity, some further removed.

4. Next in order after the Henades comes the Trias of intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intellectual being (*τὸ νοητόν, τὸ νοητὸν ἅμα καὶ νοερόν, τὸ νοερόν*). The *νοητόν* is represented by the notion Being (*οὐσία*), the *νοητὸν ἅμα καὶ νοερόν*, by the notion Life (*ζωή*), the *νοερόν* by the notion Thought (*νοῦς*). The first and second of these orders of being are again divided in triadic fashion; the division of the third order, which responds to the *νοῦς* is sevenfold. Proclus divides each member of this sevenfold division into seven members, and thus obtains seven intellectual Hebdomades (sevenfold orders), to the several members of which he refers a number of the divinities of the popular creed, and many of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic fictions.

5. From the Intellectual order emanates the Psychical. Every soul is, in its essence, eternal, but in its action existing in time. The world-soul is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substances, combined in harmonious proportions. There are divine and demoniacal as well as human souls. Situated midway between the sensible order and the divine order, the soul is endowed with liberty. It is responsible for its own evils. It is capable of turning again to the divine, but its contemplation can reach no higher than the *νοῦς*. Every man has his special demon, and it is only through this demon that he can hold communication with the gods. Man must surrender himself blindly to the demon, in order to attain his highest end. (*Cfr.* Ueberweg.)

6. Among the disciples of Proclus the following deserve special mention:—Marinus, the successor of Proclus in the presidency of the school at Athens; the physician, Asclepiodotus of Alexandria; Ammonius the son of Hermeas; Zenodotus; Isidorus, the successor of Marinus in the headship of the school; Hegias, another successor of

Marinus; and Damascius, who presided over the school in Athens about A.D. 520. With him the school came to an end. It was closed by the Emperor Justinian in the year A.D. 529. This emperor forbade the teaching of the Neo-Platonic philosophy at Athens, and appointed Christian teachers to take the place of the Platonists. The Neo-Platonists betook themselves to Persia, where they hoped to find a patron for their philosophy in the king, Chosroes. But experience dispelled this hope, and after the peace between Persia and the Empire, A.D. 533, they returned home. But they were not permitted to reopen their schools. Neo-Platonism thus came to an end. But the commentaries on the writings of Aristotle and Plato, which at this and later periods were composed by the Neo-Platonists, enabled some of them, and notably Simplicius of Cilicia (A.D. 520) and the younger Olympiodorus, to take an important part in the work of transmitting to later generations the philosophy of Greece.

PART SECOND.

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HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

General View.—Division.

§ 55.

1. The Divine Revelation accomplished in Christ, together with the Redemption achieved through Him, forms the turning point of all history. It is the end of the pre-Christian order of things and the beginning of the new. The pre-Christian period prepared the way for the redemption to come. In the moment when the Son of God became man its purpose was accomplished and its duration at an end. A new era began. The fulness of grace which flowed from the sacrifice of redemption infused a new life into humanity, and this newness of life affected not merely the practical side of human existence, it had its influence also on the domain of knowledge.

2. In pre-Christian times, virtue was recognised by the philosophers as a thing of worth, but it did not enter into the life of the people. In the new order of things, virtue found its place in practical life to an extent unknown before. The ideal of supernatural perfection, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, which the Saviour had bidden His followers to strive after, was realised in the actual lives of men, and brought forth a heroism of virtue such as the world had not yet witnessed. Through the revelation made by the Son of God a fulness of truth was brought within reach of the human mind of which men had previously no notion. And if it be true, as the ancients had it, that truth is the food of the mind, on which it lives and thrives, the revelation through the Redeemer formed an inexhaustible store from which the human mind might evermore draw new increase of the knowledge which is its life.

3. At the same time the way was prepared for speculation of an entirely new order. The older philosophy had striven to break through the barriers of error which shut out the gaze of the mind from the sun of truth, and had expended much energy in the effort. Its endeavours were not wholly without result, but it had failed to reach the fulness of truth. By this fact it furnished proof that after the fall of man the human mind, left to its own resources, without any revelation, was incapable of attaining to truth in its fulness. But in the Logos made

man the fulness of truth was manifested in the body: what the ancients had longingly sought for was now granted to men through the mercy of God. The human mind was now fully irradiated by the light of truth; it had no need to strive against the obstacles that shut out the light, and in this way the standpoint and the purpose of its speculations were made other than they had been.

4. The human mind could adopt either of two attitudes towards revelation. It might accept revelation as truth communicated by God, and make this truth the criterion and guiding principle of its speculations. If it did this, revelation became an end to which natural knowledge was to be subservient. Natural knowledge became the means to penetrate the mysteries of Christianity, and to acquire a speculative knowledge of them, so far, at least, as supernatural truths are accessible to speculation. Speculative philosophy could only culminate in a speculative theology, which, without denying the incomprehensible nature of the Christian mysteries, would strive after a deeper knowledge of their meaning.

5. Again, the human mind, in virtue of its natural freedom of election, might abandon the objective standpoint and fall back upon its own subjective resources. It might permit its own reason to deal with revelation in a more unseemly fashion; it might give reason the first place and revelation the second, so that instead of reason being subject to revelation, revelation should be accommodated to the subjective opinions of the individual; or, on occasion, entirely denied. This would, no doubt, be a perversion of right order, but just as man can set himself against the divinely-established order in the sphere of morals, so can he set himself in opposition to the divine order in the sphere of knowledge.

6. These divergent lines have both been followed in the philosophy of the newer era. Side by side with the representatives of the objective or Christian view, we find everywhere the representatives of the rationalistic or subjective. The opposition between these opposing forces of thought proceeds to open conflict, as often as the one endeavours by the arms of science to overcome the other. In this way is maintained a sort of intellectual conflict between truth and error, between the Christian and un-Christian view, which runs through the whole history of the newer philosophy. This conflict has not been without its advantages to the cause of truth, for it has put upon the combatants the necessity of studying more deeply, and thus establishing more securely the truth which was assailed.

7. These divergent currents of thought, it has been said, run through the entire philosophy of the later era. But we are not, for this, to assume that at every period of that time they were both equally powerful. So far is it otherwise, that the entire time may be divided into two periods, in one of which the objective or Christian view was predominant, while in the other the subjective or rationalistic view obtained the mastery. The first period lasted till the fifteenth century, the second extends from the fifteenth century to our own time. We do not mean that in either

period one current of thought prevailed to the exclusion of the other: we mean that in each period one current of thought was distinctly predominant.

8. In this way we obtain two great divisions of the newer philosophy, each marked by its distinctive characteristic. The first of these periods we again divide on another basis of division. In the early Christian centuries, and in the hands of the Fathers of the Church, Christian philosophy was in the first stage of its creation: the stones out of which the structure was to be built were being collected and prepared. In the period following, which we speak of as the Middle Ages, the structure itself was raised. The great systems of philosophy and speculative theology, which are characteristic of the Middle Ages, were then elaborated, and remain, like our mediæval cathedrals, monuments to later times of Christian faith and Christian intellect. In this period the elements of Christian speculation contained in the writings of the Fathers were reduced to systematic form and received considerable development in the process.

9. We may, therefore, most appropriately divide the philosophy of the Christian era into three main periods:

(*a.*) The Patristic Philosophy, extending to the period of the invasion of the barbarians;

(*b.*) Philosophy of the Middle Ages, extending to the fifteenth century;

(*c.*) Modern Philosophy, from the fifteenth century to our own times.

We shall treat of the philosophy of the new era in the order of this threefold division.

FIRST SECTION.

Patristic Philosophy.

General View and Division.

§ 56.

1. The age of the Fathers was the age which gave birth to Christian philosophy. When we speak of the birth of Christian philosophy we do not mean to imply that this philosophy was in its origin wholly independent of the philosophy which had preceded it. The life of humanity is continuous. A complete break with the past is impossible. The human mind cannot, even if it would, withdraw itself from the influence of the past. Christian philosophy, in its origin, was connected with the older philosophy; whatever of truth the latter contained was adopted by the Christian thinkers, made subservient to, and given a

place in, the body of their teaching; they rejected only that which could not stand the light of Christian truth, or bear the scrutiny of the reason which that truth had enlightened.

2. We notice, however, even in the first beginnings of Christian philosophy, the appearance of those two divergent lines of thought to which we have called attention above. Some thinkers in the construction of their systems gave the first place to the older philosophy, made it their rule of guidance, and interpreted the doctrines of Christianity in accordance with its requirements. This method gave rise to the heretical systems which encounter us in the history of the first centuries of Christianity. An analogous method had already been followed by Philo the Jew, in his attempt to reconcile the religion of the Jews with Greek philosophy. What Philo had done in the case of Judaism, the heretics did in the case of Christianity. A distinctively rationalistic character was thus the essential feature of the heretical systems of early Christian times, the feature in which they contrasted most strongly with positive Christianity.

3. Other thinkers, again—and these represented the true Christian philosophy—accepted the ancient philosophy as an aid to Christian speculation, but they made the positive truths of Christianity their highest and guiding principles, and utilised the ideas and doctrines of the ancient philosophy in their speculations only so far as these were found in accord with Christian truth. In this method the positive faith of the Christian became the criterion of speculative knowledge; philosophical opinions were not the standard which determined the articles of faith, that is to say, fixed their meaning. This was the position taken up by all the Fathers of the Church, and to this method we owe those brilliant speculations in which their works abound.

4. Holding these principles, the Fathers of the Church, nevertheless, acknowledged the worth and the importance of the pre-Christian philosophy, and recognised the utility of the study of the philosophy of the Greeks. They had, it is true, no hesitation in exposing the errors of Greek philosophy, and the mutual contradiction of its various systems, and some thinkers—Tertullian, for example—did much to effect this. But this was not done with the purpose of entirely discrediting the ancient philosophy, or of denying its claim to the possession of a certain sum of truth; the design of the writers was to prove that philosophy, of itself, is not all-sufficient, that only the Incarnate Son of God and His Church are in possession of the fulness of truth.

5. The chief aim of the Fathers and writers of the Church in their scientific labours was, on the one hand, to defend the Christian doctrines against attacks and misconceptions, and on the other to develop and support as far as possible, on speculative grounds, the truths of revelation. It was for this purpose only that they made use of the ancient philosophy: it was to defend and establish by speculative theories the articles of the Christian faith that they employed it. In its characteristic features the patristic philosophy is a philosophy of religion. The heretical systems were not purely philosophical, they claimed to be

philosophies of religion: in the same way, the speculations of the Fathers of the Church have in every case a scope which is religious as well as philosophical.

6. The central doctrine of this religious philosophy was, as might have been expected, the doctrine of the divine Logos: what He is in Himself, how He became man, and how He redeemed mankind. The notion of a divine Logos we have met with frequently in the pre-Christian philosophy. But philosophy was incompetent to give definiteness and completeness to this notion; for in its completeness this notion supposes the idea of the Trinity. Philo, who wrote under the influence of the revealed doctrines of the Old Testament, makes the Logos a kind of personality; but in his theory this personality is not something within the Godhead, it is something extraneous to it.

7. In the great dictum: Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Christianity on the one hand confirmed the truth of the notion, and on the other gave completeness and definiteness to the conception. It asserted the personality of the Logos, and at the same time declared this personality to be intrinsic to the Godhead. This was a great step in advance. The idea of a personal Logos—the Son of God identical in nature with the Father—spread light where darkness had hitherto prevailed; and the doctrine that the Logos had become man in order to bring mankind from darkness into light and from death to salvation, made the Incarnate Logos the centre of human history and the spring of life to humanity. It is not then to be wondered at that the whole religious philosophy of the Fathers seems concentrated upon this central point of doctrine.

8. Thus much may be stated regarding the patristic philosophy in general. We may, however, distinguish in the creation of Christian philosophy during the patristic age two well-marked periods. We have remarked that a twofold purpose is observable in the Fathers and Christian writers of the first centuries—one to defend the doctrines of Christianity from assaults and misconceptions, another to develop and establish the Christian truths by speculative inquiries, conducted under the guidance and control of the Christian revelation. This twofold purpose is manifest in all the representatives of patristic philosophy, but in the earlier centuries, that is, up to the Council of Nicæa, the former purpose—the defensive—is the more prominent, whilst in the post-Nicene period the effort to give speculative development to Christian truth becomes the primary end aimed at. We may thus describe the ante-Nicene period as the Age of the Apologists, the post-Nicene as the Age of Positive Speculation.

9. Following the lines here indicated, we will treat the history of patristic philosophy on which we are about to enter in the following order:

(*a.*) The heretical systems of the period; after which we will proceed to the patristic philosophy proper, which we may divide into:

(*b.*) The ante-Nicene philosophy, which is chiefly apologetic in character, and

(*c.*) The post-Nicene philosophy, in which positive speculation is predominant.

Heretical Systems of the First Centuries.

1. We do not undertake the task of giving a detailed account of all the heretical systems which appeared during the patristic age; we confine our attention to those which were philosophical in character; others, which were exclusively dogmatic, belong to the history of religious dogmas. Among the heresies of more or less philosophical character, the first to claim our notice are Gnosticism and Manicheism, systems which, under the influence of Hellenic, Philonic, and Parsee notions, established a dualism between God and Matter, and which, carrying this antithesis out of the sphere of metaphysics into the domain of ethics, gave this notion its most exaggerated development.

2. Gnosticism called forth as an opposite extreme the system of Monarchianism. The teaching of the Gnostics involved a sort of polytheism. To bridge over the chasm between God and Matter, and thus to account for the existence of the world, they assumed the existence of a number of intermediate beings, which emanated from the Supreme God, and to which, therefore, a certain divine character was to be attributed. The reaction against this polytheism took the form of Monarchianism—an extreme theory in the opposite sense. Monarchianism denied the existence of any distinctions whatever in the Divinity, even the existence of those distinctions which the doctrine of the Trinity involves, and held fast the doctrine of fixed abstract unity.

3. Last in order came Arianism, with its offshoot, Apollinarism, theories which embodied elements of Gnosticism and Monarchianism, and in which the doctrines of the two opposing heresies were blended. In historical order, Arianism follows the two other heresies; it follows them also in the order of theoretical development.

4. We will treat, then, in the first place, of Gnosticism, in the next, of Manicheism, then of Monarchianism, and lastly of Arianism and Apollinarism.

Gnosticism.

§ 57.

1. Contemporary accounts inform us that Gnosticism had its rise in the question: What is the origin of evil? (Πόθεν τὸ κακόν;). It was natural that such a question should occur to thinking minds at that period. The circumstances of the time suggested it. According to contemporary records, the religious and moral degeneracy of the age had become appalling. The deification of vice had been fatal to morality. The Christians had been subjected to fierce and cruel persecution both from Jews and pagans, and were the objects of general contempt. The sight of all the evil which surrounded them must have suggested to many

of them to ask, whence this evil came, and urged them to seek a solution of the problem.

2. But this question, by itself, was not enough to account for the origin of Gnosticism. For the question as to the origin of evil had already been answered by Christianity; and to have the problem solved it was only necessary to appeal to positive Christian teaching. The chief cause to which the rise of Gnosticism was attributable lay in the fact that the Gnostics, as well in the question of the origin of evil as in those which regarded the nature of God's relation to the world, the nature of man, and other questions were not content with the positive doctrines of Christianity as expounded by the Church, but sought a solution of these problems in non-Christian philosophy, outside the region of revelation. They did not, however, for this, separate themselves from Christianity. The result could only be the introduction into the Christian teaching of notions borrowed from the non-Christian philosophy, and the attempt to adapt the doctrine of Christianity to these preconceived philosophical opinions.

3. That this result actually occurred is shown both by the method which the Gnostics adopted in the exposition and development of their doctrines, and by their peculiar conception of the Gnosis. With regard to their method, St. Irenæus tells us that with them, reason, that is to say, their preconceived philosophical opinions, was the standard and criterion of all truth; that to meet the requirements of their system, they carried their arbitrary treatment of the Scriptures so far as to reject some parts of them altogether, and to mutilate and falsify past recognition the portions they retained. Philosophy was to them of much greater authority than the positive teaching of the Church, and consequently the portions of Scripture which established the teaching of the Church had to be put aside.

4. In the characteristics which they assign to their Gnosis, they follow in the footsteps of Philo. Philo had appealed in support of his opinions to a secret lore which had reached him by oral tradition; the Gnostics put forward pretensions of the same kind. Christ, they maintained, in His exoteric teaching had accommodated Himself to the views of his contemporaries; but in private He had imparted to His apostles a higher (esoteric) teaching, which constitutes the essence of Christian truth, and which, to a large extent, is contradictory of the exoteric doctrines. This teaching the apostles had promulgated among the initiated; for the mere people the exoteric doctrines were sufficient.

5. The teaching of the Church is nothing more than the exoteric doctrines; it does not contain the pure truth, but only the truth as adapted to the capacity of the people, and it contains, besides, an admixture of many errors. To learn the pure and perfect truth, we must seek it in that secret lore, acquaintance with which is the true Gnosis. The faith of the Church is merely a grade of knowledge. The Gnostics claimed to be alone in the possession of the true and genuine Gnosis which they endeavoured to expound in their works—hence the name Gnosticism. The Fathers of the Church, on the other hand, described

this Gnosis as false and delusive, and on this ground set themselves to combat it.

6. On the lines we have described, Gnosticism endeavoured at once to accomplish and to justify the overthrow of Christianity by the aid of non-Christian philosophy. Pursuing this design the Gnostics, in reference to the special question of the origin of evil, arrived at the gloomy dualistic notion which represents man as surrounded on all sides by hostile powers, the external world as wholly evil, matter as not created by God, spirit and body as ethically opposed to one another. The Paganism of an earlier period had deified nature; the Gnostics regarded nature as the principle of evil, and thus changed the distinction between nature and spirit into an absolute opposition.

7. The Gnostic systems were, as a rule, specially antagonistic to Judaism. The Church, in its explanation of the relation borne by the old dispensation to the new, asserted that the former was a preparatory dispensation, the latter the consummation for which the way had been prepared. But the Gnostics explained the relation to consist in a distinct opposition of the one dispensation to the other. They held that the older dispensation was under the control of a principle which was not only distinct from the supreme God who had revealed Himself in Christianity, but (in greater or less degree), opposed and even hostile to that God. The ethical dualism which they had set up in the sphere of being, they here endeavoured to introduce into history, and the contrast which they found to exist between the external and rigid character of the Jewish law and the internal gracious Christian dispensation gave encouragement to the attempt.

8. The sources from which our knowledge of Gnosticism is drawn, apart from the Gnostic work, *Pistis Sophia* (Berlin, 1851), and a few fragments, are the writings of the opponents of Gnosticism; notably, Irenæus (*adv. Hæreses*), the Pseudo Origen (Hippolytus) (*Ἔλεγχος κατὰ πασῶν αἱρεσέων*), as well as the writings of Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Theodoretus and Augustine. We may add to these the treatise of the Neo-Platonist Plotinus against the Gnostics. *Enn.* 2.

We may mention among the more recent writers who have treated of Gnosticism: Neander, *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme*, Berlin, 1818; F. A. Lewald, *Commentatio de doctrina gnostica*, Heidelb., 1818; J. Matter, *Hist. Crit. du Gnosticisme*, 1828; Möhler, *Ursprung des Gnosticismus*, Tübing, 1831, &c.

The Several Gnostic Systems.

1. The earliest Gnostic teachings are ascribed by Irenæus to Simon Magus, to his pupil Menander, and to Cerinthus, the last of whom St. John the Evangelist had it in his mind to refute, when he wrote his Gospel. Cerinthus is said to have taught that the world was not made by God, but by an inferior power which had no knowledge of the true God. The true God caused the Æon Christ to descend upon Jesus the Son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism, fitting Him thereby to preach the unknown Father, and to work miracles. This Æon separated him-

self from Jesus before the death of the latter, and had no share in His sufferings.

2. But the chief representatives of Gnosticism were Saturninus, Valentinus, Carpocrates, and Marcion, with a few others of less note. In the teaching of these Gnostics, more especially of those first mentioned, the conceptions of the thinkers are so shrouded in a cloud of fantastic conceits, that it is difficult to penetrate these extravagances of a deranged imagination, and discern the rational thought which underlies them. We must, however, try to find a path through their labyrinth of fantastic trifles.

Saturninus.

§ 58.

3. Saturninus, a pupil of Menander, was born at Antioch, and spent his life there. The most brilliant portion of his career corresponds with the reign of Hadrian (A.D. 125). He taught the existence of an unknown God—the Father. This God created a number of spirits —archangels, powers, principalities, and angels—which succeed one another, in descending order. The last seven angels, who close the series, created the world. To them also is due the creation of man, but only the creation of the animal portion of his nature.

4. From the Supreme Power, a luminous image issued, which reached the angels charged with the creation of the world. To retain this image they resolved to create man after its likeness. But the likeness which they succeeded in producing could not be other than imperfect, owing to the imperfection of the beings producing it. It could not lift itself up, it sank to the earth and crawled like a worm. The Supreme Power took pity on its condition, and as man had been created after its likeness, this Power shot a spark of its own spiritual nature into the image. Man then, for the first time, became man in the true sense, became a being at once spiritual and corporeal. That divine spirit returns after death to the source whence it came, all that then remains of man undergoes dissolution.

5. In hostile opposition to the dominion of the unknown Father is the Kingdom of Satan. The evil principle works upon man through sensuality, and endeavours by this means to bring him under its sway. Everything is evil which tends to draw men down towards material or sensible things, and to involve him more deeply in matter. On this ground, Saturninus condemned marriage and the carnal generation of children. Both he held to be derived from Satan. For similar reasons, there can be no resurrection of the body, for the body is derived from the principle of evil—matter—and could not, therefore, have any share in the glorified state.

6. Men were at first ruled by the Jewish God—one of those inferior angels who created the world. But this deity was too weak to shield

them from the attacks of Satan, and, besides, it was not fitting that men, in whom a spark of the Divine nature was burning, should be ruled over by a power of such a low order. Therefore, the unknown Father sent His Son Christ into the world, to overthrow the reign of the Jewish God, to save the good and the believing, and to condemn the wicked and the incredulous. But since the flesh is from the principle of evil, the Son did not assume a real body, but only the semblance of a human body. (Docetism.) *

7. In this teaching on the subject of man's creation we recognise the Platonic notions of Philo; the dualism between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan, the rejection of marriage, and other such theories, are clearly borrowed from the East. The more fantastical elements of Gnosticism do not yet appear prominently.

Basilides.

§ 59.

8. Basilides, also a native of Antioch, lived, like Saturninus, under the Emperor Hadrian. Towards the close of his life (A.D. 130) he taught in Egypt and chiefly in Alexandria. We have two accounts of his system differing widely from one another; the one furnished by Irenæus, the other by Hippolytus. We give first the account of Irenæus.

9. According to Irenæus, Basilides held the Unbegotten and Unnameable to be first in the scale of being; from him proceeded the Nous, from this again the Logos, from the Logos the Phronesis, from the Phronesis the Sophia and Dynamis, from these the Virtues and the chief angels. By these angels the first or highest heaven was formed. From the highest angels proceeded other angels who formed the second heaven (or sphere), and thus the process continued, until 365 orders of angels had been successively produced, and as many celestial spheres successively formed. The ruler of the celestial spheres is Abraxas, whose name contains the number 365 (1+2+100+1+60+1+200 according to the numerical significance of the Greek letters). The angels who formed the lowest sphere, fashioned our world also, and are its rulers.

10. The interposing of so many intermediate beings between God and the world indicates the dualistic character of the entire system. This feature becomes still more marked in the doctrines regarding physical nature and the origin of man. The body of man was given him by the lower or world-creating powers, his soul comes from a higher realm.

* The prophecies of the Old Testament were declared to have been inspired, partly by the world-creating angels, and partly by Satan, who contended against all those angels, but chiefly against the god of the Jews.

The soul has had its origin in the realm of light, and therefore it lives here below in a strange land. It has been degraded to life within the body in punishment of a fault. All the evil that man has to endure in this life is, consequently, the punishment of guilt which his soul has contracted, either in the present life or in a prior state. Martyrdom itself Basilides holds to be a punishment of this kind. These chastisements may, however, be means of purification for the soul.

11. It is the duty of the soul to free itself from the material element with which, contrary to the requirements of its nature, it is invested. This deliverance is to be accomplished by subduing sensuality and sensual appetite, and by rising through faith to the consciousness of the soul's higher nature. Basilides does not condemn marriage; he would retain it as a means of resisting the persistent assaults of sensual passion. The complete purification of the soul is also helped by the process of transmigration. There cannot be a resurrection of the body, for the body is derived from matter, it is of its nature antagonistic to the soul, and its reunion with the soul would be a misfortune for the latter, not an advantage.

12. The human race was originally placed under the rule of the angels who created this world. These angels divided among themselves the government of the peoples of the earth, their Archon or chief ruler reserved to himself the government of the Jewish people. He then strove to subject all other peoples to his own chosen nation. But he was opposed by the other nations and their ruling angels, and thus conflict and confusion arose. In pity, the Supreme God sent His own Son amongst men to free them from the control of the powers which rule the world, to make known to them their own higher nature, and to point out to them the way in which they could and should rise above the angels who formed the world, and even above the Archon himself.

13. The Nous, thereupon took the semblance of man, in order to manifest himself to mankind. He was not himself crucified. He substituted Simon of Cyrene for himself, by exchanging outward appearance with the latter. Whoever believes in the individual who was crucified, is still under the dominion of the world-ruling angels. We must believe in the eternal Nous, who underwent the death of the cross in appearance only. The real believers are the elect, the men of real knowledge, the Gnostics. These are above the law; nothing can defile them, not even the offering of sacrifice to the heathen gods; the difference between good and evil is no longer of importance to them.

14. The account of Hippolytus agrees with that of Irenæus in this, that in it Basilides assigns the god of the Jews (as well as the gods of the heathen) a limited power, and ascribes the redemption accomplished through Christ to the Supreme God. But Hippolytus differs from Irenæus in this, that he represents as interposed between God and the angels not the Nous, Phronesis, &c., but three *υἱότητες* (sonships), produced by the Supreme God—the Non-existent. The mutual relations which his arrangement of these three *υἱότητες* involves, and the various functions which they discharge belong to the domain of fable. We give some

details below.* Which of these two accounts represents the genuine teaching of Basilides, and which represents merely the teachings of his followers is a question still undecided. The teaching of Basilides was continued by his son Isidorus.

Valentinus and the Ophites.

§ 60.

15. The most comprehensive of the Gnostic systems is that of Valentinus, among whose followers may be reckoned Heracleon and Ptolemy, Secundus and Marcus, and many others. Valentinus was by birth an Egyptian. He taught in Alexandria about A.D. 140, and subsequently in Rome, and died, about A.D. 160, in Cyprus. He sets up as that which is the highest in existence, the incomprehensible, unnameable, eternal, and unbegotten God, to whom he gives the name Bythos, and sometimes the name Πατήρ or Προπάτωρ. From him proceed, as from a first cause, a series of supernatural powers or *Æons*, who together constitute the *Pleroma*.

16. Associated with the Bythos was a sexually different principle, *Sige* (σιγή or ἔννοια), from whom the primal Father, under the influence of Love, begat the two highest Æons, *Nous* and *Aletheia*. The Nous is called also the μονογενής (only-begotten), and also πατὴρ καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν

* According to Hippolytus, Basilides taught that, originally there was absolute nothing. From this nothing came forth the germ of the world, the non-existent god having produced by an act of will (not by emanation), that original unity which carried within it the πάνσπερμα (or, according to Clement of Alexandria, the σύγχυσις ἀρχική) of the universe. In this germ was contained a threefold sonship (υἱότης); the first raised itself at once to the non-existent god, the second, less subtle and less pure, was raised aloft by the first, who bestowed the holy spirit upon it; the third, which remains unpurified, was detained in the mass of the πάνσπερμα. The non-existent God and the two first υἱότητες inhabit the supramundane space which surrounds the world, but is separated from it by a fixed sphere (στερέωμα). The holy spirit having risen with the second sonship to the supramundane region, returned subsequently to the middle sphere, and thus became the πνεῦμα μεθόριον. Within this nether world dwells the world-ruler, unable to rise above the στερέωμα, but fondly imagining that he is the supreme god, that there is nothing above him. The law-giving god occupies a position below him. Each of these divinities has generated a son. The first of these ἄρχοντες dwells in the ethereal region; his is the Ogdoas who ruled the earth from Adam to Moses. The second—the Hebdomadas, dwells in the region beneath the moon; he ruled from Moses to Christ. As soon as the gospel or knowledge of the supramundane world (ἡ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων γνῶσις) was proclaimed, and the son of the world-ruler, through the medium of the spirit, received the light of the supramundane υἱότης, the World-ruler came to have knowledge of the supreme God, and was seized with fear. But this fear was the beginning of wisdom. He repented of his arrogance, in common with the god who is subordinate to him; and all the principalities and powers of the 365 heavens, received the preaching of the gospel. The light which proceeded from the supramundane sonship enlightened Jesus. The third υἱότης was now purified, and rose to the sphere already inhabited by the beatified sonship—to the non-existent God. As soon as these several essences reach their proper sphere, each becomes ignorant of the degrees above itself, that there may be no jealousy. Cfr. Ueberweg.

πάντων. Bythos, Sige, Nous, and Aletheia produced in turn the *Logos* and the *Zoe*, and these in their turn the *Anthropos* and the *Ecclesia*. The last four form in conjunction with the first four (τετρακτύς) the system of eight (Ogdoas). The Logos in union with Zoe begets ten (δεκάς) Æons, and *Anthropos* in union with Ecclesia begets twelve (δωδεκάς) Æons. This generation is effected by successive stages; in each stage a male and female Æon being produced, who then unite to continue the generative process. These thirty Æons form, as has been said, the *Pleroma*, or Fulness of Divine Life. The last of the twelve Æons which stand at the end of the series—and, consequently, the last of the entire thirty Æons—is Sophia a female Æon.

17. The inborn *Nous* alone has knowledge of the unbegotten Father. This knowledge is not vouchsafed the other Æons. But their desire to behold the Father is excited by this privation; and this desire becomes so powerful in Sophia that it almost leads to her dissolution. In the effort, however, this female Æon gives birth to a formless substance. But Horos is sent to her by the Father, and he succeeds with much difficulty in persuading her that the Supreme God is unknowable (ἀκατάληπτος), and thus preserves her from destruction and restores her to her first estate. The abortion she has brought forth—that formless substance to which she has given birth—is expelled by Horos from the Pleroma, and sinks into the Kenoma or empty space. By command of the Father, Nous and Aletheia hereupon bring forth by emanation two new Æons—Christ and the Holy Ghost; these enlighten the other Æons as to their relation with Bythos, and order is again restored among them. In the joy that follows, all the other Æons produce in common a new Æon of higher excellence, who is known by the several names—Jesus, Logos, Soter, or Christ, and him they offer as a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the Father.

18. All this takes place within the Pleroma. But the Christ who has been generated by Nous and Aletheia takes pity on that formless substance named Achamoth, the offspring of Sophia, which Horos has relegated to the Kenoma, and having given it essence and form, retires again within the Pleroma. As soon as Achamoth becomes sensible of the light which Christ has imparted to it, the desire springs up within it to enter into the Pleroma, but being hindered by Horos, it becomes the victim of fear, and sorrow, and want.* In response to its petitions, the Pleroma sends the Æon, Jesus, to deliver it from suffering, to rescue it from the Πάθη (Fear, Sorrow, Want, Supplication), and to reconcile it with God. But for all this, it does not succeed in attaining to the Pleroma; it reaches no further than a sphere bordering on the Pleroma, separated from the latter by Horos and the Cross, and called the lower Ogdoas. Achamoth generates the Demiurgus. The latter is a purely physical being, and has therefore no knowledge of his parent. The Demiurgus in his turn produces the sensible world, the matter of which

* In the book *Pistis Sophia* we have the romance of the sufferings of this Achamoth—*i.e.*, of this Sophia excluded from the divinity—written in detail, with full account of its penitential hymns and lamentations.

is constituted by the Πάθη which Jesus separated from Achamoth. The Pleroma forms the archetype for the Demiurgus in his labours; the sensible world is, accordingly, modelled after the Pleroma. But in this imitation the Demiurgus is an imitator unconsciously; he does not know the Pleroma, and cannot know it, for he is a purely physical being. The place of the Demiurgus is in heaven, below Achamoth; the earth is the habitation of the Demon.

19. Man is a creation of the Demiurgus. He is formed from matter (ὕλη), receives a soul (ψυχή) from the Demiurgus, and a spirit (πνεῦμα) from Achamoth. The nature of man is thus a compound formed of three elements, Body, Soul, and Spirit. The body of man was at first an ethereal nature, immaterial, and without difference of sex. It was only when man fell into sin that he was invested with a coarse material body. The spirit which Achamoth had implanted in him without knowledge of the Demiurgus impelled man to raise himself above the latter. The Demiurgus, with his angels, took alarm, and to keep man in subjection forbade him to eat of the tree of knowledge. Man disobeyed the command, and thereupon was driven from the ethereal region of Paradise into the coarse material sphere of this nether earth. Here he was invested with a material body. In this condition he is saved from complete subjection to matter only by the aid of Achamoth.

20. The Law and the Prophets are from the Demiurgus. He had promised a Messiah—but a Messiah of a psychical nature only. Man, endowed as he was with a spiritual nature, was not, however, to remain for ever under the dominion of the Demiurgus. The Saviour, Jesus, descended from the Pleroma to make known to men the mysteries of the life of God, and to free them from the dominion of the Demiurgus. For this end the man Jesus was formed from the three elements of human nature, Spirit, Soul, and Body, but in such wise that his body was not of coarse material constitution, but of ethereal form. This man came into the world, passing through the body of Mary as through a channel. In the ceremony of Baptism he united himself with the Æon, Jesus, and remained in union with him till the trial before Pilate. At this point he abandoned him and returned into the Pleroma. (Other Valentinians taught that the Æon, Jesus, was united with the man Jesus from the time of the conception of the latter).

21. Jesus came into the world to redeem men; that is to say, to reveal to them the divine mysteries, and to free them from subjection to the Demiurgus; but all men do not participate in this redemption. The Valentinians distinguish three classes of men, the Hylicists, the Psychicists, and the Pneumatists. The Hylicists (heathens) are wholly outside the region of the higher life, the spirit is not imparted to them in any degree, they have, therefore, no existence after death. The Psychicists, on the other hand (*i.e.*, the members of the Church who are content with mere faith), although they do not participate in the spirit, and are subject to the dominion and to the law of the Demiurgus, yet if they fulfil this law, and wage the fight against matter, and practise good works, may after death attain to the kingdom of the Demiurgus. But

the Pneumatists, *i.e.*, the Gnostics, have been made partakers of the spirit by Jesus; they rise above faith to the Gnosis; in the Gnosis they have knowledge of the mysteries of the Pleroma, and the knowledge leads to supreme happiness. They are not subject to the law of the Demiurgus; the difference between good and evil is of no moment to them. Marriage is not only permitted them, it is a matter of obligation. They cannot be deprived of the salvation they have attained. After death they return to Achamoth their mother. There is no resurrection of the body.

22. When the course of this world is run, Achamoth and all the spirits of the Pneumatists that are associated with her, return again to the Pleroma; the spirits mingle with the angels, to whom they are united connubially, and with whom their existence is thenceforward continued. The Demiurgus, with the souls that belong to him, ascends to the realm previously inhabited by Achamoth. As for the nether material world, the fire which was latent in matter bursts forth and entirely consumes it, and nothing is left but the Pleroma and the kingdom of the Demiurgus.

23. There are, no doubt, elements of sane philosophy in all this. The three constituent elements of human nature—body, soul, spirit—recall the Platonic theories. So, too, the Æons of the Pleroma are no more than personifications of the ideas of the Platonists, as is apparent from the circumstance that they are made the archetypes of creation. But these philosophical elements are lost in a chaos of fantastic images, the product of a disordered and unrestrained imagination. For this reason the Valentinian, like the other Gnostic systems, is of small scientific value. The sexual excesses which the Valentinians permitted themselves, as a consequence of their doctrines, deprived their system of ethical value. In every respect it remains a melancholy monument of the aberrations of human intelligence.

24. Akin to the Valentinians were the Ophites (Naassenes). Both sects may have been derived from a common origin, for the principles of the Ophites are, throughout, in accord with those of the Valentinians, the differences are merely accidental. The Ophites owe their name to a party amongst them—the Perates—in whose system the serpent of the Book of Genesis plays a prominent part. They go so far as to identify the serpent with Christ, the mediator between God and the world, and accordingly assign it divine honour.

Carpocrates, Marcion, and other Gnostics.

§ 61.

25. Carpocrates of Alexandria, who lived about the year A.D. 130, taught a kind of universalistic rationalism. According to him the Monas is the first parent, or ultimate source of all things. From this being proceeded a series of spirits, who rebelled against him, and created the world. The true Gnosis consists in the contemplation which lifts

us above this created world to the primal Monas, and by which we acquire dominion over nature and the spirits. This degree of elevation was attained by Pythagoras and Plato, and in more especial manner by Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary—the perfect man. It was only in virtue of his union with the Monas that Jesus was enabled to work miracles. We ourselves can attain to the same state, and thus acquire dominion over the powers that govern the world.

26. Carpocrates further taught the pre-existence of souls, and this in thoroughly Platonic fashion. The same may be said of his teaching regarding the transmigration of souls. The souls that have not lived entirely free from fault must, in punishment, enter successively into various bodies, until at length, having done sufficient penance, they are set free, and live in communion with God and those angels who have formed the world. Furthermore, Carpocrates teaches contempt for the moral law. He does not attribute any efficacy to prayer. Man is saved by faith and love. Every work is of itself indifferent, and becomes good or bad merely by the intention of the individual who performs it. All that the earth brings forth, everything that conduces to human enjoyment must be held in common. This communism was further developed by Epiphanes, the son and disciple of Carpocrates. The religious worship of the followers of Carpocrates was a kind of demoniacal magic.

27. Marcion of Pontus was a pupil of Cerdo—a Syrian, who taught in Rome about A.D. 140, and whose doctrines resembled those of Cerinthus. Marcion taught at Rome, in succession to Cerdo, about A.D. 160, after he had been excommunicated at Sinope (A.D. 140) by his father, the Bishop of that city, in punishment of a heinous crime. Marcion, like the other Gnostics, distinguishes between the Demiurgus and the Supreme God, but he does not derive the Demiurgus by emanation from the Supreme God, or by a fall from some higher state. He makes him equal to God, and eternal like God, but establishes an antagonism between him and God.

28. The consideration of the evil which exists in the world leads Marcion to deny that a God of goodness could have created such a world. He, therefore, supposes a God higher than the Creator of the world. The difference between the Supreme God and the Creator consists in this, that the Supreme God is good, the Demiurgus is not good, but only just. He is not good, for, as he is the Creator of the world, he is the author of the evil and the wickedness of the world, and is besides, a lover of war, is of changeable mood, self-contradictory—such, in fact, as he appears to us in the Old Testament. He is merely just, that is to say, he executes the law he has laid down relentlessly, without mercy, and without compassion; of this we have evidence in the Old Testament.

29. The whole of the Old Testament must be ascribed to the Demiurgus. All the books it contains refer to his doctrines and his legislation. He ruled the Jews with a sceptre of iron, and carried out all his designs with unbending rigour (Justice). Up to the time of Christ's appearance in the world the God of goodness was unknown in this world.

Even the Demiurgus had no knowledge of Him. He had not been revealed in nature nor in reason; not in the former, for nature was full of evils which could not exist in an order of things which was to stand as a manifestation of God's goodness; nor was God manifested to reason: on this point the contradictory doctrines of philosophers are evident proof. Nor had He revealed Himself in the Old Testament; this is evident from the contradiction between the Old Testament and the New. The God of goodness was, therefore, unknown. Christ was the first to reveal His existence.

30. To destroy the work of the Demiurgus or World-Creator, his ordinances, and everything connected therewith, and to deliver men from his oppressive yoke, the God of goodness revealed Himself in Jesus, who appeared as Man in Judæa. In Him was manifested the fulness of love and mercy, as rigour had been manifested in the God of the Old Testament. Matter, being the work of the Demiurgus, is essentially evil; Christ, the Son of the Father, could not, therefore, assume a real body, nor be born in the usual way. He appeared in the semblance merely of a body (Docetism). For reasons similar to those here adduced there can be no question of the resurrection of the body.

31. Christ revealed the God of goodness to men, and made known to them also the nature of the Demiurgus, and thus delivered them from the dominion of this latter. He promulgated no new Law; it was His mission to deliver men from the Law, not to subject them to a new Law. Christ is a Saviour only; He is not a law-giver. In rescuing mankind from the dominion of the Demiurgus He roused against Himself the hatred of the latter, and the Demiurgus in consequence excited his followers to put Christ to death. The sufferings of Christ were, however, merely apparent, for His body was no more than an appearance. The Jews still expect the Messiah promised them by the Demiurgus to gather them together out of the Dispersion.

32. The ethical principles of Marcion are of the most rigid kind. He forbade his followers the use of flesh and wine; bound them to rigorous fasts, especially on the Sabbath, as on this day the Creator rested, and fasting is a symbol of sorrow. All this was contrived in opposition to the Demiurgus. Marriage and the procreation of children are contrivances of the Demiurgus, who, in the Old Testament, made marriage obligatory; both were forbidden by Marcion. He admitted to baptism only persons who were unmarried and continent. One of his followers, however, deduced from his principles entirely opposite rules of conduct. Opposition to the Demiurgus was adduced by them as justification of prostitution, adultery, and other vices, for by indulging in these vices they considered they were resisting the World-Creator, who had forbidden these offences in the Old Testament. In this way the system of Marcion led to the same excesses as that of Carpocrates. Apelles was the most remarkable of his disciples.

33. We have yet to mention the two Gnostics, Bardesanes and Hermogenes. Bardesanes, a native of Edessa, lived towards the close of the second century, and taught

doctrines analogous to those of Valentinus. He assumes two essential principles, the unknown Father, and Matter, from which Satan was produced. From the former emanated seven Æons, who, in conjunction with the Father, constitute the Pleroma. The soul of man is derived from the Pleroma, but it has been relegated to this lower world in punishment of its faults. To redeem it Christ appeared in the world. He was born of Mary, but His body was formed of celestial elements.

34. Hermogenes lived at the beginning of the second century, and was, probably, an inhabitant of Carthage. According to Tertullian, he supposed God and Matter to be the primary dual elements. God could not produce the world from His own substance, for He is indivisible and unchangeable. He could not produce it from nothing, for in this case His infinite goodness would have forced him to make all things good; whereas, in actual fact, there is much wickedness and evil in the world. We must, therefore, assume an eternal Matter, out of which God formed the world. This is the only assumption which enables us to explain the existence of evil. This assumption gives us an element which is antagonistic to the action of God, and this element is Evil. According to Hermogenes, the soul of man is formed from Matter.

Manicheism.

§ 62.

1. The dualistic theory which we observe to be a part of all the Gnostic systems in greater or less degree, reached its extreme development in Manicheism. This doctrine is nothing more than the Parsee system in Christian garb. According to the most trustworthy accounts, Manes, the founder of the system, was a member of a family distinguished amongst the Magi, and was well versed in the lore of the Persians. He became a Christian, but his false opinions soon brought about his excommunication from the Church. In the year A.D. 238, he began to teach publicly. He lived at the court of the Persian king, Sapor. In consequence of a quarrel with the Magi he was obliged to fly from the court, and ultimately (about A.D. 277) he was executed. We are indebted chiefly to the controversial writings of Saint Augustine for our knowledge of the Manichean theories. Manicheism, like Gnosticism, was the creation of an exuberant fancy rather than of speculative thought, and its attitude towards Christianity was almost identical with that of the Gnostics. We may, therefore, content ourselves with a brief sketch of its leading outlines. In the one system, as in the other, the appeal to hidden or esoteric doctrine is a prominent characteristic.

2. The Manicheans, in answering the question: What is the origin of evil? assume the existence of two eternal principles ethically opposed to each other—a principle essentially good, and a principle essentially evil. The good principle is the God of Light, who dwells in the region of pure light, surrounded by an infinite number of the Spirits of Light. The evil principle is the Prince of Darkness, who is surrounded by the Spirits of Darkness, and dwells in darkness, *i.e.*, in the region of chaotic Matter. The Spirits of Darkness live in a state of perpetual conflict; but at length they come to have knowledge of the Kingdom of Light, whereupon they conclude a peace among themselves, and agree to attack the Kingdom of Light, and to destroy it.

3. To defend Himself against this attack the God of Light causes a force to emanate from Himself, which He opposes to the onset of the Powers of Darkness. This force is primeval man, the parent of the Living. This being enters into the struggle, but is unable long to maintain it; whereupon God causes a new force, the Spirit of Life, to emanate from Himself, which comes to the aid of primeval man. This Spirit of Life rescues primeval man from the grasp of the Powers of Darkness. But in the conflict primeval man had been deprived by these Powers of many of the rays of light which belonged to his being. These rays remain behind in chaotic matter, and thus become the World-soul. This World-soul is Christ, the Son of primeval man.

4. This does not, however, bring the strange drama to a close. The Spirit of Life which delivered man becomes, in its turn, the author of a new world. It gathers whatever of light is left in matter, or at least whatever has not been lost in chaotic matter, and this it concentrates in the sun and moon; the demons it fixes in the firmament as stars. We must, therefore make a distinction between the suffering Jesus—the light which matter has absorbed, and the Jesus whose throne is in the sun and moon. The latter seeks to deliver the former from his subjection to matter. For this purpose he causes the forces of light in the sun to assume the forms of beautiful maidens, to excite in this way the desires of the Powers of Darkness, and thus to produce a condition of disorder which shall permit the imprisoned light to escape. The flesh, or animal nature, is produced by the female demons that are fixed in the firmament.

5. Man, too, is the offspring of the demons. The Prince of Darkness, observing that the World-soul might soon be set free, persuaded his companions to resign their light to him, and then begot Adam, and subsequently Eve, that Adam's sensual passion might be excited, and the process of generation continued. In this way he sought to individualise more and more this World-soul or light, and by imprisoning it thus repeatedly to weaken its power to rise.

6. We must distinguish in man two souls—the soul which animates the body, and the soul of Light, which is a part of the universal World-soul. The animal soul is derived from the principle of evil, and is, therefore, evil by nature; the soul of light on the other hand, coming from the principle of goodness, is good of its nature. These two souls are perpetually in conflict; the antagonism which divides the world is renewed in man. The evil soul manifests itself in concupiscence, and concupiscence is, therefore, essentially evil. Every wicked deed is the outcome of this concupiscence; the soul of light commits no sin, nothing but good can proceed from it; its share in sin is not active volition, but merely weakness yielding to concupiscence. But, for this weakness, strictly speaking, it is not responsible, for man is at all times under the control of cosmical forces; there can be no question of the freedom of will in his regard.

7. In the Old Covenant the Prince of Darkness was supreme; the Old Testament is wholly his work. The God of goodness would not,

however, leave the world-soul in everlasting captivity, He sent Christ, His Son, into the world to set it free. Christ came into the world a man in appearance only; He instructed human souls as to their true nature, and taught them the way of deliverance. To reveal to them the deeper meaning of His doctrines He sent them the spirit of life, which appeared in Manes.

8. The members of the Manichean sect were divided into three classes. On the lowest class was imposed merely the *signaculum oris*, that is to say, they were forbidden to partake of flesh, eggs, milk or fish; they were also forbidden the use of wine, and, more stringently still, of profane language. On the second class was imposed the *signaculum manuum*, *i.e.*, they could not possess property, were not permitted to labour, and were bound to give themselves exclusively to contemplation. They were forbidden to destroy plants or animals. On the highest class, that is to say, on the class of the elect, was imposed the *signaculum sinus*, *i.e.*, they were forbidden to marry, or indulge in sexual intercourse. Despite this unnatural rigour, the grossest excesses were committed by the Manicheans, excesses to which they were encouraged by their belief that nothing could deprive the elect of their sanctification.

9. The souls of the elect return, immediately after the death of the body, into the kingdom of light; other souls, according to their moral character in this life, pass after death into various bodies, until they are at length purified. The world is finally consumed by fire. The souls which, by reason of their profound corruption, are incapable of purification, are condemned to eternal fire.

Monarchianism.

63.

1. The reaction against the polytheism of the Gnostics, and particularly against the antagonism established in their doctrine between the Supreme God and the Creator of the world, led to another extreme view, in which the Unity of God was so strongly insisted on that the distinctions involved in the Trinity disappeared, and the divine persons became so many different relations or modes of the one divine substance. This doctrine was known as Monarchianism, or the Antitrinitarian doctrine. In this, the teaching regarding the person of Christ was necessarily reduced to the Ebionite theory, more or less modified. We proceed to notice the most remarkable of the Monarchianists or Antitrinitarians, and to give some outline of their teaching.

2. First, amongst them are the so-called Patripassiani, amongst whom are Praxeas, Noetus and Beryllus. Praxeas lived towards the close of the second century. He taught that the Father became man in Christ; that He was born of the Virgin Mary; that He died and

rose from the dead. Praxeas distinguished the divine from the human element in Christ; the one, he called Spirit and the other Flesh. Christ suffered only as man; to the Father he ascribed a sort of co-passion (compati). Somewhat later (about A.D. 230), Noetus taught the same doctrine at Smyrna. In God, he held, there is but one person. This person existing from eternity was begotten of Mary in time. In His eternal existence He is named Father, as existing in time He is named Son. Beryllus of Bostra, a contemporary of Noetus, taught that Christ, before His birth, had no personal existence; that during His earthly life He was not God, that the divinity of the Father only dwelt in Him.

3. A second class of Monarchianists is formed by Sabellius and Paul of Samosata. Sabellius, a native of Libya, and Presbyter of Ptolemais in the Pentapolis of Africa, taught his peculiar doctrines publicly under Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, and at Rome, under Pope Sixtus II. (A.D. 257-8). The gist of his teaching was embodied in the formulas: *ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γέγονε τριάς*—the monas expanded, becomes a trinity: and *ὁ πατὴρ ὁ αὐτὸς μέν ἐστι, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα*—as Father He is one and the same, but He is expanded into the Son and Holy Ghost (*Athan.* Or. IV., Contra Arianos, 3). He thus admits only one Hypostasis or Person in God. This Hypostasis, according to the several relations it assumes, becomes Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. These three terms express no more than names for various relations of the one monas. Sabellius compares the Divine Trinity to the triple principle—soul, spirit, and body in man; which, although different one from another, unite, nevertheless, to form one person; and again, to the sun which, although one in itself, unites the three elements—power to illumine, power to heat, and rotundity of form.

4. In accordance with these views is the further opinion attributed to Sabellius, that for the creation of the world, and more particularly of man, the Logos came forth from the Father—not as a Divine Person, but merely as a power emanating from God. The Logos assumed a personal character in Christ, but this only for a time. As the sun sends forth its rays, and receives them again within itself, so did the Logos enter into Christ, and there assume personal existence, to return again to the Father later as an impersonal power.

5. Paul of Samosata became Bishop of Antioch A.D. 260. He was a man of considerable dialectical skill, but filled with vanity. He taught that Christ had no existence previous to His conception, that the Divine Logos—which is not itself a person—descended upon Him when He was conceived, and remained with Him till his Passion. Hence, Jesus, though begotten in a supernatural manner, is no more than man. But the moral perfection He attained, rendered Him God. It is true that He was endowed with intellectual power of a Divine order, but this was not because of a substantial union between God and man, but merely in consequence of a special divine influence exerted upon a human intellect and human will.

6. A third class of Monarchianists is formed by the Antitrinitarians of the Ebionite school. To this class belong the two Theodoti (the

older and younger), who taught that Christ was no more than man; and Artemon, who held like opinions, but admitted a certain influence exerted upon Jesus by the Supreme God, which raised Him above all other men, and made Him the Son of God. The notion of the Logos does not form part of this phase of Monarchianism.

Arianism and Apollinarism.

§ 64.

1. Arianism unites in one system the prominent points of doctrine peculiar both to Gnosticism and to Monarchianism. The Gnostic teaching is represented in the principle that God cannot enter into immediate contact with matter, that He can work upon it only through the agency of intermediate beings. The Monarchian teaching is represented in the doctrine that the Logos, as a person, is extraneous to the Divinity, not intrinsic to it—a proposition equivalent to a denial of the distinctions involved in the notion of the Trinity. But the construction of the Arian system indicates, at every point, the influence of the notions of Philo—a source from which, at an early period, the Gnostics had borrowed.

2. Arius, the founder of the system called by his name, was probably a native of Libya. He was a man of considerable exegetical knowledge, eloquent and skilled in dialectics, but he was remarkable for his vanity and his desire of renown. He was a presbyter of Alexandria, and subsequently to the year A.D. 313, when he failed in an attempt to secure for himself the episcopal see of that city, he publicly taught his peculiar theories. He died A.D. 336. We may reduce his doctrines to the following heads:—

3. God is the Unbegotten (ἀγέννητος), and as such He must be *one*—two unbegotten beings are inconceivable. This principle, which, as applied to the Divine *Nature*, is unimpeachable, was applied by Arius to the Divine *Persons*, and he was in consequence led to such conclusions as these: The Son of God, the Logos, is begotten; He cannot, therefore, be God; He must be regarded merely as a creature. From this it follows that He cannot be eternal, like God; He must have had a beginning; there must have been a time when He did not exist (ἦν ποτέ, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν). We are thus forced to admit a dual Logos—one intrinsic to the Divinity, which is not a personal entity, and another extrinsic to the Divinity, which possesses the character of personality; but the latter is only a creature, and can be called Wisdom or Logos only in so far as it participates in that uncreated divine wisdom which is an intrinsic but impersonal attribute of God. This is clearly Philo's teaching reproduced.

4. The Logos, being a creature, was endowed with a free will, which He could use for good or for evil. God foresaw that He would use His liberty aright, and as a reward He bestowed upon Him, at His creation,

a glory which gave Him a title to be called God. But He is not God in the strict sense of the term, and therefore He is not omniscient; He has not a perfect knowledge of the Father, nor even of His own nature. God enjoyed the title of Father from the moment that He gave being to the Logos as His Son.

5. The Logos is the instrument by means of which God created the world. God could not create the world immediately—He, the absolutely Pure, could not produce matter which is impure and unholy. He had need of an instrument to create the world, and this instrument was furnished in the Logos. The Logos was formed at the moment when God resolved to create the world. The world, then, does not exist for sake of the Logos; the Logos exists for sake of the world.

6. The Logos is, furthermore, the instrument by which God rules the world. God cannot dispense with an instrument of this kind, for He is no more able to come into immediate contact with the defilements of matter than He is able to create matter. Accordingly, a series of beings are interposed between God and the world—these supernatural powers (angels) being made subordinate to the Logos. The incarnation of the Logos is explained to signify that the Logos assumed flesh, *i.e.*, a human body, but not a human soul; and in this way actually underwent the sufferings of the Passion.

7. Apollinarism was an offshoot of Arianism; it owes its origin to Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea in Syria (about A.D., 375.) The Apollinarists, like the Manicheans, recognise three constituent elements in man, the body, the carnal soul (*ψυχὴ σαρκική*), and the spirit. The relation between the carnal soul and the spirit resembles that established by the Manicheans, for the Apollinarists find the source of evil in the *ψυχὴ σαρκική*. As to the origin of the soul, they are in favour of the theory of generation. They object to the doctrine of creation on the ground that such a doctrine involves the co-operation of God in fornication, adultery, and other such crimes, and they further maintain that the doctrine is opposed to Sacred Scripture which teaches that God ceased to create on the sixth day.

8. Regarding Christ, they taught that the Logos had not assumed human nature in its entirety, but only a body and *ψυχὴ σαρκική*—to the exclusion of the *νοῦς*. In Christ the functions of the *νοῦς* were discharged by the Logos. It is only in this hypothesis that the conflict between spirit and flesh in Christ becomes intelligible. A section of the Apollinarists went still further, and taught that the body of Christ was not formed from terrestrial matter, but was consubstantial with the Logos. They ascribed to this body qualities of the immaterial order, and asserted that the Logos had brought it with Him from heaven, not received it from Mary.

Patristic Philosophy of the Ante-Nicene Period.

Preliminary Remarks.

1. The attacks and misrepresentations to which the faith was subjected by pagans and heretics made it incumbent upon the Christians to adopt the weapons of science in defence of their belief. But to undertake a defence of the faith, they were first obliged adequately to penetrate its meaning, and to attain such speculative knowledge of its truths as the human reason could obtain. Thus much they were obliged to by the needs of the defence they were forced to undertake. A further incentive to this study was supplied by the character of the truths of faith themselves, so comprehensive and so lofty ; for the human mind is formed for truth, and the more truth manifests itself in its brightness, the more strenuous will be the effort of the mind to enter into its light.

2. It was to be expected, then, that the Christian speculation of the Ante-Nicene period, which at first was apologetic and controversial, should, as time went by, become more and more a study of Christian truth for its own sake. At a comparatively early period we find Christian schools cultivating science after the Christian fashion, as a means to a deeper knowledge of the truths of faith, and this in the service of the Church. The most remarkable of the Christian teachers and writers of the Ante-Nicene period belong to the schools of Edessa, of Antioch, and more especially of Alexandria. These schools were modelled upon the imperial schools of Rome, and in them were taught scientific theology, scriptural exegesis, philosophy, rhetoric, physics, astronomy, &c. Philosophy was made the basis of speculative theology ; it was not employed in the hope of adding to the sum of revealed truth, but only to aid towards its speculative development.

3. Christian philosophy, being employed as an aid to Christian faith, was permeated throughout by a spirit of lofty morality. The Christian teachers were deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity, and the earnest Christian spirit of their lives reflected itself in their scientific teaching. Before the tribunals of the pagan magistrates and in presence of the horrors of the gibbet they gave evidence of the supernatural energy of Christian faith and Christian morality by which they were animated ; the same spirit of faith and moral rectitude was manifested no less unequivocally in the monuments of Christian thought which they reared.

4. We begin our sketch of the period with the Apologists who defended Christianity against paganism ; we shall then notice the opponents of Gnosticism and Monarchianism, and lastly we shall pass in review the thinkers who cultivated Christian speculation for its own sake, apart from the needs of controversy.

The Apologists.

Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus.

§ 65.

1. In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers—the Fathers who were the immediate disciples of the Apostles—we find no traces of a philosophy, in the strict sense of the term. These writings are valuable chiefly as evidence of the early Christian traditions, and belong, therefore, to the history of religious dogmas rather than to the history of philosophy.* But in the writings of the Apologists philosophy is a prominent feature. It is, no doubt, employed chiefly for the purpose of controversy against the pagans, but it is employed in all thoroughness. The first of the Apologists was:

2. Flavius Justinus, a native of Flavia Neapolis (Sichem) in Palestine. (A.D., 100-160.) While yet a youth, he occupied himself with the great problems regarding God, the immortality of the soul, &c., and, as he tells us himself (*Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 2, 8) turned to the schools of the philosophers in the hope of finding a solution of them. He first tried a Stoic, then a Peripatetic, next a Pythagorean, lastly a Platonist—the last of whom afforded him, he thought, the satisfaction he desired. While he was in the midst of his speculation, he one day, during a walk by the sea-shore, encountered an old man, with whom he entered into conversation. The old man, by his arguments, made a speedy end of the hopes Justin had conceived, and then advised him to address himself to Christianity for the solution of his difficulties. Justin followed the advice, and found at length what he had been seeking—the only true philosophy. He became a convert to Christianity, and defended his new faith against Jews, pagans, and heretics. He died a martyr's death at Rome. Of the treatises composed by Justin, the principal which have reached us are the *Dialogue with the Jew Trypho*, and the *Greater* and *Lesser Apologies*.† The genuineness of the *Cohortatio ad Græcos* has been called in question in modern times, but only on intrinsic grounds which are by no means decisive.

3. Justin will not exclude the ancient philosophy from the economy of Redemption. In the Christian system the Divine Logos has manifested Himself in the flesh, and, therefore, we possess in Christianity the fulness of truth. But even in pre-Christian times the Logos was not

* The Apostolic Fathers are St. Barnabas, one of whose letters is preserved; Hermas who has left us a treatise with the title *Pastor;* Clement of Rome, the author of two letters to the Corinthians; St. Ignatius, several of whose letters are extant; St. Polycarp, one of whose letters (to the Philippians) is preserved. We may also include in the number the unknown author of the *Letter to Diognetus* (which is sometimes attributed to Justin).

† The First or Greater Apology is addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, his two sons Lucius and Verus, the Senate and the Roman people, A.D., 139; the Second or Lesser to the Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus, and the Roman Senate, A.D. 162.

wholly unrevealed. He was revealed as the omnipresent λόγος σπερματικός, as well in the works of creation as in human reason, which is reason only in so far as it participates in the Divine Logos. This Logos enabled the philosophers and poets of antiquity to attain knowledge of the truth. Whatever of truth they possessed and set forth in their writings they owed to the Logos. The measure of their knowledge was determined by the measure of their participation in the Logos; hence their knowledge of truth was only partial, and they were frequently involved in self-contradictions. The fulness of truth was revealed only in the Incarnate Logos.

4. The truth which was taught by the ancient philosophers and poets is to be ascribed to that Logos who was manifested in the flesh in the fulness of time. If this be so, then the truth taught by the philosophers and poets of paganism is essentially Christian, and, as such, belongs to Christianity. It follows also that those who, before the Incarnation of the Logos, lived according to reason, *i.e.*, according to the law of the Logos, which manifests itself in reason, were Christians, even though they may have been esteemed atheists by their contemporaries. Such were Socrates, Heraclitus, and others among the Greeks, and Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, and others among the outer nations. But these were only privileged individuals: the knowledge of God and of His law was first made general by the Incarnate Logos.

5. Besides the inner connection thus established between Greek philosophy and Christianity, Justin holds that there existed also an external bond of union. He maintains that the Greek philosophers for the most part had knowledge of the teaching of Moses and of his writings, and that they drew from this source. "The doctrine of free will," says Justin, "Plato borrowed from Moses, and he was furthermore acquainted with the whole of the Old Testament. Moreover, all that the philosophers and poets have taught regarding the immortality of the soul, punishment after death, the contemplation of things divine and kindred subjects, was derived, in the first instance, from the Jewish prophets; from this one source the seeds of truth (σπέρματα τῆς ἀληθείας) have been sent forth in all directions, though at times being wrongly apprehended by men they have given rise to differences of opinion." (*Apol.* I. 44.)

6. God is the Eternal, the Unbegotten, the Unnameable. The idea of God is implanted by nature in the mind, in the same way as the idea of the moral law. But along with (παρά), though subordinate to (ὑπό), God the Creator, we must admit another God ἕτερος θεός), through whom God the Creator reveals Himself, and who became man in Christ. This is the Son of God. In proof of this, Justin, in his controversy with the Jew Trypho, who insisted on the doctrine of the unity of God, appeals to the Old Testament. He cites as establishing the existence of "another God," the divine apparitions (theophanies) of the Old Testament. It cannot, he holds, be God theCreator who is referred to in these scenes, for it would be a contradiction to admit that the Creator of heaven and earth

should quit the super-celestial region, and manifest Himself on a small point of the earth's surface. Justin also appeals to those passages of Scripture, in which "Lord" is opposed to "Lord" and "God" to "God."

7. The question now suggests itself: In what relation does this "other God" stand to God the Creator? Justin answers this question as follows: As a beginning (or first principle), God, before things created began to exist, produced from Himself an intellectual power (*δύναμιν τινα λογικήν*), which in the Scripture is variously named "Glory of the Father," "Son," "Wisdom," "Angel," "God," "Lord," and "Word." This Logos is that "other God" who must be assumed to exist as a being different from the Creator. This Logos had existence with the Father antecedently to the existence of created things, and as Son of God was eternal and without beginning. When God wished to create the world, He, by a new generation, made the Son in a certain way extrinsic to Himself, that the Son might act as an instrument and servant of the Father in the creation of the world. Justin then assumes a twofold generation of the Logos, an intrinsic and an extrinsic; the former occurs within the Godhead, and is properly the eternal generation of the Son by the Father; the latter is connected with the revelation of the Son of God as the Logos in the creation of the world.

8. The generation of the Logos by the Father, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, does not mean that the Logos acquired an existence apart from the Father. This generation must be understood in a sense analogous to the production of the spoken word by man, or of the light by the sun. In these cases the thing generated does not separate itself from the generating principle, but remains intimately identified with it. In the same way the Logos was not, in the act of generation, separated from the Father, He continued still to be one with Him (in being.) Thus the generation of the Logos has not any parallel in the procreation of created things; it is essentially different in kind. When, then, Justin asserts that the Logos is subject (*ὑπό*) to the Father, he must be understood to mean a subordination of a personal (hypostatical) kind, not of being or nature. The same is true of the Holy Ghost, who is described by Justin as the third member of the Divine Trinity.

9. God, as has been said, created the world through the Logos. He has furnished man with a free will, which enables him to decide for good and for evil. The same Logos, by which the universe was created, became man for the salvation of the world. He abrogated the Old Law, and proclaimed a New Law. He is then the New Lawgiver (*ὁ καινὸς νομοθέτης*). The soul of man does not perish at death, it enters on a new life where eternal happiness or eternal punishment awaits it. The dead rise again to life. The first resurrection is for the just only, and occurs at the second coming of Christ. Thereupon, follows the reign of Christ on earth with His elect, for a thousand years (Chiliasm.) At the termination of this period, the general resurrection takes place, and the Last Judgment is held; after which each man receives, according to his works, eternal reward or eternal punishment.

10. With Justin we must associate his pupil Tatian. An Assyrian

by birth, Tatian made acquaintance with every branch of Greek literature, and studied the wisdom of paganism in all its forms. But his inquiries left him unsatisfied. The corruption of the pagan world inspired him with horror; even the morals of the philosophers themselves he regarded as degenerate, and he is severe in his reprobation of their shortcomings. At length he found in the Christian system the satisfaction he sought. Under the instruction of Justin he became a convert to Christianity (A.D. 162.) His excessive rigorism involved him later in error, and he became the head of a Gnostic sect—the Encratites, who condemned marriage and the use of flesh and wine as sinful. He has left a work with the title *Oratio contra (ad) Græcos.*

11. In his teaching regarding the Divine Logos, Tatian follows Justin. Before creation God existed alone, but with Him and in Him, in virtue of His attribute of intelligence, subsisted (ὑπέστησε) the Logos. This Logos proceeded from the Father, not by separation, but by participation, and in thus proceeding from the Father became the Creator of the world. Here again, we have the distinction between the intrinsic generation of the Logos and the extrinsic. In his further exposition of this view, Tatian adduces the analogy of the internal and external word in man, and remarks at the same time, that the Logos, while proceeding from God like light from light, becomes the first-begotten work of God (πρωτότοκον ἔργον θεοῦ), but is not, for this reason, a creature, inasmuch as He is not separated from God. God is not only the cause, He is also the hypostasis of the universe—that by which the continued existence of the universe is conditioned.

12. The entire universe is animated by one vital spirit, which manifests itself in the several beings in a manner peculiar to each. We must distinguish in man the soul from the spirit (ψυχὴ καὶ πνεῦμα); the latter is the image and likeness of God. He who possesses this spirit is the true pneumatist, the mere psychicist is distinguished from the brute by the faculty of speech only. The soul is mortal; it is the spirit alone that can make it immortal. Man lost the πνεῦμα by sin; only a glimmering of the divine light is left in him; he is the slave of matter. To rise to spiritual life he must despise matter, and free himself from its dominion; he will thus conquer the demon who makes use of matter to seduce the soul.

13. Athenagoras of Athens, an adept in Greek and more especially in Platonic philosophy, was at first a supporter of paganism. He is said to have read the Scriptures for the purpose of making an attack on Christianity, but to have been himself converted to Christianity in consequence of this study. His work as a Christian writer is said to have been carried out between A.D. 177 and A.D. 180. He has left two treatises: an apology addressed to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius under the title *Legatio pro Christianis*, and a treatise *De Resurrectione Mortuorum.* In the former work he defends the Christians against the triple charge of atheism, of lewdness, and of feasting on the flesh of children. In the latter he endeavours to prove the resurrection of the dead from reason.

14. In his defence of Monotheism, Athenagoras introduces an argu

ment which we meet here for the first time in Christian literature. If there be several Gods, he says (*Leg.* c. 8), they must either be all like to one another, or they must be different. Neither alternative is admissible. Not the former, for, as uncreated beings, these Gods could not be subordinated to the higher archetype to which all should conform. Not the latter, for in this case they should exist in different places, and there is no place for a second God, since the space without the boundary of the world is occupied by that one God who is a supramundane being.* For this reason the Greek poets and philosophers taught the unity of God, but a clear and certain knowledge on the point was not attained till God's revelation was made to the prophets.

15. We hold, then, continues Athenagoras, the unity of God, but admit also the existence of the Son of God. This Son of God is, according to us, the Logos of the Father in thought and actuality (*ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*) inasmuch as everything has been created after Him as archetype, and through Him as instrument. Father and Son are, however, one. The Son is indeed the first offspring (*πρῶτον γέννημα*) of the Father, but not in the sense that He ever began to be, for God possessed the Logos within Him from eternity, God being *λογικός* from eternity. The term only means that the Logos came forth from God to be the ideal element and the source of energy for all material things (*Leg.* c. 10.) Further, we have the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from God like a ray of light from the sun. Who then would not wonder to hear those described as atheists who acknowledge God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, who assert their power by maintaining their unity, and maintain a distinction by establishing an order of procession!

16. The proofs adduced by Athenagoras to establish the resurrection of the body are as follows:

(*a*) Man is one being composed of soul and body. As such he is destined by God to a fixed end, which end is attained beyond the grave. It follows that he must attain that end *as man*, and this can be secured only by supposing the body to be united to the soul after death. Furthermore, (*b*) eternal life in God, eternal contemplation of divine truth, is the supreme good of man. In this supreme good, precisely because it is the supreme good of *man*, the body must have its share, and this again, is impossible without a resurrection of the body. Lastly, (*c*) it is not the soul only, but *the man*, as such, who does the good and the evil of this life; it must therefore be *the man* who receives reward or punishment in the life to come, and this again necessarily supposes the resurrection of the body. To assert that the resurrection is impossible, we must deny to God the will or the power to raise men from death to life. Such a denial is absurd. If God has power to create man, He has also the power to raise him from death; nor can He be wanting in the will to do so, for the resurrection of the dead is neither unrighteous in itself nor unworthy of God.

17. Theophilus of Antioch, was, according to his own account, converted to Christianity by the study of the Sacred Scriptures. In his treatise, *Ad Autolycum*, composed soon after A.D. 180, he advises Autolycus to believe, in order to escape the eternal punishment of hell. In reply to the challenge of Autolycus: "Show me thy God," Theophilus writes (I. 1): "Show me thy man;" that is to say, Prove to me

* It is possible indeed to suppose the second God existing in another world or beyond its periphery, but such a God would have no concern with us, and, moreover, being restricted as to the sphere of his existence and his action, he would not be really God at all.

that you are free from sin, for it is only the pure can see God. To the challenge, "Describe your God for me," he replies (I. 3): "The being of God is not describable; His dignity, greatness, sublimity, power, wisdom, goodness and mercy, surpass human conception." He is the absolute, the ungenerated, the immutable, the immortal. He is known from His works, just as the orderly movement of a ship argues the presence of the pilot. He has called all things forth from non-being to being (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι) in order that His greatness might be manifested by the things which He created.

18. It was by means of the Logos that He created all things. Antecedently to all other existence, God had with Him the Logos; for the Logos is His Intelligence and His Wisdom. The Logos had an eternal existence (as λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) within the being—in the heart of God (ἐν καρδίᾳ θεοῦ.) But when God wished to give existence to the things which He had determined to create, He brought forth the Logos from Himself—λόγος προφορικός, as the first-born of all creatures, but not in such wise that He separated Himself from the Logos; the Logos though begotten remained still united to Him. Through the λόγος προφορικός He created the world. The three days which preceded the creation of light typify the Trinity which consists of God, his Word, and his Wisdom (Holy Ghost).

19. God who has created us can and will create us again at the resurrection. The titles of the gods of the Greeks are the names of deified mortals. The worship of the images of the gods is wholly irrational. The teachings of the heathen poets and philosophers are folly. The sacred writings of Moses and the Prophets are the most ancient of all, and contain the truth which the Greeks forgot or neglected.

20. Examining the teaching of the Apologists, regarding the Divine Logos, we notice that all of them distinguish a triple generation of the Word—His generation within the divinity as a Divine Person, an extrinsic generation in order to the creation of the world, and lastly, His generation in the flesh or Incarnation. In their teaching regarding the intrinsic and extrinsic generations of the Logos, they adopt the distinction established by Philo between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός—expressions which we find in Justin as well as in Theophilus. Their modes of expression might at times appear to suggest the notion that they made the personal existence of the Logos to begin with His extrinsic generation. But this is not their meaning. The predicates which they attribute to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος prove convincingly, as we have seen, that they were far from ascribing to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος a merely impersonal existence, or from reducing the λόγος to a mere modality, or form of Divine power.*

* In addition to the Apologists named above, we may further mention: Quadratus, Aristides, Mileto of Sardis, who addressed an Apology to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (about A.D. 170); Apollinaris of Hierapolis, who also addressed a λόγος to the same Emperor in favour of the Christians, and who wrote Πρὸς Ἕλληνας συγγράμματα πέντε; Miltiades, a Christian rhetorician, who composed an Apology as well as λόγους πρὸς Ἕλληνας and πρὸς Ἰουδαίους (none of these writings are extant), and Hermias, whose work *Irrisio Philosophorum Gentilium*, is still preserved. Aristo of Pella in Palestine, a Jew by birth, like Justin in his Dialogue *Cum Tryphone*, composed a treatise against Judaism (about A.D. 140).

THE ANTI-GNOSTICS AND ANTI-MONARCHIANISTS.

Irenæus, Hippolytus, Tertullian.

§ 66

1. We have now arrived at those ecclesiastical writers of the Ante-Nicene period, whose efforts were chiefly directed to defend Christianity against the misrepresentations of the Gnostic and Monarchianist heretics. These writers did not, indeed, omit to defend Christianity against the pagans, but their immediate concern was the confutation of the Gnostic and Monarchianist errors, and this was also the chief part of their work. The most remarkable of these Apologists are Irenæus, Hippolytus and Tertullian.

2. Irenæus, born in Asia Minor, A.D. 140, a disciple of the martyr Polycarp, was, at a later period, presbyter of the church of Lyons, and ultimately bishop of that city. He died a martyr in the persecution of Severus, A.D. 202. His chief work, "Exposure and Refutation of the False Gnosis" (ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατρόπη τῆς ψευδονύμου γνώσεως) has come down to us in an ancient Latin translation (*Adv. Hæres.* II. 5). Several fragments of the original text, notably a large portion of the first book, have also been preserved.

3. The Gnostics had appealed in support of their system to certain secret doctrines supposed to have been communicated by Jesus. Against this assumption Irenæus emphatically protests. The true doctrine, the real Gnosis, is the teaching of the Church, the doctrine handed down in the Church from the Apostles. Whoever departs from this teaching departs from truth. It must not be supposed that the human mind can comprehend all things. Whoever thinks to understand everything—to leave no secret to God—falls into error. God is incomprehensible, and cannot be measured by man's power of thought. Our concepts of Him are all imperfect. "It is better, knowing nothing, to believe in God, and to persevere in His love, than to pursue subtle inquiries which end in atheism."

4. The Gnostics further distinguished between God and the Demiurgos, assigning to the latter a subordinate rank. Here again Irenæus meets them with denial. God is Himself the Creator of the world. He has created all things by Himself, that is, by His Word and His Wisdom. In the work of creation He had no need of angels or other powers different from Himself. He could Himself execute

whatever He proposed. For this purpose, the Logos, with the Spirit, was always with Him, and through these and in these He created the world.

5. In opposition to the Gnostic view, representing Christ as a subordinate Æon, Irenæus maintains that the Logos (as well as the Spirit) is eternal, like the Father, and one with Him in being. The Son of God, he asserts, has not had a beginning. He is co-existent with the Father from eternity. The heretics find an analogy between the spoken word of man (*λόγος προφορικός*) and the Eternal Word of God, and argue that the latter has had a beginning and has been produced, just as the spoken word begins to exist and is produced, when it is uttered. But how, then, does the Word of God, who is Himself God, differ from the word of man, if both came into existence after the same fashion? No, the Word of God is co-existent with the Father from eternity, nor has He ever passed through any process of production, but has ever been a perfect Word. The same is true of the Spirit.

6. We must also acknowledge not only an equality in eternity but also a likeness of being between the Logos and the Father. The Divine Being is absolutely simple; the emanation of a world of Æons from God is absurd; the possibility of a partition of the Divine Being among a world of Æons is wholly impossible. The "emission" of the Logos by the Father is, therefore, not to be understood as a separation from the Father's being; for the Divine being does not admit of such partition; the Son, proceeding from His Father, remains one with Him in being. In this unity of being with the Father, the Son becomes, so to speak, the organ of divine revelation, the minister of the divine decrees, the dispenser of divine grace, the delegate of the Father. It is only in so far as the Father is the origin of the being and activity of the Son that the Son can be said to be subordinated to Him. In essence and being, the Son is His equal.

7. The Valentinians had maintained that the Demiurgus created the world, according to a plan given him from above; Irenæus, on the other hand, asserts that God Himself created the world, and in his work followed a plan not derived from other sources, but contained within His own mind. The Marcionites had asserted that the true God was unknown till the coming of Christ. Irenæus teaches that the true God could not remain unknown, for He had manifested Himself in creation, and men could rise from this creation to the knowledge of God. If, as a fact, they had not knowledge of Him, the fault was their own. God, it is true, is invisible and incomprehensible, but He is not so completely hidden that man could have no knowledge of Him without the Incarnation of the Logos. The better minds of paganism had actually attained knowledge of Him through His works.

8. Irenæus is equally emphatic in his rejection of the doctrine of the Marcionites that the Old and the New Testament are derived from two different sources—the Demiurgus and the "good" God. The Old Testament and the New, he holds, are the same in nature, and are both derived from the one true God. The natural law of morals God has

written in the heart of man, the ceremonial law, in which Christianity was typified, was given to the Jews because of their tendency to fall away from God. Christ fulfilled the type, and by the fact, the ceremonial law was fulfilled and abrogated, but the moral law remains. The Old Law was thus merely the forerunner of the New, and is, therefore, of the same nature.

9. The Gnostics had taught that man was formed of body, soul, and spirit. Irenæus teaches that man is composed of body and soul; the Soul being the vital principle of the compound. The (Divine) Spirit is not an attribute of man's nature, it is given only that man may become *perfect*. Man, by his soul, is the image of God (imago Dei), by the Spirit he is raised to likeness with God (ad similitudinem Dei). Man participates in the (Divine) Spirit by grace only. This Spirit is bestowed on those who restrain and control their passions. Such men become Pneumatists; other men are merely Psychicists. As for the body or flesh, it is not at all the source of evil, as the Gnostics asserted; it is, like everything else, created by God. The source of evil is the abuse of free will, the deliberate surrender of man to his sensual appetites. There is no such thing as immediate contemplation (Gnosis) of truth in its fulness, such as the Gnostics lay claim to. Man must *learn;* his knowledge is only a partial knowledge, which grows in proportion as man learns.

10. The soul of man is immortal. But it cannot lift itself to God immediately after death. It must first enter into Hades, and there remain till the resurrection. The doctrine of the heretics regarding the resurrection of the body, as well as regarding the human nature of Christ, must be met with a peremptory denial. The reign of Antichrist, that is of Satan incarnate, precedes the resurrection by a short period. Christ, then, comes again, destroys the Kingdom of Antichrist, and restores the just to life. Thereupon begins the reign of Christ with His elect on earth—a reign which lasts a thousand years, after which follows the General Judgment. The just enter, with Christ, into the Kingdom of the Father, the wicked are condemned to eternal reprobation.

11. With Irenæus is associated his pupil, Hippolytus, a presbyter of Rome, who was banished to Sicily about A.D. 235. We possess a treatise written by him with the title, Κατὰ πασῶν αἱρεσέων ἔλεγχος, of which, till a late period, only the first book was known to the learned, under the name *Origenes Philosophoumena*. In this work Hippolytus sets himself to prove that "the Gnostic errors have been derived, not from Sacred Scripture, nor from Christian Tradition, but from the lore of the Greeks, the teachings of philosophers, the mysteries, and astrology," an opinion to which Irenæus had already given expression. For the rest, Hippolytus deals with the teaching of the Gnostics in much the same way as his master, Irenæus.

12. His polemical work, *Contra Hæresim Noeti*, is of more importance. Hippolytus here attacks the system of the Monarchianists, and maintains, in opposition to their teaching, the Trinity of God. The Lord, he points out, does not say, "I and the Father *am* one," but, "I and the Father

are one"—an expression which indicates that Father and Son are two persons (*πρόσωπα*) whose power is one and the same. "And, therefore, must Noetus, whether he will or no, confess God the Almighty Father, and Jesus Christ, the Son of God, God who has become man, and to whom the Father has subjected all things—Himself and the Holy Ghost excepted—and he must further acknowledge that these (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) are really three." God is, therefore, one in power; but as regards the Economy of the Godhead (intrinsic relations), He is threefold. "We do not admit two Gods but only one, but we admit two Persons, with a third intrinsic relation (Economy) which we name the grace of the Holy Ghost. The Father is one, but there are two Persons, for there is also the Son; a third Person also is the Holy Ghost: *πατὴρ μὲν γὰρ εἷς, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, ὅτι καὶ ὁ υἱός, τὸ δὲ τρίτον (πρόσωπον) τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα.*"

13. The world has been created by the Logos, at the command of the Father, and has been created from nothing. The world, therefore, is not God, and may cease to be, if the Creator so wills it. Man has been created a dependent being, but endowed with freedom of will; it is in the misuse of this free will that evil has its origin. God imposed the Law upon man as upon a free being; the beast is ruled by the whip and the bridle, man by law, reward and punishment. The Law was promulgated from the beginning through just men, notably through Moses; the Logos, who at all times had been active impelling and exhorting men to its observance, at last appeared on earth as the Son of the Virgin. Man is not God; "but if you wish to become divine (*εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ θεὸς γενέσθαι*), obey the Creator and do not transgress His law, so that, being found faithful in a few things, you may be placed over many."

14. We pass now to Tertullian. Tertullian was born at Carthage, A.D. 160, of heathen parents. Nature had endowed him with a quick and penetrating intellect, and a vivid imagination. He studied philosophy and the fine arts, and adopted the law as a profession. The circumstances which led to his conversion to Christianity—an event which happened in his thirtieth year—have not been recorded. After his conversion, he entered the ranks of the priesthood, and devoted himself to the defence of Christianity with voice and pen. Unfortunately, the rigorism of his views led him ultimately to join the Montanists (A.D. 203.) Whether he again returned to the Catholic Church is uncertain. He died A.D. 240.

15. The writings of Tertullian are, some of them apologies on behalf of the Christian teaching, and of the conduct of the Christians under persecution; some of them dogmatic and polemical treatises against the heretics (Gnostics and Monarchianists); and some of them treatises on ethical questions. To the first class belong: the *Apologeticus*, *De Idololatria*, *Ad Nationes*, *Ad Martyres*, *De Spectaculis*, *De Testimonio animæ*, *De Corona Militis*, *De fuga in Persecutione*, *Contra Gnosticos Scorpiace*, *Ad Scapulam*. To the second class belong: *De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum*, *Adv. Marcionem*, *Adv. Hermogenem*, *Adv. Valentinianos*, *Adv. Praxeam*, *De Carne Christi*, *De Resurrectione Carnis*, *De Anima*. To the third class belong: *De Patientia*, *De Oratione*, *De Baptismo*, *De Pœnitentia*, *Ad Uxorem*, *De Cultu Feminarum*, *De Exhortatione Castitatis*, *De Monogamia*, *De Pudicitia*, *De Jejuniis*, *De Virginibus Velandis* and *De Pallio*. The last six treatises are Montanistic, so are the last two of the first class, and all in the second, with the exception of that first named.

16. Tertullian is not so great an admirer of Greek philosophy as Justin. He takes pleasure in exposing the errors of the Greek philosophers, in order to exalt Christianity by comparison with them. But this antipathy is not directed against Greek philosophy for its own sake; Tertullian's zeal is aroused chiefly by the misuse which the heretics had made of the philosophy of the Greeks to establish their own systems, and to misrepresent Christianity. It is against the heretics his condemnation is primarily directed. His constant complaint is, that the philosophers have been the patriarchs of heresy. Valentinus, he says, was equipped by the Platonists, Marcion by the Stoics; from the Epicureans comes the denial of the immortality of the soul, and from every school of philosophy the denial of the resurrection of the dead.

17. In his apologetic writings, Tertullian directs his very sharp controversial weapons against the polytheism of paganism and the superstitions connected with it. He asks the advocates of polytheism to hear the voice of nature in themselves. If they will but listen to this voice, they will be forced to acknowledge the unity of God. The soul, in a moment of sudden fright, or under the influence of any eager desire, turns involuntarily to the one true God, and not to an idol. This is shown by the exclamations which are used involuntarily on such occasions, v.g., "God grant it," "if God wills it," or, "please God," &c. In this way the soul of itself gives testimony to the one true God, nature itself is the teacher, through whom God instructs us regarding Himself. The Soul is, by nature, Christian. (*De Test. Animæ.*)

18. In his celebrated work, *De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum*, Tertullian maintains the prescriptive right of the Church against all heretics. The Church is antecedent to all heresies. Her teaching is thus the original, and therefore the only true teaching. Whatever has separated itself from her at a later period, and set itself up in opposition to her, is *eo ipso* false; the Church's teaching has a prescriptive right as opposed to these innovations. We can receive as truth only that which comes to us by ecclesiastical tradition. The tradition transmitted to us by the Apostles is the tradition transmitted by the Church, and conversely. The traditional teaching of the Church must not be abandoned under pretext of following the tradition received from the Apostles, as the heretics make profession of doing. "If thou art a Christian," says Tertullian, "believe what has been handed down."

19. In his controversies with the Marcionites, Tertullian, like Justin, endeavours to prove that knowledge of the true God does not come exclusively from the revelation made through Christ; that there is a twofold knowledge of God, a natural knowledge which begins with the works of creation, and thence ascends to the Creator, and a knowledge bestowed through prophecy (revelation). The first knowledge precedes the second. The soul exists first, prophecy comes after. But, as we have seen, the soul, of its nature, gives testimony to the true God. The consciousness of God's existence is one of its natural endowments. The true God cannot be entirely beyond its knowledge, as the Marcionites hold. He is knowable without the aid of prophecy (revelation).

20. The Marcionites are equally in error when they assume the existence of two Gods—the God of Goodness and the God of Justice (the Supreme God, and the Demiurgus.) God is the *Summum Magnum*, the highest and greatest being of whom we can have conception. If this is so, God must be one. If there were another like Himself, He would cease to be the *Summum Magnum*, for a still higher being would be conceivable, namely, the being who would have no other like himself. It follows that if God is not one, He does not exist at all; it is easier to believe that a thing does not exist at all, than to believe that it exists otherwise than is required by its nature. The heretics are in error when they assert goodness and justice to be incompatible with one another, and ascribe them in consequence to two different Gods; so far is it from the truth that goodness and justice exclude one another, that it may be said of either that it includes the other; for the man who is not just, cannot be good, and *vice versa*. (*Adv. Marc.* I., c. 3.)

21. The heretics had represented the being of God as purely ideal, and had pushed this conception so far that the belief in the reality of the Divine Being was endangered. Tertullian protests emphatically against this view. He goes so far in the contrary direction, that while holding God to be spiritual in his nature, he ascribes to Him a body also. All reality, he says, is corporeal; it is only the non-existent which can be described as incorporeal. Tertullian cannot conceive of a substance which is not of the corporeal order. "Ipsa substantia corpus est rei cujusque;" such is his formula. (*Adv. Hermog.*, c. 35.) Following the analogy of man's nature, he distinguishes in God the body from the spirit, and understands the expressions of Scripture regarding the eyes, hands, feet, &c., of God in a strictly literal sense. This is certainly a peculiar view. We must, however, allow that he does not attribute to God a material body; such a doctrine would be in absolute contradiction with other points of his teaching regarding the nature of God. He attributes a corporeal being to God in the same sense in which he attributes a corporeal element to the human soul, a peculiarity of his system which we shall presently examine.

22. In opposition to the Monarchianists, Tertullian upholds the oneness of God in a Trinity of intrinsic Divine relations (Economy) Praxeas and his followers, he says, assert that we cannot maintain the unity of God, if we do not regard the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as one and the same thing. "Just as if all were not one, when all came from one, in virtue, that is to say, of the oneness of substance, while at the same time the mystery of the Economy (system of intrinsic relations) is maintained which determines this unity to threefold Being, distinguishing from one another the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, not indeed separating them in rank, but establishing a gradation (order) among them; not differentiating them in substance but in form (Person); not in power but in character (species). They are one in substance, in rank, and in power, for there is only one God, from whom arise these gradations, forms, or characters, which bear the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." (*Adv. Prax.*, c. 2.)

23. Eternal matter, according to the conception of Hermogenes, cannot exist. "Before all things God existed alone, constituting in Himself His own universe, place of abode, and all the rest. And yet, even then, He was not wholly alone, for He had by Him that Reason (ratio) which the Holy Scripture names *Sophia*. With this Sophia, which He established in Himself as a Second Person, He deliberated, so to say, on all which He had determined to produce extrinsically to Himself. When He began the creation of the world He sent forth this Sophia as His Word, in order to create all things through it. It was thus the world came into existence. In this procession of the Word from God at the creation, the perfect generation of the Word is, furthermore, accomplished. For thenceforward the Word takes a position of perfect equality with Him from whom He issues and whose Son He becomes—the First-born Son, because generated before all other things—the Only-begotten, because He alone is generated by God, generated from the very depth of the Divine Being, from the generative centre of the heart of God." (*Adv. Prax.*, c. 6).

24. Here we encounter again the notion of a twofold generation of the Logos, an intrinsic, and an extrinsic, which we have already found set forth by the Apologists. Tertullian, however, expressly repudiates the notion of an extrinsic generation in the sense of the Valentinian προβολή. "We do not hold the Son to be a being separated from the Father, as Valentinus does; according to our teaching this Word remains ever in the Father; and with the Father, He is never separated from the Father nor becomes other (in essence) than the Father; for 'I and the Father are one.'" Tertullian is equally emphatic in asserting that the intrinsic generation precedes the extrinsic, that the Sophia, before it issued forth to create the world, had previously existed in God as "Secunda Persona condita." The peculiar point of his doctrine is that in which he maintains that the Sophia was fully generated, and could properly be named "Son," only when it issued forth for the creation of the world.

25. The world has been created from nothing, not formed from a pre-existent matter, as the heretics suppose; it follows that the world has not existed from eternity. God was God before the creation; subsequently to creation He was Lord; the former is a term which designates His Being, the latter designates His Power. (*Adv. Hermog.*, c. 3.) Man has been created to the image of God, for, in forming the first man, God took as model the manhood of the future Christ. (*De Resurr. Carn.*, c. 6.) The gods of the heathens are fallen angels, who were seduced from allegiance to God by love of mortal women. (*De Cult. Fem.*, I. 2.)

26. In his teaching regarding the nature of the human soul, Tertullian meets his heretical opponents with arguments similar to those which led him to attribute a body to God. The soul, according to him, is not an incorporeal essence. Just as in the whole man we distinguish two constituent parts—soul and body—so in the soul we must make a distinction between the spiritual and corporeal elements. These elements

are, no doubt, bound together in essential unity, and are inseparable from one another; the former, however, may, in a certain sense, be styled the soul of the soul, and the latter its body. To establish this view of the corporeal nature of the soul, Tertullian has recourse to the arguments of the Stoics. If the soul were not corporeal, it could not be affected by the action of the body, nor would it be capable of suffering. No union could be effected between the corporeal and the incorporeal, for there could be no contact between them. Children resemble their parents in mind as well as in body—a phenomena which is inexplicable if we do not suppose the soul to be corporeal. (*De Anima*, c. 5.)

27. In our concept of the soul, we must represent to ourselves a subtle, luminous, ethereal essence. It is possessed of the same form and the same organs as the body, inasmuch as it is diffused through every part of the body. It grows with the growth of the body; not by any addition to its substance, but rather by a development of its faculties and organs. Its growth may be compared to the gradual expansion of a plate of gold under the hammer; the metal does not increase in substance, but grows in extent and in brilliancy. Though the soul is corporeal, its substance cannot be increased or diminished; it is indivisible and indissoluble. (*De Anim.* c. 37.)

28. With regard to the origin of the soul, Tertullian is in favour of the theory of generation (Traducianism). The soul is generated by the parents at the same time as the body and in the same way. In generation a twofold germ is produced, a psychical and a bodily; and just as the latter is detached from the bodies of the parents, so is the former from their souls. These two elements are at first blended together, but they gradually separate, and the soul of the child is formed from the one, its body from the other. In accordance with this view it may be said that Adam's soul was the parent of all other souls. (*De Anima*, c. 19, 20, 29.)

29. Tertullian rejects the Gnostic view regarding the three constituents of man's nature—body, soul, and spirit. According to him, man is made up of body and soul, he is one being composed of soul and flesh. What we call reason (νοῦς, mens, animus), is merely a faculty of the soul—that faculty by which it thinks and wills. Tertullian, furthermore, establishes the closest relations between intellect and sense. Intellect is indebted to sense for all its cognitions, the latter is the guide, the author, and the foundation of all intellectual activity; it is not second in rank to intellect, it rather takes rank above it.

30. The degradation and condemnation of the flesh, which formed a leading heretical tenet, receives no support from Tertullian. Soul and body are, according to his view, intimately bound together, are the complements of one another. The soul is the vital principle of the body, and the body, in its turn, is an organ for the accomplishment of the special functions of the soul. Without the soul the flesh could not live; without the flesh the soul could not act. There is no activity of the soul which is not dependent on the body and effected by means of it. So closely are soul and body united, that we might well be in doubt

whether the soul sustains the body or the body the soul, whether the soul obeys the body or the body obeys the soul. Following this line of thought, Tertullian was able at length to propose the question: "What is man other than flesh?" (*De Resurr. Carnis*, c. 15.)

31. This reasoning disposed of the heretical notion that the body is the source of evil. Evil, according to Tertullian, has its source exclusively in the abuse of human liberty. It is not the flesh, as such, which stands in the way of man's salvation, but the works of the flesh, which the soul accomplishes in the body, and with its co-operation. The first man sinned by an abuse of his free will, and the souls of all other men being derived from the soul of the first man, his sin has been transmitted to his posterity. From the same source has come what we term the irrational part of the soul—that element within it which rebels against reason. Sin was implanted in the soul, and grew with its development, till at last it seemed a part of its very nature. This is the irrational element within the soul, which may rightly be said to come from the devil. There remains in us, however, a remnant of good, something of the divine image; what comes from God may be obscured, it cannot be extinguished. (*De Anima*, c. 16.)

32. The heretics had taught that the flesh had not shared in the Redemption effected by Christ, that it had been the scope of the Redemption to deliver the soul from the body. This doctrine Tertullian combats with all his dialectical resources. So little is it true that the flesh is excluded from the benefits of the Redemption, that the redemption and sanctification of the soul is dependent upon the body. Redemption first affects the body, and through the body reaches the soul. In Baptism the flesh is first washed and then the soul thereby purified. In Penance the body is subjected to the imposition of hands, in order that the soul may be enlightened and purified by the fire of the Spirit. The body is refreshed with the Body and Blood of Christ, that the soul may be nurtured by God. The flesh is, therefore, the corner-stone of salvation. "Be comforted, flesh and blood," cries Tertullian, "you have won the kingdom of Christ." (*De Resurr. Carnis*, c. 51.)

33. Tertullian maintains the immortality of the soul against pagans and heretics. Here again he appeals to the voice of nature. An instinct of our nature forces us to wish well to the dead, to bewail them or to account them happy. If the soul is not immortal, this voice of nature has no meaning. Moreover, we have a natural fear of death. Now, if the soul is mortal, why should we fear death which is a deliverance from the ills of life? Finally, we ambition lasting renown among men. To what purpose this ambition if the soul be not immortal? (*De Test. Anima*, c. 4.; *De Carne Christi*, c. 12.)

34. Tertullian is not content with the immortality of the soul. His teaching, regarding the nature and destiny of the body, furnishes him with arguments by which to maintain, against the heretics, the resurrection of the dead. There is no transmigration of souls. No souls, with the exception of the souls of martyrs, enter heaven immediately after death; but neither do they enter into other bodies; they are all

kept in Hades till the Day of Judgment. When that time comes, the bodies of men will be raised from the dead and united again to their souls. Man, in his composite nature of soul and body, has done the good and the evil of life; soul and body must, therefore, each have a share in the final retribution. Moreover, the resurrection of the dead is typified in nature, and, in a certain sense, assured, by the fact that in every sphere of nature new life springs from things inanimate. (*De Resurr. Carnis*, c. 14.)

35. It is hardly necessary, after this exposition of Tertullian's teaching, to mention that he was strongly adverse to the Docetism of the Gnostics. In his treatise, *De Carne Christi*, he sets himself to establish irrefragably the reality of the human nature of Christ. The Chiliasm, which we have seen to be a part of the doctrines of Irenæus, we find in favour with Tertullian also. On the whole, the writings of Tertullian furnish evidence of his acuteness of intellect, his zeal for the truth, and his strong moral sense. The errors which we meet in his works may impair our admiration for his intellectual greatness, but cannot wholly destroy it. Heresy found in him a dauntless and powerful opponent.

The beginning of Independent Speculation.

1. As Christianity spread, and its influence in stimulating the moral and religious sense of mankind became more widely felt, the tendency to study it, not merely for purposes of defence, but with a view to the establishment of an independent system of Christian speculation, was gradually evoked. Apology was not, indeed, wholly laid aside. The defence of Christianity against the attacks of heathen philosophers and heretics was still recognised as an essential part of the work of the Christian scholar. But the Christian controversialists now aimed at achieving this result by the construction of a system of positive Christian science. This was all the more desirable now that the training of the members of the Christian priesthood called for the foundation of higher Christian schools, and the instruction which it was necessary to impart to these schools made an advance upon mere apology indispensable.

2. The earliest beginnings of this independent Christian speculation belong to the ante-Nicene period, and are due to the so-called Catechetical Schools which flourished in the second century, chiefly at Alexandria. The Catechetical Schools of Alexandria may have been founded in imitation of the schools of Greek learning, for Athenagoras is said to have helped in their establishment. In the year A.D. 180, we find them under the control of Pantænus, who had been a Stoic before his conversion to Christianity. His colleague and (subsequently to A.D. 189) his successor, Titus Flavius Clement, of Alexandria, taught there also, and after Clement, his pupil, Origen. Under the two last-named teachers these schools attained their highest renown, and it is to these men

Christianity is indebted for the first beginnings of an independent body of speculative science.

3. During the third century the effort to replace the earlier apology by a positive Christian philosophy, which should supplement and perfect it, was exhibited in the west as well as in the east. In the west, however, there were no remarkable Christian schools to form a centre for this movement. But the desire for a more profound insight into revealed truth impelled certain eminent men to do for the west what the teachers of the Catechetical Schools were doing for the east. Amongst these men we may mention Minutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius, all of whom lived and laboured in the ante-Nicene period.

4. We shall notice in order Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and then Minutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius.

Clement of Alexandria.

§ 67.

1. Clement was born about the middle of the second century, at Alexandria, as some maintain—at Athens, as it is asserted by others. Gifted with extraordinary powers of intellect, he applied himself to the study of the various systems of Greek philosophy, and acquired in the study a knowledge which was at once comprehensive and profound. Under the influence of divine grace he became a Christian. But the character of his labours did not change with his conversion. His aim was to acquire a profounder knowledge of truth, and his ambition to lead others to share his knowledge. After many wanderings he settled at Alexandria, became a member of the Catechetical School, and after the death of its president, Pantænus, succeeded to his office. In this capacity he laboured with unceasing energy in the cause of science and education. When the persecution of Septimus Severus began (A.D. 202), he retired to Cappadocia. It is not known whether he again returned to Alexandria. He died A.D. 217.

2. The writings of Clement which have come down to us, are: (*a*) The *Cohortatio ad Gentes* (Λόγος προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας), in which he cites the extravagances and improprieties of the heathen mythology and mysteries as arguments against paganism, and exhorts all to come to Christ. (*b*) The *Paedagogus*, an exposition of the moral law of the Christian system. (*c*) The *Stromata*, in eight books, scientific studies of Christian truth, and discussions on the Christian Gnosis, not arranged in any systematic order (as Clement himself declares, and as the title of the work, which implies its resemblance to a variegated carpet, signifies), but expressed in the form of aphorisms; and lastly (*d*) A treatise under the title *Quis Dives Salvetur* (τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος), with fragmentary remains of other works.

3. With regard to the position providentially assigned to Greek philosophy, as preparatory to Christianity, Clement is at one with Justin. He draws a distinction between the sum of truth that philosophy contains

and its errors. The former he attributes to the Divine Logos, as its ultimate source, the latter he ascribes to man. In a twofold sense the Divine Logos is, for him, the author of the truth contained in Greek philosophy. In the first place, he maintains, the Greek philosophers learnt from the Jews, and were then so far wanting in honesty as to claim as their own discovery what the Jews had taught them, and what they had themselves only falsified and perverted. In the second place, he appeals to the saying of Sacred Scripture that the Divine Logos has enlightened all men, and he holds that the Greek philosophers were themselves led to the discovery of certain truths in virtue of the germs of the Divine Logos implanted in the faculty of reason.

4. From this point of view, Greek philosophy—so far as its sum of truth is concerned, appears to Clement to be a gift of God, bestowed through the Logos; as Revelation was given through Moses and the Prophets, and designed, like Revelation, to prepare the way for Christ. It was given to the heathens to lead them to righteousness, and hence, they who, in pre-christian times, lived according to the law of reason, were justified before God, inasmuch as their lives were in accord with the laws of the Divine Logos revealed in their own reason. The heathen philosophers had, however, but a partial knowledge of the truth, the fulness of truth was revealed for the first time in Christ. Plato is the most excellent of the Greek philosophers; in the system of the others there are seeds of truth, but the difficulty is to find these out and separate them from the errors.

5. This estimate of the essential character of the Greek philosophy leads up to Clement's theory regarding the Christian Gnosis. In his view, faith in the Christian teaching, as maintained in the Church, is the starting point and the basis of the Christian Gnosis. Whoever abandons ecclesiastical traditions, ceases, by the fact, to be of God. Faith, then, in its relation to the Christian Gnosis holds a position analogous to that of the προλήψις of the Stoics. According to these philosophers the προλήψις is a condition pre-requisite to the ἐπιστήμη; such too is the relation of faith to the Gnosis. Faith is a πρόληψις ἐκούσιος, a free assent to the unseen; without which a Gnosis is impossible (*Strom.* II., 2, 4, 5).

6. The mere πίστις (faith) is not γνῶσις. The Christian Gnostic in comparison with him who believes, without deeper knowledge, is what the man is compared with the child. To advance from πίστις to γνῶσις the aid of philosophy is necessary. Philosophy alone can help us to pass from mere belief to profounder speculative knowledge. The man who seeks to reach the Gnosis without philosophy, dialectic, and the study of nature, is like the man who would gather grapes without rearing the vine. (*Strom.* I., 9.) Philosophy is essentially a gift of the Divine Logos; the character of a means to the attainment of the Christian Gnosis can and must be accorded to it; in a right view of Christianity it cannot be set aside.

7. Philosophy is, however, only a theoretical requirement of the Christian Gnosis; there is a practical requirement also. The man who passes from Faith to Gnosis must repent of his sins, and enter

upon the path of moral improvement. He must fight against the desires and appetites of his own heart, and overcome them effectually. He must strive to cultivate in himself all kinds of virtue, and put forth every energy to attain personal sanctity. It is only where this previous purification and perfection of self has been accomplished, that philosophic effort, based upon Faith, can lead to the Gnosis.

8. With regard to the Gnosis itself, it essentially includes two factors. The first concerns the intelligence. In the Gnosis, the Gnostic attains to the understanding of that which before had been obscure and unintelligible. He has knowledge of everything that is, that has been, and that will be, in their ultimate causes. Christian truth stands clear and luminous before his eyes. The second factor concerns the will. It is the perfection of love. Knowledge without love is nothing; in love knowledge attains its final perfection. Love must therefore be united with knowledge, if the Gnosis is perfect. And since love in its turn, is nothing without the good works in which it reveals itself, it follows that good works must attend upon the Gnosis as the shadow upon the body. (*Strom.* VII., 10, 12.)

9. This doctrine of the Christian Gnosis furnishes Clement with the outlines of that picture of the Christian Gnostic which he presents as the ideal of Christian perfection. In setting up this ideal he is imitating the Stoics, substituting his "Christian Gnostic" for their "Sage." We even find the fundamental outlines of the "Stoic Sage" reproduced in the "Christian Gnostic." The chief characteristic of the Christian Gnostic is, as in the Stoic ideal, the *ἀπάθεια* or complete absence from the soul of all affections and excitements of passion (*πάθη*), and the tranquillity of mind thence resulting in every situation and vicissitude of life. (*Strom.* IV., 22.)

10. The following is the description of the Christian Gnostic presented to us by Clement: The Gnostic is united in perfect and immediate love with Infinite Beauty, and beyond this he desires nothing. He does not do good from fear of any punishment, nor from hope of any reward, but merely for God's sake, and for sake of the good done. Even if he were assured that he would not be punished for evil deeds, he would not perform such actions, and this for the sole reason that they are against right reason, that they are evil. He is not mastered by any inclination or any appetite; only those appetites are admitted in his nature which are indispensable for the support of bodily life, and they are satisfied only so far as the support of life requires. Affections and passions do not disturb his lofty calm of mind; to such influences he is inaccessible. This *ἀπάθεια* of the Gnostic raises him to a certain divine condition, for in it he attains to likeness with God who is essentially *ἀπαθής*. In this state his works are wholly perfect (*κατορθώματα*), for they are performed purely for righteousness' sake.

11. It will be seen that Clement makes very exorbitant demands on the Christian Gnostic. The ideal "Stoic Sage" is not in keeping with the nature of man as it exists: the same may perhaps be said of the ideal set up by Clement. He makes practically the same demands upon the

"Gnostic" that the Stoics made upon the "Sage." He does not, indeed, impose it as a duty upon every Christian to attain to this height of perfection, he restricts this obligation to the chosen few, but it is somewhat ominous to find him characterising the knowledge reached in the Gnosis as a kind of *hidden lore*, which has come down by oral tradition from the Apostles (*Strom.* L. 6. c. 7, p. 246. Edit., Oberthür). At this point, Clement, it is clear, yields too much to the false theory of the Gnosis.

12. According to Clement, God, in his proper being, is incomprehensible to human understanding. We do not so much understand what He is, as what He is not. We call Him the Good, the One, the Existent, or Spirit, God, Father, Lord, but these terms do not express what He is in Himself. We use these excellent names merely that the understanding may have whereon to support itself in its contemplation of the Divinity. God is infinitely exalted above all things created; they have all their being from Him, for they are the work of His infinite goodness, but their being is not the same as His being, they are merely created by Him.

13. There exists a "Sacred Trias" of which the Father is the first member, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third (*Strom.* L.v., c. 14, p. 255). There is a Father of all things, says Clement, a Logos of all things, and a Holy Ghost, the same everywhere (*Pædagog*, L. c. 6, p. 45, Ed. Oxon.) The Father is Being, unqualifiable, incomprehensible, and ineffable; the Son is Wisdom, Knowledge, Truth, and all that is akin to these attributes. To Him predicates may be attributed, and to Him positive attributes assigned; all powers of the spiritual order brought together in unity are concentrated in the Son. The Son is not the same unity (as the Father), nor one with the same oneness of being as the Father, but yet He is not many, divided by difference and contrast; He is the All-one, from whom all things come. In Him, as in a common centre all perfections meet, whence he is styled the A and Ω of all things (*Strom.*, L. iv., c. 25, p. 230). Finally, the Holy Ghost is the light of truth, the true light without shadow or obscurity, the Spirit of the Lord, which, without division in Itself bestows Itself on all who are sanctified by truth (*Ib.* L. vi., c. 16).

14. It has been asserted that in his teaching on the subject of the Divine Logos, Clement displayed something of the hesitation of Philo as to whether he should assign the Logos a subordinate position or give Him merely a modal existence. In the first place, Clement most decidedly does not favour the notion of modal existence, for the Son of God is, in his teaching, always a personal being. He is our instructor, says Clement, the Holy God, Jesus, the Logos, the leader of the human kind, the merciful, lovable, but just God. (*Pæd.* L. vii., p. 48, 2, 8, p. 79). "We offer praise and thanksgiving," he says again (*Pæd.* L. iii., p. 14), "to the Father and Son, to the Son and the Father, to the Son as to our Instructor and Master, and to the Holy Ghost; to the one God in whom are all things, in whom all things are one, and through whom eternity exists." Here we have Father, Son and Holy Ghost set on the same level of perfection: as, therefore, the Father is a Person, so also must it be with the Son and the Holy Ghost.

15. Clement must also be absolved from the charge of assigning to the Son a subordinate position. He attributes to the Son not only the same eternity as the Father, but he further asserts with special emphasis the oneness of essence in Father and Son, a doctrine with which the theory of subordination is wholly incompatible. God, says Clement,

does not hate anything, neither does His Logos, for both are One—God (*ἓν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ θεός*, *Prod.* i, 8, p. 50). Moreover, Clement expressly teaches the equality of the Son with the Father, for he asserts that the Divine Logos, as true God, is in every respect equal to the Lord of all things, and we are therefore bound to love Him equally with the Father (*Quis Dive Salv.*, c. 29). When, therefore, Clement describes the Son as a nature "which stands next in order to the One Supreme Ruler" (*Strom* vii., c. 2, p. 298), we must, in order to save him from self contradiction, understand him to speak of a subordination, not of the substantial, but of an hypostatical or personal kind.

16. The Logos is, then, an image of the Father, equal in all respects to the Father, and He is, moreover, the archetype of the universe. In Him are all ideas united. But not only is He the archetype of creation, He is furthermore its efficient cause, inasmuch as the Father has created the world through Him. It is the nature of God to do good, He has, therefore, created the world by means of the Logos, in order to display His goodness in it. In the world we have an immediate manifestation of the Logos, through the Logos we attain to the knowledge of the Father. Everything created is good, evil is not a substantial entity, it has its source only in the misuse of human liberty.

17. According to Clement, the human soul is an incorporeal, simple, and invisible substance. He distinguishes, however, after the fashion of the Stoics too parts in the soul—the *ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος*—reason, and the *ἄλογον μέρος*, which he also styles *πνεῦμα σαρκικὸν* or *ψυχὴ σαρκική*. The *ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος* comprehends intelligence and will, and to it nature has assigned dominion over the faculties of sense, inasmuch as the functions of the latter are dependent upon the will, and must be brought into subjection to it under the guidance of reason. The divine law may be divided according to its reference to the different parts of the soul; the laws of the Second Table concern the *πνεῦμα σαρκικόν*, those of the First Table the *ἡγεμονικόν*.[1]

Origen.

§ 68.

1. Still more renowned than Clement is his pupil, Origen. Origen was born in the year A.D. 185, most probably in Alexandria. His parents were Christians, and Origen received from them a Christian education. At an early age he attended the lectures of the Catechists Pantænus and Clement, and laid the foundation of that erudition for which he was, later, so remarkable. His father, Leonidas, suffered martyrdom in the persecution of Septimius Severus, and thenceforward Origen devoted himself with new ardour to his studies. In these he made such progress that, at the age of eighteen, and while still a layman, he became the head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. With his assumption of this office began his marvellous literary activity. His position as teacher required from him an accurate knowledge of the systems of philosophy; he therefore read the works of the Greek philosophers, and in his twenty-first year attended the school of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism, and in this way made acquaintance with Neo-Platonism itself, as well as with the doctrines of Philo. At a later period, he came into conflict with his bishop, because of his having delivered public discourses in churches, at the solicitation of his friends, Alexander, Bishop of Jerusalem, and Theoctistus, Bishop of Cæsarea, and

[1] Elsewhere Clement, following the Stoics, assigns ten faculties to the soul, the five senses, the faculty of speech, the procreative faculty, the vital principle of the flesh, reason (*ἡγεμονικόν*) and lastly the Divine Spirit, infused into the soul by faith, and impressing on it a higher character.

obtained priestly ordination in spite of the opposition of his bishop, who probably resented some erroneous opinions which he held. He was deprived of his position as teacher by a synodical decree, and by the decree of another synod expelled from the ranks of the clergy. But he found a new home in Palestine with the friends already named, and there established a new school, from which many famous men went forth. He was imprisoned in the persecution of Decius, A.D. 249, and after his liberation died in consequence of the hardships he had endured during his captivity, A.D. 254.

2. Origen's chief work was his interpretation of Holy Scripture. He composed Commentaries on many Books, the most important of which are his Commentaries on *Matthew* and *John*. He exhibits a marked liking for allegorical interpretation, without, however, sacrificing the literal. We have further, his work *Contra Celsum*, in eight books, a defence of Christianity against that Philosopher. In this work Origen gives proof, in an extraordinary degree, of intellectual subtlety and erudition. The work of chief importance in determining the special character of his scientific views is his *De Principiis* (περὶ ἀρχῶν), a treatise on the fundamental truths of Christianity, in four books. This work may be regarded as at least a first attempt at scientific exposition and justification of the doctrines of Christianity in systematic order.[1] Clement had sketched the Gnostic ideal in its several outlines, Origen set himself to determine in greater minuteness the knowledg possessed by the Gnostic. In doing this he expounded the rational grounds which confirmed the teachings of the Faith, and endeavoured to reduce them to a well-ordered system of connected truths. In the latter part of his task, his success was only partial, and as to the first, the attempts at a development of the Christian teaching which he here offers us are not at any point very successful.

3. Origen recognises the fact that it is only from the standpoint fixed by Christain Faith that a right comprehension of things human and divine is attainable. To avoid error it is essential that there should be no departure from ecclesiastical tradition. In spite of these salutary principles Origen did not succeed in avoiding the danger he was providing against. The philosophical opinions which he had borrowed from the Greek philosophers, and chiefly from the followers of Philo and from the Neo-Platonists, became blended in his mind with the dogmas of Faith and affected his appreciation of Christian truth. The errors thence arising became distinctly manifest in his work *De Principiis*. In his translation of this work, Rufinus has toned down or wholly changed many of the more objectionable passages; but even with this improvement the errors are not wholly put out of sight. Origen himself seems to have felt at times that his assertions were at variance with truth, for he desired that this work—one of the earliest he composed—should not be published; many propositions contained in it he reprobated later, and many he put forward as mere surmises—mere opinions, about which every one may form what estimate he will. This, however, is not sufficient excuse for erroneous assertions, the more so that we find him speaking of an esoteric teaching not intended for the people, but only for the wise and the initiated.

4. According to Origen, God is exalted in nature above all things, ineffable, and incomprehensible, He is above truth, wisdom, being. He is not fire, nor light, nor air, but an absolute incorporeal unity (μονάς or ἑνάς). He is neither part, nor a totality, He does not admit in Himself a greater and a less, He is unchangeable and without limit, space and time are excluded from His Being. He is omnipotent, but His omnipotence is qualified by His wisdom and His goodness; He

[1] The greater part of this work has been preserved to us in a Latin translation executed by Rufinus, the friend and disciple of Origen.

cannot act in opposition to these attributes. We cannot contemplate God immediately in His own being. How could our weak vision bear the effulgence of His light? We have knowledge of Him only from His works.

5. There is but one God; plurality in God is a contradiction in terms. The one plan which we observe in the world is inconceivable, unless we assume it to have been planned by one mind. Heresy asserts that goodness and justice are incompatible, and for this reason holds the existence of two Gods, the one good and the other just. This, however, is absurd. Goodness and justice are so far from being incompatible that the one perfection supposes the other. God would not be good if He were not just, and would not be just if He were not good. The two perfections are inseparable.

6. Origen's teaching on the subject of the Divine Trinity was, even in the days of the Fathers, differently viewed by different critics. Some Fathers, as Epiphanius, Jerome, and Augustine, regarded him as the forerunner of Arianism, and reproached him with anticipating in his writings the teachings of that heresy. Others, as Gregory Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Pamphilus Martyr, and even Athanasius himself, did not question the orthodoxy of Origen's teaching regarding the Trinity. The last named writer did not scruple to quote arguments from the works of Origen, in his controversy with the Arians. Our own opinion is that Origen's doctrine regarding the Trinity is, in substance, orthodox; but we admit that in the scientific exposition of his opinions, he makes use of formulas and phrases which might easily give rise to misconceptions. It is not necessary to enter deeply into this question. We may dismiss it with the following remarks:—

7. In expounding the allegorical sense of the Scriptural saying, "Drink water from the fountain of three springs" (Prov. v. 15), Origen remarks: "To the inquiry, What is the one source of these several streams? I would answer: the knowledge of the unbegotten Father is one stream, the knowledge of the Son another, and finally, the knowledge of the Holy Ghost a third. For the Son is different from the Father, and the Holy Ghost different from the Father and the Son. The plurality of streams refers to the difference in person between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. But these several streams have one single source—in other words, the Divine Trinity is one in substance and in nature" (*In Num.* Hom. xii. 1). "We must, therefore, acknowledge one God, but admit in this confession of Faith, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Herein consists the τριὰς ἀοχική, the τριὰς προσκυνητή to which everything that is is subject" (*In Math.* t. 15, n. 31).

8. The Son is begotten from the substance of the Father, not created from nothing. But our notion of this conception must exclude every corporeal imagination; we must not, therefore, allow that in this generation the Son is separated from the Father's substance. His personal character is not something extrinsic to the Godhead, it exists within the Divinity. As light goes forth from light, and the will proceeds from the spirit without separation from the source, so does the Son proceed from the Father, for the Divine nature is indivisible. This generation is from eternity. The Son exists from eternity as well as the Father. The generative act is not transient, it is eternally persistent, without any order of sequence, accomplished *simul et semel*. All that is in the Father is in the Son also (*In Jerem.* Hom. 8, n. 2). "The God of all things is not alone in His greatness; He shares His greatness with His Son, the First-born of creatures. This Son is the image of the invisible God, and represents in image the greatness of the Father" (*C. Cels.* vi. 69).

9. The meaning of these assertions regarding the Trinity, or rather, regarding the Son of God, is unmistakable. But there are other propositions laid down by Origen, on

this point of Christian belief, which are not so irreproachable. For example, he states in one place (*In. Joan.* t. 2, n. 2.) that "He who is *αὐτοθεός*, that is to say, God of His own nature, is called in the Gospel *ὁ θεός*; whereas everything other than the *αὐτοθεός*, all that becomes God by virtue of participation in the Godhead of the latter, (*θεοποιούμενον*), is, if we speak accurately, not *ὁ θεός*, but merely *θεός*. This latter appellation must be bestowed first of all on the First-born of creatures, for He, being *πρὸς τὸν θεὸν*, is the first to receive divinity from God, and is, therefore, superior to, and more excellent than, the other "gods," to whom He (the *θεός*) is, as it were, a *ὁ θεός*. They owe it to Him and to His goodness that they are gods, for He derives *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* the fulness of the nature which renders them gods. The true God is, therefore, *ὁ θεός*; the beings who receive the form of God are images of this divine archetype. But of these images the first and primal image is that Logos which is *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, that Logos which has been from the beginning and ever remains *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, which would not, however, possess Divine Being were He not *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, and would not remain God did He not eternally continue to contemplate the depth of the Father's being."

10. Another passage (*In. Joan.* t. 13, n. 25) seems to be still more explicitly in favour of the subordination of the Son: "Although the Son of God," says Origen, "surpasses all (created natures) in essence, dignity, power, and divinity, inasmuch as He is the living Word and the living Wisdom, yet He is in no wise the equal of the Father. For He is (merely) the image of the Father's goodness, the reflection, not of God, but of God's glory and eternal radiance—a pure emanation from His glory—the untarnished mirror of His action." The Son and the Holy Ghost surpass all created things, but they are themselves surpassed by the Father, of whom the Redeemer says: "The Father who hath sent Me is greater than I." In accordance with this teaching is the view put forward by Origen (*In. Joan.* 32, 449), that the knowledge possessed by the Son is lower in kind than that possessed by the Father. The Son, he says, has knowledge of the Father, but a less perfect knowledge than the Father has of Himself.

11. These expressions, to which many others of the same kind might be added, do not affect the general orthodoxy of Origen's opinions regarding the Trinity, for Origen in numberless other passages expresses himself with unequivocal correctness on the subject, and the doubtful passages must be interpreted in the light of the others, as meaning not a subordination of essence or nature but of person. Origen would appear to signify by these phrases that the Father is the *primum principium*, from whom the Son receives the Divine nature, being generated by Him. He attributes to the Father merely the *auctoritas primi principii* in the Divine Trinity, and, in this respect only, puts Him above the Son and the Holy Ghost, without establishing in the latter a subordination of essence or nature to the Father. This becomes still more evident from the passages in which he expressly describes the Son as *αὐτόλογος, αὐτοσύναμις, αὐτοδικαιοσύνη, αὐτοαλήθεια*, etc., and teaches that the Son does not participate in Wisdom, Justice, etc., but that He *is* these things (in essence). (*C. Cels.* vi., c. 64.) But it is not to be denied that the expressions we have quoted are not above reproach as they stand, and might easily give occasion to misunderstanding. It is hardly surprising that, at a later period, the Arians appealed to the writings of Origen in support of their doctrines, and that many of the Fathers expressed themselves dissatisfied with Origen's views regarding the Trinity.

12. To proceed in our exposition. The Logos is the hypostatical Wisdom of God, and is, by the fact, the Archetype of all things, the *ἰδέα ἰδέων*. Through the Logos which thus, in archetypal fashion, contains all things in Himself, are all things created. By His power the universe exists. He penetrates and permeates the entire creation, giving being to and maintaining everything. He is the comprehensive force which embraces and upholds all things. He is, as it were, the soul of the universe. To Him is every revelation due. He is the source of reason in man; all knowledge of truth is, in the last analysis, attributable to Him. The motive which led to the creation of the world by the Logos is the Divine Goodness. God created the world out of love. He did not find matter already existent and fashion it into the universe; He is the author of matter also. "Otherwise some providence older

than His must have been at work to give thought expression in matter, or some happy chance must have played the part of providence."

13. Creation has, however, had no beginning; it is eternal. The Divine omnipotence and goodness require that it should be so. God's omnipotence and goodness are eternal as God Himself. But God could not be eternally omnipotent if there were not from eternity something on which He could exert His power and His sovereignty; nor could He be eternally good if there were not from eternity creatures towards which His goodness might be exercised. Created being must, therefore, have existed from eternity. This the more, that to admit a beginning in time of this created world would suppose a change to have taken place in God at the moment when He began to create. Furthermore, since God could not have a foreknowledge of everything, if the duration of the world were without limit, we must assume an endless *series* of *worlds*, or cosmical æons, in which the end of one period is the beginning of the next. There has been no cosmical period in which a world did not exist. These numberless worlds are all different from one another; no one of them is wholly like another (*De Princ.* I. 2, 10.; III. 5, 3.; II. 5, 3.; II. 3, 4.).

14. The created universe consists of two component parts—the world of spirits and the material world. Matter is only notionally different from the qualities that modify it; it cannot exist without these qualities. Therefore, in determining the nature of corporeal things as such, the Neo-Platonists are not far from the truth when they assert that a body is nothing more than a sum of qualities; for, if we separate the qualities from it, there is absolutely nothing left of the body. (*De Princ.* II. 1, 4.; IV. 34). With regard to spiritual beings, they are not distinguished by specific differences. God has made them all alike. If any differences are observed in them, these are to be attributed, not to their natural constitution, but to the free determining of their own condition. Created spirits are not, like God, essentially good; they can choose good or evil of their own free will, and, according to their choice, and their consequent merit or culpability, is their place in the universe assigned them. No being is of itself evil; its own action makes it whatever it is. All rational creatures resemble, at the outset, a homogeneous mass, from which God forms vessels for honour or dishonour, according to their several deserts (*De Princ.* III. 1, 21.; III. 5, 4.; II. 9, 6).

15. From these principles important consequences are deducible. In the first place, Origen finds in them a proof of the pre-existence of souls. Rational beings were, he holds, all created at once by God, alike in nature and alike in perfection. Of these many remained faithful to God, and by their faithful service preserved their original union with God. These are the angels. Others were too indolent to make the effort of will necessary to maintain their union with good, and in this way have separated themselves more or less from God. This separation, being a deliberate act on their part, and being a violation of the divine law, was an abandonment of God, and, as such, implied guilt in them. In punishment of this fault, the fallen spirits were repelled from

God, and became reduced to a condition out of accord with their ideal state and destiny. Those that had separated themselves from God by the longest interval became demons; those whose fault was less were imprisoned in human bodies, and became human souls. It is, therefore, to this separation from God that we must attribute the origin of the demon world and of the human race. And to this separation must be attributed not only the origin of the human race, but also the differences which exist between men, as well in their individual qualities as in the external conditions of their existence—these differences being determined by the various degrees of the guilt which occasioned their entrance into the life of earth.

16. The consequences of this fall extend yet further. To it is also to be traced the origin of the material world of our experience. God created at once not only all spirits but all matter also, and, foreseeing the fall of the spirits, He created it in quantity sufficient for the formation of the world. Matter, however, existed at the outset, in a higher, supersensuous state, not exhibiting those rude sensible qualities under which it presents itself now. The possibility of such a higher state is intelligible from the fact that matter is, in its essence, merely an aggregate of intelligible qualities, which only in combination become sensible and corporeal. But when the spirits fell away from God, and in punishment of their offence were invested with bodies of flesh, all matter was reduced to a condition perceptible by sense; and out of this matter God formed the various objects of the sensible world for the use of man, and for the fulfilment of His plan of the universe. This is the "vanity" to which, according to the words of the apostle, even irrational things are made subject in consequence of the fall (*De Princip.* III. 5.; IV. 5).

17. These are the general principles of Origen's system. Let us now examine the details of his teaching: Origen asserts the human soul to be of a spiritual nature, and endeavours to establish the same truth by demonstration. For this purpose he appeals to the essential qualities of the human faculty of cognition, urging that the range of human cognition, as well as the supersensuous character of the objects with which it is concerned, are inexplicable unless we admit the spiritual nature of the principle at work. Further, if real objects respond to the perceptions of sense, so also must a real object respond to that intellectual cognition which has for its object the *ego* itself, and this proves the soul to be no mere accident of the body. Lastly, if man were merely a body, God should also be regarded as a corporeal being, for man has knowledge of God, and the corporeal can have knowledge only of the corporeal (*De Princ.*, I. 1, 7).

18. Distinctly as Origen asserts the immaterial and spiritual nature of the soul, he, nevertheless, will not admit it to be possible that a created spiritual substance could exist without a body. This prerogative, he holds to belong exclusively to God. He, therefore, maintains that all created spirits—human souls included—are, in their extramundane state, invested with a glorified body, and that this bodily adjunct is separate from them in thought only—not in fact. On these

principles is based his teaching regarding the immortality of the soul. He holds it for indisputable that the soul is, of its nature, immortal; for, being a spiritual essence, it is, in a certain sense, like God, and must, therefore, be immortal like Him. A further argument is found in the fact that there would not be a perfect manifestation of the divine goodness if God did not bestow His benefits on rational creatures throughout eternity. Lastly, man could not be said to be made to the image of God, if the immortality of that image—*i.e.*, of the Logos—had not its counterpart in man. But the soul, on quitting its earthly body, does not enter into a purely incorporeal state; it still preserves that ethereal body which is essential to it, and which, during this life, is hidden under the veil of the flesh (*Ib.* II., 2, 2).

19. Regarding the relations which subsist between soul and body, Origen teaches expressly that the body of flesh has life, sense, and movement from the soul. He cites the arguments currently used in support of the theory of three constituent elements in man's nature, but he sets forth the reasons which prove them ineffectual. As for the conflict between "the spirit and the flesh," which was a favourite argument with the supporters of that theory, he observes that "the flesh" denotes merely the sensual tendencies and appetites, and that the conflict between "spirit and flesh" refers merely to the antagonism between these desires and reason. Origen, indeed, distinguishes between νοῦς and ψυχή, but the distinction is a distinction of relations, and is explained by Origen in a peculiar fashion. In the Greek language, the term ψυχή is connected with the idea of cold, and Origen is of opinion that the spirit (νοῦς) becomes ψυχή or vital principle of the body, because of its having grown cold in the love of God. It is, therefore, the present duty of the soul so to advance in the love of God, that it may divest itself of this character, and thus at length become the spirit again (*Ib.* II., 8, 3).

20. Origen holds the freedom of the will to be undeniable. The voice of consciousness, he says, speaks decisively on the point. Virtue without freedom is impossible. A being which can distinguish between different actions, which can approve of one and reprobate another, must necessarily be in a position to elect between them. Good and evil are founded on liberty. Evil is a turning away from the fulness of true being to emptiness and nothingness, and is therefore a *privation;* life in sin is a life of death. Evil has not its source in matter, it has its cause in the abuse of human liberty.

21. We have, in the last place, to examine the eschatology of Origen: The human soul has been condemned to imprisonment in the body, because of its sin in a previous state. This punishment is, however, a saving punishment. Healed of sin, the soul is destined to return to its first state. This return is, in the present æon of the universe, dependent on the Redemption. Here we have the explanation of the Redeemer's mission. The Logos assumed human nature, and died for us, in order to obtain pardon and grace from God. The soul of Christ, like all other souls, existed antecedently to its union with the Logos; but

by the unchanging, enduring love with which it remained faithful to God, this soul merited union with the Logos. In this sense, the union may be said to be the work of this soul itself.

22. The Redemption from sin is not efficacious for this life only, it extends its influence into the life to come. In that further life too, the punishment suffered is a saving punishment. Purified souls pass into glory immediately after the death of the body; for the others, the process of salvation through suffering is continued after death. This suffering is inflicted by fire, inasmuch as the consciousness of sin, and the stings of conscience resemble the torment caused by fire. This fire will purify the soul; and, the purification accomplished, the soul sooner or later enters into glory. The process of the purification of souls will extend over many centuries, and evil will thus gradually diminish, until at last it disappears wholly, and the mercy of God reaches down to him who has sunk lowest—to Satan. Accordingly, the final restoration will extend to all the spirits which have fallen away from God; to all human souls and to all the demons. The *Apocatastasis* will be universal (*Ib.* I., 6, 3.)

23. The Apocatastasis culminates in the resurrection of the body. When, at length, all souls have been purified, the bodies will be raised from the dead, and united to the souls in a glorified state. When all this has been accomplished, the material world returns again to its higher condition; the differences between material beings cease to exist, and the original unity and perfection of the entire creation is re-established. God will then be all in all. Then begins a new cosmical period, a new falling off takes place, and a new world appears in place of the old. And so the series of never-ending changes proceeds.*

24. Origen left behind him many famous disciples, from whose ranks came the most remarkable ecclesiastical teachers of the third century. We may mention, as specially worthy of note, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius the Great. There were not wanting also many able writers to oppose what they regarded as the errors of his system. To the number of his opponents belongs Methodius, Bishop, first of Olympus, and subsequently of Tyre, who suffered martyrdom, probably, under Diocletian (A.D. 290.) Methodius attacked the theories of Origen regarding the likeness of nature in rational beings and the pre-existence of souls, as also his theory regarding the eternity of creation. Methodius composed two treatises (Περὶ γενητῶν and Περὶ ἀναστάσεως), in which he puts forward his refutation of these theories in the form of dialogues.

25. The specific and generic differences between things, Methodius holds, cannot be the consequence of the fall of the spirits: they are, on the contrary, the original conditions of existence, beginning with the beginning of the world; they are wholly natural, and, therefore, preconceived in the divine idea of things. In his opinion, the human soul cannot be regarded as like in nature to the angels, for the soul is destined to be united to the body, whilst the angelical nature excludes the notion of a body of flesh. Man is not

* In his treatise *Contra Celsum*, composed at the request of his friend Ambrosius, Origen maintains the accord between Christianity and reason, and the demonstrability of the Christian Faith. His proofs are, the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Old Testament; the miracles daily worked on behalf of the sick and the possessed by the reading of the Gospel; the triumphant spread of the Gospel, and its purifying effect, and the conspicuous purity of life in the Christian communities in the midst of the general corruption. Origen then proceeds to establish the several dogmas by appropriate arguments, as in the treatise Περὶ ἀρχῶν. He maintains the right of the Christian communities to establish themselves against the will of the state, in the name of the natural law, which is derived from God and superior to written law.

soul alone: he consists of soul and body; both unite to constitute one form of beauty. The soul, therefore, cannot exist before the body; it must, as the form of the body, be created at the moment the body is created. Man exists from the beginning, as man, in the same way as all other things. Origen's arguments for the eternity of creation are worthless. God would possess His entire perfection, without a created world; no necessity whatever constrained Him to create the universe. If we admitted that the beginning of creation in time would imply a change in God, we should also be obliged to admit that the same would be implied in His ceasing to create. Whatever is created supposes a pre existent cause of its being, is produced by this cause, and must, as thus produced, have had a beginning.

26. It is evident that Methodius had detected the errors in the teaching of Origen; nor was he deterred by the great reputation which Origen enjoyed from vigorously attacking, in the name of science, what he conceived to be the defects of his system. In this he rendered to Christian science, which was not yet established on a solid basis, a service which it is impossible to estimate too highly.

Minutius Felix, Arnobius and Lactantius.

§ 69.

1. While the Hellenistic theologians were developing a scientific theology, chiefly with regard to the nature of Christ, the ecclesiastical writers of the West were giving special prominence to the points of Christian teaching which regarded belief in God and the immortality of the soul, as well as the anthropological and ethical elements of Christian belief. Amongst these writers, a foremost place is occupied by Minutius Felix, a Roman lawyer, who lived probably towards the close of the second century. In his work *Octavius*, he describes the conversion of the heathen Cecilius, by Octavius, a Christian. He defends the belief in the unity of God—a truth which he finds received by philosophers of the greatest renown; he condemns the polytheism of popular superstition as contrary to reason and to the moral sense, and defends against all objectors the Christian doctrine regarding the mutability of the world, the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the body.

2. Cecilius maintains that, in our present uncertainty regarding all that transcends experience, we ought not, with vain self-confidence, to trust to our own judgment; that we ought to remain true to the traditions that have come down to us; that if we will play the philosopher we must be content to deal with human things only; and for the rest be satisfied that our best knowledge is to know that we are ignorant. Against this scepticism Octavius protests. Our knowledge of God is not uncertain; on the contrary, nothing is so evident to the human mind as the existence of God, if we but consider the order established in nature, and in particular, the purposed structure of living organisms, more especially of the human body. There must be a Divine Being who rules and governs the world as well in its totality as in its various parts. The unity of plan in nature is proof of the unity of this God. To this unity of God the consciousness of man spontaneously bears testimony (*Si Deus dederit*, &c.), and it is distinctly acknowledged by almost all philosophers.

3. God is infinite, omnipotent, eternal; before the world He was a world to Himself—*ante Mundum Sibi Ipse fuit pro Mundo*—He alone has adequate knowledge of Himself; He is beyond the comprehension of our understanding. The gods of the popular superstition are deified kings or discoverers. Impure demons also are worshipped as gods. The true God is not in one place or another, He is omnipresent. The world passes; man is immortal. The immortality of the soul is only half the truth, the body also will rise again, and everything in nature will be renewed. It is just that Christians should enjoy a better fate in the future life than the pagans; for ignorance of God is in itself culpable, and knowledge of God is a claim on forgiveness. Moreover, the lives of the Christians are morally much better than those of the pagans. The sufferings of the Christians serve to test and preserve them in their conflict with hostile powers. They are fully justified in abstaining from worldly pleasures, for these are dangerous in their effect upon the moral and religious character. The doctrine of Divine Predestination does not conflict with the justice of God; God foresees the dispositions of men, and determines their lot according to this foreknowledge. Fate is nothing more than the decree of God.

4. The lines of discussion traced by Minutius Felix were followed by Arnobius in his treatise *Adversus Gentes*, published soon after A.D. 300. Arnobius, while a pagan, had been a stubborn opponent of Christianity, and, in his profession of teacher of rhetoric, had ample opportunity of expressing this hostility. After his conversion to the Christian Faith, the Bishop of Sicca required him to publish a treatise in defence of Christianity, as proof of the genuineness of his conversion. In compliance with this requirement, he published the treatise *Adversus Gentes*. In this work, he follows Minutius in his attack upon polytheism, but treats the question with greater fulness of detail. The popular superstition he reprobates as absurd and immoral, and defends the doctrine of one eternal God. He summarily rejects the allegorical significance attributed to the myths of polytheism. Doubt as to the existence of God he does not regard as deserving of serious refutation; for belief in God is inborn in every man; nay, the very beasts and plants, if they could only speak, would proclaim God to be the ruler of the universe. God is infinite and eternal—the place and space in which all things are.

5. Arnobius proves the Divinity of Christ chiefly from the change wrought by Christ in the opinions and manners of mankind, and from His miracles. On the last argument he lays the chief weight. The philosophers, he says, in whom the pagans put their trust, were, for the most part, men of pure lives and were versed in science, but they could not, like Christ, work a miracle. Wherefore we must hold Christ in higher esteem than the philosophers, and set Him above them all. As to the human soul—Arnobius assigns it a condition of being intermediate between the divine and material, and on this ground controverts the Platonic view that the soul is, of its nature, immortal. The immortality of the soul, he holds, is not a consequence of the nature of the soul, but

is a gracious gift of God. This, however, should not make men doubt of the soul's immortality; for, if the soul were mortal, it would not only be a great error, but also a great folly, to control passion, since no reward in a future life would await so difficult a struggle. But the existence of the soul before the body is not to be admitted. The Platonic argument founded on our recollection of things is futile; the correct answers which we return to questions regarding geometrical figures are not derived from knowledge previously acquired, but from present consideration under the guidance of skilful questioning.

6. About the same time as Arnobius, lived and laboured the Rhetorician, Lactantius.

Lactantius was appointed teacher of Rhetoric, at Nicomedia, by the Emperor Diocletian. He became a Christian, probably about A.D. 303, and forthwith undertook the scientific defence of Christianity against his former associates. This defence he conducted by positive exposition of doctrine, as well as by refutation of objections. He endeavoured to render the truth of Christianity intelligible to his adversaries by setting forth the philosophical reasons which justified the Christian teaching. At a later period he became tutor to Crispus, son of the Emperor Constantine. He died about A.D. 325. His principal work is the *Institutiones Divinæ*, in which he maintains the right of Christianity to recognition as a religious system, and, at the same time, gives an exposition of many points of Christian doctrine. He also published a compendium of the *Institutiones* under the title *Epitome Divinarum Institutionum, ad Pentadium Fratrem*. We have also from his pen: *Liber de Opificio Dei, ad Demetrianum*; *Liber de Ira Dei*; *De Mortibus Persecutorum*; *Fragmenta et Carmina*. In these writings he unites to a pleasing manner of presenting his subject a purity of style worthy of Cicero, and a tolerably comprehensive and exact knowledge of his subject. It must, however, be allowed that at times his clear and graceful exposition is not accompanied by thoroughness of treatment and depth of thought.

7. To refute polytheism and demonstrate the unity of God, is a primary task with Lactantius. That there is a God who rules the world with foreknowledge and controlling power cannot be denied in view of the marvellous order which reigns on all sides of the universe. It is equally evident that this God is one. For unity is clearly deducible from the notion of God as an infinitely perfect being. If there were several gods, there would be a division of perfections, and so no one of them would be God any longer. Moreover, the one plan of order established in the world supposes one ordaining power and one providence. If there were several gods, a conflict of wills would be possible, and contentions between them would follow, which must disturb the general order. As one spirit rules the body of man, so one God rules the world. Polytheism has its origin only in aberrations of the human mind; in their misfortunes men call instinctively on the one God, it is only when fortunate and happy that they turn to gods and to idols.

8. The world has been created by God. If matter were eternal it would be unchangeable, and the formation of the world would be, by the fact, impossible. The human soul is a luminous or fiery essence, so delicate and subtle that it escapes not merely the eye of the body, but even the glance of the mind. It is not propagated by procreation, each soul is created immediately by God. In the soul, we must distinguish between

the *animus* (*mens*) by which we think, and the *anima* by which we live. It is only in a relative sense, however, that the one can be said to be different from the other. Reason has its seat in the head, it is this faculty which perceives by means of the senses; the senses may be said to be the windows through which it beholds the external world. The body has life from the soul, and from the soul only.

9. The highest good attainable by man must be of such a kind that it is not shared with other living things, and that it is adapted not to the body but to the nobler element in human nature. It must also be of a kind which is incapable of increase or diminution; otherwise it would not be the highest good. This character of the good in question requires that it should be eternal. It follows that the highest good cannot be sensual pleasure, for this the beasts also enjoy; nor can it be virtue, for virtue requires a courageous endurance of the sufferings and burdens of this life, and sometimes even demands the sacrifice of life itself—all which is incompatible with the notion of supreme happiness. The highest good cannot, therefore, be anything of the mere temporal order; it awaits us in a future life—it is nothing else than immortality, that is, a life of eternal happiness in God.

10. This being so, the supreme good is attainable only through the knowledge and worship of God, that is, through religion. Religion, not philosophy, leads to happiness. Man differs from the beasts essentially in this that he is an *animal religiosum*. This is his chief excellence. Furthermore, without religion there is no virtue. If there is no immortality, that is to say, no future life, in which reward and punishment are bestowed on the deeds of this life, virtue has no longer any meaning. Since virtue, then, is a thing worth striving for, only in the hypothesis of a future immortality, it is evident there can be no true virtue without religion. Religion is the mother, the soul of all virtues. But virtue must be united to religion, if religion is to lead man to the goal of life. Religion and virtue are the pathway to the sovereign good. Virtue does not consist in an entire suppression of the passions ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$), such a course would be unnatural, and only a fool would enter upon it; nor does virtue consist in the weakening of the passions, it is rather to be found in a right use of the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$, *i.e.*, in directing them to the attainment of the supreme good.

11. Lactantius having asserted that the sovereign good of man is immortality, it might have been expected that he would have demonstrated scientifically the immortality of the soul, and proofs to this effect are not wanting in his works; but he holds, like Arnobius, that this immortality does not result from the nature of the soul, but is to be accounted for by the conserving power of God. This being premised, he infers the immortality of the soul from its capacity to know and love God and from its natural destination to these acts. God, the object of its knowledge and love, is eternal; it follows that the soul which is created to know and love Him must also be eternal, *i.e.*, immortal. An analogous argument may be drawn from the notion of virtue: virtue being, in its essence, enduring and eternal, it follows that the soul, which is capable of virtue,

must share in these attributes. Finally, the immortality of the soul may be demonstrated from its Divine origin, and from this, further, that its works, in contrast with those of the body, are destined to endure eternally.

12. Into his teaching regarding the resurrection of the body Lactantius introduces the fantastic notions of the Chiliasts. The souls of men, after death, are retained together in one place, till the resurrection. The resurrection of all the dead does not take place at once. The resurrection of the just takes place first, after which follows the reign of a thousand years. Then comes the second resurrection—that of the just and the unjust, and, after this, the Last Judgment.

Patristic Philosophy of the Post-Nicene Period.

General Remarks.

1. The Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) forms one of the most remarkable events in the history of the Christian Church. At the moment when the Church, after long and sanguinary persecution, had at length obtained liberty, a heresy, springing from within the body of the Church itself, denying the fundamental truths of Christianity—the Divinity of Christ, and the Incarnation of God—threatened to destroy that Church which the rude methods of the persecutors had not been able to shake. This heresy was known as Arianism. It had already worked great confusion in Christendom when the bishops of the Church met at Nicæa, and in a solemn confession of faith proclaimed the divinity of the Logos, and His oneness in substance with the Father. This definition of the Church's faith stayed the progress of the heresy, and though the controversy with the Arians was not at an end, this solemn declaration formed a bulwark against which heresy was destined to expend itself in vain.

2. The Council of Nicæa formed a turning-point for Christian philosophy, as well as for the history of the Christian Church. The dogmatic definition of this unity in substance of the Son and the Father, became a centre of truth, from which the defenders of Christianity proceeded in giving scientific development to the dogmas of Faith. The freedom secured to the Church, under Constantine, contributed not a little to an enlarged activity of thought, and increased, in considerable measure, the fruitfulness of scientific investigation. In this wise, Christian philosophy attained a remarkable development in the Post-Nicene period, and produced results which were destined to influence profoundly the course of thought in the ages that followed. What had been begun in the period preceding was now progressively developed. Still maintaining its conflict with heresy, Christian philosophy was growing into a structure which could defy attack.

3. In the Patristic philosophy of this period, we have to notice two

distinct currents of thought. The one is represented by the Greek, the other by the Latin, Fathers. In the speculative opinions of the former, the influence of Origen, and even of the Neo-Platonists, is much more marked than in those of the latter. The Platonic philosophy was, indeed, the philosophy which the Latin Fathers pressed into the service of Christian speculation, but the distinctively Neo-Platonic views, and the allied opinions of Origen, find no favour with them, whereas these views occupy a foremost place in the speculations of many of the Greek Fathers. In both alike, orthodoxy of Faith is a guiding principle, but the philosophic differences we have noticed are so evident in their works that they cannot fail to force themselves on the attentive student.

4. In our exposition we will treat first of the Greek, and then of the Latin, Fathers and ecclesiastical writers.

Greek Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers

Athanasius, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nazianzus.

§ 70.

1. It does not fall within the scope of our undertaking to trace in detail the chequered life of Athanasius, on whom posterity has rightfully bestowed the title of "Great." This task belongs to the writer of ecclesiastical history. Athanasius was born between A.D. 296 and A.D. 298, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. He assisted, with his bishop Alexander, at the Council of Nicæa, and on the death of that prelate succeeded to his See, A.D. 326. At this point began the long struggle of his life. He stands in the midst of the fierce conflict which the Arian heresy had roused, like a rock in the midst of the sea, and the genius as well as the unshaken firmness with which he upheld the fundamental dogma of Christianity have made his name imperishable through all time. He was expelled four times from his See, by violence and calumny; but his courage could not be shaken, and he was at length permitted to end his days in comparative peace. He died A.D. 373.

2. The writings of Athanasius are, for the most part, devoted to the proof and explanation of the dogma of Christ's Divinity, and His Unity in Substance with the Father. They belong, therefore, rather to the history of dogmas, than to the history of philosophy. Two only of his treatises have special interest for the philosopher, the work *Contra Gentes*, an apology for Christianity against the pagans, and the work *De Incarnatione Verbi*, in which Athanasius set forth his psychological theories. It will be enough to notice these two works.

3. Athanasius, in his work *Contra Gentes*, begins, like other Apologists, with a demonstration of the unity of God. He appeals to the universal order and harmony which prevail in the universe, and argues that this order, being one in itself, proves the ordaining intelligence to be one.

From the organic unity which binds the members of the body together we argue the existence of one soul, the principle of this unity; so from the unity of the world our reason is forced to infer the existence of one God. There can be but one God. A plurality of gods are not gods at all. Polytheism is Atheism.

4. This proof seems to Athanasius so evident, that he holds it must compel the reason even of the pagan who is the slave of sensual passion. But it is only sensual men who need the aid of such proofs as this; the man whose soul is lifted above the desires of sense and the sensuous pictures of imagination which they provoke, and whose heart is purified from sin and from all attachment to sin, has no need of such arguments. He can see within himself, as in an image, the Logos, and, through the Logos, the Father; for man is created to the image of God. To know the one God we need only know ourselves, need only know our own soul This explains why the denial of God is followed by the denial of the soul, and conversely. The pagans denied the one God, and they also denied the existence of a soul.

5. This one God is infinitely perfect, and cannot be comprehended by human thought. He is incomprehensible and inscrutable. We can obtain an imperfect knowledge of Him from His works. Creation gives a knowledge of the Logos, through whom God has made the world; and through the Logos—the channel of revelation, we have knowledge of the Father. But from the works of God we know what God is not, rather than what He is. He is incorporeal, immutable, all-sufficient. He is the Good, and more than the Good. He transcends being itself. It is supreme folly to identify Him with the created world, or with any part of it. The gods of the heathens are phantoms conjured up by the diseased imaginations of men.

6. The soul of man is a spiritual substance, essentially distinct from the body. The irrational beast concerns itself only with things present to its senses, and has neither the power to pass beyond these, nor even to render an account to itself of that which it perceives. But man's thought not only reaches to things other than those present to his senses, but furthermore judges of the things presented to sense, and decides that one object is to be preferred to another. There must, therefore, exist in him some higher principle to which belong the functions thus distinguished from the functions of sense. Again, man's faculty of thought can rise to a sphere which transcends all experiences. He can contemplate and can love things perishable and mortal, but he can understand and love the imperishable and the immortal as well. How could this be, if he had not in himself some element of being which does not pass and is not doomed to die?

7. Again, it is a law of the senses that, when they are directed to their proper object, and this object is within their reach, they cannot cease to act upon the object in question. This being so, how shall we explain the phenomenon that man not unfrequently diverts his senses from the proper object and forbids them to enjoy it, unless we assume that there exists in him some principle of action different from the body, and hold-

ing control over the senses? It is only because he is possessed of a spiritual soul that man becomes capable of receiving the law which commands good and forbids evil. Suppose him deprived of this spiritual soul, and he can no more distinguish good from evil, and elect between both, than can the beast.

8. The human will is free, and this freedom is the root of the good and the evil in man. Evil is not a positive entity; it is merely a privation. Man is bound to use his liberty to know and love God: this is goodness; should he turn from God and to the things of sense, this want of the knowledge and love of God is evil. For this he is responsible to God, for he has not been overborne by any external force, but has deliberately incurred the guilt himself.

9. With Athanasius are connected two remarkable men, who, from their early youth, were bound together by the closest ties of friendship, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nazianzus. Basil was born in Cæsarea of Cappadocia, about A.D. 330, he received his education first at Constantinople and then at Athens, and subsequently became Archbishop of Cæsarea, where he was a foremost champion of the Church in her struggle with Arianism (379). Gregory, on the other hand, was born at Nazianzus, in the south-west of Cappadocia, about the same year, A.D. 330. He too received his education at Athens; while here he formed the acquaintance of Basil, and a friendship was cemented which united them closely for the remainder of their lives. Gregory became, at a later period, Bishop of Constantinople, and in this capacity laboured strenuously in the cause of Faith. The intrigues of the Arians ultimately forced him to resign his See, and he thereupon withdrew into retirement (390).

10. To the works of both these writers the remark made with reference to Athanasius will apply. The defence of the dogma of the Trinity and a fuller study of its significance was their chief task, though they sometimes discussed other theological themes. Both held Origen in profound veneration. Of Basil's writings the most important for the history of philosophy are the *Hexæmeron*, his *Homilies*, and the treatise *Contra Eunomium*. Gregory was an orator: his so-called theological discourses are amongst the best examples of oratory that have come to us from the age in which he lived..

11. The contest with Eunomius in which these two Fathers (as well as Gregory of Nyssa) engaged, is particularly worthy of notice. Eunomius, with Aetius, belonged to the sect known as Anomians—a sect which dissented from the more extreme forms of Arianism. To maintain the fundamental Arian doctrine, and to combat the unity of essence (*ὁμοουσία*) in the Trinity, Eunomius, with Aetius, maintained two singular propositions with regard to our knowledge of God:

(*a*) In the first place he rejected wholly the notion of a knowledge of God derived from created things, *i.e.*, through the Logos. He held the Logos to be a mere creature, and he could not, in consequence, allow the world, which the Logos had created, to be a revelation of God, or a means of attaining knowledge of Him. Accordingly he assumed our knowledge of God to be direct and immediate, and asserted that to know God we have no need of created things or other medium. Pursuing this idea, he maintained that

this immediate knowledge of God is an exhaustive knowledge, and he consequently denied that God is incomprehensible. He knew God, he asserted, as well as he knew himself, or even better.

(*b*) But this was not all. He further held that between the attributes we assign in thought to God there is no difference whatever—not even a difference *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν* (virtual distinction). The assumption that the Divine Being is known directly and immediately in all His fulness led him logically to the conclusion that no distinction is admissible between the essential attributes of God. If we admit the simplicity of the Divine Being, we are forced to admit that all the names applied to God are alike in significance, that they all designate directly and immediately the Divine Being in His completeness. Nor can it be asserted that God's attributes are distinguishable *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*. For what is merely notional *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν* has no existence except in terms or words, and vanishes with the utterance of the words. Our language is true only when it responds to existent objects. When one and the same object is designated by several names, either these names have no difference of meaning, or the differences exist in the object as well as in the names. The latter alternative is inadmissible with reference to God, because of His absolute simplicity of being: the former only can be allowed: that is to say, all names applied to the attributes of God are of equal significance; between these attributes no differences exist.

12. The orthodox teachers strenuously combated these opinions. Basil and the two Gregories insisted strongly on the principle that the Divine Being exceeds our comprehension, and that we have not an immediate knowledge of God, but know Him only from His works. This contention involved the denial of the other assertion that between the terms applied to God, *i.e.*, between the Divine attributes, no distinction is allowable. "In point of fact," says Basil, (*Cont. Eunom.* I. 2.) "if what Eunomius asserts were true, it would follow that we might at will substitute one of the Divine Names for another, just as we name the same apostle Peter or Cephas or Simon indifferently. Thus if I were asked what I mean by *Supreme Judge* I might answer, *the Increated*, and if asked what is signified by the term *Justice*, I might answer, *Incorporeal Being*. This is evidently absurd."

13. We must, therefore, allow a distinction of meaning (at least *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*) between the terms we apply to God. If it is true that we have not an immediate knowledge of God, nor comprehend Him in all the infinitude of His Being, but only obtain a practical knowledge of Him from his works, it must follow that we contemplate the being of God from various points of view, according to the various ways in which He reveals Himself in created things. And this being so, there must thence result *different concepts* by which we represent God to ourselves, and *different names* by which we designate Him; and these different concepts and different names, because of the distinction thus established between them, must not be exchanged with one another. We might assert as much as this with reference to objects of the least importance; for example, we conceive differently the grain of corn as product of a vegetable growth, and as seed, and again as an article of food, and we apply different names to it accordingly. No one will, however, contend that these concepts and these names express one and the same thing, though they are applied to one and the same object.

14. The absolute oneness of the Divine Being is not denied or even imperilled by this doctrine. Light, Vine, Way, Life, Shepherd, etc., do not signify the same thing, and yet one and the same Christ is designated

by all these terms. "The Divine Nature," says Basil, (*C. Eunom.* I. 12.) " is one, simple, formally indivisible (μοναειδής), and without constituent parts; but the human mind, attached to the earth and enclosed within an earthly body, being unable to attain the clear conception after which it strives, must represent to itself the Ineffable Being partially, and under various forms in a multiplicity of concepts; it cannot succeed in comprehending in one conception the object of its thought." "They think unworthily of the Divine Being," says Gregory of Nazianzus (*Or.* 45, *ad Eragr.*), "who hold that, as the names applied to God are many, so the things signified by these names are manifold also. We know that the Being signified is absolutely indivisible, absolutely simple, though, for our advantage He submits Himself to a certain division in our thoughts." Cfr. Kleutgen. *Philosophie der Vorzeit.* Vol. I., p. 309.

Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius, and Nemesius.

§ 71.

1. Gregory of Nyssa is the third member of that remarkable group —"the three great Cappadocians" (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa). He deserves from us a notice apart, because his place in the history of philosophy is much more important than that of the other two, whose renown was achieved principally in the field of theology and rhetoric. His philosophy is characterised by a strong leaning to the views of Origen and the Neo-Platonists, a tendency which led him to introduce into his writings many opinions which do not merit unqualified approval. It has, no doubt, been contended by many critics, that Gregory's writings have been largely interpolated by the Origenists; but many opinions derived from Origen are so closely identified with his whole line of thought that their introduction cannot be accounted for by any theory of interpolation.

2. Gregory of Nyssa, born A.D. 331, was a younger brother of St. Basil. At the close of his school career he adopted the teaching of rhetoric as a profession. Later on, he became Bishop of Nyssa. He was one of the ablest supporters of the Church against Arianism, and maintained strenuously the struggle for the Faith during the lifetime of his brother Basil, and more strenuously still after his death. It was his endeavour to prove by philosophic arguments, to believers and unbelievers alike, the truth of the Christian religion and its divine origin, and then to make it acceptable to all. He took a prominent part in the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381). He died A.D. 394.

3. The writings of Gregory of Nyssa are very numerous. We shall mention only those that are of special interest to the philosopher. To this class belong: (*a*) The Dialogue *De Anima et ejus Resurrectione;* (*b*) the treatise *Contra Eunomium;* (*c*) the *Hexaëmeron;* (*d*) *De Hominis Opificio;* (*e*) the *Oratio Catechetica* (λόγος κατηχητικός); (*f*) *De eo, quid sit Ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei;* (*g*) *De Anima;* (*h*) *De iis qui præmature abripiuntur;* (*i*) *De Mortuis;* (*k*) *Contra Fatum;* (*l*) *In dictum Apostoli, Tunc etiam ipse Filius subjicietur, etc.;* (*m*) *De vita Mosis;* (*n*) *In Christi Resurrectionem;* (*o*) *In verba, Faciamus hominem, etc.; Oratt., etc.*

4. Like Basil, Gregory of Nyssa controverts at every point the pretensions of the Anomians, who claimed to have comprehensive knowledge of the being of God. He calls constant attention to the limits imposed on human knowledge. It is certain that sensible objects exist: it is equally certain that we have not an exhaustive knowledge of their being. Nay, we do not even possess perfect knowledge of our own being; we cannot, for example, understand fully the mode in which our soul is united with our body. How much farther are we from possessing a comprehensive knowledge of God! The incomprehensibility of God is a point which must be unequivocally maintained.

5. While thus restricting the compass of human knowledge within due limits, Gregory is far from denying to man all power of attaining truth. He holds, on the contrary, that man's knowledge is his highest privilege—that gift in which the lofty nature of man's soul and its resemblance to God is made manifest. He dwells at length on the proofs which establish the existence and unity of God. The leading proof for God's existence appears to him to be the skilful and wise disposition of things in the universe; his proof for the unity of God is founded on the "Supreme perfection of God in power, goodness, wisdom, eternity and every other attribute—a perfection which vanishes if we suppose the Divinity divided among a plurality of gods."

6. But in combating the polytheism of the heathens we must not be betrayed into the abstract monotheism of the Jews. Christianity holds an intermediate position between these two extremes, teaching as it does the triple personality of God. "God possesses a Logos," says Gregory. "He cannot be without reason. This Logos cannot be a mere attribute of God; it must form a second Person in God. God is infinitely perfect, His Logos must be infinitely more perfect than the logos in man. It cannot, as in man, be something limited, nor can it, like speech in man, possess only transient existence; it must be an eternal and living Hypostasis (Person), endowed with the same power and the same will as the Father." We may reason in like manner with regard to the Holy Ghost. Instituting a comparison with the breath we draw—which, however, is merely a current of air, an object quite different from ourselves—Gregory endeavours to prove the identity of substance between the Holy Ghost and God. In this way he establishes his contention that Christianity occupies an intermediate position between Judaism and paganism—holding with the Jews as to the unity of nature, holding with the pagans as to the plurality of persons. The question why the three Divine Persons are not three Gods, is answered by the statement that these three are not individuals of one species, but different Hypostases of one and the same Divine Essence.

7. Creation is a work of Divine power, wisdom and love. The world was created by the Divine Logos, not from necessity, but from an excess of love. God wished to share the riches of the Divinity with other beings. Participation in these riches only rational beings are capable of; it follows that the whole visible world is destined for the service of man. For man's sake the world was created—to enable man to know God through

the work of creation, and, ultimately, to share in God's eternal happiness.

8. The question here arises: how composite, changeable, in a word, corporeal beings could be produced by a Being who is Himself absolutely simple, incorporeal, and immutable? We may not be able to say how all this has been effected, but we can give a sufficient answer to the question proposed if we consider the nature of the body. The body is composed of constituent elements which, considered in themselves, are purely of the ideal order, mere potencies, such as quality, quantity, figure, size, colour, etc. If, in thought, we abstract these elements from the body, nothing whatever remains. The body is, therefore, constituted by the combination of these qualities which, in themselves, are incorporeal. Fundamentally, therefore, and considered in its elements, it is something incorporeal. If this is so, the problem is solved; it becomes intelligible that the body, being in its essence something incorporeal, can have been created by an incorporeal being. This explanation, it is evident, rests wholly on notions derived from Origen and the Neo-Platonists.

9. Gregory holds the soul of man to be an incorporeal, spiritual essence. In proof of this he appeals to the function of intelligence, to the faculty of speech, to the erect posture of the human body, to the conformation of the bodily organs, especially of the hand which is clearly destined to serve the needs of a rational being, and lastly to the fact that the soul does not subsist by material food, that it feeds on what is incorporeal—on ideal truth. If the soul were a composite being there would exist some principle of unity within it. And were this principle composite, a further principle of union would have to be supposed, and the hypothesis before made would have to be repeated. The process cannot be prolonged into infinity, and we must, therefore, ultimately arrive at a principle which is simple and immaterial.

10. There is but one soul in man. Man consists of body and soul. Gregory knows nothing of a third constituent element. The body has life from the soul, and from the soul only; the soul is its principle of vitality, and this one soul possesses at once the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual powers. As regards the vegetative and sensitive faculties, the soul is dependent upon the body, and can exercise these faculties only in and through the body; in its intellectual functions it is superior to the body, and is unaided by corporeal organs. Man is thus the *Microcosm*—he represents in himself the being of inanimate things, the life of plants, the sensitive nature of animals, and the intelligence of the angels. Furthermore, he is created to the image of God, inasmuch as the unbegotten Psyche gives birth to the νοερὸς λόγος, and the νοῦς issues from both. We cannot fully comprehend the mode of union between soul and body, but this at least is certain that the soul is substantially present in every portion of the body. The body is the mirror of the soul, and the soul being the mirror of God, the body is the mirror of this mirror.

11. It is not by mere chance that the soul is united to the body; it

is of its nature destined to this union. The doctrine of the pre-existence of souls is, therefore, absurd. A further argument for this view appears in this, that the hypothesis of pre-existence makes sin the sole explanation of man's origin—an explanation which is not only absurd in itself, but, furthermore, makes it impossible that man should be delivered from sin, for it makes sin the very condition of his existence. The soul came into existence with the body; living things generate only living things: it follows that the human embryo must be animated from the beginning. The origin of the soul must not, however, be accounted for by generation, the soul is created immediately by God.

12. Gregory maintains the freedom of the human will. Reason essentially implies liberty, for the power to distinguish good from evil would be meaningless unless the will could elect between the good and the evil. Moreover, without liberty, all virtue, foresight, merit and culpability would be impossible. In liberty we have, therefore, the source of evil. The body is not evil in itself, and is not the cause of evil; for it is God's creation. Evil is not a positive entity. It is the absence of good, the deflection of the will from the good which is positive being—that which ought to exist.

13. Up to this point Gregory's psychological views are above reproach. But other opinions follow which cannot receive the same commendation. Gregory distinguishes between the true nature of man, and other elements which may be regarded as a *superadditum*. The true being of man consists in his reason, which is created like to God; what is irrational in man, *e.g.*, the material body with its sexual differences, and the faculties of sense, are extraneous to the reason or true nature of man, an adjunct of it, something superadded to it. Gregory compares the irrational faculties, with their appetites, tendencies and passions to ulcers which have fastened on the original nature of man, and which are, therefore, opposed to reason. In accordance with these notions he interprets the double narrative of the creation of man which we find in Genesis. He holds that the "man created after the image and likeness of God" is the true man, the ideal man whose being is reason; whereas the "Adam" whom God formed from the earth, and into whom he breathed the soul, is the man of our experience, the man who is burdened with a material body and unreasoning faculties. But the question immediately presents itself: Why is the true nature of man burdened with these additions? This question Gregory answers as follows:—

14. The first man was placed by God in a state resembling that of the angels. His nature was pure and was not disfigured by union with elements extraneous to itself. He had not a material body, nor was there in him any mark of sexual difference; he was free from unreasoning passions, not subject to suffering and death. In a word he was the perfect, the ideal man. If he had not sinned he would have continued to live in this state. Mankind would not have been propagated by the sexual reproduction of individuals, the existence of individual men would have been effected as the angelic nature is multiplied; they would have been produced at once as a large but numerically definite multitude of individuals.

15. But as God foresaw that man would sin, He invested the purer nature of man with a body of flesh. This was a new act on the part of the Creator, distinct from that act by which He created (the ideal) man after His image and likeness, and therefore it is related apart in the sacred narrative. The origin of man, as we now know him, is to be traced to sin, inasmuch as man's sin was foreseen by God, and God's action was determined in accordance with the prevision. In consequence of his descent to the level of the beast, man assumed the peculiarities of the brute. Unreasoning appetites and passions asserted themselves in him; he became subject to pain and death, and the human species became sexually differentiated. Human nature could no longer be multiplied in individuals after the manner of the angels, its increase would have to be accomplished by carnal procreation, and would, in consequence, be effected successively in time. The story of man's fall, as narrated in Scripture, is, according to Gregory, an allegory in which all this is signified. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is sensuality, under the influence of which evil appears as good to the unreasoning appetites; the skins with which God clothed the first man after the fall are nothing else than the body of flesh; and so of the rest.

16. But though the material body with which man is invested and the unreasoning appetites that prevail in it are the consequence of sin, they, nevertheless, are not an unmixed evil for man. In God's design they are given as a means to moral perfection—to virtue. The appetites of sense are not wicked in themselves, they become wicked only by the improper use made of them by the will. If reason asserts its authority over them, if it does not permit them unwarranted excesses, but uses them for purposes of good, they become the means and instruments of virtue. And such, in the plan of God, they should be. The grace of the Redeemer, is, however, necessary to enable man to carry out God's design in this respect. This leads us to Gregory's doctrine on the subject of Redemption:

17. It was intended that man should return to his original condition, and again attain supreme happiness in God. To make this possible for him, the Logos came down to earth, assumed human nature, and accomplished the work of redemption. He undertook to deliver man from the dominion of Satan, and to lead him back to God. But it was not by putting forth His power that the Redeemer set Himself to conquer Satan. By atoning for the sin of man, He would acquire a right over man, a right which would abrogate the power which Satan had acquired over man in consequence of his sin. For this purpose He gave His life as a ransom for us. By taking upon Himself human nature, and shrouding therein His Godhead, He outwitted Satan, for Satan was thus led to incite his followers to bring about the Redeemer's death, and in this way co-operated in effecting the saving atonement.

18. That man may participate in the Redemption, he must, as a primary requirement, possess the grace that admits him to its benefits. When he has been sanctified by Faith and the Sacraments, it is then his duty to renounce the lusts of flesh, and to live for virtue. Christ has crushed the head of the serpent, but He has left the tail, that we may be

confirmed in goodness by the struggle against passion. Man in his creation, was made the image of God; it lies within his own power to make the likeness perfect; to do this is the essential task set him in life. He will attain this end if he strives at all times, and according to the measure of his powers, to imitate Christ, the ideal and perfect model of Christian life.

19. Gregory's teaching closes in his eschatology: Christ having risen from the dead, and entered into glory, has in His own person restored human nature to that original ideal condition from which it fell through sin. But that nature, as individualised in the multitude of men, has not yet been restored to its primal state. Nor can it be thus restored till the number of the human race is numerically complete. Ultimately this race must attain numerical completeness—this the law of human nature demands, for the number of individuals in whom this nature must attain actual existence is definitely fixed. It is only, when, by the process of carnal procreation, man's nature has attained existence in all the individuals who are destined to possess it, that it can return thus individualised to its formal condition. When this has been accomplished, the Apocatastasis (Restoration) will be universal, and will embrace all human creatures without exception.

20. It follows that the punishment inflicted on the wicked in the life to come, will be merely purificatory. After death they are subjected to the pain of fire, in the measure deserved by their misdeeds. This fire will gradually consume what is carnal and sinful in the souls of the wicked, at their departure out of this life, so that after a longer or shorter period of punishment these souls will be thoroughly purified, and delivered from everything that offends reason or partakes of sin. The cleansing pain to which the wicked are subjected in the life to come may be compared to the purifying of gold by fire. Fire separates the dross from the gold and restores the metal to its pure state: of like effect will be the process which the souls of the wicked are destined to undergo.

21. When the human race has finally reached numerical completeness, the Resurrection will follow. As to the possibility of a Resurrection no doubt is possible. For, though the elements of the body are scattered to all the winds after death, the soul, in virtue of its natural love for the body, in a certain sense remains united to them still. And this union is possible to the soul, because, being a simple substance, it has no need of actual extension to maintain union with these elements, wherever they may be. This union being maintained, the soul is enabled to draw to itself the scattered elements with which it is united. In this way we may assure ourselves of the possibility of the Resurrection. The body will, however, rise in the glorified state, and will not, therefore, exhibit difference of sex, nor any of the characteristics of irrational nature.

22. The Resurrection is followed by the Last Judgment. Those who are then found entirely pure will enter forthwith into glory—the rest are again consigned to the punishment of fire. But their punishment will not be eternal. A time must come when evil will be utterly extirpated

from the realm of being, for as evil has not been from eternity, so will it not exist for eternity. Those therefore who, after the Last Judgment, are consigned to further punishment, will, sooner or later, be wholly purified and enter into glory. And man's nature in every individual in whom it is represented will finally be glorified to the measure of the glory of Christ. Even the demons themselves will at length acknowledge the sovereignty of Christ, and the Apocatastasis will be universal, without any exception whatever. When this consummation has been achieved, then will God be all in all, for all will be in God, and God will be in all.

23. We have here set forth the doctrines of Gregory of Nyssa as we find them in his works. Whether we take these doctrines as his own throughout, or whether we hold that much has been interpolated by the Origenists, we cannot but allow that the general tone of his philosophical opinions indicates the influence upon his mind of the doctrines of Origen and the Neo-Platonists. Wherever he deals with purely dogmatic questions we find him entirely in harmony with the sense of the Church; where he enters upon the field of philosophic speculation, the peculiar opinions of Origen and the Neo-Platonists appear prominently in his teaching. The peculiar views which he was thus led to form seem to have been regarded as mere eccentricities of private opinion. This is proved by the high reputation for orthodoxy which he has always enjoyed in the Church. His faith in the dogmas of Christianity being above suspicion, the Church did not make much account of the peculiarities of his philosophical opinions.

24. The same cannot be said of Synesius of Cyrene, for this philosopher set his own opinions above Christian truth. He was born in the year 375, was first a Neo-Platonist, then became a Christian, a priest, and finally a bishop. The lady-philosopher, Hypatia, was his teacher, and throughout his after-career he maintained a friendly intercourse with her. He did not believe in the ultimate destruction of the world, was inclined to a belief in the pre-existence of souls, admitted the immortality of the soul, but held the doctrine of the Resurrection to be merely a sacred allegory. In his public teaching he taught the current dogmas of belief, on the ground that myths are necessary for the crowd; the pure unimaginative truth is accessible only to a few, and would only blind the weak eyes of the multitude. His notion of God is more Neo-Platonic than Christian. He represents God as "the unit of unities, the monad of monads, undifferentiated in contrarieties, which, issuing forth in ineffable fashion in the forms first-born from it, receives a three-fold shape—the transcendent source of Being crowned by the beauty of its children, which come forth from its centre, and stand in order around that centre. This eternal spirit, divided without division, entered into matter, and the world received form and motion, and in those who have fallen to this nether world it became a force to raise them again to heaven."

25. The same Neo-Platonic views are shared by Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, in Phœnicia, who lived, it is probable, towards the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. In his work *De Natura*

Hominis, he combats the doctrine of the creation of souls on the ground that everything which has a beginning in time must be perishable and mortal, and that the created world must be supposed imperfect if souls are constantly being created. He, therefore, declares himself in favour of the doctrine of pre-existence. Everything supersensuous is eternal, the soul as well as other things. The corporeal and the incorporeal alike have been created from nothing, but the former has a beginning and an end, the latter has neither. The corporeal world will not, however, perish, for God will not destroy what rightly fulfils its end.

26. Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls had, as we have seen, many supporters, but it had also many antagonists. Foremost amongst these was Æneas of Gaza, a teacher of rhetoric in Egypt (about A.D. 487). He contends, in his work *Theophrastus*, that the soul, if it had existed before the body, would preserve a recollection of this earlier life: and besides it is contrary to reason to inflict punishment for a fault of which the delinquent has no recollection. The life of the soul in the body cannot be a punishment, for the differences of external fortune, to which appeal is made, are not evidence of good or evil; free will explains everything. Furthermore, the life of the soul before its union with the body would have been useless and superfluous, since the soul is of its nature prepared for union with the body. Æneas also combats the doctrine of the eternity of the world. To the objection that in the supposition of a beginning of the world, God must previously have been inactive, he replies by reminding us of the life in the Trinity of Divine Persons—which God has lived eternally, and in which He is eternally active.

27. Following in the line of argument indicated by Æneas, in his attack upon the theory of an eternal world and of the pre-existence of souls, we find Zacharias Scholasticus, bishop of Mytilene (about A.D. 536), and Joannes Philoponus of Alexandria, a Monophysite (about the middle of the sixth century) and a commentator of Aristotle. The last mentioned writer incurred the accusation of teaching Tritheism, from the manner in which he applied to the Trinity the Aristotelian doctrine, that "substantial existence in the fullest sense of the word belongs to all individuals." He also adopts the theory of a triple soul in man—the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational; and holds that they are described as one soul because all these are mutually interdependent, and united by mutual sympathy. He explains the Resurrection, not by the restoration of life to the bodies formerly possessed by men, but by the creation of bodies entirely new.

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus Confessor, and John of Damascus.

§ 72.

1. The blending of Neo-Platonic with Christian notions is carried to the highest point in the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. The works of this author which have come down to us are a treatise *De Divinis Nominibus*, the *Theologia Mystica*, and the books *De Coelesti et Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, as well as ten "Letters." Other writings of the same author, to which allusion is made in the works we have quoted, amongst which is a *Theologia Symbolica*, have been lost. Critics are now agreed that these writings are not the work of the St. Dionysius the Areopagite, of whom mention is made in the Acts of the Apostles, but of an anonymous writer who lived, most probably, in the latter decades of the fifth century, and who published his writings under the name of St. Dionysius, in order to secure them a greater notoriety.

2. The writings in question are mentioned for the first time in the Monophysite controversy. The Severians, a moderate section of the Monophysites, had, by command of the Emperor Justinian, held a conference with certain Catholic bishops at Constantinople, and in the conference they made appeal to the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, in defence of their peculiar Monophysite doctrines. But the spokesman of the Catholic bishops, Hypatius, at once questioned their genuineness. No further dispute was for a time raised on this subject, and the works in question came eventually to be held in high estimation. This was particularly the case when the Popes Gregory, Martin, and Agatho quoted them in their writings. A commentary on these writings, composed by Maximus Confessor, a man of approved orthodoxy, contributed still more to establish them as authoritative. In the middle ages they were translated by Scotus Erigena, and thenceforward their influence was still further enhanced. The Scholastics as well as the Mystics, drew largely upon them, and the most remarkable of the Scholastic writers not only quoted them freely, but even wrote lengthened commentaries upon them.

3. The influence of Neo-Platonism is specially prominent in these treatises. For the most part they follow Plotinus, but there also appears in them evidence of the influence of later members of the same school, such as Iamblichus and Proclus, with both of whom they concur in exalting the One, not merely above the Existent, but also above the Good. Regarded from the standpoint of orthodox Faith, they are capable of an interpretation which is compatible with orthodox belief, and in this sense they were interpreted by the Christian teachers who undertook to explain them. But if the Neo-Platonic views contained in them were strongly insisted on, they might easily give occasion to many errors—a result to which, in later times they did, in fact, lead.

4. According to the teaching of "Dionysius," God is exalted above all being, and above all qualifications of being, infinite in his self-existence. No predicates, therefore, can be attributed to Him, in the sense in which they are attributed to created objects. For God there is no name, no concept; His inaccessible Being is lifted above all names and above all concepts; the notion of the Good itself is not one with the notion of the Godhead, the latter transcends the notion of the Good as all others. God is transcendent being, transcendently good, transcendently perfect. He is, therefore, in the strict sense of the word, the Ineffable. Transcending, as he does, all being and all perfection, He is beyond the range of every intellect, and every faculty of knowledge*

5. Though God is exalted above all being and above all qualities of being, He is, nevertheless, the cause of all being; and since the cause must include in itself *a priori* whatever is in the effect, He must include in Himself all the perfections that belong to existent being. But we must not predicate these perfections of Him in the sense in which we predicate them of created objects, but in a far higher meaning. All the while, we must remember these predicates do not give us knowledge of God as He is in Himself; in this respect He is above all predicates. In using terms of this kind, we are merely endeavouring to bring God nearer to ourselves, we employ them to gain some glimpse of the transcendent being of God, and to state in some way our knowledge.

6. We must, in accordance with these principles, distinguish two kinds of theology—a positive and a negative. The positive or affirmative theology attributes all perfections to God, represents Him as infinitely wise, just, good, etc. The negative theology, on the other hand, denies

* According to "Dionysius," the following are the degrees of the ascending scale which leads to God. First we have the spirit or reason, more general than reason is sensation, more general than sensation is life, more general than life is being, more general than being is the Good, and lastly, above the Good is the Divine.

all such perfections in God, and aims at comprehending that being which absolutely transcends predicates of all and every kind. If we compare together these two kinds of theology, we shall find the negative to be unquestionably the more excellent; for by this method we make the nearest approach to understanding God in His exaltation above all other things. But negative theology itself is not the highest; for the exalted being of God not only transcends positive predicates, it transcends negative predicates also; they do not give us knowledge of God as He is in Himself. The highest theology of all, as we shall presently see, is mystical theology.

7. All created things have ideal existence in God. The Holy Scripture styles ideas, as they exist in God, *προορίσμους*. These ideas are not merely archetypes of things, they are formative forces as well. By means of these ideas, created things come forth from God in their actual reality. This issuing of all things from God is thus explained: God in His transcendent elevation cannot allow His goodness to be unproductive; the infinite goodness of God overflowed, as it were, and God, without losing His transcendental state and His absolute unity, diffused Himself through the universe of things, all of which, in their fashion, were thus made to partake of the Divine Being. A voice is heard by many ears, and a light is seen by many eyes, but, though thus diffused, the light and voice do not lose themselves while thus spread: so it is with the diffusion of the Divine Being in things created.

8. The further doctrines which "Dionysius" lays down with regard to creation are in accordance with these views. He asserts that, in creation, God multiplied Himself, in a certain sense, without however losing His unity; that, without ceasing to exist in Himself, He went out of Himself, as it were, and diffused Himself through the multitudinous objects of creation; that God is the universal being, that He exists in everything, and comes into being in everything. "Dionysius" even asserts that the being of all things is no other than the transcendental being of God. This notwithstanding, God, according to his view, is not a portion of the universe, nor anything existing in the universe; admitting no admixture of any extraneous element, God stands aloof from the universe, and maintains Himself eternally in this transcendental state. Just as the sun sheds its light over everything outside itself, so does God diffuse His goodness through all things, without prejudice to His unity or His transcendent elevation.

9. And as all things issue from God, so do all things tend to return to Him again. The reason of this, too, is to be found in His goodness. In virtue of His infinite goodness all things go forth from God; in virtue of this same goodness He attracts them to Himself again. God's goodness diffuses itself in all things, but in thus diffusing itself it forms a bond which attaches all things to God—a chain which binds them all to Him. God is at once the first cause and final end of all things, and He is the one and the other because of His infinite goodness.

10. It will be observed that this doctrine, which makes all things issue from God, borders very closely on the Emanation theory of the

Neo-Platonists. It is true that "Dionysius" holds fast to the principle that things did not exist before they issued from God, and thus distinctly asserts that Creation had a beginning. We are, therefore, justified in giving a favourable interpretation to the formulas of Neo-Platonism in which he has embodied the Christian notions; and we may regard the principle that the being of things is the transcendental being of God, as applied only to the ideal being of things. But it is clear that doctrines thus formulated may give rise to very serious misconceptions, and may lead to very dangerous consequences. Of this we shall have proof later.

11. In consonance with these, the fundamental principles of his system, —"Dionysius," in his work *De Cœlesti et Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, makes God the centre of the spheres which are formed by the orders of created things. Around the Divine centre creatures arrange themselves, so to speak, in concentric circles; in such fashion, however, that these circles represent ever diminishing grades of perfection, the diminution in perfection being proportioned to the distance from the common centre. This gradually descending scheme of concentric orders of being is so bound together that each degree exerts a purifying, illuminating, and perfecting influence on that which stands immediately beneath it, and in this way unites it with one common centre. This arrangement of the orders of being, the vital relation thus established between them, is styled by "Dionysius," the Hierarchy of Things."

12. "Dionysius" further distinguishes between the *celestial* and the *ecclesiastical* hierarchies. The former is constituted by the three orders of angels—the first consisting of the Thrones, the Seraphim, and the Cherubim; the second of the Dominations, the Virtues, the Powers; and the third of the Principalities, the Archangels, and the Angels. The ecclesiastical hierarchy, on the other hand, consists of Priests and People, each division being sub-divided into three orders. The former is divided into Bishops, Priests, and Ceremonial Ministers, of which the last is the purifying, the second the illuminating, and the third the perfecting order. The hierarchy, of the Laics consists of the perfect (the Monks), the sanctified laity, and the people unsanctified. In this way is constituted the scheme of hierarchical life—a scheme which is founded upon and determined by the Sacraments. Highest in the hierarchical system, and centre of the whole, is Christ. The ultimate purpose of this hierarchical arrangement is the deification or divinisation of man—a purpose which is achieved by mystical elevation.

13. To raise himself to this mystical eminence, in other words, to attain to immediate contemplation of God, man must rise above all things sensuous and supersensuous, above the existent and the non-existent; must reduce all his cognitive faculties, whether of sense or intellect, to absolute inaction, and, in this sacred silence, immerse himself in the primal Divine Unity, and bury himself in the gloom of the Divine Being. This is that "Sacred Ignorance" which is the highest form of knowledge. It is by not knowing God, that is, by making abstraction from all attributes whether positive or negative, and by thus representing

God to ourselves in His absolute incomprehensibility, that we attain the highest knowledge granted to the human mind: God as He is in His transcendental being, as He is in Himself. The divine light has shrouded itself with the creatures that have proceeded from it, as with a veil, but in this mystical process we penetrate the veil and approach the eternal light in which God dwells. In this state man is deified. The whole teaching of "Dionysius" culminates in mysticism.

14. Maximus Confessor (580-662), followed the teaching of "Dionysius" on the one hand, and of Gregory of Nyssa on the other. He was one of the most learned and subtle theologians of his time, and defended the orthodox faith against the Monothelites as well as against the so-called Ecthesis of the Emperor Heraclius. Under Constans II he suffered cruel tortures for his faith, and was then sent into exile, where he died at an advanced age. He was the author of several works, of a Commentary on the writings of "Dionysius Areopagita," *Quæstiones in Scripturam*, a *Mystagogia*, and others. The greater part of his works were published by Combefisius (Paris, 1675).

15. The opinions of Maximus, with regard to the mystical life, deserve special mention. In order to rise to the mystical state, the soul must free itself wholly from the things of sense, it must then "pass beyond all thought of the existent and the non-existent; detach itself wholly from its own faculties, and from the supersensuous faculty of thought; then may it become united with God who is above all rational thought." This union is not so much an activity of soul as a passivity, for it is caused entirely by the action of divine grace—a notion which was put already forward by "Dionysius the Areopagite." In the present life this union is not attainable in its perfection, it can be consummated only in the life to come. With this doctrine Maximus connects the theory of the final restitution of all souls, with regard to which he adopts the peculiar views of Gregory of Nyssa. The means of accomplishing this end are furnished by the Incarnation of Christ; the Incarnation is the climax of divine revelation, and would therefore, have taken place had there been no fall of man by sin.

16. The last of the Greek Ecclesiastical writers who claims a place in the history of Philosophy is the monk Joannes Damascenus. He was born at Damascus in Syria, towards the close of the seventh century, was a strenuous opponent of the iconoclasm of Leo the Isaurian, and suffered grievous persecution in consequence. He composed a work which he entitled the *Fount of Knowledge*, (πηγὴ γνώσεως). He begins with a short exposition of (Aristotelian) Ontology, connects with this his refutation of heresy, and concludes with a systematic exposition of the orthodox teaching, under the title *De Fide Orthodoxa*. In this work he declares he will not set down anything of his own, but will merely bring together, and arrange systematically, what has been the teaching of holy and learned men. In this undertaking Philosophy, and more especially Logic and Ontology, will give efficient aid, for which reason, he styles Philosophy the *Ancilla theologiæ*. This work has been held in high esteem in the East, even to our day; the scholastics of the West, too, have been largely influenced by it in the exposition of their theological doctrines.

Latin Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers.

Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome.

§ 73.

1. The three names we have set at the head of this section belong properly to the history of Dogma, but the history of Philosophy must not pass them wholly by. Philosophy, however, holds only a secondary place in their writings, and therefore we may be brief in our notice of them. We shall do no more than concisely indicate the general character of their teaching, dwelling chiefly upon those points which are of special philosophic interest.

2. Hilary was born at Poitiers, and about the middle of the fourth century was raised to the episcopal See of that city, at the time when Arianism, under the favour of the Emperor Constantius, was gaining the mastery everywhere. He opposed an energetic resistance to the Arians, and was, in consequence, banished to Phrygia by Constantius. There he composed his chief work, *De Trinitate*. At a later period he was recalled from banishment, and died A.D. 368.

3. A glance at the work *De Trinitate* shows us that Hilary was averse to unrestrained license of investigation in Divine things, and that he required such inquiries to be based on Faith. The first thing necessary is to believe whatever God has revealed. It is only when this point is secured that we can go on to investigate what we believe, in order to be able to render an account of the grounds of our Faith.

4. With these principles in view, Hilary sets himself to combat the tortuous reasonings of the Arians. He reviews all their arguments, combats each of them in turn, and exposes the sophistries that underlie them. His logic is inexorable, his demonstrations convincing, his language is sometimes obscure, but the thoughts expressed are always striking. He is the enemy of sophistry of all kinds, and his reasoning is always bold and honest.

5. It is somewhat strange to find him asserting that the human soul is a corporeal substance. There is not, he maintains, anything created which is not of corporeal nature. The different kinds of souls, whether they be united to bodies, or whether they be free from bodies, receive from nature a corporeal substance, for everything that has been created must exist in something (*Comment. in Matth.*, c. 5, 8). But he does not understand by this corporeal "substance" of the soul a terrestrial, material, perishable body, and he is thus enabled elsewhere (*Tract. in Ps.* 52, 7; *in Ps.* 118, *litt.* 10, 7,) to speak of the soul as a simple substance. In this teaching he seems to follow Tertullian's views on the subject of the "spiritual body."

6. But in his theory regarding the origin of the soul, he is not in favour of Tertullian's *Traducianism;* he supports the theory of creation. In his view, the soul cannot receive its being in the same way as the body. The body alone is produced by carnal generation; the soul is

created immediately by God, to God's image and likeness, and at the moment of its creation is united with the body.

7. Ambrose next claims our notice. He was born in Treves, A.D. 340, and was the son of the governor of that city. He betook himself to Rome for the study of law, and there became remarkable as an orator. Subsequently he was appointed governor of Milan, and while holding this office was elected Archbishop of the city by the clergy and people. He discharged his episcopal duties with apostolic zeal; his faith was unwavering, his life peace, and his devotion to the interests of his flock unremitting. He died A.D. 397.

8. In his literary labours St. Ambrose occupied himself chiefly with the explanation of the Scriptures. He adopted, throughout, the allegorical method, after the manner of Philo, and many of Philo's notions are found in his explanations. Among the works which exhibit this tendency, are the *Hexaemeron*, the treatises *De Isaac et Anima*, *De Abraham*, *De Bono Mortis*, *De Noe et Arca*, *De Paradiso*, *De Cain et Abel*, *De Jacob et Vita Beata*, etc. Of special interest to the philosopher is his work *De Officiis Ministrorum*, a treatise of Christian ethics modelled on the work of Cicero.

9. The ethical system of St. Ambrose differs from that of the pagan philosopher primarily in this, that it makes eternal life beyond the grave the ultimate end of all morality and virtue. Eternal happiness in God is the high destiny of man, and virtue must be practised only for the sake of this end. Apart from this purpose, virtue has no value. Whatever is ethically good is also useful for the attainment of man's final end, and conversely whatever is really useful is also morally good.

10. Virtue and morality having immediate reference to God, that is to happiness in God, it follows that piety (pietas), as manifested in the religious worship of God, is the foundation of all virtues. It is the immediate basis of the four Cardinal Virtues—Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, in which the moral life of man reveals itself and takes shape. Deflection from virtue is evil; and the evil has its source, not in the body, not in some substance other than our own personality, but solely in our own free will, which turns away from the path of righteousness.

11. Jerome was a contemporary of Ambrose. He was born A.D. 346, completed his education at Rome, and, after receiving Baptism, retired to the desert of Chalcis, where he lived the life of a hermit. Subsequently, he quitted the desert, and betook himself to Antioch, where he was ordained priest, and thence travelled to Constantinople and to Rome. After the death of Pope Damasus, he returned to the East, and selected Bethlehem as his place of abode. At this time began the most remarkable period of his literary activity. He died A.D. 420.

12. We need not mention that Jerome occupied himself principally with the translation and interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, and that his fame rests chiefly on the important services he rendered on this subject. Philosophical disquisitions are to be found here and there in his work. He describes the human soul as an invisible incorporeal being

(*Com. in Ev. Matth.*, iv., c. 27,) but adds the restriction, "secundum crassiorem dico nostri corporis substantiam." It would appear from this that he shared the views of Hilary regarding the nature of the soul. He does not seem to have formed any definite opinion as to the origin of the soul, but he distinctly rejects the theory of pre-existence, for in this hypothesis, he holds, the union of the soul with the body and, consequently the Resurrection, would be contrary to nature.

Augustine.

Life and Writings of Saint Augustine.

§ 74.

1. We have now reached the remarkable man in whom the philosophy of the Patristic period attained its highest development. We refer to St. Augustine. He is the great luminary of the period to which he belongs. His great mind gathered together all the elements of Christian philosophy hitherto called into existence, reduced them to systematic unity, and left them to succeeding ages as a systematic whole, for further study and investigation. The world does not often bring forth a genius like that of Augustine. Such depth of thought, such delicacy of discrimination, a spirit of inquiry so fruitful in results, such a genuine appreciation of the ideal, such conclusive reasoning, are not often found in one man to the same degree. God and the soul—these were the objects to which his investigations were mainly directed; the whole effort of his mind found expression in the pregnant words: Noverim Te (Deus), noverim me!

2. Aurelius Angustinus was born at Tagaste in Numidia, A.D. 353. His father Patricius was a pagan, his mother Monica a Christian of exemplary piety. The extraordinary intellectual gifts of the boy manifested themselves at an early age, but passion awoke in him at the same time in all its energy, a circumstance which caused much sorrow to his mother. He received his education successively at Tagaste, Madaura, and Carthage. The vice and the excesses with which he was brought in contact in Madaura and Carthage affected his moral character most perniciously. All the while his great mind was not idle, it was restlessly seeking a solution for the great problems of life. He believed such a solution was offered by the Manicheans, and he accordingly joined their sect. When his education was finished, he adopted the profession of teacher of rhetoric, and in this capacity taught at Carthage, at Rome, and at Milan. During his stay at Milan the turning point of his life was reached.

3. The contradictions involved in the Manichean doctrines had bewildered him, and he had in consequence adopted the scepticism of the Academy, when his study of the writings of Plato at last roused him from his sensual degradation and awoke in him the love of the ideal. The preaching of St. Ambrose exercised a still more powerful influence on the mind of the young man. Augustine had gone to hear the discourses of the bishop for the sake of the graces of his oratory, but he soon went for the sake of the exalted teaching which was clothed in these charms of eloquence. A further influence was that of his mother, who had followed him from Rome, and whose prayers and counsels were added to the other gracious impulses brought to bear on him. The decisive moment came, and after a struggle the grace of God triumphed.

4. After his conversion, Augustine, with several of his friends, retired to the country seat of Cassiciacum, near Milan, and in the year 387 he received Baptism. At this date began his great literary activity in the service of the Church. In the year 391 circumstances arose which obliged him to make a journey to Hippo. There he was forced by

the people to receive priest's orders, and to act as assistant to the aged bishop of that See. On the death of the bishop, Augustine was unanimously elected to succeed him (395). In his new office he laboured indefatigably for the establishment of the Catholic Faith and Christian morality, and defended the doctrines of the Church with signal energy against the Manicheans, Donatists and Pelagians. He died A.D. 430.

5. Of the writings of St. Augustine, those are of special interest for the history of philosophy which were written in the first years after his conversion. In the later years of his life he was occupied mainly with questions affecting religious dogmas, as during that period he was engrossed by his struggle with the Donatists, Manicheans, and Pelagians. To the earlier writings belong :—(*a*) The treatise *Contra Academicos* ; (*b*), *De Vita Beata* ; (*c*), *De Ordine* ; and (*d*), the *Soliloquia*. These works were composed previous to his baptism at Cassiciacum. Before his baptism also, but after his return to Milan, were composed (*e*), the treatise *De Immortalitate Animæ* ; (*f*), the work, *De Grammatica* ; (*g*), the treatises *De Magistro* ; and *h*, the *Principia Dialectices*. During his journey from Milan to Africa, he composed at Rome, (*i*), the treatise *De Quantitate Animæ* ; (*k*), the three books *De Libero Arbitrio* ; (*l*), the books *De Moribus Ecclesiæ* ; and (*m*), *De Moribus Manichæorum*. At Tagaste he composed the treatises (*n*), *De Musica* ; (*o*), *De Genesi contra Manichæos* ; and (*p*), *De Vera Religione*.

6. The works which he wrote as a priest and a bishop, and which are of chief interest to the philosopher are :—(*a*), *De Doctrina Christiana*, Libri iv. ; (*b*), *De Fide et Symbolo* ; (*c*), *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate* ; (*d*), *De Utilitate Credendi* ; (*e*), *De Agone Christiano* ; (*f*), *De Genesi ad Litteram*, *Libri* xii. ; *De Fide contra Manichæos* ; (*h*), *De Duabus Animis contra Manichæos* ; (*i*), *Contra Fortunatum Manich.* ; (*k*) *Contra Adimantum Manichæi Discipulum* ; (*l*), *Contra Faustum Manichæum* ; (*m*) *De Spiritu et Littera* ; (*n*) *De Anima et ejus Origine* : (*o*), *De Actis cum Felice Manichæo* ; (*p*), *De Natura Boni contra Manichæos* ; (*q*.) *Contra Epistolam Manichæi quam vocant Fundamenti* ; (*r*), *Contra Secundinum Manichæum* ; (*s*), *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, etc.

7. But the works of St. Augustine which are the most important of all, both to the theologian and to the philosopher, are his great works *De Civitate Dei* in 22 books, and his work *De Trinitate* in 15 books. The latter of these was composed between A.D. 400 and 410 ; the former was begun A.D. 413 and completed A.D. 426. Of importance also to the philosopher are his *Confessions* which he wrote about A.D. 400. His letters, sermons, and commentaries on the Scripture also contain much that throws light upon his philosophical opinions. Of his writings against the Pelagians we may mention :—(*a*), *Contra Julianum Pelagianum* ; (*b*), *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* ; (*c*), *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* ; (*d*) *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum Pelag.* ; (*e*) *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* ; (*f*) *De Correptione et Gratia* ; (*g*), *De Natura et Gratia* ; (*h*), *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* ; (*i*), *De Præedestinatione Sanctorum* ; (*k*), *De Dono Perseverantiæ* ; (*l*), *De Peccato Originali* ; etc. The *Retractationes* were composed by Augustine a few years before his death ; in this work he reviews his entire system and corrects many points of his earlier teaching.

8. We have mentioned that Augustine, after his conversion, devoted his scientific inquiries chiefly to two subjects—God and the soul. For the conduct of his inquiries it was necessary that he should lay down a definite theory of knowledge which should serve as a basis on which to establish his system of investigation. In order to set forth clearly the philosophy of St. Augustine, it will be necessary to explain first the principles of his theory of knowledge ; we shall then proceed to his teaching regarding God and the creation of the world ; and lastly we shall deal with his doctrine regarding man, and the ethical theories which are connected with this portion of his system.

Theory of Knowledge.

§ 75.

1. At this point of our exposition, it is of chief importance to set forth the relation which Augustine conceives to exist between reason

and authority. All that we learn, he says, we learn either from authority or from reason. Faith is the result of the former process, knowledge is the result of the latter. In the order of time authority comes first, in the order of the nature of things, reason is the first and most excellent. The usual course when we learn a thing is that authority comes before reason. Authority offers the truth which faith thereupon accepts, but this process leads on to scientific knowledge. For reason is thus enabled to direct its attention to the truth given by authority, to acquire scientific knowledge of it, and to establish it on a scientific basis. The latter kind of knowledge is of its nature higher than a mere knowledge of faith. In this wise does faith become the basis, the condition, and the first beginning of scientific knowledge (*De Ord., Lib.* 2, c. 9.)

2. These general principles Augustine applies to determine the relation between Divine Revelation and human reason. In any scientific investigation of revealed truth, faith must precede knowledge, it must be the basis and antecedent condition of knowledge. In other words, the truths of divine revelation must be received by faith before we can attain a scientific or a speculative knowledge of them. Faith is therefore indispensable for man. This the more that sin has entangled man in the love of things of earth, and diverted him from the eternal; and in consequence, faith has become necessary to man as a means of salvation, as the means by which he must reach truth, and thus attain salvation (*De Vera Relig.*, c. 24).

3. This being premised, we may now take up the theory of knowledge, strictly so called, which Augustine offers us. To every act of knowledge, he teaches, two factors concur—an object known, and a subject knowing. Of its nature, the object is antecedent to the subject—without an object no knowledge is possible. This principle is of universal application. Now, the objects of knowledge are of two kinds, the sensible and the supersensuous; we may, therefore, distinguish in man two kinds of knowledge—experience and reason. Sense, or experience, is concerned with the sensible; reason deals with the supersensuous or intelligible. These two kinds of knowledge are essentially distinct from one another.

4. But the question arises: Is certainty possible in knowledge? The Academics deny this, inasmuch as they teach that mere probability is all that we can attain. But, in the first place, such probability could not be had unless we suppose the knowledge of truth possible, for the probable is probable only because it is like truth; and it is measured by comparison with truth. In the next place, probability would not, by any means, suffice to make us happy, whatever the Academics may say to the contrary. For, no one can be happy who does not possess that which he desires to possess, and no one searches who does not wish to find. He, therefore, who seeks truth without finding it, does not possess that which he wishes to possess, and cannot, consequently, be happy. Nor can such an one be said to be really wise; for the sage, as such, must be happy; certainty in knowledge must, therefore, be attainable.

5. The same principle can further be established by positive argument. We cannot doubt that we are thinking, willing, and living. Consciousness gives such indisputable evidence on this point that doubt or denial is impossible. If a person were to doubt whether he thinks or exists, he would, by his very doubt itself, admit that he thinks and exists; if he did not exist, he could not doubt. Furthermore, the man who knows that he doubts, has, by the fact, knowledge of a truth; is certain of this truth, that he is doubting. The man who doubts whether there is any truth, acknowledges one proposition to be true; and, as all things are true only because truth exists, he, by the fact, acknowledges the existence of truth and his own certainty with regard to it (*De Lib. Arb.*, Lib. 2, c. 3. *Soliloq.*, Lib. 2, c. 1, etc.)

6. Again, the truth of our sensuous knowledge is also beyond doubt. We may indeed, be deceived in the use of our senses; but the fault is not to be attributed to the senses, for these always represent the object, according to the impressions which they actually receive. It is not by our senses we are deceived, but by the judgment we form with regard to their perceptions. We form our judgment hastily on our present impressions, without closer inquiry into the relations which may possibly exist between these and external objects. As for the existence of an objective material world, sense renders us so certain that doubt is wholly impossible.

7. The truth of sensuous knowledge cannot be doubted; the truth of knowledge gained by intellect is no less above suspicion. Nothing can be more absurd than to assert that what we see with our eyes exists, but what we perceive with our intellect does not exist; for it would be irrational to suppose that reason or intelligence is not incomparably higher than bodily sense (*De Immort. Anim.*, c. 10). Dialectical truths are, therefore, indisputable. No one, for instance, can doubt that the truth of the antecedent of an hypothetical proposition involves the truth of the consequent, or that, in a disjunctive proposition, the denial of all the members, except one, involves the truth of the member remaining. And so of other truths.

8. As to the possibility of attaining certain knowledge, there can, then, be no doubt. A further question now arises as to the conditions of intellectual knowledge; and, first, as to the way in which intellectual knowledge is acquired. Augustine distinguishes two methods by which the knowledge of intelligible objects is attained. The first method begins with the faculties of sense. The intellect directs its attention to the objects perceived by the senses, inquires into their causes, and thus endeavours to reach the knowledge of the Ultimate, or First Cause, a process described in the words of the Apostle: "Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur" (*De Gen. ad litt.*, iv., c. 32).

9. The second method begins with what is within man himself. Man must withdraw from sense, and retire within himself, if he would contemplate truth in all its purity. Augustine reminds us of this principle at every turn. "Noli foras ire," he repeats, "in te redi; in interiori homine habitat veritas" (*De Vera Relig.*, c. 39). The consider-

ation of himself and of the processes of his intellectual life is, for man, the second means to the knowledge of higher truth. And this way is the more excellent, for it is more within man's reach, and therefore leads more perfectly to the end pursued than the other, which begins with sense and leads to the supersensuous.

10. To enable man by these means successfully to reach intelligible truth another condition is necessary. This condition is virtue and purity of heart. Truth can find place only in a pure heart. The man who would successfully prosecute the search after truth must, therefore, purify his soul from all defilement, and the purer his heart is from sin, and the more it is adorned with virtue and holiness, the more clearly and more perfectly will truth be communicated to him.

11. This being premised, we may now penetrate more deeply into the nature of intellectual knowledge. The question which first arises concerns the ultimate or highest ground of all knowledge. Augustine answers that the ultimate ground or reason of all intellectual knowledge is the Absolute Truth—God. This principle Augustine proves after the fashion of Plato:

(*a.*) That we may have knowledge of anything as true, or good, or beautiful, and distinguish it from what is not true, or good, or beautiful, it is necessary to have a rule or standard, according to which the judgment regarding the object is determined. This standard, according to which we estimate the truth, or goodness, or beauty of an object, must be absolutely immutable, otherwise it could not be a trustworthy standard of judgment. The standard of judgment must be present to our minds; but, it is not the mind itself, for the mind is changeable, and, besides, we judge ourselves and our own actions by this standard, and must so judge ourselves. That immutable, invariable standard must, therefore, be something higher than our own minds; and, since there is nothing immutable and invariable but God, this standard must be God Himself, in so far as He is absolute truth, goodness, and beauty (*De Lib. Arb.*, II, c. 12, 16).

(*b.*) If a human teacher states any principle to us, we do not immediately perceive the truth of the principle. We must have within ourselves a criterion by which we test the truth of the proposition stated. And this criterion can, for the reason already given, be no other than the absolute truth itself. It appears, then, that the immutable, eternal Word of God is the teacher of the soul; we consult this Word when we endeavour to assure ourselves of the truth of a proposition laid down by a human teacher; and this truth the Word reveals to us with as much clearness and evidence as our moral condition permits. Instruction from without only leads us to consult the instructor within ourselves, to receive from Him an insight into the truth (*De Magistro*, c. 11).

(*c.*) When two individuals understand and acknowledge as true an assertion advanced by one or the other, the question presents itself: How and by what means have both alike knowledge of the truth in question? The one does not read it in the other; there must be some common ground in which and by which both alike obtain knowledge of

it. This ground can, again, be no other than the absolute, immutable truth, which is above both, and in accordance with which both alike form their judgment (*Conf.* XII, c. 25).

12. It follows from these considerations that our minds are, in some mysterious way, united to the eternal unchanging truth. Without this union they would be incapable of attaining knowledge of truth. God is the Sun which illumines human minds. In His light we perceive truth. As we can observe nothing with the eye of the body, when the sun does not shed its light over the objects of vision; so we cannot have knowledge of intellectual truth except in the light of God—the Sun of our faculty of intelligence. And, as the sun sheds its light upon all men, so that, in its light, all may be able to see, so does God give His light to all minds to make truth accessible to all. This gift is, however, bestowed upon different men in different degrees, as their aptitudes are differently determined by their moral condition.

13. The knowledge of the essences of created things depends upon the intellectual light thus furnished by the absolute divine truth. Without this light such knowledge would be impossible. The Divine Word includes within Himself the ultimate reasons (rationes) or archetypal forms, after which all things are created and of which all things are ectypes. God, as absolute truth, is thus the ultimate cause of all our knowledge of truth, and the Word of God is the ultimate cause which renders intelligible to us the essences of things, inasmuch as He includes within Himself the archetypal forms of all existence. It follows that we may assert, and must assert, that we have knowledge of the essences of things in their ultimate eternal causes (in rationibus aeternis) which exist in God.

14. In this way the origin of our intellectual knowledge must be explained. It now becomes manifest how the consideration of our own activity of intellect leads us at once to the knowledge of God. When we see that all intellectual knowledge is dependent upon the absolute truth, which is the sun of our intelligence, we need only turn our gaze from the object illumined by that sun to the sun itself, and we, at once, have knowledge of God, the ultimate and supreme cause of all our knowledge.

15. If we consider the theory of knowledge here set forth, we shall observe that Augustine follows unmistakably the Platonic line of thought. But we should not be warranted in concluding, at once, from this, that his views are identical with those of the Ontologists. Augustine nowhere asserts that we have immediate intuition of God and of all truth in Him—the position maintained by the Ontologists. Nay, such a thing would be in flat contradiction with his subsequent teaching regarding God and created things. The later scholastics, it may be assumed, interpret him correctly, when they understand Augustine's theory, which holds that God is the sun of the mind, and that we have knowledge of truth only in the light which He diffuses, to mean that God is the ultimate principle, not of all being only, but of all knowledge as well; that the intellect, by which we attain the truth, is a participation of

the Divine intelligence; that, moreover, the principles of reason which guide our judgments have their ultimate and highest source in God (in the Divine Word), and that, when we judge in accordance with these principles, we are judging according to the standard fixed by the Absolute Truth. We may also assume the Scholastics to be warranted in maintaining that Augustine's proposition as to our knowing the essences of things *in rationibus æternis* does not imply an immediate contemplation of the Divine Ideas, but merely signifies that the essences of things could neither be nor be known, unless they were antecedently formed in the Divine Ideas, as in their highest cause. The thoroughly Platonic character of Augustine's theory of knowledge lent favour, however, to the interpretation put upon it by the Ontologist school at a later period.

Teaching regarding God and Creation.

§ 76.

1. Augustine's chief proof for the existence of God is derived from our notion of the True and the Good. It is a fact that we know truth. Now, irrespective of the principle that an absolute truth must be supposed, to enable us to know any truth whatever, it is to be noted that whatever is true is so only because of the absolute truth, that is, because it participates in that truth. There must, therefore, exist an absolute truth: this truth is God. God, therefore, exists. Again, it is undeniable that we all strive after what is good, for we all seek to be happy. There are many kinds of changeable good after which we may strive. But, nothing changeable is good of itself; it is good only because it participates in the good which is absolute and unchangeable. It follows that there must exist a good which is, in itself, absolute and unchangeable. This good is God. God, therefore, exists (*De Lib. Arb.*, II, *c.* 3, 15; *De Trin.*, VIII, *c.* 3).

2. God, as He is in Himself, is above all predicates. No one of the categories can be applied to Him in the sense in which it is applicable to creatures. Even the category of Substance cannot be applied to Him in its proper sense; if it were so, then it would follow that He could be the subject of accidents. In regard to God, it is better to employ the notion Essence (Essentia) than the notion Substance. From this it follows that God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible and ineffable; there exists no term which is worthy of Him or which rightly signifies His Being. In the right understanding of this truth consists the right knowledge of God. *Deus melius scitur nesciendo.* If, however, we speak of Him in human language, we must attribute to Him all that our thoughts can conceive of what is loftiest and most excellent.

3. God is absolute simplicity. He is not only free from every admixture of material element—an eternal immutable Form—but, furthermore, every attribute which belongs to Him is one and the same thing

with His Essence. In God, being, life, wisdom, goodness, etc., are not different things; all these are, in Him, one and the same thing—His absolute infinite Essence. God is not good or just because of participated justice or goodness; He is His own justice and goodness. The same holds of His other attributes. God is, therefore, absolutely immutable and imperishable; no shadow of change can affect Him.

4. God is eternal. His existence is an unchanging present, without a past and without a future. God is immeasurable and omnipresent; limitation and extension in space have no application to Him. He is above space and above time; and yet He is in every space and at all times, whole in the whole, and whole in every part.

5. God is absolute intelligence and absolute will, and is, therefore, the absolute spirit. As spirit, God is Divine. Conceiving in thought His own Essence, He generates within Himself the Eternal, Personal Word, in whom the whole infinitude of His Being is expressed. The Divine Word is thus the Son of God, the Personal Image of the Father. Again, the Father loves Himself in the Son, and the Son loves Himself in the Father, and in this love there proceeds from both Love rendered personal—the Holy Ghost. In the Divine Word, moreover, the Father expresses not merely Himself, He expresses all other things likewise. The Divine Word includes within Himself the ideas or primal causes of all things; these ideas may even be said to be the Logos Himself, for nothing can exist in Him which is not His Being itself.

6. God is omniscient. Nothing is hidden from His gaze. His knowledge is antecedent to the existence of things which are. We have knowledge of things because they are, and in so far forth as they are; but things are for the reason that God knows them, and after the manner that God knows them. God is absolutely free. He is sufficient for His own happiness. He has no need of any other thing. All His actions, therefore, producing effects extrinsic to Himself are absolutely free. No shadow of necessity can affect His will. Whatever He determines on, He chooses freely; but His choice once made, He cannot change His decision; such a change would imply imperfection of knowledge or imperfection of will.

7. God is omnipotent. Whatever He wills He can effect, and He can effect it by His mere will, without need of the concurrence of any other cause. God's will is co-extensive with God's power. Whatever is in contradiction with His essence or His attributes, that God cannot will, and, consequently, cannot effect. It would be weakness in Him to will or to effect anything of this kind. God is absolutely holy; He can will nothing except what is good; evil He can neither desire nor do. It is, therefore, impossible that He should be the author of evil in the world. God is infinitely good; what He wills, He wills for the good of His creatures. He is, however, absolutely just; He must therefore reward or punish each man according to his deserts.

8. There does not exist any eternal matter, apart from God, out of which He fashioned the created world; for God, being omnipotent, has no need of a material substrate on which to exercise His productive

power; His omnipotence is competent to give things their total being. Nor has God produced the world from out His own being; in such a supposition the world would be like to Him in nature. The origin of the world can, therefore, be explained only by creation from nothing. God created the world from nothing. But He did not effect this creation unconsciously. He reproduced in creation the eternal ideas of the Divine Word. Every species of being has its proper idea in the Divine Word, and is created to the likeness of that idea.

9. The creation of the world is the revelation of the Divine goodness. God was not, however, so moved by His goodness to create, that creation was for Him a necessity. On the contrary, the ultimate and highest reason for creation was the absolute and free choice of God. He has created the world because He willed so to do. To seek a higher reason for this Divine resolve would be to set above God a higher power on which He would be dependent, and so to deny His supremacy. The perfection and happiness of God have received no increase from creation; the creative activity of God has been a benefit to creatures only.

10. Created things are not without beginning, and they are not eternal, for they are changeable and perishable, and what is changeable and perishable cannot be eternal. Whatever is created is limited in time and space. Time is the measure of movement; it can begin only with the beginning of motion. Hence the world is not in time; contrariwise time was created in and with the world. Before the creation of the world there was no time. The same holds good of space, for without an extended world space is inconceivable.

11. God created all things simultaneously—the world of spirits and the world of matter. *Creavit omnia simul.* In the Scriptural expression: "God created the heavens and the earth," we are to understand by the term "heaven" the world of spirits, and by the term "earth" corporeal nature. Matter without form was the direct product of the Divine act of creation. This formless matter had no determinate—no actual character; it was "almost nothing." It could not, therefore, exist for an instant in the formless condition; it must have been clothed in some form or other from the beginning. Matter, then, does not come before form, in the order of time; it takes precedence in the order of nature—that is to say, matter must be presupposed as the substrate of form; it is only in this sense that matter can be said to have been created first. We must, further, distinguish between spiritual and corporeal matter, of which one is the substrate of the corporeal, the other of the spiritual world.

12. All things having been simultaneously created, we cannot understand by the "six days" of the Mosaic narrative six successive periods of time. The six days represent no more than the order in which things follow one another in the gradations of being. The six days were consequently only one day, or, more properly, one instant, which is mentioned six times, because the Scripture, at each mention of the term, introduces a new order of being, which, of its nature, is next to that immediately preceding, its existence being dependent on the existence

of the preceding order. By the six days is meant no more than that the universe of things is divided into six gradations of being; and as the number six is the most perfect number, the phrase may be understood to signify the perfection of the world which God has created.

13. The duration of the created world depends upon God's conservation of its existence. If the sustaining power of God were for a moment withdrawn, the world would sink back into nothingness. The Divine wisdom has furthermore established all things in a comprehensive order, and assigned to each being its determined place in this order; and as He has made all things in order, so does He govern all things and guide them all by His providence to their appointed end. Evil itself is not excluded from this providence, for evil may be made to serve purposes of good.

14. God is not, indeed, the author of evil; but evil could not exist in the world unless by permission of God, since nothing exists contrary to His will. Evil is opposed to the will of God in so far as He abhors it, but it is not opposed to the will of God in the sense that it exists in spite of Him. Consequently, though evil, in itself, is not good, yet it may be said that it is well it should exist, since it does not exist without God's (permissive) will. But it is well that it should only exist in so far as it is subservient to good. God can draw good out of evil. Evil, then, is against established order, in so far as it disturbs that order, but it is not for this reason extrinsic to established order, for when the evil exists it is made subject to that order, and hence subservient to good. God might, indeed, have prevented evil, but He preferred to draw good from evil, rather than not permit evil at all. The magnificence of the universal order is rendered more imposing by the presence of evil and by its subordination to good.

15. In the order of the universe there must be little things as well as great. We must not measure things by their usefulness to us; we must not account evil whatever injures us; we must judge each thing according to its own nature; each has its own standard of perfection—its own form—its own harmony in itself. All creatures praise and glorify God, and this in such wise that they invite man to praise and glorify Him. Man stands at the summit of the visible world; he is the microcosmos, for he has within himself the being of inanimate bodies, the vegetative life of the plant, the sensuous faculties of the brute, and, over and above this, is possessed of reason, which last attribute brings him into kinship with the angels. Thus, he forms the link of union between the world of spirit and the world of matter.

Psychology.

§ 77.

1. The human soul is a substance essentially different from the body—immaterial, simple, and spiritual. The category of Quantity cannot be applied to it; it has not extension in space. The proofs adduced by Augustine for this doctrine are, briefly, the following:

(*a.*) If the soul were corporeal, it would be a body of determined quality. It would, in consequence, have knowledge of itself as being of this quality. This, however, is not the case. (*De Trin.*, X. c. 7.)

(*b.*) Even the faculty of sensuous perception is inexplicable, if supposed to belong to a principle wholly material. If the soul were corporeal it could not contain at once within itself the vast number of sensuous images with which our memory is stored. Still less can our intellectual knowledge be attributed to a corporeal principle, for this knowledge is concerned with the immaterial and supersensuous, whereas the corporeal deals only with the corporeal and sensible; to this only is its power proportioned. (*De Anima et ejus Orig.*, c. 17. *De Quant. Anim.*, c. 13.)

(*c.*) When we reflect upon a truth, we penetrate and understand it more perfectly the more we withdraw from sense and retire within ourselves, and so become immersed in the truth. Now, if the soul were merely the harmony of the body, and not a substance distinct from it, this divorce from the body and concentration of the soul within itself would be impossible. (*De Immort. Anim.*, c. 10.)

(*d.*) The soul perceives at every point of the body the impressions made at that point, and perceives them not by a portion of its being, but by the entire *ego*. It must, therefore, be whole in every part of the body. This is possible only if the soul is of simple incorporeal nature, for a body, being an extended entity, can be present simultaneously at several points only by means of the several parts of which it is composed. (*Ep.* 166, *ad Hieron.*, p. 4.)

2. From the immaterial and simple nature of the soul we may argue to its further characteristics. In the first place it is essentially individual. There is no such thing as an universal soul—each man has his own individual soul. In the second place, the soul of man, being essentially spiritual and rational, cannot be degraded to the condition of an irrational soul; the doctrine of the migration of souls is, therefore, an absurdity. In the third place, the human soul is like in nature to the pure spirits or angels. Its nature, no doubt, disposes it to union with the body, but this does not make it specifically distinct from the angels, for the angels, too, have bodies, though these are more perfect in kind than the bodies of men, and are immortal. It follows that man being distinguished from the brutes, on the one side, and from the angels, on the other, may be rightly defined an *animal rationale mortale*.

3. The soul is not, as the Manicheans say, an emanation from God. If it were, it ought either to share in all the divine perfections, being of like nature with God, or the Divine substance ought to be capable of all those imperfections which we perceive in ourselves. The one alternative is as absurd as the other. The soul must, therefore, like other beings, have been originally created by God.

4. As to the point of time at which the soul of the first man was created, Augustine is led by his principle that God created all things at once, to the view that Adam's soul was created at the same time as all other spiritual beings, and was subsequently united to the body. That union, however, was not the punishment of any offence; the nature of the soul

required its union with the body, the union was not unnatural, nor was it for the soul a condition of misfortune.

5. Augustine rejects the notion that all human souls have been created simultaneously and are united successively to the several bodies which they animate. The individual soul comes into existence with the individual body to which it belongs. But Augustine is unable to arrive at a definite opinion as to the manner in which these souls come into being. Their origin by a generative process would seem to him to afford the best explanation of the transmission of original sin; but, on the other hand, it is inconceivable to him how one soul can be generated by another, if the soul be an immaterial and simple essence. The theory of generation degenerates easily into Traducianism—a doctrine which must be totally rejected, for it has meaning only in the hypothesis that the soul is of a corporeal nature.

6. But the theory of creation is, according to Augustine, surrounded with insoluble difficulties. If God daily creates new souls, these souls as they come forth from His hand must be good in themselves. Now, in their union with the body they are made subject to original sin; and as this union is not of their choice, but accomplished wholly by God, it is difficult to explain on what grounds those souls can be eternally reprobated which could not by any possibility be purified by baptism, such souls, for instance, as those of children who die unbaptized. God would be obliged to secure baptism for such children; for if, by uniting their souls to their bodies, He makes them subject to original sin, He is bound to make provision for their deliverance from this sin. But, on the other hand, God cannot be held to owe anything to anyone.

7. In this way, Augustine sees difficulties on both sides, to which he can find no answer. He, therefore, holds it to be the more prudent, and the safer, course to suspend his judgment—and this all the more that Sacred Scripture does not lay down any definite teaching on the point. The passages which are cited in favour of the one theory or the other are not conclusive, because any one of them can be interpreted in the sense of either theory. This he undertakes to prove in regard to a number of such passages.

8. Augustine asserts emphatically the oneness of the soul in man. The essential constituent parts of man are soul and body, and nothing more. If an argument be built on the words of the Apostle, "the flesh wars against the spirit," to show that there are in man two souls substantially different from one another, each having a will of its own, it might be argued with equal force, that there is no reason why we should stop at a duality of wills; we should admit as many wills as there are opposing tendencies in man, and these tendencies are numberless.

9. In one aspect of its being the soul of man is in close relation with the body, in another it is superior to the body. We may distinguish in the soul a *pars inferior* and a *pars superior*, according to the different characters of the faculties with which it is endowed. By the lower part of the soul we mean the vegetative and sensitive faculties, in virtue of which the soul is the principle of corporeal life, as well as of sensuous

perception and locomotion. The functions of these faculties are essentially dependent upon the bodily organs. The higher part of the soul, on the other hand, signifies the intellectual faculties—reason and will—faculties whose functions are not dependent on the bodily organism. Herein lies the difference between "spirit" and "soul." The terms are altogether relative: In so far forth as the soul stands in immediate relation with the body by its sensitive and vegetative faculties, it may be called "soul" in the stricter sense of the term; in so far as it is exalted above the body in its functions of thought and will, it may be called "spirit."

10. The soul in its union with the body is the element which determines the nature or specific character of the composite entity: "Tradit speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus, in quantum est." (*De Immort. Anim.*, c. 15.) And hence, man, as man, is something different from either of the component elements of his being. The body is not man, neither is the soul; man is the unit formed by both (*De Mor. Eccl.*, I., c. 4). Body and soul in conjunction form a single nature different from both constituents—this nature is man.

11. The relations which subsist between the body and the soul in man render it impossible for the body to exercise independently any influence upon the soul. This becomes more evident if we observe that to admit the opposite would be to give the soul the character of matter which receives in itself the action of the body—a supposition which is incompatible with the spiritual nature of the soul, and its superiority to the body. The body, then, does not act upon the soul, but the soul acts in and through the body. If the soul suffers, it is not that it is so affected by the body; the affection comes from itself in so far as it has become capable of suffering by its union with the body, and by its activity in the organism.

12. The action of the soul in the body and on the body is not, however, immediate. Between the active soul and the organs of the body there is interposed a subtle element of a somewhat spiritual nature by means of which the action of the soul reaches the organs of the body. This element Augustine designates "Light" or "Air;" that is, he atrributes to it a nature analogous to that of light and air. In this way he tries to bridge over the chasm that separates the spiritual soul from matter. He is, however, ready to admit that it remains a mystery impossible of adequate comprehension *how* the soul is united to a material body.

13. The human soul, in so far as it is a sensitive soul, shows its activity in the functions of sensuous knowledge and sensuous appetite. To the faculty of sensuous knowledge belong the external senses, the *Sensus Communis* or General Sense in which the external senses are united, the Imagination (vis spiritalis) and the Sensuous Memory. The Sensuous Appetite is the faculty of sensuous pleasure. To the soul, as spirit, Augustine assigns three fundamental faculties:—Intellectual Memory (memoria), Intelligence (intelligentia), and Will (voluntas). Furthermore, Intelligence is either intuitive or discursive, and we must, therefore distinguish between Intellect (mens) and Reason (ratio). In other parts of his work, (*De Quant. Anim.* c. 27), Augustine substitutes,

for the last two terms, the expressions Ratio and Ratiocinatio. The distinction here laid down is, it must be remembered, only relative.

14. The soul, being spirit, is created after the image of the Triune God. All other things exhibit the imprint (vestigia) of the Trinity in their unity, form, and order; but in the soul we have the image (imago) of God. Augustine explains variously wherein the image of God consists. He finds it in the trinity of elements—Being, Knowledge, Will; in the three fundamental faculties—Memory, Intelligence, Will; and lastly in the action of these three fundamental faculties when they are concerned with God. When the soul *remembers* God, the *thought* of God proceeds from this recollection, and with this thought is conjoined the *love* of God, which serves as it were to bind together the recollection and the thought. In this threefold action is reflected, in clear outline, the triune life of God.

15. The soul is, of its nature, immortal. For this proposition Augustine adduces many proofs, akin, for the most part, to the Platonist reasoning; of this kind are the following:—

(*a*) That thing in which the imperishable exists is itself imperishable. Now truth exists in the soul, inasmuch as the soul possesses it by knowledge. Truth is imperishable. Therefore, the soul must be imperishable also.

(*b*) The soul is identified with Reason. Now Reason, as such, is immortal, for the principles of Reason are immortal. It follows that the soul is imperishable, if the soul be inseparable from Reason. That it is inseparable is proved by the fact that the union of the soul with Reason is not an union in space, and the one, by consequence, cannot be separated from the other. The soul, accordingly, is imperishable; and, since Reason can exist only in a living subject, the union of Reason with the soul implies not only the indefectibility of the latter, but also the perpetuity of its life—namely, its immortality, in the true sense of the term.

(*c*) The essential distinction between soul and body consists in this, that the soul is life, whilst the body is merely animated. If the soul, like the body, could be deprived of life, it would cease to be a soul, it would be like the body, merely a something animated (animatum). The soul, therefore, cannot lose its life; that is, it is immortal.

(*d*) Being has no contrary principle which can destroy it (essentiæ nihil contrarium). The body though dissolved after death does not lose its being, for its elements remain; so the soul also must endure, that is, it is imperishable. Nor is there any principle contrary to the *life* of the soul which can destroy it. The life of the soul is truth, and the contrary of truth is error; but error, it is clear, cannot destroy the life of the soul. It follows that not only in its being, but also in its life, the soul is imperishable; that is to say, it is immortal.

Ethics.

§ 78.

1. The subjective basis of moral life is free will. Augustine uses the term liberty in a twofold sense: the one liberty of choice, the other freedom from evil, and freedom for (supernatural) good.

Free will, as a faculty of choice, is, according to Augustine, an essential attribute of man, for

(*a*) Will is will precisely because it is exempted from physical necessity and determines itself to act or to forbear. Freedom is involved in this essential notion of will; a will without freedom is inconceivable. (*De Lib. Arb.*, III. c. 3.)

(*b*) Furthermore, consciousness testifies clearly to the freedom of the will. Of what are we more keenly conscious than of the fact that we have a will, and that we act by our will, unconstrained by any necessity? (*De Lib. Arb.*, III. c. 1.)

(*c*) Without free will, the distinction between good and evil becomes unintelligible. If we were not free we could not be bound by any moral law: merit and demerit, reward and punishment, praise and blame, would be wholly meaningless. The very remorse which we experience in reference to certain actions is evident proof of free will, for we could not feel remorse for an act the performance or omission of which was not in our power. (*De Act. cont. Felic. Man.*, II. c. 8.)

2. Freedom from evil and freedom for (supernatural) good is not, according to Augustine, an essential attribute of the human will, it depends on the grace of God. This grace alone can free us from evil and bestow the capability for (supernatural) good, as well as the desire of attaining it. Free will, as a faculty of choice, the *liberum arbitrium*, cannot be lost, but the freedom from evil and the freedom for (supernatural) good may be forfeited, though not otherwise than by our own fault.

Free will, as a faculty of choice, is not destroyed or impaired by God's providence. God foresees the actions of men as they are, namely, as free acts, which we are at liberty to perform or to omit. The foreknowledge of God does not deprive free acts of their character of freedom. Man's act is not what it is, because God foresees it thus, but rather God foresees it thus, because it is what it is. If man's act were other than it is, God would have foreseen it to be otherwise.

3. With this teaching regarding free will we may associate Augustine's doctrine regarding the Sovereign Good. He distinguishes two kinds of good, the enjoyable and the useful. The enjoyable is that which, when possessed, makes us happy, and which, therefore, we desire for its own sake; the useful is that which is merely a means to the attainment of another good, and which, therefore, we desire and strive after for sake of something else.

4. This being premised, it becomes clear that the Sovereign Good

must have the following characteristics:—It must be an enjoyable good, which being possessed makes us completely happy. It must be inalienable; a happiness which could be lost would not be true or perfect happiness at all. Lastly, it must be the source not only of our highest happiness, but also of our supreme perfection, for good, of its own nature, is calculated not only to make us happy but also to make us perfect.

5. If this be so, it follows that the Sovereign Good cannot consist either in sensual pleasure, or in virtue, for neither of these exhibits the characteristics which belong to the Sovereign Good. The Sovereign Good must be something higher than man; it can be no other than God—the Infinite Good. The supreme happiness of man must, therefore, consist in the eternal contemplation and love of God, the Sovereign Good. It follows that for man God is the only enjoyable good, and that every other good is merely a useful good, that is to say, it should be used only for the attainment of eternal happiness in God.

6. It follows, further, that supreme happiness is not attainable in this life, and that it is reserved for us in the life to come. The ultimate end of man is to attain eternal happiness in God; his ultimate end is, therefore, not attainable in this life, it must be secured hereafter. This leads at once to the rule of life for man. Man's duty here below is to strive after the Sovereign Good, that is, to live so as to attain to the Sovereign Good in the life to come.

7. The path of duty, in this respect, is marked for us by the Divine Law. We must act according to this law in order to fulfil the duty set us in life, and it is precisely in living and acting according to this law that moral goodness consists. But to fulfil this law in every respect, it is necessary to strive after virtue; in virtue consists our moral perfection. Moral goodness is essentially connected with the final destiny of man; so too, is virtue. Virtue is essentially the means to the attainment of the Sovereign Good; this relation apart, virtue ceases to be virtue; it becomes a mere form of self-deification which is vice, not virtue.

8. Virtue is defined by Augustine "Animi habitus, naturæ modo et rationi consentaneus" (*Cont. Jul. Pelag.*, IV., c. 3); or, as "Ars bene recteque vivendi" (*De Civit. Dei*, XIV., c. 9). It is, therefore, a capability or tendency of the will for good, acquired by the practice of what is good, and which implies strength and firmness of will in well-doing. Virtue does not require that man should be wholly inaccessible to the movements of passion; the so-called ἀπάθεια is unnatural and contrary to virtue; virtue requires only that the πάθη should be kept under control, that they should be restrained within the limits prescribed by the moral law, and thus made subservient to rightness of life.

9. The Divine Law being the rule and standard of moral action, the point or precept of this law which is the basis of the whole and which includes within it all other precepts, is the Law of Love. First in this order is the love of God; the love of God is our first and highest duty. This love leads us to refer to God all that we are, all that we have, and all that we do, and thus to make of ourselves an offering to Him. From the love of God is derived the true love of self, in virtue of which we

seek what is best for us, our Supreme Good, God Himself. With this is united the love of our neighbour, which consists in this, that we desire for our neighbour as for ourselves his highest good, and, as far as in us lies, assist him to attain it.

10. As the law of love is the fundamental law of our moral life, so love is the fundamental virtue. It is the basis of all other virtues; all other virtues are only special aspects of the virtue of love. In the first place, this holds good with regard to the Cardinal Virtues—Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice. Prudence is love, in so far as it discriminates clearly between what is a help to it and what is a hinderance. Fortitude is love, in so far as it boldly and readily undergoes all things for sake of the object it loves. Temperance is love, in so far as it maintains itself inviolate and undefiled for sake of what it loves. Finally, Justice is love, in so far as its service is wholly for the object loved, and it thus acquires dominion over all things else. (*De Mor. Eccl.*, I., c. 15.) Love is, thus, the source of all that is morally good, and no work has worth or merit before God if it be not done for love.

11. Evil is not a real substantial entity; everything that is, in so far as it is, is both true and good. Evil is merely negation—negation of the good which ought to exist—that is to say, it is a *privation* of good. Evil is, therefore, possible only through good; if there were no good, a privation of good or loss of good would not be possible. A being absolutely evil, in which no good whatever exists, is an impossibility; be it ever so evil, inasmuch as it is or has being, it is to that extent good. Absolute evil is absolute negation—mere nothing.

12. These considerations exhibit to us the relation which subsists between evil and the natural order. Evil is contrary to nature, since it deprives nature of its befitting good. In this sense it may be described as a deterioration or corruption of nature. But evil cannot destroy nature, for the corruption induced by evil supposes a nature or substance corrupted, and the destruction of this would involve the disappearance of the evil.

13. With regard to the cause of evil, we must distinguish between the remote and the proximate cause. The remote cause is the finiteness and mutability of created things. It is only a being which is finite and changeable which can be subject to evil. God, the absolutely immutable, is beyond the reach of evil; for the immutable, as such, cannot undergo a privation of good. The proximate source of evil is the free will of man. Free will alone can effect evil, as it alone can effect good. But beyond its freedom no further reason can be assigned why the free will does evil rather than good. The Manicheans are absurd, when they assign man's bodily nature as a reason to explain why he does evil.

14. We must distinguish two kinds of evil (*malum*): the *malum culpæ*, and the *malum pœnæ*. The former is moral evil—evil in the strict sense of the term; the latter is a consequence of the former, and is occasioned by it. To begin with moral evil: it must consist in the privation of moral good, in man's turning away from his Sovereign Good, and giving himself to good that is changeable. Good that is

changeable is not, indeed, evil in itself; but when man prefers it to the Sovereign Good, and sets it above the Sovereign Good, he perverts and disturbs right order, and precisely in this perversion of order lies the evil of his action. This turning away from the Sovereign Good, and turning to evil, takes place when man violates the Divine law, which marks for him the path to the Sovereign Good. Hence moral evil—sin—may be defined "Dictum, factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei." (*Contra Faust. Manich.*, XXII., c. 27.)

15. The *malum pœnæ* is the actual loss of the Sovereign Good, incurred as the punishment of moral evil. This last constitutes unhappiness, for happiness can consist only in the possession of the Supreme Good. In the present life, this unhappiness is not felt in its full force, for the good of the mutable and created order goes some way to compensate for the loss; but in the life to come such compensation is not admissible, and the fulness of misery must then be experienced. Such is the punishment of moral evil. That it should be inflicted is a requirement of God's justice, and from this point of view it may be called good, since it is an effect of God's justice. It is, therefore, an evil only for the man on whom it falls; and in so far as it is thus an evil it is caused by man himself, for he has provoked it by his sin. As a requirement of justice it is good, for it is a restoration of the order that had been disturbed; viewed in this light, it has God for its author.

16. We see, then, that a good action implies an approach to God, the Supreme Being; whereas an evil action implies a separation from the Supreme Being—a movement towards nothingness. Hence, it is only the good action which is a positive entity in every respect; the evil act is positive only as an act; the direction in which it tends is to non-being, it is in this regard something merely negative. This analysis warranted Augustine in asserting that evil may be said to have, not a *causa efficiens* but a *causa deficiens*, for it is essentially a defection from the highest perfection—a retrogression towards imperfection and nothingness. (*De Civ. Dei*, XII., c. 7.)

17. So much with regard to the general lines of Augustine's Ethics. His teaching on the subject of Grace and Redemption falls, no doubt, under this section; but we cannot follow him into these questions; they belong to the history of dogma, not to the history of philosophy. We content ourselves with noticing a few points:

(*a.*) The first man, says Augustine, enjoyed freedom from evil and freedom for good, he consequently had power not to sin—"posse non peccare." He needed, it is true, for this the assistance of God, but this assistance was merely an *adjutorium sine quo non*, that is, an aid without which he could not succeed in avoiding evil and doing good; but not a grace *by means of which* he did good.

(*b.*) But when the first man sinned, the guilt and the punishment of his sin descended upon all his posterity, for the reason that they were all contained *seminaliter* in him. In consequence of this inherited sin, man can no longer do that which is connected with his supernatural destiny, and he is thus made subject to evil. To the "posse non peccare" has succeeded the "non posse non peccare." Not that man is forced to evil by any intrinsic necessity, but that man is so hampered by sensual desires, that he can no longer shake himself free from evil, for sensuality is ever dragging him down to it again.

(*c.*) The human race was delivered from sin and its punishments by Christ. By His

Passion and Death. Christ has merited for us the grace which destroys evil within us, and makes us again capable of good. This grace, by which we do good, is not a mere *adjutorium sine quo non*, it is an *adjutorium quo*, that is, it not only makes the good possible for us, it also effects the good within us, although not without our will, or further than our will co-operates. This grace restores the "posse non peccare," it leads us to the condition of eternal perfection, where the "posse non peccare" is replaced by the "non posse peccare."

(*d.*) Redemption is, on the part of God, a free act. He would not have acted unjustly had He left all men in original sin and under the condemnation which follows it. But He was pleased to show, on the one hand, what the offence of man deserved, and on the other what His own mercy could effect. He, therefore, elected from the *massa damnationis* a portion of the human race to be saved by His gratuitous grace, while He left the rest in the *massa damnationis*.

(*e.*) This election is called in Scripture *Predestination*. The non-predestined are not altogether excluded from God's grace; but it is only in the elect that grace produces its full effect, leading them effectually to their destined end. To the non-predestined it is not an injustice that they are not elected; they have deserved condemnation: God does not predestine them to evil; it is only because of His knowledge of the evil which they do that they are condemned. This is what the Scripture signifies by the term *Reprobation*.

(*f.*) From the outset, God's grace delivered a certain number of human beings from perdition, and this number constituted the kingdom of God, as opposed to the kingdom of the world. The entire time covered by the existence of the human race is no more than the period of development for these two kingdoms. In the end will come the complete separation of the elect from the reprobate. After the general resurrection, the former will receive eternal reward, the latter eternal punishment. There is no restoration of the reprobate, as imagined by Origen.

18. The vastness of the doctrinal system of Augustine is apparent from even this brief sketch. His inquiries covered the whole range of speculative knowledge, and his clear and penetrating mind diffused light in every region of its investigations. It is not a matter of surprise that Augustine's teaching should have exercised a larger influence on the development of Christian philosophy than that of any other thinker.

Claudianus Mamertus, Boethius, Cassiodorus.

§ 79.

1. With Augustine, the development of Christian philosophy in the West came for a time to an end. It was not, however, that the intellects of the Christian Church had lost their power, or that the ardour for scientific investigation had grown cold. The cause was wholly external in character; it is to be sought in the disturbances produced by the barbarian invasion. This migration of nations brought about the overthrow of existing social conditions; and the long wars and turmoils which succeeded it rendered impossible the peaceful development of intellectual life, and gave little leisure for philosophic thought. It was only in the retirement of the monasteries that Christian science could still find an asylum. Here it took refuge, and here it continued to exist through the long period of general catastrophe, waiting for times more favourable to its progress. It is noticeable that, after the time of Augustine, the labours of the men who concerned themselves

with science were directed chiefly to collecting and preserving what had already been created. They laboured to preserve and transmit to better times the results already achieved by Christian science. To this their efforts were directed and in this consisted their chief merit.

2. Of importance as a philosopher is the priest Claudianus Mamertus, of Vienne, in Gaul (about the middle of the 5th century), because of his defence of the doctrine of the spirituality of the soul, contained in his work *De Statu Animæ*. The Semi-Pelagians, Cassian, Faustus, and Gennadius (of the 5th century), following Tertullian and Hilary, had taught that the soul is of corporeal nature. God alone, they had held, is incorporeal; all created things are corporeal, the human soul with the rest. Everything created, they argued, is limited, has consequently its place in space, and is therefore corporeal; everything created has quality and quantity; God alone is above and beyond the Categories; quality implies extension, and extension, without corporeal substance, is inconceivable. Furthermore, the soul dwells within the body, and for this reason is of limited extension, and is, consequently, a corporeal substance. In point of quality, it is of a nature resembling light or air, but is, nevertheless, corporeal.

3. Against this doctrine Claudianus protests. The world, to be perfect, he argues, must contain in itself beings of all kinds; hence God must have created incorporeal beings, and to this class belong the souls of men. A further reason for holding human souls to be incorporeal is the teaching of Scripture that they are made after the likeness of the incorporeal God. The soul cannot be brought under the category of quantity, for its faculties of memory, reason, will, have no extension; and since these faculties are one with the substance of the soul, the soul also must be without extension or quantity. The incorporeal nature of the soul is further shown in the soul's intellectual activity. Sensible objects are perceived by it in unsensuous fashion, and besides, it is capable of comprehending the supersensuous and incorporeal. From this we are forced to conclude that the soul is itself supersensuous and incorporeal, for it could not, otherwise, have knowledge of objects of this kind. Finally, the soul is present in every part of the body, for it has perception of the impressions made on the different parts of the body. But it could not be present simultaneously in these several parts if it were not incorporeal.

4. Boethius Senator of Rome, who flourished under Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths (A.D. 470-526), and whom the accusations of his enemies consigned to long captivity and finally to death, did much to preserve the learning of the ancients and of earlier Christianity. He translated the logical works of Aristotle, with the Isagoge of Porphyry, on which he wrote a commentary. He also wrote a commentary on Cicero's *Topica*. The aim of Boethius in these writings was purely didactic. He endeavoured to transmit the achievements of earlier philosophers, in the form most easy of understanding. The genuineness of the treatise *De Trinitate* is disputed.

5. But his most remarkable work is the book *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, composed by him while in prison. It is classical in style, and is written partly in prose and partly in verse; its contents may be described as a kind of Theodicea or Natural Theology. He endeavours to prove that the supreme good for man does not consist in riches or other possessions: not in power or glory; not in posts of honour or pleasure; in a word not in finite good: that it lies beyond time, and can be no other than God. God, as the fulness of goodness, is the sovereign good for man. In the possession of God consists the happiness after which all are striving. To strive for this supreme good is the duty set us in life. The purpose of God's providence is to lead us to this end. In furtherance of this purpose, God makes use of the most varied means, some pleasing to man, other some an affliction to him. The good and the evil which happen to man in life are, in God's design, alike contrived for his salvation. The conviction that happiness awaits us beyond the grave, and that the good and the evil of life are means to attain it, is the firmest support of man in the vicissitudes of life: as long as he holds fast by this truth he cannot be dismayed.

6. The Senator Cassiodorus was a contemporary of Boethius (A.D. 468-575), and, like him, held important public offices under Theodoric. But he ultimately retired into the convent of Vivarium, near Squillace in Bruttii, and there, with his monks, devoted himself exclusively to study and education. He composed a treatise on theological education, and on the liberal arts (Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric—the Trivium; Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy—the Quadrivium.) These arts he held to be of much utility, as they aid us to acquire an understanding of Scripture and a knowledge of God. His treatise *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Artium Liberalium* was much used as a text-book in succeeding centuries.

7. In his work *De Anima*, Cassiodorus cites for the spirituality of the soul the same proofs as Claudianus. The human soul is not a part of God, for it is mutable; but it is created after the image of God, and is therefore incorporeal. The category of Quantity cannot be applied to the soul, for the reason that it is present in every part of the body. As to the soul's Quality, it is of the nature of light. And, since it is created to the image of the immortal Creator, the soul, too, is immortal.

8. In the first half of the seventh century lived Isidore, Bishop of Seville, who did much for the spread of learning among the Visigoths. His chief work is the treatise *Originum sive Etymologiarum*, a work of encyclopædic character, which embraces all the knowledge of the time, sacred and profane. He was also the author of three books of *Sentences*, a Handbook of Christian Doctrine, much prized in later times and largely used as a text-book in schools, and finally of the books *De Ordine Creaturarum* and *De Natura Rerum*.

9. Venerable Bede (A.D. 674-735), was the first to spread instruction and to diffuse knowledge among the Anglo-Saxons. His works are numerous and very varied in character, but they consist more of extracts and collections than original products of thought. He composed some excellent summaries for use in teaching. Most important in connection with philosophy is his work *De Natura Rerum*, which followed the lines of the work bearing the same name by Isidore.

These were the men who handed down the inheritance of learning, and prepared the way for the new era—the middle ages.

SECOND PERIOD.

HISTORY OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

GENERAL SURVEY.

§ 80.

1. The invasion of the barbarians laid the Empire of Rome in ruins. The Christian Church had her share in the disasters which overwhelmed the empire; her institutions suffered sadly in the turmoil. Wherever the barbarians established a footing they overturned and destroyed what she had created at infinite cost of self-sacrifice.

2. But the catastrophe which wrought this evil created conditions in which the Church was enabled to exercise her influence effectively on the social life of the new nations. The civilisation of Rome had passed away. Within the empire the Church had been able to establish flourishing Christian communities, in which the virtues of Christianity were carried to their fullest development. But she had not been able to effect a general reform of national and social life, nor to infuse the spirit of Christian life into the people as a whole.

3. The new nations offered a more favourable field for her regenerating activity. They were not enervated by an obsolete and effete civilisation. They were full of the vigour of healthy life; they were much more amenable to the vivifying influence of the Christian spirit; and under the influence of this spirit they built up their national and social institutions.

4. The task before the Church was not an easy one. She had to put forth all the strength within her, in her conflict with the barbarians. Again and again the fierce instincts of barbarism broke forth in wild revolt against her teaching. But she carried on her work undaunted. Relying on the Divine authority with which she was invested she firmly confronted the inrushing hordes, conquered their savage ferocity, and brought them at length under the rule and discipline of Christian civilisation.

5. The way was now cleared for the development of civilised life on new lines; and this development was effected in all directions,

notably in the sphere of science. The obstacles which the confusion of the times had put in the way of scientific studies had been removed, and the spirit of scientific investigation started on its path with renewed life and energy. Theology and philosophy were the first to enter upon the path of progress; their developments were remarkable, and the results obtained of signal and lasting value.

6. Side by side with Christianity another power enters into the history of the Middle Ages. In the beginning of the seventh century (610) Mohammed founded in Arabia a new religion—the religion of Islam. Force was the means on which the prophet relied for the establishment of his system: he imposed it as a religious duty upon his followers to propagate Islam with fire and sword. The fierce fanaticism thus evoked bore down all before it. Mohammed's successors, the Khalifs, added conquest to conquest. Persia, Syria, Phœnicia, Palestine, the islands of Cyprus and Rhodes, Egypt, and Northern Africa were overrun and subdued in fifteen years. From Africa the tide of invasion poured into Spain, and thence the Moors pushed their conquests into France, where their course was at last arrested by Charles Martel on the field of Poitiers (732).

7. When the first ardour of fanaticism had subsided, and orderly government had been introduced into the dominions of the Khalifs, culture of a certain kind found a place in Islam. The desire for knowledge grew out of these beginnings. A movement of thought was created, which gave rise in the course of the Middle Ages to an "Arabian" theology and philosophy, which engaged the energies of notable men of learning, and which were taught in schools founded by the Khalifs. These schools, and the learned men attached to them, enjoyed a wide reputation, not merely among the followers of Islam, but among Christian scholars also; and the Arabian philosophers exercised an important influence in the development of Christian philosophy among the people of the West.

8. Judaism entered as another factor into mediæval civilisation. After the destruction of their city by the Romans the Jews were dispersed among the nations. But they remained united by racial bonds, and continued to retain some of the characteristics of a nation. Their distinctive peculiarities found expression in the domain of learning. Among the Jews of the Middle Ages there arose many distinguished scholars, who devoted themselves to theological and philosophical studies, and who carried into the field of science the characteristics of Judaism. In many respects they stood in close relation with the Arabians, but, on the whole, they have a character distinctively their own.

9. We have, therefore, to distinguish in the history of mediæval philosophy three well marked lines of development—the Christian, the Arabian, and the Jewish. Such movements in the field of philosophy as are presented to us by the Byzantine Empire during

the Middle Ages are isolated and unconnected: no genuine development of philosophic thought is discernible in them. We shall, therefore, bestow only a brief notice on them. We shall then follow the development of mediæval philosophy in its three main lines, treating first of Arabian and Jewish philosophy—the latter in close connection with the former—and ending with a review of the progress and development of Christian philosophy.

Brief Notice of Mediæval Greek Philosophy.

§ 81.

1. Among the Greeks and Syrians, after Neo-Platonism declined, and particularly, after it had been formally prohibited by a decree of the Emperor Justinian (529.) the philosophy of Aristotle came to be held more and more in esteem—the Aristotelian Dialectic being largely employed in theological controversies, first by the heretics and then by the teachers of orthodoxy. So early as the fifth century the school of the Syrian Nestorians at Edessa had become a chief seat of the Aristotelian philosophy. The most ancient work on this philosophy which we owe to the Syrians is a commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* by Probus, a contemporary of Bishop Ibas of Edessa. Probus also wrote commentaries on the *Anal. Prior* and the *Soph. Elench.*

2. When the School of Edessa was broken up by command of the Emperor Zeno, (489) owing to its support of Nestorianism, its members fled in large numbers to Persia, and there, under the protection of the Sassanidæ, disseminated their philosophical as well as their religious doctrines. Out of the remains of the School of Edessa grew up the schools of Nisibis and Gandispora—the latter a school of medicine as well as of philosophy; and in both the philosophy of Aristotle was cultivated.

3. Later, though with less zeal than the Nestorians, the Syrian Monophysites and Jacobites gave themselves to the study of Aristotle. Schools of Aristotelian philosophy arose at Resaina and Kinnesrin. The first to promote these studies was Sergius of Resaina, who, in the sixth century, translated Aristotle into Syriac. Of the scholars of Kinnesrin the most remarkable is James of Edessa, who translated various theological and philosophical treatises into Syriac; his translation of the Categories of Aristotle is extant in manuscript. We may further mention Abulfaragius (in the 13th century) who compiled a compendium of Peripatetic Philosophy. (*Butyrum Sapientiæ.*)

4. Among the Greeks proper, we have already made acquaintance with John of Damascus (about A.D. 700,) whose sympathy with Aristotle we have indicated. (cf. p. 262.) In the second half of the ninth century Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, became distinguished for his great learning; his *Bibliotheca* contains extracts from a large number of philosophical treatises. His work on the Aristotelian *Categories* exists in manuscript.

5. In the eleventh century we find Michael Psellus distinguished as a logician. Besides an Introduction to Philosophy which includes an account of the opinions of philosophers regarding the soul, commentaries on the *Quinque voces* of Porphyry, and on Aristotle's Categories and *De Interpretatione*, he wrote a Compendium of Aristotelian Logic with the title Σύνοψις εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους λογικὴν ἐπιστήμην, in five books, the fifth of which contains the *Topics* according to Themistius.

6. In reference to this Compendium it is specially worthy of notice that here for the first time appear the mnemonics which have since been used in the logical treatises on the Syllogism; α is employed

to signify the universal affirmative, ε the universal negative, ι the particular affirmative, and ο the particular negative. The mnemonic words which Psellus employed to signify the moods of the first figure are: γράμματα, ἔγραψε, γραφίδι, τεχνικός; for the moods of the second figures: ἔγραψε, κάτεχε, μέτριον, ἄχολον; for those of the third: ἅπασι, σθεναρός, ἰσάκις, ἀσπίδι, ὁμαλός, φέριστος; for those of the fourth: γράμμασιν, ἔταξε, χάρισι, πάρθενος, ἱερόν. In the Latin translation of the Commentary of Psellus by William Shyreswood, Lambert of Auxerre, and Petrus Hispanus, the Greek words were replaced by the familiar *Barbara*, *Celarent*, *Darii*, etc. In the last chapter of the *Topics* we find a chapter upon the force of the various parts of speech under the title; *De Terminorum Proprietatibus;* this has been reproduced in the Latin treatises on Logic.

7. A contemporary and rival of Psellus, and later, his successor in the dignity of ὕπατος φιλοσόφων, was Joannes Italicus, who wrote commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle. To this period belongs also Michael Ephesius, and to the twelfth-century Eustratius, Metropolitan of Nicæa, both of whom wrote commentaries on different parts of Aristotle's *Organon*. About the middle of the thirteenth century we find Nicephorus Blemmides composing an ἐπιτομὴ λογικῆς, and Georgius Aneponymus compiling a compendium of the Logic of Aristotle. In the fourteenth century Georgius Pachymeres appeared as the author of a Compendium of the Aristotelian Logic, and Theodorus Metochita wrote paraphrases of the physiological and psychological writings of Aristotle, as well as treatises upon Plato and other philosophers. Cfr. Ueberweg, vol. I., s. 150 sqq.

HISTORY OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

THE ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 82.

1. The Arabs, formed by Mohammed into a warlike people and entrusted with the duty of propagating Islam by the sword, exercised a destroying influence on scientific culture wherever they established themselves—and this for about a century after the death of the Prophet. The destruction of the Library of Alexandria by Amru, the General of the Khalif Omar (640), is a fact for which history vouches. But when the first fervour of fanaticism had passed, and the Mohammedan sovereignty settled down into an established form of government, there arose among the Arabs a scientific movement which was not without its useful results.

2. The first scientific efforts were, as might have been expected, directed to explain the Koran and the doctrines it propounded. The theology thus created was at first mainly *critical*, but theological differences soon arose, sects were formed, and, as a consequence, theology assumed a certain *dogmatic* character. The teachers of theology were named *Motekâllemin*—teachers of the *Kelam*—*i.e.*, of the Word, or revealed faith. An offshoot of this school of teachers, at a later time, were known as *Motazalen*, a sect who rejected the blind faith in the Koran prescribed by the Motekâllemin, and adopted a rationalistic attitude towards its doctrines.

3. From the time of the establishment of the dynasty of the Abassidæ (750) Aristotelian philosophy was received with favour among the Arabs. This was specially the case under the Khalif Al Mamum (813–833). The Arabs owed their first acquaintance with Aristotle's writings to the Syrian Christians. These Syrian Christians took service as physicians among the Arabs; they translated at first treatises on medicine, and then philosophical writings; and as the philosophy of Aristotle, because of the importance which it attached to the observation of nature, had a special affinity with the medical sciences, this philosophy first engaged the attention of the translators. These translations of Aristotle were made first into Syriac and then into Arabic. It thus happened that Aristotelian Philosophy was received among the Arabs associated with medicine. This association was, to a large extent, enduring; the most celebrated Arabian philosophers were, as a rule, celebrated physicians.

4. By direction of Al Mamum translations of Aristotelian writings were made under the guidance of John Ibn-al-Batuk. The work was continued under Motawakkel by Honein Ibn Ishak (Johannitius), a Nestorian (+876), who presided over a school of translators at Bagdad, which included his son Ishak ben Honein, and his nephew Hobeisch-al-Asam. In the tenth century new translations were undertaken by Syrian Christians, the most notable of whom were the Nestorians Abu Baschar Mata and Fahja ben Adi, the Tagritan, as also Isa ben Zaraa. We may also mention among these scholars John Messuah, a learned Greek. The translations of these writers included, not merely the works of Aristotle, but those also of many Aristotelians (of Alexander Ephrodisius and Themistius, and of the Neo-Platonist interpreters, such as Porphyry, Ammonius, and Galen), the *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Laws* of Plato, as well as selections from the Neo-Platonists, particularly from Proclus.

5. The translators became interpreters also, in order to make intelligible to the Arabs doctrines so foreign to their ways of thought as were the physical science and philosophy of the Greeks. The traditions of Greek philosophy which still survived were a remnant of that combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism which had been taught by the last philsophers of antiquity, and hence it was that the Aristotelian philosophy which the Arabs received through the Greco-Syrian translators and interpreters bore the imprint of Neo-Platonism. This explains the prevalence among the early Arab Aristotelians of Neo-Platonist notions; it was only by degrees they emancipated themselves from this influence, and attained to a truer understanding of the philosophy of Aristotle.

6. In this way there was formed among the Arabs, from the time

of the Abassidæ, a genuine Arabico-Aristotelian philosophy, which took its place side by side with Arab theology. The Khalifs protected and encouraged it by founding libraries and schools; of which the most celebrated in the East were those of Bagdad. The zeal for philosophy was carried by the Ommaiads and Moors into Spain, but the Spanish schools flourished at a later period than those of the East. The most remarkable of the Spanish schools was that of Cordova.

7. This Aristotelian philosophy among the Arabs was not, however, in perfect accord with the Koran. We shall see that on many points, *e.g.*, the eternity of the world, the Providence of God, etc., it differed essentially from the teaching of the Koran. The Arabian Aristotelians were fully aware of this, and endeavoured accordingly, to set themselves right, as far as they could, with the doctrines of their religion. This accord between Science and Religion they sought to establish in one of two ways:—

(*a*) They admitted that Religion contained the genuine truth, but that it exhibited the truth only in symbols, for the reason that the common people can be reached by the truth only when it is symbolically expressed. Religion, as it stands, is intended for the people, and for the people alone; to them knowledge can come only through Religion. It is the task of philosophy to remove from the truth the veil of symbolism, and, by methods of rational inquiry, to rise to the knowledge of truth in its purity. In this process it must not disparage Religion, but neither must Religion be made a rule and criterion of knowledge for the learned. The wise man listens only to the voice of Reason. But the influence of Religion upon the people must not be impaired; and to avoid this philosophy must be confined to the circle of the wise; it would be poison for the multitude.

(*b*) This manner of determining the relations between Science and Religion was not, however, wholly satisfactory; for the philosophers put forward points of doctrine which were distinctly contradictory of the teachings of the Koran. In cases of this kind they endeavoured to save themselves by appeal to the principle that scientific opinions of this sort were justifiable and true in the domain of Reason and Philosophy, but in this domain only—they were false in the sphere of Religion and of Faith. It was the business of the philosophers to teach what was true according to Reason and Philosophy; they did not assert that these doctrines were true according to Religion and to Faith; on the contrary, they were bound to hold, and did hold, that from this point of view they were false. This distinction, which we shall find maintained both by Avicenna and Averroes, establishes as a principle the contradiction between Reason and Religion; but this was only to enable philosophy to maintain itself against the requirements of the Koran.

8. This was not, however, enough to satisfy the Motekâllemin, the uncompromising advocates of the Koran. In their eyes the

Aristotelians were heretics, and they accordingly treated them as an heretical sect in Islam. But they were led further, in consequence of the divergence of the Aristotelians from the orthodox doctrine. The Motekâllemin could no longer rest satisfied with a mere explanation of the Koran; they were constrained to offer rational arguments in favour of its chief tenets, especially of those with which the philosophers were at variance, and to refute by the same method the opposing doctrines. In this way the dogmatic teaching of the Arabs came to acquire a certain philosophic character; and a certain kind of religious philosophy was created which played a not unimportant part in the history of Arabian thought.

9. Following the division of our subject indicated in this brief survey of the Arabian philosophy, we will treat first of the Arabian Aristotelians—the "philosophers" proper; and then we will notice that Philosophy of Religion which, among the Arabs, was opposed to the "philosophy" of the Aristotelians.

THE ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS.

I.—In The East.

Alkendi, Alfarabi, and Avicenna.

§ 83.

1. It is usual to regard Alkendi as the founder of the Arabico-Aristotelian philosophy. Alkendi was a native of Basra, on the Gulf of Persia; he lived in the reign of Al Mamum during the first half of the ninth century, and died about the year 870. He was skilled alike in Astronomy, Mathematics, and Medicine, and won for himself the honourable title of "Philosopher of the Arabs." He wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle—on the metaphysical treatises as on the others. "His system of Astrology was founded on the assumption of a general causal connection between all things, in consequence of which each object contemplated in the totality of its relations, became as it were a mirror of the universe." The rigid followers of the Koran regarded him as a heretic.

2. Of still greater fame was Alfarabi, a philosopher of the tenth century. He was born towards the end of the ninth century at Balak, in the province of Farab, was educated at Bagdad, and began his career as a teacher in that city. At a later period he proceeded to Aleppo, and thence to Damascus, where he joined the mystical sect of the Sufites, without, however, abandoning his work as a teacher of philosophy (+950). His writings consist of short essays, in which he follows closely the methods of the Greek Neo-Platonists. Two of his treatises, *De Scientiis* and *De Intellectu et Intellecto*, were published at Paris in 1638 in a Latin translation. Schmölders

(*Documenta Phil. Arab.*, Bonn 1836), adds two others: *Commentatio de Rebus Studio Arist. Philosophiæ præmittendis* and *Fontes Quæstionum.*

3. Alfarabi was followed by the most celebrated of all the Arabian Aristotelians of the East—Avicenna (Ibn Sina). He was born at Affena, in the province of Bokhara, in 980. At an early age he studied Philosophy and Medicine at Bagdad, and this with such happy results, that at the age of twenty-one, he wrote works on philosophical and medical subjects. He subsequently laboured as a teacher of philosophy and medicine at Ispahan. His moral shortcomings were notorious; he was addicted to wine and sensual indulgence, and thereby hastened his death. He died in the year 1037. His works most deserving of notice are his Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics, his shorter treatises: *De Divisione Scientiarum*, *De Definitis et Quæsitis*, *De Almahad*, *De Anima*, *Aphorismata de Anima*, and lastly, his celebrated *Canon Medicinæ*, which for centuries was in high repute, and ranked as a standard authority in medical science.

4. As regards the relations of Avicenna to his predecessors, it may be stated that on all points of teaching he follows closely the views of Alfarabi. If we compare the systems of the two men we find no essential difference between them, we notice only that Avicenna gives fuller development to the fundamental doctrines laid down by Alfarabi. In order, therefore, to avoid needless repetition, we will here sketch merely the main points of Avicenna's teaching, premising that in these we shall find expressed the broad lines of Alfarabi's also.

5. In the Logic of Avicenna, special stress is laid upon the principle: *Intellectus in formis agit universalitatem;* that is to say, the essential forms of things are, in themselves, neither universal nor individual; that they may become the one or the other, the intervention of a cause is necessary. The cause of their individuality is matter; for only in so far as they are actualized in matter do they become individual. The cause of their universality, on the other hand, is Intellect; for only in so far as they are apprehended by Intellect, apart from the matter in which they are actualized, and by Intellect referred to individual objects as a *Predicabile de Omnibus*, do they become universal.

6. Hence Matter is the principle of the plurality of objects within the same species; Intellect, on the other hand, is the principle of the unity of these several objects in the species. And here we have to understand Intellect in a double sense—the Divine and Human. Of these the former is antecedent to things, the latter follows them. The universal exists *ante rem*, in the Divine Intellect; then *in re* in so far as its content constitutes the *Essence* or *Quiddity* of the individual objects; and lastly, *post rem* in the Human Intellect, which abstracts it from these individual objects, and represents it in thought as a *Predicabile de multis.*

7. In his Metaphysics, Avicenna (with Alfarabi) offers the following proof for the existence of God: The world is a composite thing,

and therefore does not exist of necessity. It is, therefore, in itself something merely possible, something which may exist or not exist. Its actual existence implies a cause which has given existence to what was in itself a mere possibility. This cause cannot itself have been of the merely possible order. In this hypothesis, it would presuppose an ulterior cause from which to receive its actual being, and this cause again another, and so backwards, the series of causes either reaching back into the infinite or returning upon itself to form a circle; both of which consequences are absurd. The cause, then, which the world postulates exists of necessity. And the necessary cause is God.

8. Now if God is the primary, necessarily existing cause of all things, He is, as such, the absolutely perfect, the sovereignly perfect being. He is eternal, to Himself sufficient, immutable. He is Wisdom, Life, Knowledge, Power, Will; He is the highest Good, Beauty, and Excellence. He enjoys in Himself the highest happiness. But no one of the attributes which we may thus assign Him is in any way different from His Being. In Him there is nothing composite in any sense whatever of that term; God is absolute simplicity; there is nothing in Him which is not Himself. Intellect, the Intelligible, and the Act of Intelligence (intelligere) are in Him one and the same thing.

9. From these principles, on which rests the proof of God's existence, further consequences follow. The world does not exist of necessity, and, consequently, its possibility must be taken as antecedent to its actual existence. Here two alternatives are offered us. This possibility which precedes the actuality is something inherent in a subject or it is not. If it is not, then this possibility is a substance—a consequence which is inadmissible. The former alternative must, therefore, be accepted; we must suppose a subject in which the possibility of the existent world is contained. This subject or underlying basis of possibility is Matter. Hence Matter is the basis of possibility, the pre-requirement of all actuality; and since possibility is eternal, so also is Matter.

10. In proving this we have proved at the same time the eternity of the world. For, in the first place, Matter as mere possibility can never actually exist, such existence contradicts its very concept: it can, therefore, exist only in the actually existing objects of the world, of which, as possibility, it is the underlying basis. In the second place, cause and effect are necessarily co-related; the one cannot exist without the other. If God and the world are to one another as cause to effect, as the world is inconceivable without God, so God is inconceivable without the world. If, then, God is eternal, so also is the world.

11. God is eternal of Himself and by Himself; the world on the other hand is eternal, because eternally caused by God. God is eternal without time; the world is eternally existing in time. As the world could not come into actual being without God, so neither

could it continue actually to exist without Him. The world does not of itself maintain itself in existence, when once it has received existence; its continuance is essentially dependent on the causal influence of God. God is not transiently, but permanently, the cause of the world's existence.

12. The question may now be asked: by what means has God become the cause of the world's existence? In replying, we must, before all else, assure ourselves that we cannot attribute to God a Will by which He could act for a determinate end, desire anything outside Himself (voluntas ad extra.) A will of this kind would connote in God a desire for something which He did not already possess, and which He might obtain: such a notion is at variance with the infinite perfection of God. This being so, God must have been the cause of the world's existence, not by His Will, but by His Knowledge.

13. God is the Absolute Good, and, as such, is the source of all good and of all order. God knows Himself as the Absolute Good, as the source of all good; and, as a result of this knowledge, all things proceed from Him, which are a consequence of His nature, the whole order of being, the entire system of actuality. God, it is true, loves Himself as the Absolute Good, and, because of His love for Himself, loves everything which proceeds from Him; but His Love follows upon the Thought which is the efficient cause of things, it is not itself the efficient cause.

14. Here we find Avicenna following in the footsteps of the Neo-Platonists; for it is distinctly the teaching of Neo-Platonism that God's knowing Himself is the condition on which depends the coming forth from the eternal source of being, of all that comes from God. And precisely for this reason, Avicenna, like the Neo-Platonists, can regard the causal action of God merely as a kind of emanation. For if the Thought, not the Will, of God is the source of all things that lie outside God's Being, it must follow that everything which comes from God is merely an ideal emanation from the Divine Intellect. And the philosophy of the Arabs becomes a doctrine of emanation.

15. But how and in what manner do all things proceed from God? To this question Avicenna (with Alfarabi) gives the following answer: God is absolute unity and simplicity. From unity only unity can proceed; *ab uno non est nisi unum.* Hence what immediately proceeds from God can be only a second unity. The plurality of things, as it is found in the world, must be referred *mediately* to God. Hence to explain how the world proceeded from God we must assume a descending series of emanations, which proceeding from one unity, developes by successive steps into plurality, until at the point of greatest distance from God, it attains the greatest multiplicity of things.

16. The order of these emanations is thus laid down: God by knowing Himself causes to proceed from Him the Second Unity, that is, the First Intelligence. This is in

itself an unity: but it already involves plurality: for we must distinguish in it *possibility* and *actuality*, inasmuch as it is in itself only possible, but receives actuality from the First Unity. And for the reason that plurality is already involved in its unity it is possible for it to give rise to a further plurality. The relation of the "First Intelligence" to the Platonist νοῦς is unmistakable.

17. It is by this act of Knowledge, and by this only, that God causes further being to proceed from Himself, the same holds good of the subsequent evolution of the Divine Emanations. The First Intelligence has knowledge of God on the one side, and on the other has knowledge of itself both as to its potentiality and actuality. In virtue of its knowledge of God there proceeds from it the *Second Intelligence*; in virtue of its knowledge of its own actuality there proceeds from it the *World-soul* which corresponds to the Second Intelligence: in virtue of its knowledge of its potentiality there proceeds from it the *highest sphere*, animated and kept in movement by the world-soul.

18. And thus onward: As the First Intelligence, by its act of Knowledge, produces the Second Intelligence, with the corresponding soul, and the sphere corresponding to this soul, so the Second Intelligence produces a Third Intelligence with a corresponding soul and a cosmic sphere corresponding to this soul. And thus proceed successive emanations of Intelligence, Soul, and Cosmic Sphere, down through the spheres of all the planets till we arrive at the *Active Intellect*, the moving principle of the Lunar Sphere. And as the series of emanations proceeds, imperfection and multiplicity appear more distinctly at each stage.

19 The last member in the series of purely spiritual emanations is, we have seen, the Active Intellect. To this principle is immediately due the sublunary elemental world. No further Intelligence emanates from this Active Intellect. In the act by which it knows itself in potentiality there emanate from it the Souls of men and the Forms of corporeal things; and in the act by which it knows itself in its actuality it gives rise to the Matter of the elemental world.

20. Hence the Active Intellect bears within itself all the forms of corporeal things; by it they are infused into the Matter which it generates, and thus, compacted of Matter and Form, arise the several objects of the sublunary elemental world. The Active Intellect does not, however, merely produce those forms from out itself; they come ultimately from God, passing into the First Intelligence, and from this through the succeeding intelligences down to the Active Intellect; from which proceed immediately the forms that, in combination with Matter, constitute individual objects.

21. These Forms can, however, be infused into matter only on condition that the latter is first *duly disposed* to receive them. This disposition is accomplished by *generation*. The end to which generation tends is, therefore, not the production of a complete being, specifically resembling the parent, but only to the due preparation and disposition of matter for the reception of the substantial form from the Active Intellect; it is only when the matter duly disposed has received the form from this source that the being exists in completeness.

22. In this wise, then, by the agency of the Active Intellect, the several different objects of the sublunary elemental world arise. And so it happens that at the greatest distance from God, the multiplicity of things is greatest, their imperfections being in direct proportion to their multiplicity. Hence, too, it is only in this region of being that evil can be found. But this evil is not an end in itself, it is only a necessary condition of good in the nether world.

23. And as God is the primal source of being from which the cosmic system proceeds, so also is He the last end towards which all things tend. God is the supreme object of desire, and, as such, is the last end of all things. All things strive to assimilate themselves with God, and the effort after this assimilation is the cause of motion. The celestial spheres strive, by their eternal movement of rotation, to attain this assimilation with the Intelligence which presides over them, and thus assimilation with God Himself; the same object is pursued by the elemental world in its movements, that is, in the activities peculiar

to it. In this way is established the truth of the saying of Aristotle, God causes motion "as the object of desire."

24. We must not, however, believe that, because God is the primal source and ultimate end of all being, His knowledge is of such kind that it extends to individual objects. This is not the case. Avicenna will have it that if we ascribe to God a knowledge of things which are subject to generation and corruption, or indeed of things which are contingent in any sense, we thereby introduce a temporal and contingent element into God's knowledge—and this we must not do. Moreover, the individual object in its individuality, and the contingent object as contingent, are perceptible only by means of the senses; and we cannot ascribe to God sensuous knowledge or faculty of imagination.

25. Hence the direct object of the Divine knowledge is the universal. God, as the ultimate principle of all things, has immediate knowledge only of the universal, of the universal forms and laws of being. The individual he does not know in its individuality, but only in the universal as in the cause which contains it. If we object that this theory sets limits to the Divine knowledge, we are answered that by asserting God's knowledge of all things in their causes, we are safeguarding the perfection of God's knowledge; that to extend further the Divine knowledge would be to impair its perfection.

26. This limiting of the Divine knowledge to the universal leads on to the further principle that the Providence of God, also, is confined to the universal and necessary laws which control the actual world; that the individual and the casual, as such, are not included under it. We can speak of the individual being subject to the providence of God, only in the sense that the individual is controlled by the necessary laws of the universe. A providence on the part of God which should guide the individual as such to its proper end is inadmissible.

27. Avicenna, like Aristotle, regards the human soul as the *essential form* of the body. He distinguishes between the faculties of soul which are united with the body and dependent upon it, and the Intellect which is a power transcending the bodily organism, and which exercises its activity without aid from any organ. His proof for the supra-organic immaterial nature of the soul is borrowed from Aristotle. From the principle that the soul has an immaterial power and activity, exercised without the body, he argues that the being of the soul is independent of the body, and so immaterial.

28. On the subject of the intellect, Avicenna having adopted the distinction between the Active and Passive Intellect, lays it down that it is only the Passive Intellect which is an essential faculty of the individual soul. The Active Intellect is something distinct from the individual soul, a principle which has its own separate existence. As such, it is universal; one and the same in all men. If we inquire further into the nature of this one universal intellect, we are told that it is nothing else than that universal Active Intellect,

which closes the series of Cosmic Intelligences at its lowest extremity, and from which the Forms are derived which are infused into matter

29. The process by which human knowledge is acquired assumes, according to this theory, an analogy with the process which gives rise to the objects of the elemental world. The Passive Intellect may be compared with Matter. Into this the Active Intellect infuses a form of knowledge, what it infuses into Matter as forms of actual being, and thus the mere potency passes into actual knowledge The outcome of this process is the *Intellectus in actu* or *effectu*—knowledge in act. What we call the act of knowing is, therefore, the turning of the Passive Intellect to the Active, to receive from it the intelligible species of the object of knowledge.

30. For this, however, a previous preparation or disposition is necessary. This preparation is effected by means of the sensuous image (phantasma.) As, in the process of generation, matter must be disposed by natural agents to receive its appropriate forms from the Active Intellect, so must the Passive Intellect be disposed by the sensuous image to receive from the same source the corresponding intelligible species.

31. A further distinction has, however, to be made between the *Intellectus Infusus*, and the *Intellectus Adeptus*. All intellectual knowledge does not rest on a basis of sense-experience or presuppose it; there is a certain knowledge which, without previous disposition or preparation is imparted by this Active Intellect to the soul, and which is itself the basis and antecedent condition of that knowledge which the reasoning faculty founds upon sense-experience. Of this kind are the first principles of the Reason. These must, therefore, be described as *Intellectus Infusus*, while the rest of our knowledge, which we build upon these principles out of material supplied by the senses, is included under the notion *Intellectus Adeptus*.

32. We must not, however, so conceive the "Acquired Intellect" as to attribute to it a power of preserving in itself the knowledge it has once attained. The so-called Intellectual Memory has no existence; for memory is essentially associated with a bodily organ. All learning of things consists in this that the Passive Intellect is rendered more and more expeditious in turning itself at any moment to the Active Intellect, to receive from this latter the intelligible species.

33. The theory of human knowledge, as here set forth, involves the doctrine that the Intellect knows the inmost nature of things, for the Passive Intellect derives from the Active those very forms which are realised in nature, and which constitute the very essences of existing things. Hence we can say with justice that the thing actually understood, the *intellectum in actu*, is one and the same with the faculty actually understanding—the *intellectus in actu*, and that the Intellect in its acts of knowledge, apprehends, not something outside itself, but only itself—that which is really contained within it.

34. Over and above the natural knowledge, of which the process is here explained, Avicenna admits a higher mystical knowledge. The soul communicates immediately with that Active Intellect which controls all things, and thus it is in a position to receive knowledge of an unwonted kind from this higher source without any use of the ordinary means by which knowledge is acquired. Such knowledge is due to an extraordinary illuminating efficacy of the Active Intellect, and is, therefore, of a mystical rather than a rational nature.

35. To this mystical kind of knowledge belongs Prophecy. Prophetic knowledge follows an order the reverse of that observed in the ordinary intellectual processes. The latter begin with the sense-images of Imagination, and then advance upwards to the intelligible; the former begins with the intelligible, received into the soul without help of Sense or Imagination, and thence descends through the Imagination to the images of sense, shrouding in these the intelligible truths, so as to adapt them to popular comprehension.

36. Mystical knowledge is the highest that man can attain. In this knowledge man finds his highest happiness. But it can be attained only when the soul is prepared for it by a pure and holy life. The mystical light requires a pure and holy receptacle in which its revelations shall be received. Given this condition, the soul may not only be raised by the Active Intellect to preternatural knowledge, it may also be endowed with preternatural active virtue, the prophet may become a worker of miracles.

37. Avicenna maintains the immortality of the soul. He proves its destiny in this respect through its immaterial nature. The Resurrection of the body, as taught by the Koran, is to be accepted as a point of religious belief; philosophically, however, the doctrine is false. Philosophically it can be regarded only as a sensuous expression of the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, which the prophet employs to adapt this doctrine to the understanding of the people.

ARABIAN ARISTOTELIANS.

II.—In Spain.

Avempace, Averroes, and Abubacer.

§ 84.

1. The Arabian philosophy attained development at a later period in Spain, than in the East. It is, indeed, stated that there were celebrated philosophers in Spain under the Ommaiads, particularly under Hakem II. in the tenth century. But we know nothing of their doctrines, no mention is made of them by the later Arabian philosophers. It was only towards the close of the eleventh century, when the Moors had established themselves in Spain, that a philosopher appeared of whom the Christian Scholastics take frequent note. He was known to them under the name Avempace.

2. Avempace (Ibn Badscheh) was born at Saragossa, and obtained celebrity as a physician, a poet, and a philosopher. He resided at the Moorish Court, and died, it is said in 1138, from poison administered by a rival. He wrote short treatises (most of them now lost) of which Munk (Mélanges etc., p. 386) gives the following titles: "Logical Treatises," "A Treatise on the Soul," another on the "Hermit's Guide," (Régime du solitaire,) another on the union of the Intellect with Man, and lastly a valedictory epistle (Epistola Expeditionis.)

3. The treatise "The Hermit's Guide," the chief contents of which are set forth by Munk, discusses the various degrees by which the soul rises from the merely instinctive processes which it shares with the brute, and delivering itself more and more from Matter and Potentiality, attains at length to the knowledge of the separated form of things, and in this knowledge finds its beatitude. Avempace is said to have identified the *Intellectus Materialis* with the *Virtus Imaginativa*.

4. Averroes (Ibn. Roschd) occupies a much more important place in the History of Philosophy than does Avempace.

Averroes was born in 1126 at Cordova, in which town his father was Chief Magistrate and Chief Priest. He first studied Theology and Jurisprudence, later he gave himself to Medicine, Mathematics and Philosophy. After his father's death he succeeded to his various offices, and whilst thus employed in important public duties, he composed (at Seville) the greater portion of those remarkable treatises which made his name famous in after ages. It is said that in his old age he was appointed regent of Spain by the Khalif Jussuf el Mansur, but that, soon after, having been accused of atheism and contempt of religion, he was excluded from the Mosque and sent into exile. He was, however, reinstated in his dignities after a brief interval, and was then summoned to Morocco to act as physician to the Court. He died there in 1198.

5. Averroes is chiefly remarkable for his commentaries on the writings of Aristotle; they have secured him the title of "the Commentator." On some of the Aristotelian treatises he has written as many as three commentaries—the first in the form of a brief paraphrase, the second in somewhat greater minuteness, and the third in all fulness of detail. We have a three-fold commentary of this kind on the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Physics*, the treatise *De Cælo*, the *De Anima*, and the *Metaphysics*. In the case of other works only the short paraphrase and commentary remain to us. "Averroes did not possess the Greek original of the works of Aristotle; he understood neither Greek nor Syriac; wherever the Arabian translation was obscure or incorrect he was obliged to conjecture the true sense from the general context of the Aristotelian teaching."

6. Besides his commentaries Averroes composed many other treatises. Of these the most important are: *a*) "Tehafot al Tehafot" (Destruction of destructions) a reply to Algazel's *Refutation of the Philosophers* which we shall notice later; *b*) "Quæsita in libros logicæ Aristotelis;" *c*) "Treatises on Physics" (on the Problems of Aristotle's *Physics*); *d*) "Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine"; *e*) "De animæ beatitudine"; *f*) "De Intellectu possibili vel materiali" (preserved to us only in a Hebrew translation); *g*) on "the harmony of Religion and Philosophy" (a Hebrew text); *h*) "on the true meaning of Religious Dogmas, or the way of proving the same," &c.

7. Averroes entertained the most profound admiration for Aristotle; his veneration went almost the length of worship. He held that the teachings of Aristotle were the most luminous and the most trustworthy which had come down to the Arabs from the older philosophers; Aristotle had pushed thought as far as it is permitted to man, and should therefore be regarded as the one safe guide in philosophical speculation. The doctrines of Aristotle are for Averroes the supreme wisdom; his intellect represents the highest development of the human understanding; he was given to mankind by Providence to show in one example what is the highest human perfection; his writings contain no error whatever.

8. Accordingly, in his own teaching, Averroes always faithfully follows Aristotle. In his interpretation and exposition of the Aristotelian Logic, Physic, and Metaphysic, he does not differ widely from Avicenna. It is only in Psychology that the two philosophers follow widely different paths. To avoid repetition, we will not touch upon those points on which Averroes and Avicenna are in agreement, as, for example, the eternity of the world, the existence of spirits which hold a middle place between God and the world, etc.;

we will merely direct attention to the points on which Averroes is at variance with his predecessor.

9. In the first place, Averroes differs from Avicenna in his conception of the process by which the elementary substances of the physical world came into being. The latter, as we have seen, held that the individual entities of the elemental world derive their being from the Active Intellect which impresses the forms of things on Matter. Averroes, on the other hand, asserts that the forms of natural objects are contained potentially in matter, and that these objects come into being by the action of efficient causes which *educe* the forms from matter, and so effect the transition from potentiality to actuality. The assumption that the forms are introduced into matter from without is equivalent to the doctrine of a creation from nothing—a wholly untenable theory.

10. With regard to God's knowledge of things, Averroes is at one with Avicenna in asserting that God has no knowledge of individuals as such; but Averroes does not establish any analogy between God's knowledge and the knowledge obtained by means of universal ideas; he holds it to be of a kind far transcending this. God's knowledge is, to speak accurately, only of Himself, as He actually exists; what is inferior to Himself He knows, not as it actually is, but only as it exists in Himself—in so far as it has in Him the principle of its being. As a consequence of this theory, he maintains that God's providence has to do with the general order of the universe, not with individual things.

11. In Psychology, Averroes makes a distinct advance upon the position of Avicenna. He separates not merely the *Intellectus Agens*, but the *Intellectus Possibilis* as well, from the individual soul, and holds the latter to be a wholly distinct principle. In accordance with this view, he teaches that not only the Active Intellect, but the Possible Intellect also, is one in all men; and that individual men are rational and capable of knowledge, whether actually or potentially, only in so far as they participate in that one universal intellect.

12. In the series of Intelligences which extend from God downwards to the world, the Universal Active Intellect occupies the lowest rank. It communicates itself to the individual man, and it is in virtue of this communication that he attains to intellectual knowledge. To account for this communication, we are not to assume the existence of a Possible Intellect in the individual soul; rather, it is the Universal Active Intellect which, communicating itself to man, becomes in him a Possible Intellect; so that both the Active and the Possible Intellect of the individual are to be traced back to the Universal Active Intellect.

13. Avicenna had ascribed the Possible Intellect to the human soul as an essential constituent faculty, and had thus been able to establish an essential difference between the soul of man and the soul of the brute. Averroes denies to the individual soul every native intellectual faculty, and is thus unable to make the difference between the human and the brute soul more than a difference of degree. According to Averroes, the human soul differs from that of the brute only by its possession of what he calls the Passive Intellect—a faculty which enables it to compare and to distinguish individual representations (the *vis cogitativa* of the Scholastics). This Passive Intellect is, however, merely a factor of the sense faculty, and its action is dependent upon the brain. With him, therefore, there is no essential distinction between the human and the purely animal soul.

14. If we ask in what manner the extrinsic activity of the Active Intellect communicates itself to man and causes knowledge in him, Averroes answers: —The Forms of things are not induced into Matter by the Active Intellect, but existing potentially in Matter, are evolved from it by the Action of the Intellect; in like manner, human knowledge is not due to the transfer of intelligible species from the Active Intellect to the soul; it is to be explained by the operation of the Active Intellect *abstracting* from the sense presentations the intelligible species which are contained in them potentially, and which are, we may say, *educed* by the Intellect.

15. This being so, the genesis of intellectual knowledge postulates, in the first place, the existence of sensuous presentations, and, in the next, the due elaboration of these by the so-called Passive Intellect, so that they may be prepared for the operation of the Active Intellect. Given the phantasm, the Active Intellect present in man generates out of it, by its abstractive power, the intelligible species. The substratum, or subject, of these intellectual forms of knowledge cannot be other than the Active Intellect itself. In so far as it is the substratum, or subject, of the intelligible species, it becomes the Possible, or as Averroes expresses it, the Material Intellect. When, therefore, an intelligible species is generated in man by the operation of the Active Intellect, by the fact the Intellect unites itself with the individual in question as Passive Intellect, according to the special form which it assumes in the intelligible species generated. In this way man attains to a participation in the one Universal Intellect, and in this way does he attain actual knowledge.

16. From the doctrine thus stated, the following inferences are derivable :—

a) In the first place, in the process of knowledge, man is himself active only in so far as his Passive Intellect prepares the phantasms for the operations of the Active Intellect. What follows after this preparation, and demands it as a condition, is a natural process to which the Passive Intellect contributes nothing.

b) In the second place, it is evident that the differences which separate men in point of mental capacity and intellectual acquirements cannot in any way affect the Intellect itself. These differences are to be ascribed rather to the greater or less perfection of the faculty of Passive Intellect in the several individuals. It is only the operation of the Passive Intellect which belongs to the individual, the act of intellectual knowledge is a purely natural process which is carried out in accord with the character of the activity put forth by the Passive Intellect.

c) In the third place, the individual attains to participation in the Possible Intellect only to the extent of the special form of knowledge, which is generated by the abstractive operation of the Active Intellect. It can, therefore, be said, in different senses, that Possible Intellect is one in all men, and that it is different in each. It is one in intrinsic being in all of them, it differs in *form* in different individuals.

17. The product of the development of human knowledge is the Acquired Intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). This development is different in different individuals; hence there are corresponding differences in the Acquired Intellect. This intellect is, furthermore, perishable, like the individuals themselves. It is only in the aggregate of the human race that it becomes eternal and immutable, for in the aggregate of mankind knowledge and science are always living actualities.

18. The knowledge acquired by the Intellect deals immediately with the intelligible as embodied in the objects of sense: it is this object of knowledge which is derived from the phantasm by the abstractive operation of the Active Intellect. But inasmuch as the Active Intellect is essentially associated with the higher immaterial intelligence, it becomes possible for man to attain by means of this Intellect to knowledge of this higher mind. This is the highest degree of human knowledge. In this knowledge, according to Averroes, consists man's supreme happiness. When he has reached this degree man becomes like to God: he knows all things as they are; he has reached the highest perfection, and, consequently, the most perfect happiness.

19. The path which leads to this perfection is the study of the speculative sciences; and, in the first place, of philosophy. Averroes has no sympathy with mysticism; science is for him the only means to this end. The use of this means involves the labour of continuous study, and is, therefore, reserved exclusively for the more gifted minds: and even to these it is only in old age that it is given to reach the goal; if the supreme perfection were accessible to all men it would cease to be supreme. It follows that Philosophy is the noblest pursuit to which man can devote himself.

20. Discussing the relations between religion and philosophy, Averroes holds that religion is a pre-requirement of philosophy: the man who does not first submit himself to law and religion cannot attain to insight into truth. Religion, however, contains the truth hidden under images; it is for the philosopher to penetrate beneath the veil, and reach truth in its purity. This advance of knowledge to pure truth constitutes the religion peculiar to the philosopher; man can offer God no worthier homage than the knowledge of His works, which leads to the knowledge of Himself in the fulness of His being.

21. According to Averroes the immortality of the soul is, from the philosopher's point of view, a delusion. As we have seen, the individual human soul is not essentially different in nature from the soul of the brute; it is dependent on the organism in all its functions; it cannot therefore be regarded as an immaterial entity; it cannot, accordingly, lay claim to a personal immortality. That Universal Intellect, which is one in all men, is immortal in its objective unity; but not the individual soul. The human race, as such, is eternal and imperishable, not individual men. What is told us of a future life, and of the fate awaiting us there, is mere fable.

22. This outcome of philosophical speculation is, it must be admitted, at variance with religious teaching. But this result is to be maintained only as *philosophical* truth; in the domain of religious faith the opposite doctrine is to be accepted as true. The Unity of Intellect in all men is the necessary conclusion of philosophical inquiry: as such, and only as such, will Averroes accept it; in religious belief he assents to the contrary doctrine. This rulemust be observed in all cases where philosophy is at variance with religion: the former must never take up a position of hostility to the latter.

23. Thus far Averroes. We must now cast a glance at one of his older contemporaries—Abubacer (Ibn Tofeil), who is said to have been the friend of Averroes. He was born in Andalusia about A.D. 1100, and was renowned as a physician, a mathematician, a philosopher and a poet. He died in Morocco A.D. 1185. He is the author of a work which bears the title *Haji Ibn Jokdahn, i.e., The Living One, the Son of the Watcher*. Eichhorn published this work in a German translation in 1783, under the title *The Natural Man* (it had been published in a Latin translation with the title *Philosophus Autodidactus* by Pococke; Oxford, 1671). This work is a philosophical romance, which tells how a man (Ibn Jokdahn),

who lived from his youth upwards on a desert island, evolved from within himself a whole system of knowledge, until at last he raised himself to that highest grade of knowledge which consists in contemplation.

24. It is interesting to observe how this isolated man at first attained to a knowledge of the intelligible forms of corporeal things, and thence to the knowledge of God and the soul. Curious, too, are the means he makes use of - as, for example, turning round and round in a circle, sitting the whole day long with drooping head and closed eyes—in order to promote in himself a certain condition of ecstasy which would raise him to the immediate contemplation of God. We cannot here follow the story in its details; we can only mention that Jokdahn reaches happily the highest degree of knowledge, and that he can, thenceforth, enter at pleasure the ecstatic condition.

25. The general tendency of the story goes to show that the natural progressive unfolding of human cognition leads to those same results which we find put before us by religion; with this difference, that religion presents these truths under the veil of images, whereas, at the highest stage of human knowledge, they are laid before us in their undimmed purity. Accordingly the tale concludes with an episode in which a stranger (Asal), having come to the island by accident, has the teaching of the Koran unfolded to him by Jokdahn, to whom he in turn relates his experiences in Mysticism. To the surprise of both their doctrines are found to correspond exactly. Accordingly Jokdahn, after his return to social life, perceives that the reason why the Prophet has spoken in metaphor is because the mere people is incapable of understanding truth unless it is expressed in imagery.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARABS.

The Teaching of the Motekâllemin and Motazalen.

85.

1. We have already seen in what way the positive dogmatism of the Arabs gradually assumed the character of a philosophy of religion, in the struggle with the heretical "philosophers," and how a philosophic basis was thus provided for the chief doctrines of the Koran. These doctrines are: the creation and inception of the world; the unity and immateriality of God; the multiplicity of the Divine attributes; providence in the shape of inexorable fate; and the resurrection of the body.

2. This basis to religion was not furnished by the Metaphysic of Aristotle; it was precisely by means of the Aristotelian Metaphysic that the "philosophers" had arrived at those conclusions so much at variance with the Koran—the eternity of the world, the limitation of God's providence, the denial of the multiplicity of attributes in God, etc. The end was attained by laying down a new set of metaphysical principles. Let us now see what were the metaphysical principles of the Motekâllemin. Of these Moses Maimonides gives us, in his *More Nevochim* (ps. I., c. 73, 74), the following account:

3. The ultimate constituent elements of bodies are not Matter and Form, but Atoms. A body is in its essence nothing more than an aggregate and combination of atoms. What we call generation is merely the combination of atoms; corruption is merely their separation. Hence a body, as such, is not a substance; it is merely a combination of substances;

the true substances are the atoms. The atoms, being indivisible, have no quantity. Quantity belongs to them only when they combine to form a body. For the same reason accidents do not belong to a body, as such, for it is not a substance; they belong to its atoms. As snow is white only because all its parts are white, so a body is, for example, living only because all its atoms are such; it is sensitive only because all its atoms are so, etc.

4. All atoms are of the same kind; there is no specific difference between them. The same, is, therefore, true of the bodies which they form. There are no determinate specific differences of nature which distinguish corporeal things *inter se*. Between the individuals of different species there is, in reality, no greater difference than between individuals of the same species. All differences between corporeal things are merely accidental; accidents are the only differentiating elements. From this we infer that there are no natural or specific accidents which essentially belong to certain atoms, not to others; every atom is capable of combining with every accident.

5. A substance cannot, however, exist without some accident. Just as accident is unthinkable without substance, so is substance unthinkable without accident. If a positive accident is not attributable to it, *eo ipso* the privation of the accident belongs to it, and the privation is itself an accident. For instance, if the positive accident of life is not attributable to a substance, by the fact the negative accident of death becomes attributable to it. Accident is thus a necessary condition of the existence of substance, just as substance is a necessary condition of the existence of accident.

6. Every accident is, however, of its nature *transient*, no accident can ever endure for two successive instants, though two "nows" immediately follow one another in time. In the moment which immediately succeeds its coming into being, the accident passes away. It follows that to enable an accident to endure it must be *created afresh* in every successive moment. And as substance cannot exist apart from its accident, the same is true of substance; that a substance may endure it is necessary that it should be created afresh in each successive moment of its existence.

7. From this we are forced to conclude that in mundane things there is no principle or power of action. If an atom possessed a power of this kind, the power would endure as long as the activity lasted. But this cannot be since the power is an accident, and as such, is transient. It follows that all action and all movement which we perceive in the world must be attributed immediately to God. It is God, and God alone, who creates the accidents of activity and movement, and imparts them to substance.

8. It follows further that the combination of cause and effect which we observe in the world is not based on a really existing relation, but arises from the fact that God habitually joins certain activities which He Himself produces with certain corresponding effects which He also evokes. No accident can pass from one subject to another, since it has, of its nature, only a transient existence—is the thing of a moment. Hence, when a piece of cloth is dipped in a black dye, the black colour does not pass into the cloth; it is God who produces the dark colour in the immersed cloth, and this because it is His habit to produce this colour in these circumstances.

9. Man is not excepted from the universal law here laid down. His activities are not from himself, all his actions are effected by God, and this in conformity with an habitual practice of joining determined effects to determined activities. For example when a man is writing, four accidents are produced by God, accidents whose only relation consists in their simultaneous existence: the will to set the pen in motion; the power to carry out this determination; the movement of the hand; and the movement of the pen. The actions of men are thus results of God's action, which he is constantly producing and imparting to man. In anything which man effects he is merely the *blind passive instrument of God*.

10. It is a further metaphysical principle adopted by the Motekâllemin that the possibility of things does not postulate matter as its subject or substratum; it consists in this, that a thing can be or not be inasmuch as our intelligence perceives that no contradiction is implied either in its existence or non-existence. Matter as the substratum of the possible, occupying a middle position between the existent and the non-existent, is absurdity. As soon as it is regarded as something objective, it is actually existent, not merely possible. The notion of the possible is thus made one with the notion of the thinkable.

11. On the other hand, everything which imagination can picture, intellect must recognise as possible. Since the differences of things are merely accidental, and since God can join to any atom any accident whatever, it follows that whatever our imagination can picture may actually exist as it is pictured. For example, a man might be as large as a mountain, might have several heads, might fly through the air, etc. All this can be repre-

sented in imagination, and must therefore be rationally held to be possible.

12. An infinite quantity is an impossibility. An infinite number, whether in succession or co-existent, cannot exist. Every actual quantity, and every actual number is, as such, determined and, being determined, is limited. To assume an infinite quantity or an infinite number is to assume what is self-contradictory. We cannot, therefore, speak of infinite space, or infinite time. Bodies consist of atoms, the number of these atoms is limited, the corporeal world must therefore be limited in extent. In the same way, time consists of successive moments, which we may style time-atoms, and as an infinite number of these atoms is impossible, time must be limited. The so-called Infinite, in so far as it applies to Number and Quantity, to Time and Space, must be excluded from the language of science.

13. Such are the fundamental principles of the Motekâllemin. On these principles they establish their proofs of the chief dogmas of Islam. The main lines of their reasoning in this connexion are as follows :—

(*a*.) Whoever admits the eternity of the world must admit an endless series of generations, since each individual coming into existence is generated by another. The generating and generated individuals must, therefore, form an endless series, and so there must be an endless time-series. Again, whoever admits that substance has an eternal existence, and that only accidents are continuously created afresh, must carry this creation of accidents backwards in an endless line, and thus admitting an infinite series of creations, must admit an infinite time-series. But an endless series, an infinite time, is an impossibility. The world, therefore, and the substances of which it is constituted must have had a beginning, must have been created. And this the more that the atoms composing the world are combined in a certain determined order, whereas, of themselves, they are not determined to any definite order or arrangement at all. We are, therefore, forced to conclude that the existing combination has been accomplished by God, and this being so, the world cannot be eternal, it must have come into being at the moment when God combined its atoms in a fixed order.

(*b*) Furthermore, every portion of the world, every body within it, might exist otherwise than it actually does exist, for, as has been shown, what Imagination can picture, Intellect must recognise as possible. Every body has a definite size and a definite shape, occupies a definite place, and exists at a definite time ; but no one of these conditions is necessary ; it might just as well have another size and another shape, occupy a different space, and exist at a different time. We must, therefore, suppose a cause which has brought it about that the body has precisely this size and shape, and exists in this place and at this time ; this *appropriation* supposes an *appropriator*. This being granted, it follows that the world has received its existence, and its conformation from the *appropriator* in question ; and if this is the case, the world cannot have endured from eternity, it must have had a beginning.

(*c*) Every one must admit that, so far as its own nature is concerned, the world might exist or not exist. As a matter of fact it actually exists ; in the case of the world, existence *pre-ponderates* over non existence. This preponderance postulates a cause acting in favour of existence as against non-existence. This being so, it follows that the existence of the world is caused by God, who effects the preponderance. Consequently, the world does not exist of itself, it cannot, therefore, be eternal, it must have had a beginning of existence ; it began to exist at the moment when the cause in question gave the preponderance to existence over non-existence.

14. Amongst other proofs for the oneness of God the Motekâllemin offer the following :—If there were several gods, it would be possible that one of them should produce a given accident in a given substance, while another produced a contrary accident in the same substance. Either these accidents would simultaneously inhere in the same substance, or they would each negative the other. In the first case, we should have the truth of contradictories ; in the second, we should have a substance without any accident ; both consequences are alike impossible. That God is not a corporeal substance they prove by this, among other arguments :—If God were corporeal he would have a determinate shape, and since a body of itself has no

tendency to one shape rather than another, a higher determining power (*appropriator*) should be assumed to give him determinate form; he would, in this assumption, cease to be God, that is, the first and highest Cause as represented by the very notion of His being.

15. The relation of the Divine Attributes to the Substance of the Divine Being is conceived by the Motekâllemin after the analogy of the relation of accidents to substance, although they do not hold these attributes to be accidents in the strict sense. They regard them rather as adjuncts of the Divine Substance—as *superadditum substantiæ*—and, therefore, as something really distinct from the latter; from which conception it follows they are distinct from one another. They believe they have thus reconciled the plurality of the Divine Attributes laid down in the Koran, with the unity of the Divine Substance, without losing the plurality of attributes in the unity of the Divine Being, as did the "philosophers," and without, on the other hand, losing the unity of the Divine Essence in the plurality of attributes.

16. Their conception of Providence accords wholly with that of the Koran. Providence is an inexorable Fate. Everything that happens in the world is not only foreknown by God, it is absolutely determined; everything that happens happens of necessity; there is neither chance nor liberty. Every action of man, whether good or bad, is pre-determined; it is not in his power to choose between alternative courses of action. Nor is the pre-determining will of God guided by wisdom and justice, His action is wholly arbitrary, and what he does is right because He does it; He cannot do wrong. Whatever may happen to man he can never have a right to complain of God's ordinance; no wrong can be done him. God works in man the evil as well as the good; and although man cannot avoid the evil, God can, without injustice, punish him for it. Nay, God might conceivably punish the good and reward the wicked, and man would have no just ground for complaining of this dispensation. "God wills it"; this is the ultimate and absolute explanation of human conduct.

17. The grounds on which the Motekâllemin establish this conception of Providence are furnished by that metaphysical theory which denies all active power to secondary causes, and assigns all the movements and actions of created things to God. In this theory created things are merely lifeless instruments in the hand of God, He can use them in any way, and for any purpose that He chooses. In His action He is not bound to follow any eternal laws of wisdom and justice; He can work in His creatures what He wills, dispose of them as He wills; He does them no injustice in this; created beings are subject to the Divine Will as to absolute Fate, nothing is left to their self-determination, for they possess no such power; everything is pre-ordained by the Divine Will; this is the only principle which acts in, and through created being. (Mos. Maim. *Doct. Perplex.*, ps. 3, c. 17.)

18. Such is the doctrine of the Orthodox Motekâllemin. The Motazalen were at one with them in fundamental metaphysical principles; the points of difference are unessential. On the question of the Divine Attributes, however, the teaching of the Motazalen has much affinity with that of the "Philosophers." They deny that the Divine Attributes are a *superadditum quid substantiæ*; such a

conception, they maintain, opens the way to a denial of the oneness of God; for every distinct Attribute would be infinite, and being infinite would itself be God. Accordingly, they teach that the Attributes are *potentially* in God, that on occasion of any effect being produced by God, they pass from potency to act, and, as it were, emerge from the Divine Essence. To this extent they may be distinguished from the Divine Substance; but they are not anything added to that Substance, but rather something emerging from it (*aliquid ex substantia divina egrediens*).

19. In their Doctrine of Providence also the Motazalen endeavoured to soften the hard lines of the orthodox teaching. Denying the limitations imposed by the theories of the "philosophers," they attributed universal control to Divine Providence, but they denied that God acts in blind unreason. They held that all His actions are directed by Wisdom and Justice, and that it is, consequently, impossible He should punish righteous conduct. When therefore evil befalls the righteous, the reason is not to be sought in the arbitrary action of God, but in His design to promote thereby the welfare of the just man, and to increase his reward in a future life (*Ib., ps.* 1, *c.* 75—*ps.* 3, *c.* 17),

Algazel.

§. 86.

1. Before concluding this sketch of religious philosophy among the Arabs, we must give an account of a remarkable thinker, who was largely in accord with that philosophy, but who in many important points held doctrines peculiarly his own. We refer to Algazel (Al-Gazzali).

He was born at Gazzalah, in Khorosan. In his youth he acquired great renown for learning, and while yet a young man, was invited to Bagdad to teach philosophy. Soon he came to lose hope of reaching truth on the lines followed by the philosophers. He turned from them, resigned his office of teacher, and retired into Syria, in order to give himself to mystical contemplation as a Sufite (solitary). He spent eleven years in the practices of Sufite life, and during this period, it is alleged, received revelations of the highest importance. He conceived himself bound to impart to others the knowledge he had thus received, and felt called to work for the spread of truth and the extirpation of error. Accordingly he left his solitude, and began to teach again. He changed the sphere of his teaching activity from time to time. Towards the end of his life he retired again into solitude, and died at Tus, in 1111.

2. During the period of his life as a Sufite, he wrote his three best known works. The first of these is his treatise *Makacid al falâsifa* (The Efforts of the Philosophers). In this work he expounded the whole system of the Arabian Aristotelians, taking Avicenna as their typical representive (1). Next followed the treatise : *Tehâfot al falâsifa* (*Destructio Philosophorum*), in which the whole system expounded in the Makacid is subjected to a destructive criticism. Lastly came the work, "Rehabilitation of Religious Knowledge," in which the author lays down his own system. This work has not yet been edited. But its fame in ancient times may be judged from the saying then current, that if the whole system of Islam perished, it could be restored from the pages of this work. We may mention here the title of a treatise in which Algazel deals with certain points of Mystical Doctrine. The title is "O Child." It has been translated by Hammer-Purgstall.

3. Algazel, as has been said, shares the hostile attitude of the

(1). The Logic, Physic, and Metaphysic of the Makacid were largely studied in the Middle Ages; about the middle of the twelfth century they were translated by Dominicus Gondisalvi, with the assistance of a Jewish scholar.

Motekâllemin towards philosophy, and he, like them, is led to adopt this attitude in the interests of Religion. The doctrines of the "Philosophers" are at variance with religious teaching; they are therefore false; and must, accordingly, be controverted and refuted. But he is prejudiced against philosophy on other grounds also. Philosophy, with its logical methods of proof, cannot reveal to us the inner treasures of truth. It opens to us only a very limited sphere of knowledge, and even here its guidance is not wholly trustworthy. To attain truth in its fulness we must seek a higher source of knowledge. This higher source is the immediate illumination of the mind by God. Immediate spiritual experience, direct mystical intuition is the only means of reaching truth in its totality and securing absolute certainty. The path of mysticism, not philosophy with its limited and untrustworthy methods of proof, leads to fulness of knowledge.

4. From the point of view of Religion and the point of view of Mysticism, Algazel directs the shafts of his criticism against the "Philosophers" in his *Destructio Philosophorum*. He controverts and refutes the theory of an eternal world, and upholds the theory of creation: he maintains the reality of the Divine Attributes in the Divine Substance, and the distinction of attribute from attribute, the universality of Divine Providence, the resurrection of the body, and the exercise of miraculous power by God. It would lead us too far to follow him into his discussion of these several points. We must content ourselves with stating that his attacks upon the philosophers exhibited extraordinary acuteness, and that his criticism of their reasoning is always searching, and at times absolutely destructive.

By way of example of Algazel's method we may take his criticism of the "philosophic" theory that God has no knowledge of individual objects. Leaving out of consideration, he says that this doctrine strikes at the root of all law, turns the utterances of the prophets and the words of the Sacred Scripture into untruth and unreality, cuts away the ground on which the hopes of the believer rest, let us examine the reasons on which the doctrine is professedly based. They are absolutely and utterly futile. The "philosophers" tell us that if we admit in God a knowledge of individual objects we are bound to allow the Divine knowledge to be in itself as mutable as the objects and phenomena with which it deals. But this is obviously a false reasoning. It does not hold even in the case of human knowledge. It may happen that we have knowledge of an event before it actually occurs. When it actually occurs, in the moment in which it takes place, is our knowledge of the event in question different from what it was before? Assuredly not. It remains the same; the change affects not the knowledge, but the object of knowledge. So is it with God's knowledge of things. His knowledge of things and of phenomena remains ever the same, whatever be the changes to which they are subject. The limitations of God's knowledge are, indeed, necessary if we adopt the theory of the "philosophers" concerning an eternal world. It is only when we start from the principle that the world has been created by God, by a free act of will, that we are forced to infer that God knows everything He has created, and guides it to its end. If we assert that the world has not been called into being by God, that it has eternal being of itself, there is then no reason why we should attribute to that principle which merely gives movement to an already existent world, a knowledge of all objects and all phenomena, and a Providential control over them. In the interests of the theory we are led to deny to the principle of movement knowledge of, and control over, the things of the world, for in this way we exclude all interference with the eternal and necessary course of nature. Nature, and Nature's course, will not then depend for their being on the knowledge and free will of God; neither will they depend on them for their duration or their development, etc.

5. We have here only the negative side of Algazel's teaching; in his mysticism he gives his positive doctrines. To rise to the heights of mysticism, he tells us, a man must renounce sensuality, must slay his passions with the sword of temperance, and resign his will wholly to God. The true realities of things will then be manifested to him. Neither thought nor word can express what the soul contemplates in this ecstasy, and while man gazes in rapture on the vision he will be enchanted by the fulness of knowledge revealed to him. To attempt to utter what is thus unspeakable would be mere blasphemy. In the highest stage of this rapture the soul is absorbed in God, and loses itself in the infinitude of the Divine Essence.

6. With Algazel we close our account of Arabian philosophy. Taking into account the source of its development and the divergent paths along which it advanced, we must recognise that a vigorous intellectual life prevailed among the Arabs. But it was not given them to reconcile Philosophy with Religion. The antagonism between speculation and dogmatic teaching found marked expression among them. Nor was the antagonism a mere accident of their intellectual history; it grew out of the essential characteristics of both departments of knowledge as they possessed them. The genuine reconciliation of Philosophy with Religion can be effected only on a Christian basis.

HISTORY OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION II.

Jewish Philosophy.

§ 87.

1. The religious belief of the Jews of the Middle Ages was based, generally speaking, on the *Talmud*. Besides the Sacred Scriptures, the Jews recognised as authoritative the traditions of the ancient Rabbis. At first these traditions had been handed down orally, but later they were reduced to writing, and under the name Talmud, formed, for the Jews, a kind of second volume of the Law. About the middle of the eighth century a revolt against the authority of the Talmud was provoked by the Jew Anan; the supporters of this movement separated from the *Talmudists* proper, or *Rabbinites*. They received the name *Karaites*. Their characteristic doctrine was the rejection of tradition and the Talmud.

2. In the domain of Philosophy three principal schools of thought arose among the mediæval Jews—the Cabbalistic, the Neo-Platonic, and the Aristotelian. The Cabbalistic philosophy is expounded in the two books *Jezirah* and *Sohar*, the first of which was attributed to Rabbi Akiba (about 135 A.D.); the second to his son, Simeon ben Jochai. The Neo-Platonic school is represented by Ibn Gebirol,

called by the scholastics Avicebron. The Arabico-Aristotelian school was founded by Saadiah Fajjumi, and had as its chief representative Moses Maimonides.

3. The Cabbalah purports to be a system of esoteric doctrine handed down by tradition. The Cabbalists assume that behind the literal and obvious meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, there is concealed another and a deeper meaning in which the full and genuine truth is expressed. This deeper meaning was revealed by God to Moses; it was handed on by oral tradition, and was recorded at a later period in the Cabbalistic books. This assumption found a place in the early Greco-Jewish philosophy, and was prevalent among the Gnostics of the first centuries of the Christian era. We might, in fact, describe the Cabbalists as Jewish Gnostics. The Cabbalists professed to read the hidden meaning out of the text of the Scriptures;—or, better, to read it into them, by a system of interpretation which discovered in each letter of the Law the symbol of a Divine mystery, and which made large use of an involved theory of symbolical numbers.

4. Neo-Platonic speculation in the Middle Ages, as represented by Ibn Gebirol, exercised considerable influence on the development of the Cabbalah. But speculation among the Jews soon took another turn. The attempt was made to furnish a philosophic justification of the doctrines of the Law; a philosophical theology sprang up in which the teachings of Aristotle were applied to establish the dogmas of the Jewish faith. This development became specially remarkable in Spain after the Jewish school had been founded at Cordova. The Jews translated into Hebrew the works of the Arabian Aristotelians, and adopted their fundamental doctrines, so far as these could be applied, for the end they had in view.

5. Gradually this Jewish philosophy assumed a more and more rationalistic character. The Jewish Aristotelians, like the Arabians, based their speculations on the assumption that it is the task of the philosopher, not merely to support the traditional teachings of religion by adducing rational grounds in support of them, but, also, to set forth fully unveiled that truth which religion so frequently expresses in symbols. The strictly orthodox Jews resented this intrusion of philosophy into the domain of Jewish theology, and became strongly hostile to the "philosophers." The ensuing antagonism between the liberal and the rigidly orthodox schools continued throughout the Middle Ages.

6. With these introductory remarks we pass to an examination of the Cabbalah: we shall then take up the teachings of Avicebron and close our account of this philosophy with Moses Maimonides.

The Cabbalah.

§ 88.

1. There is no general agreement as to the origin of the Cabbalah. Some authors claim for it a pre-Christian origin, others ascribe it to

the first centuries of the Christian era, others again are of opinion that it is a product of the Middle Ages—of that period when the Jews became acquainted with Neo-Platonism through the Arabs, and followed the latter in the paths of mysticism. Nor are the critics agreed as to the date at which the books *Jezirah* and *Sohar* were compiled. Some will have it that they date from the time to which legend ascribes their origin. Others contend that the book *Jezirah* is not older than the middle of the ninth century, and that the *Sohar* is not older than the thirteenth. We need not here enter into this question of dates, as we are concerned merely with the contents of the Cabbalah. We may state, however, that it was only in the Middle Ages that the Cabbalistic traditions were reduced to a systematic theory.

2. The Cabbalists held the Divine First Principle to be in itself an undifferentiated, indeterminate, simple unity. In his absolutely transcendental being, God is not in the strict sense *any thing*. This concept of God was expressed by the term *En Soph*. But just because God is not any thing, He is at the same time every thing, because all things proceed from Him as their ultimate cause. In the order of actuality God is, therefore, not any being; in the order of possibility He is all beings, because all proceed from Him.

3. En Soph is the *Primal Light*. In the beginning this light filled all space, nay, it was cosmic space itself. In order to give existence to something other than itself, it contracted its being and thereby formed vacuum. This vacuum it filled with a dimmed and gradually fading light, which it gave forth from itself. Thus things had their origin from God. When, therefore, it is said that God created the world "out of nothing" we are to understand this "nothing" to mean the incomprehensible "No-Thing" represented in our concept of God as He is in Himself. What we call "the creation of the world" is nothing more than the *emanation* of things from that Divine "No-Thing," which is expressed by the term En Soph.

4. What first came forth in this wise from God, the Primal Light, was the *Archetypal Man—Adam Kadmon*. In him the indeterminate attained determination. Archetypal Man was the prototype of all creation, the comprehensive concept of all things, the eternal wisdom, the true son of God. Archetypal Man is so named because man as the microcosmos concentrates in himself all created being.

5. Through Adam Kadmon there further emanated from God the ten *Sephiroth*. These we may regard from two points of view—in their relation to God and in their relation to the world. Under the first aspect they are the *creative attributes* of God, modes in which the existence of God becomes manifest. Hence, they are called, by the Cabbalists, faces of God or Divine Persons. Through these, God reveals Himself and becomes a possible object of knowledge. In Adam Kadmon they have their centre, and this being may, therefore, be styled their unity. In their relation to the world

the ten Sephiroth are represented by the Cabbalists as ten concentric circles of light coming from God and giving existence to the world.

6. Considered as attributes or manifestations of God, the ten Sephiroth arrange themselves in trinal combinations producing a system of *three triads*, to which the tenth Sephiroth attaches as a common resultant.

(*a.*) The first and highest Triad consists of the *Crown* (Cether), *Wisdom* (Cochmah), *Understanding* (Binah.)

(*b.*) The second Triad includes *Beauty, Grace, Righteousness* (Tipheret, Chesed, Din.)

(*c.*) The third Triad includes *Rational Ground, Triumph, Glory* (Jesod, Nezach, Hod.)

The tenth and last Sephira is the *Kingdom* (Malkuth). This, however, expresses nothing more than the harmony between the other Sephiroth, and their dominion over the world.

7. These ten Sephiroth are the limits within which the Divine Being encloses itself, the different degrees of darkness in which it shrouds its light, to render itself knowable and a possible object of contemplation; in its infinite effulgence it would blind our powers of vision.

8. Turning to the consideration of the Sephiroth in their relation to the world, we learn that they are emanations from the Divine Being, which give the world existence. Here, too, we have a threefold distribution, and in accordance with this a threefold creation. Corresponding to the three triads of the Sephiroth there are three created worlds:—

(*a.*) The world *Beriah*. This is the uppermost of the created worlds, here the three highest Sephiroth reign. This is the "inner" heaven, the immediate dwelling-place of God; it is inhabited by pure spirits.

(*b.*) The world *Jezirah*. This comes next in order to the world Beriah; in it the middle order of Sephiroth reign; it forms the "outer" world, and is composed of the celestial spheres. It is the dwelling-place of the angels, beings invested with rarified bodies. *Metatronus* stands at the head of the angelic hierarchy.

(*c.*) The World *Asiah*. This is the lowest world, it is ruled over by the lowest order of Sephiroth. It is the elemental world, or world of Nature, the region of our earth. Here is the home of man.

9. Above these three worlds stands another, the archetypal world *Aziluth*, the exemplar after which the others are modelled. This world is merely the archetypal man —Adam Kadmon, for he it is who contains all ideas in himself. As the type and exemplar of created things this world stands mid-way between God and Creation. To distinguish it from the created order it is called the "divine" heaven; no merely created thing has abode within it.

10. The three created worlds are modelled on the type of the world Aziluth; between these worlds, themselves, the relation of type and ectype is maintained. The higher world is, in each case, the type of the world next below it in rank. Everything contained in a lower world is contained also in that immediately above it, but in higher typical form. The higher world also exercises an active influence upon the lower. In this way the created system forms a "Kingdom," divided into three parts, with the stamp of the supreme world Aziluth impressed upon the whole.

11. In its lowest stage the process of emanation issues in *Matter*. Matter is produced by the extinction of the light which emanates from God, on the ultimate verge of its range; it is in fact nothing more than light thus extinguished. It occupies the lowest region

in the world Asiah, it constitutes the sphere of darkness—*i.e.*, of extinguished light. And since Darkness is the antithesis of Light, and Light is one with the *Good*, Matter is at once the principle and the home of *Evil*. In the Darkness of Matter the spirits of evil with their chief *Samael*, have their dwelling-place.

12. The Cabbalists tell us of a world which preceded that now existing, but which was destroyed before the present system of things began its course. The cause of its destruction was the fall of the angels. The angels were the princes of that earlier world, but they sinned and were cast forth from heaven; their fall involved the destruction of the world over which they ruled; the ruins of that world became the place of their punishment. Out of those ruins was fashioned a new world of which man was appointed the ruler.

13. Man is formed of a body and a soul. His soul is constituted by three principles—*Nephesch*, *Ruach*, *Neschamah*. Nephesch corresponds to the world Asiah, Ruach to the world Jezirah, and Neschamah to the world Beriah. Nephesch is the principle of *animal* (sensuous) *life* in man: Neschamah the principle of pure *intelligence*, the spirit, incapable of evil; Ruach stands mid-way between these; it is the *moral principle*. Man is good when this principle follows the guidance of Neschamah, evil when it follows Nephesch—*i.e.*, the sensuous appetite.

14. With this theory of three constituent elements in the human soul, the Cabbalists combined a doctrine of the soul's pre-existence. They did not, indeed, maintain that the soul's union with the body was a punishment for sin committed in a previous state; they held that the soul was naturally pre-determined to an union with the body in order that it might fulfil the task of its life in the visible world. But they laid it down that the soul which here below makes evil use of its liberty began, in its pre-corporeal existence, to separate itself from God, and there entered upon its course of evil. The last soul to enter earthly life will be the soul of the Messiah.

15. The transmigration of souls was finally adopted by the Cabbalists. All souls are destined to return at length to the bosom of the Absolute Being; but to reach this end they must develop all their powers, and by a course of probation attain to consciousness of themselves and their origin. If they have not accomplished this task in the space of one life, they are obliged to enter another body. Ultimately, however, they return to God again, and, united with him in perfect contemplation and love, enjoy a divine condition of existence.

2. Avicebron.

§ 89.

1. Ibn Gebirol, called by the scholastics Avicebron, and regarded by them as an Arab philosopher, belongs to the Neo-Platonist school. He was the earliest representative of philosophy among the Spanish Jews. Born at Malaga in 1020, and educated at Saragossa, he enjoyed till his death, in 1070, the reputation of a poet, a moralist, and philosopher. His chief work is the treatise *Fons Vitæ*. In the 13th century, portion of this work was translated into Hebrew from the original Arabic by the Jewish philosopher Schem Tob ibn Falaquera, with the title Mekor Chadjim. It has been issued in a French translation by Munk in his *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*. This work was well known to the Christian scholastics of the middle ages, and is often cited by them.

2. The fundamental principle of Avicebron's teaching, a principle frequently referred to by the Christian Scholastics, is this: "All things of earth, without exception, corporeal and spiritual alike, are composed of Matter and Form, for all are first possible and then actual, and therefore presuppose a subject of possibility, that is, Matter. To God alone this conception is inapplicable, for God is a necessary being, and therefore immaterial. Nor are we so to understand the principle as if there were one kind of Matter for material things, another for things spiritual; one and the same universal Matter is the basis of the corporeal and the incorporeal alike: they differ only in this, that in the one case this Matter is determined by corporeal Form, in the other by spiritual Form.

3. This being established, Avicebron proceeds to trace the origin of the world to the operation of the Divine Will. The Divine Will is the creative Word of God, in which lies the ultimate ground of all being and of all movement. In this teaching Avicebron is at variance with the Arabian Aristotelians, who traced the origin of the world back to Thought in God as to its ultimate cause. And just because he held the world to owe its being to Will rather than to Thought in God, he was led to hold that the world is not an emanation from the Divine Being, but a product of God's creative act.

4. But in the construction of his Cosmic system, Avicebron was not hindered by this reasoning from introducing the Neo-Platonist notion of emanation, and so impairing the value of his doctrine of creation. In his view, God and the corporeal world are separated by such a distance that it is impossible the world could have been produced immediately by God. He therefore interposed some connecting links between God and the material world. From God immediately proceeds the *Universal Intelligence*; from this emanates the *World-Soul*, and from this again *Nature*, i.e., the force which generates, animates and controls the material world.

5. The Universal Intelligence is composed of Matter and Form. From this source the material element, passing down through the World-Soul and Nature, takes corporeal form in the bodies of the material world and there becomes visible. The Universal Intelligence contains also all forms of material things, and their forces are imparted to things through the creative action of the Word. They, too, pass through the World-Soul and Nature, are realised in material objects, and there manifest themselves. The lower world is thus the ectype of the higher. And as Form and Matter reach the lower world from the higher, so too do action and movement; bodies have no movement of their own.

6. We have here, it is obvious, a system wholly Neo-Platonist, but for the principle of creation which is introduced at the outset. It must, however, be admitted that the notion of creation is out of place in the theory. For, if all being is accounted for by a continuous emanation of lower from higher being, it is difficult to understand why the Universal Intelligence should not be produced in the same way, but must be created by God. It was his acceptance of Revelation that prevented Avicebron from applying the principles of his system to the Universal Intelligence.

7. Avicebron was not acquainted with the original works of Plotinus, but he had before him some of the Neo-Platonist treatises of later date. These treatises, for the most part apocryphal, on the Latin translations of which the Scholastics, towards the close of the twelfth century, drew freely, were, according to Munk (*Mélanges* p. 240), the following:—Proklus' *Elementa Theologiæ*: Pseudo-Empedocles, *On the Five Elements*: Pseudo-Pythagoras; the *Theologia* of Pseudo-Aristotle (a Neo-Platonist treatise on God and His Emanations, on the Intellect, and the World-Soul), and lastly the treatise "De Causis," which contains Neo-Platonist doctrines taken, for the most part, textually from Proklus' *Institutio Theologica*.

3. Moses Maimonides.

1. We come now to the third school of mediæval Jewish philosophy. Its distinctive characteristic is its adoption of Aristotelian philosophy as the basis of its rational defence of the Jewish faith.

The founder of this school of thought was, as already mentioned, Saadiah Fujjumi—born in Egypt A.D. 892, in later life a teacher in the Academy of Sora, near Babylon, died 942. In the year 933 he composed his most important work, *Emunot We Deot* (Faith and Philosophy). Following, as it appears, in the footsteps of an earlier contemporary, David ben Merwan al Makammez, he endeavours, in this treatise, to establish the accord between reason and the dogmas of the Jewish faith, and to demonstrate the untenability of such dogmas and philosophic principles as are in contradiction with them. The cardinal points of his teaching are: the unity of God, the plurality of Divine Attributes, the creation of the world from nothing, the absolute perfection of the Revealed Law, the freedom of the will, retribution in a world to come, the resurrection of the body.

2. Saadiah was followed, in the middle of the eleventh century, by Rabbi Bechai, who in his treatise, *The Heart's Duties*, sketches out a complete system of Jewish ethics; after R. Bechai came Juda Hallevi, of Andalusia (1080-1150), author of the book *Khosari*, which narrates the conversion of the King of Khosra by a Jew, and which, rejecting the aid of (Aristotelian) philosophy, exhorts to faith and piety; and lastly Abraham ben David, who in his work *The Higher Faith*, written in 1160, appears as a champion of Aristotelian philosophy, and a vigorous opponent of the Neo-Platonist teaching of Avicebron.

3. But by far the most famous among the Jewish philosophers of this school is Moses Maimonides. He was the first to introduce among the Jews the Aristotelian philosophy in its completeness, and to utilise this system as a whole in support of the Jewish dogmas. He was born at Cordova in Spain in 1135. He gave himself to the study of Aristotle under the guidance of Averroes or one of his disciples. Persecuted as a heretic by his fellow Jews, he withdrew to Fez, and subsequently to Cairo, where he was appointed physician to the Sultan Saladin. He founded a school in Alexandria, but was driven from this city also by the persecutions of his co-religionists. He died in 1204.

4. Maimonides is the author of several works treating of Jewish Theology and Ethics. His chief work is the *More Nevochim* or *Doctor Perplexorum* (The Guide of the Erring).[1] In this work he has a two-fold aim: to furnish a philosophic basis for the dogmas of the Jewish faith, and to set forth the true meaning which the Holy Scriptures conceal under images, similes, and parables. He adopts the axiom of the Arabian Aristotelians that the teaching of the prophets was expressed mainly in images because in this way only could it be conveyed to the people, but that it is the duty of the scholar to strip it of this veil with the aid of philosophy and to lay bare the hidden truth. For Maimonides, however, philosophy in the true sense is the philosophy of Aristotle.

5. In the More Nevochim, Maimonides treats first of the Divine Attributes. He lays down the principle that we must not ascribe any *positive* attributes to God. For, such attributes should either be distinct from the Divine Substance or one with it. In the first case, they would be related to the Divine Substance as accidents, and accidents cannot be ascribed to God. In the second case, they would not be distinct from one another, for they would be one with the Divine Essence, which is in itself absolutely undifferentiated. Hence all the positive attributes which men ascribe to God are merely different names, which do not stand for different elements in the Divine Being, but all signify one and the same thing.

[1] The original of this work was written in Arabic with the title Dalalat al Haïrin (Guidance for Doubters). It was translated into Hebrew by Samuel ibn Tibbon about A.D. 1200 with the title More Nebuchim. Many Hebrew editions were issued. The first Latin translation was published in Paris A.D. 1520.

6. It is true that "the Law" ascribes different positive perfections to God. But this is because the Law accommodates itself to the common methods of human thought; man cannot conceive the absolute perfection of God otherwise than by attributing to Him the perfections which he perceives in himself or in other objects. We must explain the forms of expression used in "the Law" by assuming that the different attributes ascribed to God are denominations by which are signified the different kinds of effects which His action produces in the world. According to its mode of operation, we describe fire as a dissolving and combining, a cooking and consuming, a blackening and whitening force, without thereby implying a plurality of forces; in the same way the Law designates God by different names according to the different effects He produces, without any implication of a difference between the attributes which correspond to these different names.

7. If we admitted the Positive Attributes assigned to God to be anything more than different denominations of God corresponding to His different works, we should be forced to admit a likeness or analogy between God and created things, on the basis of which the perfections of created objects might be predicated of God. But no such analogy exists; God and a created object cannot be represented by a common concept, even by a concept based on mere resemblance. When, therefore, we use the same term to designate God and a created thing, we are using the term *equivocally*; the term is one, but there is nothing in common between the objects signified.

8. It follows from this that negative attributes alone can be predicated of God. In no other way can we have determinate concepts of the Divine Essence. We can determine what God is not, not what He is. In this sense are to be understood all the designations applied to God; it is only when thus understood that they retain their meaning if applied to the Divine Being. When, for example, we speak of God as wise, we must understand by the term that he is not subject to ignorance, when we speak of Him as powerful, we must mean that He is not liable to weakness or fatigue, &c. And let us not believe that this negative knowledge is insufficient and futile. The more we deny of God the more perfect is our knowledge of Him.

9. A further question treated of by Maimonides in the More Nevochim is that of the eternity of the world. On this question, says Maimonides, "the Law" asserts that the world has been created by God out of nothing, and has, therefore, had a beginning; the Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, maintains that the world is, and must be, eternal. The Medabberim among the Ishmaelites (i.e., the Mohammedan theologians) are of opinion that it can be demonstrated by reason that the world had a beginning and was created, and they adduce arguments which, they allege, prove this proposition. But all these proofs rest on unproved assumptions. Instead of the true principles of Aristotle, they construct metaphysical principles of their own, and on this foundation build their argument for the world's beginning. Proofs of this kind have absolutely no validity. Maimonides accordingly adopts the view that it cannot be demonstratively established by reason that the world has had a beginning.

10. But neither can it be demonstrated that the world is necessarily eternal, *i.e.* that it cannot have had a beginning. Aristotle's arguments in this respect are not conclusive. Maimonides endeavours to prove his point, and follows here the line of reasoning traced by Algazel. Thus:—

a) The Aristotelians assert, that if we admit God to have created the world, we must also admit that in the creating, he passed from the condition of potency to the con-

dition of act, and this involves change in God. But, replies Maimonides, there can be no question of potentiality in God, in Him the material element does not exist, and consequently there cannot in Him be a transition from potency to act.

(*b*) Again, it is urged that if the world were created, and so had a beginning, it would follow that before Creation there must have been some hindrance which prevented God from creating, or that when He created, some entirely new reason occurred to Him to urge Him to create. But, answers Maimonides, it is only a will, acting because of extrinsic motives, which acts for a determinate motive, and is restrained from action by interposed hindrances. Here we have to do with the Absolute Will, the end of whose action was wholly within itself.

(*c*) Aristotle's argument that matter must be eternal, because otherwise an antecedent matter must be supposed to account for its coming into existence, is valid only when we are dealing with causes in the order of nature; the action of natural causes supposes pre-existent matter. But the reasoning is not applicable to the Absolute Cause; an absolute cause has the power not only to form things from pre-existent matter, but also to give being to matter itself. We may deal in analogous fashion with the argument in reference to the eternity of motion.[1]

11. The eternity of the world cannot be proved from reason; reason must therefore recognise that it is at least *possible* the world may have been created and have had a beginning, as taught by the "Law." The creation of the world and its beginning in time, is, consequently, an article of faith, not a truth of philosophy, it is not a truth that can be proved, but neither is there proof of its contradictory. This is sufficient to safeguard the "Law," and to justify it, so far as philosophy is concerned.[2]

12. These are the chief points of teaching in the More Nevochim which are of importance for the history of philosophy. In reference to its further teaching a few remarks will suffice.

(*a*) *Prophecy*, according to Maimonides, is to be explained by an influence exerted by God through the Active Intellect (a principle which Maimonides, like Avicenna, holds to be distinct from the individual mind) on the intellect of the individual, and through this channel, on his imagination. By this means the prophet is enabled to have knowledge of hidden things, and to express that knowledge in appropriate images. This conception of the gift of prophecy is, it will be observed, in keeping with the doctrines of the Arabians.

(*b*) *Evil*, Maimonides teaches, has its origin in *Matter*. This applies to moral and physical evil alike. All disorder, corruption and imperfection of things come from matter; moral evil is due to the fact that man permits himself to be dominated by matter, in other words, that he obeys his sensuous appetites and passions. The task of man's life in the sphere of moral effort, is to control his sensuous appetites, to subdue matter in himself. For this end he has been endowed with freedom of will.

(*c*) On the question of Divine Providence, Maimonides agrees with the Arabian Aristotelians, so far as all things of earth, man excepted, are concerned. The Providence of God takes account of the Universal only, that is, provides only for the maintenance of genera and species; it does not extend to the individual. This dispensation does not apply to man; in his case, Divine Providence has care of each and every individual.

(*d*) But though man is thus privileged in the system of Maimonides, the philosopher will not allow that all other things of earth are designed to subserve the purposes of

[1] According to Aristotle motion cannot have had a beginning, for the beginning of a movement supposes an antecedent movement by which it is effected, and this another antecedent movement, and so backwards in infinite regression. But all this holds good only within the sphere of natural causation. It does not follow that a cause above nature may not have given existence to the thing moved as well as to its movement—an hypothesis which involves beginning of motion.

[2] The same holds in reference to the resurrection of the body. It cannot be proved or disproved by reason. It is, therefore, strictly an article of faith.

human life, that they have been created for man's sake. Everything, he maintains, has its end in itself, and is created by God for its own sake. God brought forth every creature by an act of will, and fixed for each the special end of its existence.

(c) The end of the "Law" is to lead man to perfection, first to perfection of his physical being, then to moral, and finally to intellectual perfection. This last is the ultimate end of man. By the practice of social and moral virtues man must strive to attain the virtues of Intellect. He must turn all his thoughts towards the highest concept God, and must devote himself with all his energies to the investigation of the highest truth. Herein consists the true worship of God, the worship of the heart. Not because of reward or punishment, but for its own sake alone, must we love and do the good.

13. The influence exercised by the teaching of Maimonides was great and widespread, but it did not make way unchallenged. The Jews of the stricter orthodox school set themselves to oppose it. They described it as "a selling of Sacred Scripture to the Greeks," and as "an undermining of the solid foundation of the Law." But the opposition was ineffectual. The doctrines of Maimonides, and indeed Aristotelianism as a whole, secured a crowd of supporters all through the course of the Middle Ages. Among the many commentators of Maimonides we may mention Palquera (in the 13th century), Joseph Caspi († 1350), Levi ben Gerson (1288–1370), Moses ben Josua of Narbonne in the 14th century), J. Abravanel (in the 15th century). These were not in agreement with Maimonides on all points; for example, B. Levi ben Gerson, in his work *Milkamoth Adonai*, rejects altogether the doctrine of creation out of nothing.

14. Here too we may make mention of Ahron ben Elias of Nicomedia, the author of a work published in 1346 with the title *Ez-Chaim* (Arbor Vitæ), which attained great celebrity. He is a vigorous opponent of Maimonides. A disciple of the Karaitic dogmatic school, he censures Maimonides for perverting religion by means of philosophy. The professed purpose of his work (Ez-Chaim) is to secure the doctrines of faith, understood in their true sense, from the dangerous influences of philosophy. Though thus antagonistic to Maimonides, the general philosophic character of the work Ez-Chaim is, in general, the same as that of the More Nevochim.

15. Of the later Jewish philosophers the best deserving of mention are Albo, Schem Tow, Elias del Medigo, Abravanel, whom we have already noticed, and his son Leo—all in the 15th century.

HISTORY OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

Section III.

Christian Philosophy.

General Survey.

§ 90.

1. The Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages is continuous with the Patristic. It builds upon the foundations which the earlier philosophy had laid. It is not, however, a mere reproduction of the teaching of the Fathers. The great thinkers of the Middle Ages were men of original thought; they availed themselves of the fruitful germs which lay ready to hand in the Patristic philosophy, but they aimed at developing these into the fulness and ripeness of knowledge. They were not mere imitators, their philosophy was an organic development of that which had preceded it.

2. Prominent in the new philosophic movement is a tendency which shows itself but faintly in the earlier—the tendency to be *systematic*. What the Fathers had worked out in fragmentary fashion, and, for the most part in casual treatises meant to satisfy a casual need, the great Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages gathered into one united whole, and built into imposing systems. The systematic structure which the Fathers failed to give to their teaching was supplied by their mediæval successors. But this perfection was not reached by a single effort, it was pursued through a long process of construction till it was attained at last, in the golden age of Mediæval Christian philosophy.

3. In this process of development, continued through the Middle Ages, two distinct currents of thought present themselves to our notice—the *Scholastic* and the *Mystical*. Indications of the divergence of these two lines of speculation may be observed in the Patristic period; in the Middle Ages the distinction became broadly and deeply marked. Scholasticism represents the rational or speculative side of human thought, Mysticism the contemplative. The subject-matter with which both professed to occupy themselves was the same, but each dealt with this subject-matter in its own fashion. Scholasticism sought to comprehend and to demonstrate truth by the investigations of reason; Mysticism by the methods of contemplation, by the sympathies of the heart and the emotions. The divergence between Scholasticism and Mysticism had its salutary influence on the development of mediæval philosophy. The two schools of thought were at one in their reverence for the truths of Christianity; but, in their differences on other points, they mutually supplemented each other's teaching, and so counterbalanced one another as to prevent either from pushing its doctrines to dangerous extremes.

4. The name "Scholastic" was originally bestowed on the liberal arts (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectic, constituting the *Trivium*; with Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music constituting the *Quadrivium*). The name was subsequently given to all who, in the schools, devoted themselves to the sciences, especially to philosophy and theology. The philosophy and theology of these teachers came, in this way, to be known as the "scholastic." And this designation, borrowed from the dominant school of thought in the period, came at last to be applied to the whole philosophy of the Middle Ages.

5. Scholastic philosophy received a powerful impulse from the adoption of the Aristotelian philosophy in the Christian schools. Up to the twelfth century the logical treatises of Aristotle were the only works of the philosopher known to the Schools of the West. But in the course of the twelfth century the whole body of Aristotle's works was brought within reach of the Christian scholars—thanks to the Arab and Jewish followers of the Stagyrite. In the first use

of this acquisition mistakes and errors were committed, but these were speedly repaired, and a method of philosophic investigation was devised, which made the philosophy of Aristotle subservient to the development of Christian Scholasticism.

6. In the history of the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages we may distinguish three periods or stages—the period of its rise and early development; the period of its greatest splendour, in the thirteenth century; the period of stagnation following the thirteenth century, when it ceases to advance, or at least makes no advance comparable to what had gone before. This season of arrested progress was a critical period for Scholastic philosophy. For during this time many defects crept into its methods; and these defects were, in part, the cause of the attacks, which assailed it in the fifteenth century, and which aimed at its total subversion.

7. We will divide our sketch of Mediæval Christian philosophy into three sections corresponding to the three periods indicated above—the period of the rise and first development of that philosophy, the period of its maturity and prime, and lastly the period of its decline.

FIRST PERIOD.

The Rise and Development of Scholastic Philosophy.

First Attempts at Philosophic Speculation by the Nations of the West.

§ 91.

1. The history of the philosophy of the Middle Ages begins with the reign of Charlemagne. The rule of this monarch was made famous by triumphs in the field of knowledge, as well as by feats of arms. How much he did for the cause of education in France is known to all students of history. He invited to his realm the most learned men of the age, commissioned them to organise and to direct the system of education, and himself, at the age of forty, sat at their feet to receive the instruction which had not been given him in his youth.

2. The most remarkable of the men who devoted themselves to science and to education under Charlemagne was the Englishman Alcuin. Charlemagne invited him (A.D. 781), to his Court, and appointed him head of the Palace School (Schola Palatina). Alcuin is the thinker of the Middle Ages with whom the history of Scholastic Philosophy must begin. He has left us several treatises which give evidence of rare gifts, and of great erudition. Apart from his theological works—the most remarkable of which is his treatise *De Fide Trinitatis*—we are indebted to him for works

which belong to the domain of philosophy proper. Such, for instance, is his dialogue *De Grammatica*, as well as those *De Rhetorica et Virtutibus* and *De Dialectica*; so also his *Disputatio Pippini cum Albino Scholastico* on the subject of natural history, and, lastly, his work *De Animæ Ratione*, written for the use of the maiden Eulalia.

3. In his philosophical opinions Alcuin always faithfully follows St. Augustine. This is specially noticeable in the last of the above-named treatises, that *De Animæ Ratione*; the Psychology of St. Augustine is here expounded and developed. Nor are ethical doctrines overlooked. God, says Alcuin, is man's highest good. The tendency towards the highest good is implanted in man's nature; it is natural to man to love God. Virtue is the path which leads to the Good. In virtue, furthermore, consists the whole beauty of the soul. True morality is exhibited in the harmonious activity of the four cardinal virtues, the crown and perfection of which is found in Love.

4. In his later years Alcuin became Abbot of Tours. Here he founded a school which was soon famous throughout Europe, and which sent forth many learned men. After his death, A.D. 804, his work was continued by his disciples. Amongst these disciples we may name Fredegisus, who succeeded him as Abbot of Tours, to whom we owe a long treatise with the title *De Nihilo et Tenebris*, in which the author endeavours to prove that "Nothingness," as well as "Darkness," is not a pure negation, that it is in itself something real and positive. It does not appear what object is aimed at in this disquisition. Another disciple of Alcuin was Rhabanus Maurus, Abbot of Fulda, and subsequently Archbishop of Mayence (A.D. 776-856), who founded the School of Fulda, the parent institution of the Schools of Germany. He was the author of a great work in twenty-two books, which bore the title *De Universo*—an encyclopædia of the knowledge of the age. Yet another disciple was Paschasius, Abbot of Corbie († 851), who, in his work *De Fide, Spe, et Caritate*, discussed minutely, and with much ability, the doctrines of the Christian Faith.

5. In the ninth century the monk Gottschalk originated the so-called Predestination controversy which occasioned much disturbance in the Church of France. He taught that Predestination was twofold—Predestination to grace and glory, and Predestination to wickedness and damnation. He was opposed by Rhabanus Maurus and Hincmar of Rheims, who upheld the doctrine of one Predestination, and taught that God predestines only to grace and glory, not to wickedness and damnation. Evil God merely permits, and, foreseeing the evil, condemns man to punishment. We make mention of the Predestination controversy chiefly because Scotus Erigena, of whom we have now to speak, took part in it, at the request of Hincmar of Rheims, and discussed the doctrine of Predestination from the standpoint of philosophy.

2. JOANNES SCOTUS ERIGENA.

§. 92.

1. The first completely developed system of Philosophy which the middle ages offer us bears the name of Scotus Erigena. It is a remarkable fact that his system has much in common with the doctrines of the Neo-Platonists, that he carries on their teaching into the Middle Ages. His guides are, first of all the supposititious "Denis the Areopagite," whose works he translated at the request of Charles the Bald; then Maximus Confessor, the commentator of "Denis"; Basil and Gregory of Nazianza; Gregory of Nyssa and Origen. The Latin Fathers, notably St. Augustine, hold a secondary place in his esteem. From these teachers, and particularly from the Greek Fathers we have mentioned, he adopted such points of Neo-Platonist doctrine as their writings contained. With the theories thus obtained, he combined the conceptions peculiar to Christianity, and thus succeeded in forming an Idealistic theory of Emanation, which he sought to establish on a Christian basis, but in which the distinctively Christian notions are refined and perverted until they are made to fit into the formulas of Neo-Platonism where they lose their genuine meaning and significance.

2. The personal history of Scotus Erigena is involved in much obscurity; what tradition has preserved regarding him is evidently in great part fabulous. We only know with certainty that about the year 843 he was invited to the Palace School (Schola Palatina) at Paris by Charles the Bald, and that he lived and laboured at the Court of Charles. He was probably an Irishman by birth. He appears to have received his education at the famous schools of Ireland. He was familiar with the Greek as well as the Latin tongue. Of the ancient philosophers he held Plato in highest esteem, though he also appreciated Aristotle. He knew the *Timæus* of Plato in the translation by Chalcidius, he was acquainted with the first parts of the *Organon* of Aristotle, and with the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. It is said that in his old age he was invited by Alfred the Great to the newly founded University of Oxford, and that he was subsequently appointed Abbot of Malmesbury, where he was murdered by the monks.

3. As regards the works of Scotus Erigena, it has been already said that he translated the writings of the supposed "Denis the Areopagite;" he also translated a work of Maximus Confessor. The works of which he was himself the author are a short treatise, *De Predestinatione*; the great work *De Divisione Naturæ*, in five books, composed in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupils, and containing a complete statement of the writer's system of philosophy; lastly a *Homilia in Prolog. Evang. sec. Joannem*, with a few minor treatises of little importance.

4. In his treatise *De Predestinatione* Erigena defends the doctrine of one predestination; but he does this in a fashion peculiar to himself. The three chief grounds which he assigns for the doctrine of one predestination are these:—

(*a*). All that is in God is God himself; hence the Will by which He predestines is identical with the Divine Being. Now the Being of God is absolutely simple; it follows that the predestinating Will of God is absolutely simple, and so there can be only one kind of predestination.

(*b*). Opposite effects suppose opposite causes, one and the same cause cannot produce effects of opposite natures. Now good and evil, bliss and misery are opposed to one

another ; hence one God cannot be the cause of both ; it follows there can be only one kind of predestination.

(*c*). God can predestine only that which He knows. God does not know evil, for knowledge attains only that which is ; what is not cannot be the object of knowledge. Evil is nothing real, nothing that is. It follows that God cannot know it. If He knew it, it would be something positive, something real ; and, moreover, God Himself would be the author of it, and so it would have necessary existence in the world. But this is clearly absurd. It remains then that God does not know evil, and cannot, therefore, predestine evil. Accordingly there can be only one kind of predestination, a predestination to good and to happiness.

5. We turn now from this remarkable course of argument to consider the philosophical system of Erigena. Regarded as a philosopher, he may be described as at once theosophist and gnostic. The Christian Faith is for him the basis and the condition of all and every form of knowledge. The starting point of all rational investigation must be the divine Truth as set forth in the Sacred Scriptures. Hence in the rational creature, faith is the principle with which the knowledge of the Creator begins (*De Div. Nat.* I , 71 Ed. Migne).

6. It is the business of reason to discover by thought the meaning of the Divine utterances—a manifold meaning, and of changing aspect like the feathers of the peacock ; and chiefly is it the business of reason to reduce the figurative expressions so largely employed in Sacred Scripture, to their genuine sense. It is thus the task of reason to unfold the mysterious hidden meaning of the Divine utterances ; that is, by rational investigation, to render intelligible the truths contained in Holy Writ. This holds good of all kinds of truth, of all the " Divine Deliverances." Erigena makes no distinction between truths of reason and mysteries ; he aims at demonstrating and developing all the truths of Revelation by the same rational methods. Philosophy, according to this view, is coextensive with Revelation, and it is in this sense he adopts the saying of St. Augustine that true philosophy and true religion are one and the same thing (*De Præd., Proœm.*).

7. In our efforts to penetrate the hidden meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, to discover the secrets of Revelation, we must not treat lightly the authority of the Fathers ; it would be unseemly in us to sit in judgment upon their opinions ; we must receive their teaching devoutly and respectfully. But it is permitted us, in the first place, to *select* from their writings what, in our judgment, is most in accord with the Divine utterances—and, in this respect, the Greek Fathers are, as a rule, to be preferred to the Latin, for the latter, in their interpretation, lean too much to popular modes of apprehension. In the second place, reason stands, in the last issue, above the authority of the Church Fathers, and, accordingly, when it has reached an assured conclusion, it must hold fast by it in spite of the authority of the Fathers. Nay, the case is contemplated in which a philosophical conclusion of the kind may seem to conflict with the sayings of Scripture itself. And Erigena lays it down (*De Div. Nat.*, Lib. 1, C. 63), that even in this case

reason is to be our guide, for reason cannot be crushed by any authority whatever.

8. To these doctrines, characteristic at once of the theosophist and the gnostic, Erigena adds an element of mysticism also. Reason, he says, is in itself darkness; it cannot penetrate the Divine mysteries unless it be illuminated by the sun of the Divine Word. Enlightened by the Divine light it triumphs over every form of darkness, and is enabled to behold directly and immediately the Supreme Truth itself. In this state it is not so much Reason which contemplates the Supreme Truth as the Supreme Truth which contemplates itself in man. It is not man who finds God, but God who finds Himself in man.

9. Having premised these general notions, we have now to enter into the details of Erigena's system. Erigena begins by distinguishing Four Natures:—

(*a*) The First Nature is that which creates, but is not created (natura, quæ non creatur et creat)—this is God, in so far as He is the sovereign efficient Cause of all things.

(*b*) The Second Nature is that which creates and is created (natura, quæ creatur et creat)—this is the aggregate of Ideas in the Divine Word in so far as these ideas are not merely divine conceptions but creative potencies also—Primordial causes.

(*c*) The Third Nature is that which is created but does not create (natura, quæ creatur et non creat)—this is the world perceived by sense with the individual objects which it includes.

(*d*) Finally, the Fourth Nature is that which is not created and does not create (natura, quæ non creatur nec creat)—this, again, is God, but God in so far as He is the final end of all things, and leads all things back to Himself. (*De Div. Nat.*, Lib. I., c. 1.)

With the subject matter indicated in this fourfold division the whole system of Erigena is concerned; it is nothing more than an exposition of the theories regarding these Four Natures. He begins with the First:—

The First Nature.

§ 93.

1. God as the First Nature transcends, in His own being, all Categories and Predicates. In His own being He transcends all created objects; in the same way He transcends the Categories and Predicates which are properly applied to these objects. No one of them can be applied to Him in its proper sense—not even the Category *οὐσία*; he is not *οὐσία*. He is something more. In His own being God is without definite form, and is therefore beyond the reach of our faculty of understanding. He cannot be apprehended by thought or described in language. As being absolutely formless and incomprehensible, He might rightly be called "Nothing,"

(Nihilum). He is, in truth nothing of the sum of things; He is raised above all things. He is not a determined "Quid," or nature as contrasted with any other "Quid," or nature; He is without "quiddity," *i.e*, Nothing. In reference to Himself He knows *that* He is, not *what* He is, for He is not any "what," not any "Quid." And precisely because He does not know *what* He is, does He know Himself as truly God.

2. We must, indeed, attribute all perfections to God; these perfections must be in Him, since He communicates them to created things. But this attribution is figurative merely; such perfections cannot be attributed to God in any strict use of the terms employed (*proprie*). We are thus led to distinguish two kinds of Theology—one *affirmative* καταφατική, and a *negative* ἀποφατική. Affirmative Theology asserts all perfections of God, inasmuch as He is the ultimate cause of those perfections in created things. But as such affirmation is possible only in an improper sense, Negative Theology again denies these perfections of God. The latter is the more perfect form of science. It uses words in their proper meaning; whereas the former uses them in a translated sense. God is best known by want of knowledge; ignorance in reference to God is the true knowledge. When, therefore, we make any assertion regarding God, it is best so to express ourselves, that the negative as well as the positive element of our knowledge shall appear in our words. This can be done by setting the prefix *supra* before any predicate we may apply to God. God is the supra-existent, the supra-potent, the supra-sapient, etc.

3. Although God is the supra-existent, and, therefore, to us incomprehensible, yet is He not for this wholly hidden from us. He reveals Himself to our intelligence in the Divine Manifestations (Theophanies). By Divine Manifestations are to be understood, on the one hand, the phenomena of that created world which our senses perceive; on the other, the inner illumination of Divine Grace.

4. In these manifestations is revealed not merely the Divine Nature, but the Trinity of Persons in God as well. The Theophanies lead to a knowledge of the Trinity. From the knowledge that things *are*, Theologians advance to the knowledge that God *is;* from the orderly distribution of things in genera and species, they learn that God is *wise;* from their settled movements, they infer that God *lives*. In this way they come to a knowledge of the Trinity. By the term "Being," is to be understood the Father; by "Wisdom," the Son; by "Life," the Holy Ghost. The Father has established all things in the Son, founded in Him the whole created order; His generation by the Father constitutes the entire order of Primal Causes. The Holy Ghost, on the other hand, is the differentiating and co-ordinating Cause acting upon those things which the Father has established as a unity in the Son. This development of the theory brings us to the Second Nature.

The Second Nature.

§ 94.

1. The Second Nature, as we have seen, is the aggregate of all those ultimate reasons or primal forms of things, which serve at once as prototypes and as creative agencies (Primal Causes) for the objects of the sensible world.[1] They are, as we have said, produced by God in the Divine Word, and are, therefore, one with this Word, not something distinct from it. Hence the three points of doctrine regarding them:—

(*a*) Things, as they exist ideally in the Divine Word, do not exhibit, in this condition, plurality or difference; they exist in the Divine Word as an undifferentiated unity.

(*b*) The creation of the Ideal World in the Divine Word is eternal, without beginning; for, if God created it in time, the creation would constitute an accidental modification of the substance of His divinity, and God is not the subject of accidental modifications.

(*c*) The eternity of the Primal Causes is not, however, quite the same as the eternity of God. God is eternal because He is uncreated; the ultimate principles of things are eternal, because they are eternally created by God.

2. It is thus true to say that God did not exist before He created this (Ideal) world; for this world is posterior to Him in nature only, not in time. If we ask how the creation of the Ideal World was effected, Erigena answers that God created it out of nothing. But this term "nothing" here signifies the Being of God Himself regarded as "supra-existent"; for, as we have already seen, considered as "supra-existent," it must be designated "nothing" Hence the creation of the order of Primal Causes is nothing more than their emanation from the "supra-existent" Divine Being, by the exercise of God's living power.

3. God, says Erigena, has made all things out of Nothing—that is, out of Himself; for by the term "Nothing" is to be understood God, who does not exist as a determinate being, and who from the negation of all being has proceeded to the affirmation of all being, proceeding from Himself to Himself, from Nothing to Something. God thus assumes being in the Primal causes of things; in them He creates Himself; in them He comes forth from the hidden depths of His nature, in which He is hidden even from Himself. He descends into the First Principles of things, and, creating Himself, begins to be something, having previously been, as it were, shut up in the "Supra-existent Nothing."

[1] Erigena calls them not merely *προτοτυπά*, *προορίσματα*, but also *θεῖα θεἠματα*.

4. As the Ideal World proceeds from God as its creating Cause, so the Sensible World proceeds from the Ideal. The Sensible World is the product of the activity of the Ideal; for the Primary Principles are not mere archetypes, they are Primary Causes as well; that is to say, creative powers producing sensible objects. Hence it is affirmed of the Second Nature that it is created, and creates in its turn. This aspect of the Second Nature leads us to the consideration of the Third Nature.

Third Nature.

§ 95.

1. The Third Nature is the totality of the objects which are perceptible by the Senses. The question at once arises: What conception are we to form as to the intrinsic nature of the world which the senses perceive? In his answer to this question Erigena starts with the assumption that the Universal Concept, taken in its universality, has objective reality: he would even maintain that the Universal, as such, is the only objective reality, individual objects being merely passing manifestations of the Universal, which alone has real existence. In accordance with these notions, he lays down the following points of doctrine regarding the Third Nature:—

(*a*) The common substratum of all phenomena is one entity or being which is in itself undifferentiated and indeterminate—the *οὐσία*. In this *οὐσία* all things are one, in fact as well as in concept, for it is the one sole substance of all things.

(*b*) This one universal *οὐσία*, divides, within itself, into genera and species, without however, losing its substantial unity. It is only in this self-division into genera and species that the *οὐσία* attains actuality.

(*c*) The species thus generated manifest themselves in individual objects. Hence a species is whole in all, and whole in each of the individuals contained under it. The species is the element of true being in the individual, it is by it that the individual subsists. And as species and genus are one in the *οὐσία*, so also are individuals when reduced to the same ultimate term.

(2.) The character of individuality is primarily manifested in the corporeal world, But how, we may ask, do the individual objects proceed from the universal? In dealing with this problem, Erigena adopts the Neo-Platonist view as to the nature of material bodies His teaching on this subject is as follows:

(*a*) Every material body can be ultimately analysed into separate elements, which are in themselves purely intelligible, that is, mere qualities. Without size, figure, position, density, colour, etc., a body is unthinkable. If, therefore, we separate these purely intelligible elements from the body, there is not left anything which can be called a body.

(*b.*) Hence it follows that a body is merely the result of the concurrence and combination of these purely intelligible elements. A body is, therefore, in its component parts, of the purely intelligible and immaterial order; the outward corporeal semblance is due to the combination of intelligible accidents; it is merely the product of the conjunction of these accidental qualities.

(*c*) Individual corporeal objects come into being by the fact that the *οὐσία*, in its ultimate species, becomes invested with accidental qualities, and so assumes corporeal appearance. The *οὐσία* as such, could not be the subject of accidental qualities, it is only in its lowest species that it can assume them; hence the fact that we have only specifically determined bodies. The accidents with which the *οὐσία* in its ultimate species, is invested are involved in constant transition and change—contrasting in this respect with the *οὐσία* itself which is immutable and enduring; this is the explanation of the changeableness and instability of the phenomenal world. The accidents, furthermore, are that in which individual objects differ from one another; generically and specifically, they are all one.

(3.) This explanation, it is evident, reduces the visible world to something purely *ideal*. Everything that meets us in the visible world is, in its real being, something merely ideal or intelligible, the corporeal character of things is merely a matter of appearance. Furthermore, the visible world is reduced to one only being, the *οὐσία*. The unity which exists in the world is not a mere *unitas ordinis*, it is an unity of being. The world is not a well-ordered aggregate of many substantially different things; it is one being and one substance.

(4.) In the light of these doctrines, we are enabled to determine the relations which subsist between the Second Nature and the Third. These relations are thus set forth by Erigena:

(*a*) The Second Nature and the Third are not distinct in actual being. The Third Nature, as opposed to the Second, does not possess in itself any independent reality. They are one in being and essence, the difference between them is a difference of states or conditions.

(*b*) In the Divine Word the *οὐσία* exists in absolute unity and wholly without differentiation; in the phenomenal world it is differentiated into genera and species, and, in the lowest stages of its differentiation, is invested with those Accidents, to which the appearance of a phenomenal world seeming to possess independent existence is due.

(*c*). When, then, it is asserted that the Primal Principles contained in the Divine Word are the efficient causes of the phenomenal world, this must be understood to mean that these Primal Principles themselves appear in the effects of which they are the causes. They do not produce their effects as something different from themselves, they appear themselves in their effect, and take existence in them; and taking existence in them, they manifest themselves in these effects, multiplied and differentiated.

(*d*) But though manifesting themselves thus in their effects, those Primal Principles maintain themselves, all the while, in the Divine Word, and in that unity which they enjoy within it. They descend, indeed, into the multiplicity and differentiation of their

effects, but preserve, nevertheless, their transcendent unity and supra-mundane state in the Divine Word.

(*e*) The first manifestation of the Primal Principles in their effects is the beginning of Time. Immanent in the Divine Word, they are above Time, they are eternal: but as soon as they manifest themselves in their effects, the course of Time begins in the sphere of these effects, for these effects can be of the temporal order only.

5. These being the relations between the Second Nature and the Third, it becomes manifest what are the relations between the First Nature and the Third, that is, between God and the world. And here we reach the cardinal point of Erigena's system. Erigena admits, it is true, a creation from nothing; but he expressly warns us that this is not to be understood in the ordinary theological meaning of the terms employed. We have seen that, according to Erigena's view, the "Nothing" from which the Primal Principles of things have been created is the Divine Being itself, in its supra-essential state, and that, furthermore, the phenomenal world is not, in actual reality, different from the Primal Principles; it follows necessarily that the "Nothing" out of which God has created the phenomenal world is the Divine Being in its supra-essential state. This is, in fact, Erigena's express teaching.

6. Coming down from that transcendent fulness of being in which God is described as Non-Being, God creates Himself in the Primal Principles. Next (when the Primal Principles manifest themselves in their effects), He descends from these Primal Principles to their effects, takes existence in the latter, and reveals Himself in His Theophanies. Thus does He proceed, through the manifold forms of these effects to the ultimate order in the whole system of Nature—to material bodies. In this way, advancing in determined order through all things, He makes all things, and becomes all in all things, without, however, ceasing to be above and beyond all things. In this way He produces all things from nothing—the essence of things, out of His supra-essential being: the life of things, out of His supra-vital being; &c., in a word, out of the negation of all that is and that is not, He brings forth all that is and that is not (III. 20).

7. Here then we have the Emanation Theory of Pantheism, in that form which it received in Neo-Platonism. From the Nothingness of God's supra-essential being come forth the Primal Principles of all things, and then through these Primal Principles God descends to their effects, and in these becomes all things that are. The *οὐσία* which, as a unit of being, is the ultimate basis of all things, is, in the last analysis, the *οὐσία* of God Himself. God, says Erigena, is the essence of all things (I. 3). The effect is no more than the cause taking new existence. Hence God, in so far as He is a Cause, takes existence in the effects He produces (III. 22). Creation is His advance to a new existence out of the depths of His supra-essential being. "God and the creature," says Erigena, "are not two beings distinct from one another; they are one and the same." (III. 17).

8. Though God exists in all things, and takes being in them, He does not, however, lose Himself in them; He remains all the while in His own being, always indivisible, always an unity which

transcends the world. In His relation to the world, He at once dwells in, and transcends, it. He is, and He is not, the universal οὐσία of all things. In the outpouring of Himself in the things of the world, He is their οὐσία; in His own being He is not this οὐσία. In His own being He is the unity of all antitheses; descending into the things of the world, He enters into these antitheses. The Emanation theory of pantheism could hardly be more distinctly formulated.

9. Analogous to the First, Second, and Third Nature, we have in man Intellect (*Intellectus*), Reason (*Ratio*), and the Inner Sense (*Sensus Interior*). The Intellect, the νοῦς of the Greeks, is the intuitive faculty; the proper object of its knowledge is God as He is in Himself, that is as He in His own nature transcends being and non-being alike. Reason—the λόγος of the Greeks—has for its object the Second Nature, that is, the eternal principles of things as they exist in God. The Inner Sense—the διάνοια of the Greeks—has for its proper object the Third Nature, inasmuch as its task is to reduce the perceptions of sense back to their proper mental concepts, and to investigate the reasons of sensible phenomena.

10. As regards the course followed by man in the acquisition of knowledge, it may be described as, in its first stage, a progress upwards. The Interior Sense abstracts the universal concept from the perceptions of sense; these concepts are reduced by the Reason to the unity which they possess in the Divine Word; lastly, the Intellect reduces all objects of knowledge back to God, inasmuch as it apprehends Him as the Supra-existent, and perceives how all genera and species proceed from God and return to Him again. In its second stage, human knowledge is a movement downwards. It begins with the "gnostic intuition" of God by the Intellect, descends by the Reason to the Primal Principles evolving these from the being of God, and ends with the Interior Sense, which evolves the genera and species of the sensible world out of the unity of the Primal Principles.

In man all things have been created—and this in a twofold sense. In the first place, we find united in man the elements which appear differentiated and opposed in the rest of the created world. Man *apprehends* as does the angel, *infers* as does man, *feels* as does the irrational brute, *lives* as does the plant, and *is* in body and soul as are all things else. In the second place, all things have been created in man inasmuch as the concept of all created things has been implanted in him by God. All our concepts of things are indwelling, innate within us; that we have no consciousness of these concepts, and that our knowledge is, in general, so defective, is due to original sin. These concepts of things, moreover, are nothing else than the *essences* of things themselves which are thought in the concepts. As the Divine ideas of things which the Father creates in the Son are the very essences of things, and the basis of all accidental attributes, so the concepts of things which the Son creates in man are the essences of things and the basis of all their accidental attributes. Hence the essences of things subsist in the human soul after the same fashion in which they subsist in the Divine Word; with this difference only that in the latter they exist as causative virtues, in the former they exist in the condition of effects produced. In this further sense then, all things, as has been said, are created in man.

12. On the lines of the distinction here established between the Second Nature and the Third, Erigena distinguishes two meanings of the term *man*—the ideal man in the Divine Word, and the man of our experience, in the phenomenal world. The former is the *universal man*; the multiplicity of *individual men* exists in the phenomenal world only. It is only in this region, therefore, that individual consciousness exists; in the Divine Word no man knows himself as an individual, there exists only the general consciousness of the universal man.

13. If we ask for an account of the translation of man from the ideal state to the plurality of individuals given in our actual experience, Erigena tells us that it is to be explained by original sin. The first man was created after the image and likeness of God; this was the ideal man in the Divine Word—the latter was signified by the Paradise in which the first man was placed. The first man was not invested with a material body, and was without difference of sex. If he had not sinned he would have remained in this condition. But as soon as he sinned he was clothed with a material body, and dissolved into a plurality of individuals—the differentiation of sexes being involved in the latter consequence of sin.

14. In the further development of this point of his teaching Erigena follows Gregory of Nyssa. The elaborate details into which he here enters are merely a reproduction of the views of Gregory in reference to original sin and its consequences. The allegorical interpretation of the Scriptural narrative of the fall, which is a necessity of this theory, is reproduced in the form in which Gregory borrowed it from Philo. We may, therefore, pass it over without further notice here.

15. This theory of Erigena in reference to original sin, furnishes an answer to the question, why the Third Nature proceeded from the Second. If the Third Nature is in its intrinsic being one with the Second, except in so far as we find what is above Time and Sense in the latter dissolved into plurality and become accessible to sense in the former, what, we are led to ask, is the reason for this process of depreciation? The answer to this question is furnished by the doctrine enunciated regarding original sin.

16. Erigena says:—"Mundus iste in varias sensibilesque species, diverasque partium suarum multiplicitates non erumperet, si Deus casum primi hominis, unitatem suæ naturæ deserentis, non prævideret" (ii. 12). The reason, then, for the existence of the world of sense, or Third Nature, is man's falling away from God. It is not due to a free act of creation on God's part; it would not have come into being if man had not sinned.

17. The world of sense, should not, properly speaking have existed at all; it cannot, for this reason, exist eternally. The consequences of original sin must be obliterated; the sensible world must return again to God in order that He may be all in all things. This leads us to the Fourth Nature, that is to God, as he is the ultimate end of all things to whom all things must return in order that He may be all in all things. Here He presents Himself to us as not created and not creating.

The Fourth Nature.

§ 97.

1. This return of all things to God is accomplished by certain degrees, or in certain stages. The natural objects of sense return to their Primal Principles; they are divested of their outward sensible appearances and are glorified in the Divine Word. As regards man we must distinguish between the universal and the individual return. All men, without exception, return to Paradise, that is, to the Primal Principles in the Divine Word. But the elect rise still higher, they not only return to Paradise, but they eat also of the Tree of Life, that is to say, they become one with God; they are deified.

2. This doctrine does not, however, mean that things—man in particular—on their return to God, lose their own nature and substance. When things of lower condition pass into a higher, they do not for this lose their proper being, they are merely raised

to a higher and more perfect state. As the air does not lose its own nature when it is illuminated by light, but merely assumes the appearance of light, or, as iron does not lose its own nature when it is glowing with heat, but merely assumes the appearance of fire, so the proper nature or substantial being of the deified man does not cease to exist when it is wholly united to God, and God lives and moves in it. The same may be said of other things.

3. The essential condition on which the return of all things to God depends is the Redemption. The Divine Word descended into the sphere of the things produced by the Eternal Causes, when He took upon Himself that human nature in which are contained all things visible and invisible. It was necessary that He should thus descend, in order that the effect of those causes, and so, those causes themselves, should be saved. For if the effects perished, so also should the causes. According to this theory, the Incarnation and Redemption are essential factors in that process of theogony which ends with the return of all things to God.

4. In Christ human nature is already deified, inasmuch as in Him human nature has become one with the glorified Divine nature. What has thus been effected in Christ can be accomplished in the case of other men and of the sensible world in general, only when the predestined number of mankind has been attained. Then the Resurrection will take place; the material body will become spiritualised; the difference of sex will cease to exist; and everything will return thither whence it came.

5. But, though human nature in its entirety, that is in all the individuals in whom it is represented, shall return to Paradise, that is, to the Primal Principles, eternal punishment shall nevertheless be the condition of the wicked. Punishment falls, not upon human nature, but upon human will, for the latter alone is the cause of evil. Hence human nature will be glorified even in the wicked; but they will, none the less, be punished in their faculty of will. This punishment will consist in this, that the objects of sense with which they gratified their desires in this life shall be withdrawn from them and they shall thus be left to emptiness of heart, and to the tumult of passion which can never more be satisfied. This is the torment which consumes them, the fire which rages within them.

6. The system of Erigena may, perhaps, bear the impress of genius, but it is not Christian. He tries, no doubt, to make room for the Christian dogmas at every point, even where accord with Christianity is impossible. We have an example in his doctrine of the eternity of punishment. But the Christian dogma must accommodate itself to the requirements of the Neo-Platonic doctrine, into which it is made to fit, and loses by the fact its genuine significance. It is, therefore, not a matter of wonder that the Church emphatically protested against the system of Erigena, and that his work, *De Divisione Naturæ*, was condemned as well by Leo IX. (1050) as by Honorius III. (1225).

7. Contemporary with Scotus Erigena was the monk Heiricus of Auxerre (834-881), who studied first under Haimon, a pupil of Alcuin, and afterwards at Ferrières, and founded a school in the monastery of Auxerre. Recent investigations have proved him to have been the author of a treatise, "Glosses on the Ten Categories." He does not follow in the path of mysticism traced by Erigena, but holds to the explanation of universal notions given by Aristotle and Boethius. The same may be said of Remigius of Auxerre (+904), a pupil of Heiricus, and of Jepa, the author of "Glosses on the Isagoge of Porphyry."

Further Developments of Philosophy.

§ 98

1. In the tenth century we meet with the commanding figure of the monk Gerbert, who later ascended the Papal throne as Pope Sylvester II. (1003). He began his studies in the convent of Aurillac in Auvergne, continued them in other schools of France, and even travelled into Spain to seek learning among the Arabs. He possessed a wide knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, and was regarded by his contemporaries as a prodigy of learning. Two short treatises of his have come down to us. One treats of the Eucharist; the other bears the title, *De rationali et ratione uti.*

2. In the latter treatise the question is discussed—How can we say of the intelligent being that it uses reason? To answer the question we must distinguish between two intelligences—the eternal divine intelligence and the intelligence which has existence in time. The first must be conceived as essentially active, and in reference to it intelligence and the use of intelligence are equivalent terms. The second possesses in itself merely the capacity for intelligence and must, therefore, pass from the state of potency to that of act. The act of intelligence can be assigned to it merely as an accident.

3. In the period succeeding the ninth century Dialectics was the first part of philosophy to be studied and developed. Dialectics was accounted a necessary preparation for the study of Theology. In studying it, the works generally used were the writings of Boethius on Logic. Up to the eleventh century the only works of Aristotle known to the scholars of the west were the *Categories* and the treatise *De Interpretatione*, as they had been translated by Boethius. The *Isagoge* of Porphyry, as translated by Boethius and Victorinus, was also in their hands, as well as the Manuals of Cassiodorus.

4. This eager study of Dialectics led men to exaggerate its importance and to hold that by Dialectics alone the most profound problems could be solved; even the mysteries of the Christian faith were not beyond its reach. In discussing these the Dialecticians came to exalt the principles of their own science above the authority of the Scriptures and the definitions of the Church, and to claim the right of deciding these questions by their own methods. The true conception of these mysteries was, they held, that which was reached by dialectical study.

5. A type of the overbearing dialectician is to be found in Berengarius of Tours (999-1088), a pupil of Fulbert, who made his name famous by his denial of the dogma of Transubstantiation. In his treatise, *De Sacra Cœna* he sets the authority of Dialectical Science above the dogmatic definitions of the Church. In support of his contention he invokes the authority of St. Augustine, who described Dialectic as the "Art of Arts" and "the Science of Sciences," and who taught that we must in all matters appeal to Dialectic, for this appeal is the appeal to reason—to the image of God within ourselves. In many things, no doubt, we must be guided by authority, but it is much better to arrive at the knowledge of truth by the use of our own reason.

6. Against the extravagant pretensions of the Dialecticians and their abuse of their science, protest was raised from many sides. Fulbert, the disciple of Gerbert, and the founder of a school at Chartres (A.D. 990), of which See he became Bishop, warned his pupils

against them. Peter Damian, too, strongly censured their arrogance, and insisted that Dialectic is not the arbiter of truth, but its servant. In the same strain the monk Otho († 1083) complained in his treatise, *De tribus Quæstionibus*, that certain Dialecticians were so prejudiced in favour of their science that they made Scripture itself subject to its authority, and had more faith in Boethius than in the inspired writers. So, too, Lanfranc, a monk of the Abbey of Bec, in Normandy (1005-1089), later Archbishop of Canterbury—the great opponent of Berengarius. The same attitude towards the Dialecticians was adopted by Abbot William of Hirschau (1026-1091).

7. The studies of the Dialecticians led them, as might have been expected, to a discussion of the question of universal notions. In the *Introduction* (Isagoge) of Porphyry the question had been raised but left unanswered. The science of Dialectic calls for its solution; the attempt to solve it gave rise to two opposing schools—that of the Nominalists and of the Rigid Realists.

NOMINALISM AND REALISM.

Roscellin of Compiègne; and William of Champeaux.

§99.

1. The passage in the *Introduction* of Porphyry, to which we have alluded, ran as follows in the translation of Boethius:—"De generibus et speciebus illud quidem, sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa hæc consistentia sint, dicere recusabo; altissimum enim negotium est hujusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis." It was to be expected that the Christian schools would not leave the question in suspense, as it is left here. Philosophy had been challenged to offer a definite solution of the problem, and the problem was of such a kind that each system of philosophy would be affected in its whole extent by the solution which it offered.[1]

2. The question proposed might be answered in any of three ways. Porphyry had indicated this in the passage we have quoted. In the first place it might be assumed that to the universal notion corresponds an object which is at once real and universal. In this case the universal is the only genuine reality; for individuals, as such, have no substantial being in the proper sense of the term. They are merely phenomenal manifestations of the universal, *i.e.*, of the true reality: the universal does not pre-suppose the individual, but conversely; it is antecedent to the individual, and merely manifests itself in the latter—"Universalia ante rem." This

[1] And so it happened that in the schools of this period the central point of dispute was whether the objects represented by the five concepts enumerated in the *Introduction* of Porphyry—*genus*, *differentia*, *species*, *proprium*, and *accidens*—are five realities (quinque res) or merely five words (quinque voces).

method of solution was proposed in the system of Erigena; we have seen that this was the conception which lay at the basis of, and dominated, the whole system of that philosopher.

3. Again, an answer, the direct contrary of this, might be given to the question proposed. It might be assumed that the universal concept has no objective reality at all; that it is a mere product of our process of thought. We are forced to embrace a plurality of things under one *name*, simply because we find it impossible mentally to represent each individual by itself. In this explanation the universal being merely notional, "in nudo intellectu," necessarily pre supposes the individual, for the inclusion of a number of individuals under one common name is impossible, unless these individuals be supposed given. Here we have the "Universalia post rem."

4 Lastly, a third answer might be given to the question. Distinguishing between the thing represented by the universal, and the character of universality which this object presents, as it appears in our thought, we might assert that what the universal concept represents is really found in every individual for which it can stand, but that the formal character of universality is due to the abstractive process of our thought, which draws forth the conceptual elements of the universal notion from the individual objects, and then regards this abstract notion as applicable to all the individuals in turn, as predicable of all of them (*prædicabile de omnibus*). In this explanation it is only the matter (*content*) of the universal notion which has objective reality, and this objective reality it possesses only in the individual; the individual is the substantial being in the strict sense of the term. Here we have the *universalia in re*. This was the solution of the problem offered by Aristotle, and to this Boethius adhered in his text books.

5. Each of these three solutions of the famous problem has had its advocates. On this point we find three distinct schools of opinion in the history of philosophy. The Extreme Realists adopt the first solution, the Nominalists the second, and the Qualified (Aristotelian) Realists the third. By Extreme Realism then, we understand the theory which assigns objective reality to the universal, and makes this reality itself universal; by Nominalism we mean the theory which denies all objective reality to the universal, and makes it a mere name, by Qualified Realism we understand that theory which holds the universal to be objectively real, but finds that the reality is objective in the individual only, that it is the thing expressed by the concept which is actual, not the (universal) form of the concept. In their earlier historical development these several opinions were not sharply distinguished from one another. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the opposition between them only began to make itself felt; at this period the Realism of Aristotle was the dominant opinion in the schools. It was in the eleventh century that the antithesis was fully established, and that a conflict betweeen the

rival schools began—a conflict which was conducted with great acuteness of reasoning by the several disputants, and which was not always free from rancour and bitterness.

6. Roscellin of Compiègne is usually accounted the founder of the Nominalist School. He cannot, however, be strictly said to have founded the school; the distinction between Nominalism and Realism was established before his time. But it was he who most definitely and most forcibly stated the Nominalist position, and he may thus be regarded as the chief representative of Nominalism. He was born in Armorica, in Southern Brittany, studied at Soissons and at Rheims, taught publicly at Tours and Locmenach, and was subsequently appointed Canon of Compiègne, where, however, he still devoted himself to teaching. It does not appear that he wrote any treatises; he delivered his views in spoken discourses. Only one letter, written to his pupil, Abelard, dealing chiefly with the doctrine of the Trinity, has come down to us. Our knowledge of his peculiar views is derived mainly from Anselm, Abelard, and John of Salisbury.

7. According to Anselm, Roscellin taught that universal notions are merely *general names* which serve to designate an aggregate of individuals. Anselm in this connexion makes use of the phrase, *flatus vocis*; he reproves the Nominalists for describing our general notions as merely *flatus vocis*. Whether Roscellin himself made use of this phrase we are not told. Intrepreting thus the doctrine of the Nominalists, Anselm censures them for losing themselves in the things of sense and the pictures of imagination, and for failing to discern that which may be separated from the perceptions of sense to become an object of intuition to the reason. We cannot know the *nature* of man so long as we deal only with the individual, and fail to understand how several men may be specifically one. It would appear from this that the Nominalists adhered to the strict letter of the formula which summarised their philosophy.

8. A passage occurs in the writings of Abelard (*Ep.* 21, *ad Episc. Paris.*) in which Roscellin is said to have maintained that nothing could be composed of parts; that only the words by which things are named are divisible. For, if a thing had parts, then any given part would be part of the whole; but the whole is made up of all its parts. The given part would, therefore, be part of itself and of all the other parts—a conclusion which is wholly inadmissible. In this reasoning it is evidently implied that the differences which we perceive between things are only in our thought; that they do not affect the objective reality of things; that in the objective order we have nothing but undifferentiated unities—a proposition which accords fully with the denial of objective reality to our general notions.

9. So much for the theoretical part of Roscellin's system. The theory thus formulated he applied to the Christian dogma of the Trinity,

and the result was a doctrine of Tritheism. His course of argument appears to have been as follows:—If if it be true that individuals are the only real entities, it must follow that the Three Persons of the Godhead are in reality three individual substances. This assertion he seems to have formally made. According to the statement of Anselm (*De Fide Trin.*, c. 2. 3), he taught that the three Divine Persons are only one in power and in will, but, for the rest, they are three entities, three essences, three substances. If this be not our conception of the distinction between the Persons of the Divine Trinity, if we make the Trinity one essence, one *res*, we shall then be forced to admit that the Father and the Holy Ghost have become man with the Son. If the usage of language permitted it, the Three Persons might, therefore, be called "Three Gods."

10. In Roscellin's letter to Abelard the same doctrine is set forth. The Three Divine Persons, he asserts, are three substances, the unity of which consists in the fact that they are equal to one another. The heresy of Arius, therefore, consisted in this, that he maintained a subordination of one Person to another; and assigned to the Second and Third Persons a beginning in time. The Divine Persons are one in virtue of their common possession of Divine Majesty, not because this Majesty is individualised; for what is individualised cannot be common, and conversely what is common to several individuals cannot itself be individual. If, then, it be said that the Father has begotten the Son, this is the same thing as to say: the substance of the Father has brought forth the substance of the Son. This tritheistical doctrine brought Roscellin into conflict with the Church, and the Council of Soissons (1002) obliged him to abjure it.

11. In extreme antagonism to this nominalistic teaching came the doctrine of exaggerated realism, which boldly asserted the objective reality of the universal as such. The leading representative of this teaching was William of Champeaux (1070-1121). He studied at Paris under Manegold of Lutenbach; then under the renowned scholastic, Anselm of Laon; he is said to have also been a pupil of Roscellin. He became a teacher at the Cathedral School of Notre Dame in Paris; and, later on, taught at the Monastery of St. Victor, in the same city, where he established the School of St. Victor, which subsequently attained a wide celebrity. He was an intimate friend of St. Bernard. Of his works we possess only a short treatise, *De Origine Animæ*, and some fragmentary remains. With regard to his doctrine on the subject of Universals, we know only what his contemporaries—notably Abelard—have told us.

12. Abelard in his *Historia Calamitatum* (c. 2) attributes to William of Champeaux the teaching that every Universal Concept exists essentially (*essentialiter*) in its totality in each individual included under it; that in essence and being there is not, therefore, any distinction between individuals of the same species; that the

difference between them is a difference of the accidents of each. Thus interpreted, William of Champeaux, like Scotus Erigena, would maintain the objective reality of Universals as such, and assert that every concept, considered as an universal entity, has objective as well as subjective existence. In accordance with this notion, the specific differences by which genera are differentiated would be mere accidents in relation to the latter, but they would be substantial elements of the species—a doctrine which led Abelard to assert that William held these differences to be the species. According to the account of Abelard, the objections which he made to this theory had the effect of inducing William so far to modify it as to allow that the same thing—that is to say, the same species—could not be attributed to different individuals essentially (*essentialiter*), but only individually (*individualiter*). It is not clear what this formula means; but at leasts it indicates a disposition on the part of William of Champeaux so to adapt his theory as to leave to the individual a real substantive being.

13. Against the extreme realistic position taken up by William of Champeaux, the objection was even then put forward (especially in the treatise, *De Generibus et Speciebus*, of which we shall have have more to say presently) that in this hypothesis one and the same substance would possess contradictory attributes, and that the same body would be in different places at the same time. "If the essential nature of man exists wholly in Socrates, it cannot exist at all in what is not Socrates. Now, if it at the same time exists in Plato, it follows that Socrates and Plato must be one, and that Socrates must exist as well where Plato is, as where he is himself." The objection is, in truth, insoluble if we grant the assumption of the extreme realistic theory.

14. A less extreme form of the nominalistic theory is the so-called doctrine of Conceptualism, which also had its origin in the eleventh century. This theory denies the objective reality of Universals as such, but will not allow that they are mere names. It asserts that they are at least universal conceptions, universal intellectual representations, under which we include a multitude of objects because of their resemblance to one another. This seems to be the view advocated in the treatise, *De Generibus et Speciebus*, already referred to, which Cousin assigns to Abelard, but which others assign to Joscelin of Soissons (Ritter), or some other author.

15. In this treatise the universal concept is said to represent an aggregate (collectio) of individuals, which although they really constitute a plurality, may, nevertheless, be regarded as one species, one universal, one nature; in the same way as a nation or an army, though composed of many persons, can be thought of, and be designated, as one. With this difference, however, that the individuals which comprise the universal aggregate cannot be taken at random: the individuals included under the universal concepts must resemble one another in the *matter* of which they are composed, though they differ in *form*; they must be "created alike."

16. This is explained by an example: Socrates, as an individual, is made up of the "human element" (humanitas) which constitutes a sort of material substratum, and of

the "Socratic element" (socratitas), which is the form that consitutes that human individual, Socrates, and distinguishes him from all other human individuals. The same is true in the case of Plato, of the "human element" and the "Platonic element" (Platonitas). We observe that the material element is the same in both, for in both it is the "human element;" whereas the form is different in each, and they are thus distinct individuals. It is because the *matter*, as explained, is alike in both, that both are and must be included under the universal concept "man."

17. What has here been laid down in reference to the individual is true, in its measure, of the species; for in species also we have like matter and differing forms. For example, in the case of "man" and "beast," the matter "animal" is alike in both, while the forms "rational" and "irrational" differ. Hence the two species can, because of the likeness of the material element in each, be included under the same common concept "animal." From this it follows that the universal is not an element which exists in its entirety in a plurality of individuals. When we predicate of the individual a generic or specific notion, we only assert thereby that the individual is one of those things which is included under a determined genus or species; our predication has an *adjectival*, not a *substantive* significance.

18. The antagonism between Nominalism and extreme Realism found full expression in the controversies of the eleventh century. All the while the more moderate form of Realism, which had been represented earlier by Boethius, was not lost sight of. It asserted itself side by side with the extreme theories, and ultimately, in the thirteenth century, triumphed over both. Its representative and advocate in the eleventh century, and the man who prepared the way for its ultimate triumph was

Anselm of Canterbury.

§ 100.

1. Anselm was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, in the year 1033; was brought up in Christian piety by his mother Ermenberg; entered the monastery of Bec in Normandy, in 1060, at the invitation of Lanfranc; and became prior, and ultimately abbot of the monastery. Here his time was divided between the duties of his office, and the literary work which had become a necessity of his life. It was at this period that he composed his best works. In 1093 he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, and from this time forward devoted himself, very often in conflict with the English Kings, William Rufus and Henry II., to the reform of the Church in England on the lines laid down by Gregory VII. He died in 1109.

2. The writings of Anselm were, for the most part, composed to meet the needs of special occasions, and they deal therefore, as a rule, with special points of Faith and Philosophy. Nevertheless we can observe in them a distinct effort to secure *system* in their teachings. The most remarkable of these works are: (*a*) the *Dialogus de Grammatico*, the earliest of the author's treatises, a discussion between a teacher and his pupil on the question then frequently treated by the grammarians—whether "grammarian" should be classed under

the category of Substance or Quality; (*b*) the *Dialogus de Veritate*, in which the Concept of Truth is examined and discussed; (*c*) the *Monologium*, an outline of the foundations of Theology; (*d*) the *Prosologium*, in which the so-called Ontological Argument for God's existence is set forth; (*e*) the *Liber Apologeticus contra Insipientem*, a defence of the Ontological *Argument* against the attack which the monk Gaunilo had made on it in his *Liber pro Insipiente*; (*f*) the work *De Fide Trinitatis*; (*g*) *De Processione spiritus sancti*; (*h*) *De Casu Diaboli*; (*i*) *De Conceptu Virginali*; (*k*) *Cur Deus Homo*; (*l*) *De Libero Arbitrio*; (*m*) *De Concordia Præscientiæ cum Libero Arbitrio*, etc.

3. Anselm, as a philosopher, assumes towards the Christian Faith the attitude defined by St. Augustine. He holds that, when there is question of Christian truth, faith must form the prelude and the basis of scientific knowledge. He lays down the principle in the celebrated formula: "Non quæro intelligere, ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam" (*Prosl.* c. i.). Knowledge, as given in the subject knowing, holds, no doubt, a place above faith; it stands midway between faith and intuition: but it stands above faith only in the sense that it affords an insight into the articles of faith, not at all in the sense that knowledge constitutes a rule of faith. The contrary indeed is the case. The mind must first be securely established in faith before it can proceed to a scientific knowledge of what it believes. This knowledge, it can and must obtain, to neglect it is culpable negligence. (*De Fid. Trin., Præf.; Cur Deus Homo*, lib. i, c. ii.)

4. While asserting this relation between Knowledge and Faith, Anselm does not depreciate the natural powers of reason. He lays it down distinctly that man, without any aid from Faith, by reason merely, can attain to the knowledge of many truths; in particular, to the knowledge of God. He even appears at first sight to extend unduly the possibilities of scientific knowledge; he appears disposed to ask from mere reason a knowledge of the Christian Mysteries. For example, in the preface to his *Cur Deus Homo*, he states that he proposes to make complete abstraction from Christ and from Divine Revelation, and by Reason alone, and by arguments furnished wholly by Reason, to prove that the Redemption in all its incidents *necessarily* occurred as history recounts it to have happened. And again in the *Monologium* he endeavours to prove from reason the Doctrine of the Trinity.

5. What might seem exaggerated in these statements is modified by what he lays down elsewhere. He expressly states that the results of our rational inquiries must be tested by Sacred Scripture, and must be rejected when condemned by Scripture even when they appear to us irrefragable; but that they are to be maintained when found in conformity with Scripture. When therefore, he makes an assertion which is not confirmed by the higher authority (of Faith), it is to be understood that the proposition, though proved on rational grounds, is certain in this sense only that it is assumed as true and demonstrated, provisionally, as long as God does not make known the truth of the contradictory (*Cur Deus Homo*, lib. i., c. ii., c. xxxviii. *De Conc. Præsc., etc.*, qu. iii., c. vi.)

Anselm here takes up a position wholly different from that of Scotus Erigena. The latter would maintain that even in the case of a conflict between the conclusions of reason and the authority of Holy Scripture we are to abide by the verdict of reason.

6. In his analysis of the notion of Truth, Anselm distinguishes between the truth of knowledge, the truth of the will, and the truth of things. In each case his analysis leads him ultimately to identify the notion of truth with the notion of "rightness" (*rectitudo*). The truth of knowledge consists in the conformity of our knowledge with the thing, in the *rectitudo cognitionis*; the truth of the will consists in the conformity of the will with the Law, in the *rectitudo voluntatis*: and the truth of things in the conformity of the thing with the Divine Idea, in the *rectitudo rei*. Hence, absolute truth is absolute rectitude.

On God.

§ 101.

To prove the existence of God, Anselm, in his Monologium, adduces three arguments, *a posteriori*. They are the following:—

(*a*) In the objective world we have an infinitude of things that are good, but which differ widely from one another in respect of their goodness. Now, this is possible only in so far as they are not good in themselves, but *participate* in some common principle which is good in itself and by itself. There must, therefore, exist a good, which is such of itself and by itself; this must be the supreme good, for nothing which owes its goodness to another can be placed above that which is good of itself. Now, the supreme good is God.

(*b*) The second proof is derived from the existence of things that have come into being. Such things postulate a first and highest cause to account for their existence. This cause must be one and one only. If there were several such causes, each would exist of itself and by itself, and would postulate further a single common nature, through which each existed of itself and by itself. We should thus be again forced to recur to an ultimate unity. The one self-existent cause of all things we call God.

(*c*) The third proof is derived from the different degrees of goodness and perfection which the objects of your knowledge present. These gradations cannot be endless in their progression upwards, they must ultimately terminate in a being who stands above all grades, who is *infinitely perfect*. This must be one and one only. If there were several infinitely perfect beings they would postulate an ulterior individual nature through which they would be infinitely perfect; and so we should at last be compelled to admit an ultimate unity. Now the infinitely perfect being is God.

2. But Anselm is not content with these proofs *a posteriori*. He looks for a proof which shall dispense with and replace them all. This proof, he thinks, is furnished by that argument which infers the existence of God from the very notion of His being. The argument is stated at length in the *Proslogium*; it may be thus put in brief:—

(*a*) When we think of God we think of Him as the highest being, than whom no higher being can be conceived. The atheist may deny that such a being exists, but he can at least comprehend what is meant by "a being than whom no higher can be conceived." And when he understands this and perceives it, it has existence in his intellect, even though he does not as yet perceive that it has actual objective existence also. He cannot, therefore, deny that "the highest being than whom no higher can be conceived,"

inasmuch as he can think such a being, and actually does think it, has existence in his intellect.

(*b*) Now, this being cannot exist in the intellect only; it must also exist in actual reality. For, let us suppose it to exist only in the intellect, then it is something which at least *can* have objective actuality, and this latter notion adds something to the former; to be actually existent is more than to be merely an object of thought. If, then, the being than which a higher cannot be conceived exists only in the intellect, it becomes by the fact a being than which a higher can be conceived—for a higher is that being having actual existence. Hence, an evident contradiction. We conclude, therefore, that the being than which a higher cannot be conceived exists not in the intellect only, but in actual reality as well.

(*c*) Nay, its actual existence is so necessary that it is impossible it should be non-existent. For we can form the concept of a being whose non-existence is inconceivable, and this being is evidently higher and more perfect than the being which can be thought of as non-existent. If then the being, than which no higher is conceivable, could be non-existent, this being would, according to the principle just laid down, be a being than which a still higher would be conceivable. Hence, a manifest contradiction. It follows that the being in question exists necessarily, that its non-existence is impossible.

3. Anselm, as we have said, laid great stress on this argument, which he believed could replace all the others. His reasoning was, however, called in question, during his lifetime, by the Monk Gaunilo, in his "*Liber pro Insipiente.*" Gaunilo points out the defect in the argument, and proves that it is inconclusive.

(*a*) In the first place, he says, "from the fact that we form a notion of God it does not follow that God has being in our intellect; the being in the intellect of that *quo majus cogitari nequit* is to be understood in the same sense as the being in the intellect of anything else of which we think; if we take in any more extended sense the "intelligere rem esse"—an assumption which Anselm does not make—we should be assuming what we have to prove.

(*b*) In the second place, although we perceive that the being, than whom a higher cannot be conceived, necessarily includes real existence, we cannot, from the circumstance that we perceive this to be the case, conclude that such a being actually exists. We must first prove its existence by other means; it is only when this is done that by speculative study of it we can advance to the further knowledge, that the being exists of itself and by itself, that it has necessary existence. "Prius enim certum mihi necesse est fiat, revera esse alicubi majus ipsum, et tum demum ex eo, quod majus est omnibus, in se ipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum."

(*c*) If we admit the validity of Anselm's argument, we might, with equal reason, infer from our notion of a perfect island, its actual existence. The ancients tell us of a lost island to which they attributed every kind of perfection. Now, we might reason thus: this island has every possible perfection, but a chief perfection is existence; hence, if it does not exist, it has not every possible perfection. This reasoning is clearly absurd; but its defect attaches to Anselm's reasoning from the notion of the most perfect being to the actual existence of such a being.

4. Anselm defended his argument in his "*Liber Apologeticus Contra Gaunilonem*"; but he was unable to meet satisfactorily the difficulties which must always beset the attempt to reason from the mere conception of a thing to its actual existence. This argument of Anselm was rejected by the whole body of the scholastic writers who followed him. And their reasons for rejecting it were always those which had been urged by Gaunilo. In spite of

Anselm's confidence in it, the argument must be held to be really of no worth.

5. Having laid down the proofs of God's existence, Anselm proceeds, in the *Monologium*, to develop that notion by which God is represented to the mind. In the first place, he thus endeavours to establish the truth that God exists of Himself and by Himself: God does not receive existence from any higher cause, for in this case He would no longer be the highest being. Nor did He receive it from Himself: He did not produce Himself from nothing, for in this hypothesis He must have had existence before He existed. Neither did He evolve Himself out of some pre-existing matter; for in this hypothesis His existence would have depended on an ulterior cause (material cause), which we have seen to be impossible. God, therefore exists purely of Himself and by Himself, and what He is that He is of Himself, and by Himself.

6. Furthermore, if God is the highest being, than whom no higher is conceivable, He must, necessarily, be the fulness of all perfection. We must, therefore, attribute to Him every perfection the attribution of which involves a higher excellence than would be involved in its negation. Accordingly, we must hold that the Divine Nature is not corporeal; for an incorporeal, spiritual being is more excellent than a corporeal. On the other hand God is living, wise, almighty, truthful, just, happy, etc., for it is more excellent to be such than not so to be.

7. Moreover, all these perfections must be predicated of God, not *qualitative*, but *quidditative*. For example, if God is just, He is so through justice. Now, if this justice is anything other than Himself, His being just would be attributed to Him merely as a quality. But this justice cannot be anything other than God Himself; for, whatever God is, that He is of Himself and by Himself. Hence to be just belongs to Him *quidditative*. And so of His other perfections. God, therefore, does not *possess* justice; rather He *is* justice; He *has* not life; He is life. He does not *possess* wisdom; He is wisdom; and so of other attributes.

8. Again, the being of God is in no sense *composite*. Whatever is composite owes to the parts of which it is composed whatever it is and has, and to this extent the composing parts are higher than the being which they form, for the latter exists only through them, not they through it. If, therefore, the Divine Being were composite, by the fact it would cease to be the highest being. Hence God is *absolutely simple*, and, though different attributes are ascribed to Him, these do not indicate different elements in the Divine Nature. Each of them expresses the totality of the Divine Being.

9. God is *eternal*, without beginning and without end. If he had a beginning He would have been created, and could not be self-existent. If the Divine Nature could perish it would not be the highest immortality, and, consequently, would not be the highest

nature conceivable. Truth, moreover, is eternal, and Truth is God. God does not exist in space; there are no spatial dimensions in Him: He is unextended, immeasurable. Hence, God is exalted above all Time and all Space. And yet, He is in all space and in all time; whole in the whole, and whole in every portion of space, and present with all His Eternity in every moment of Time.

10. God is absolutely *immutable*. For, in the perfect life of God, there is no succession; what He is, that He is once for all, in one indivisible act. His life does not evolve itself in a series of successive processes; His being is completed once and for ever in its absolute totality, without increase and without diminution. Hence we cannot ascribe to God any accidental attributes; such attributes would involve mutability of being. God is without accident of any kind. And for this reason the category of substance can be applied to Him only in the sense that He exists by Himself and for Himself, not in that sense in which substance is regarded as the permanent substratum of accidental qualities.

Theory of Ideas.—Creation.

§ 102.

1. God is the self-existent being, and as such must, according to the proofs just given, be One, and One only; it follows that all else which has existence derives its origin from Him, has been produced by Him. If now we are asked in what manner God has produced these other things, we must answer, in the first place, that the being of God cannot itself be the material substratum which underlies these things. If this were the case, the highest nature would be subject to change and corruption in lower things, and would thus deny its own character of the highest good, which is clearly absurd. This being so, we are led to the conclusion that God can have produced things in no other way than by *creating* them.

2. We are not, however, to understand this creation out of nothing as if the "nothing" were a sort of matter out of which things were evolved. Such a notion is absurd; what is "nothing" cannot be the material cause of anything. The expression "nothing" signifies merely that there was not anything from which the world could be produced. Things had, before their creation, no *real* being in any sense, this being they obtained only by creation.

3. Created things have, however, an *ideal* existence eternally in the Divine Mind. For, the creative action of God is intelligent, not blind; and it pre-supposes accordingly a knowledge of the thing to be created. God has, therefore, an eternal conception of created things; and this conception is the ideal or archetype after which they are created. In this respect, the creative action of God may be

compared with the action of the artist, which supposes the idea of the work of art previously existing in the artist's mind. In their *ideal being* in the Divine Mind all things are eternal: they exist in time in their *actual* being outside the Divine Intellect.

4. The divine ideas are a sort of inner language in God: they are the Word by which God expresses things: just as a notion in man is the internal word by which he expresses an object in his thought. In this way we are led to the knowledge of an indwelling Word in God, which He expresses in Himself, and by which He expresses all things. Substantially this Word is not distinct from the substance of the Divinity. Everything which God produces He produces by Himself, and as by His indwelling Word He generates things ideally, this Word must be one with Himself.

5. This, however, is not yet a full account of the notion of the Divine Word. If the content of the Divine Word were no more than the aggregate of the ideas of created things, it would follow that God's knowledge would be exclusively confined to these objects: and, in the supposition that no created world was destined to exist, God's knowledge would have no content at all, that is, He would have no knowledge. This conclusion is clearly inadmissible. Hence there must be another object of knowledge, an object which would be always present to the mind of God, even in the supposition that no created world was called into being. This object is God Himself. God has eternal knowledge of Himself in all His infinitude: and having eternal knowledge of Himself He expresses that knowledge eternally. Hence we have in God an Eternal Word, independently of things created.

6. We must not, however, because of this, assert the existence in God of a twofold Word—one in which He expresses Himself, the other in which He expresses the objects of creation. The former, like the latter, is in essence one with the substance of the Divinity; and as this is absolutely incomposite (simple), the Word in both cases must be one and the same. God thinks and expresses by one and the same Word Himself and the objects of creation, or rather He expresses in the Word which expresses Himself, the objects of creation also. As they exist in the Divine Word the ideas of things are this Divine Word itself, in so far as it is the archetype of the created order.

7. On this foundation Anselm constructs his philosophical doctrine regarding the Trinity. According to the Christian dogma the Son of God is the Personal Word of God. Keeping this dogma in view Anselm endeavours to prove by purely speculative methods that we must conceive the Son of God as one in essence with the Father, as distinct from Him in Person, but, in consequence of their oneness of essence, as equal to Him in every respect. The Holy Ghost, in Anselm's teaching, is the Personal Divine Love proceeding from the Father and the Son, and,—since God loves Himself in all His infinitude,—one in essence with them as they are one with one another. We will not enter further into these doctrines; we may, however, add the remark that Anselm, like Augustine, in his speculations on the subject of the Trinity, is fond of invoking the analogy furnished by the three fundamental faculties of the human soul—the memory, understanding and will.

Freedom of the Will.—Evil.

§ 103.

1. Regarding the Freedom of the Will, Anselm holds most peculiar views. He starts from the principle that Free Will cannot be defined as the faculty of choosing between good and evil, between sinning and not sinning. If such were the definition we should be obliged to deny Free Will to God and the good angels. The liberty to choose evil cannot be admitted into our notion of Free Will. The power to do evil is neither Free Will, nor an element of Free Will (*De Lib. Arb.* c. 1.).

2. In defining the notion of Free Will, we must distinguish between two kinds of volition—the volition of the rightful (*voluntas justi*), and the volition of the convenient, *voluntas commodi*. The latter is exercised of necessity; for, in general, we necessarily desire what is suitable to us. But it is not of necessity that we desire what is right. Hence freedom does not belong to the volitions of the convenient, but rather to the volitions of the rightful.

3. Now the Will can desire what is right only in case it is itself righteous. The Will is not right and good because it desires what is right and good, but contrariwise, it desires what is right and good because it is itself right and good. The Will cannot, therefore, acquire righteousness (*rectitudo voluntatis*) by its own volitions, this quality must be conferred upon it by God, and only when it has been so conferred can the Will desire what is rightful.

4. On the other hand man is capable of preserving this righteousness when he has once obtained it. And this precisely it is his task to do. He can and ought to preserve it, and that for its own sake, not for any ulterior advantage; for only then is he righteous, and preserves his righteousness, when he desires what is rightful for its own sake. The man who does good for sake of some external advantage, does not act rightfully in the strict sense of the word, and does not, therefore, preserve his righteousness.

5. These notions furnish us at once with the concept of Free Will. Freedom is nothing more than the power of the Will to preserve righteousnesss (*rectitudo voluntatis*) for its own sake (*De Lib. Arb.* c. 3). Understanding the notion of Freedom in this wise we may assert that Freedom is invincible. No power other than the Will itself can deprive the Will of righteousness; it is only by its own act of self-determination that the Will abandons its righteousness. Temptation, be it never so great, has no power over the Will unless the Will resolves to follow it, and so to abandon righteousness.

6. Replying to the objection that this definition of Free Will involves the consequence that man by committing sin has lost his liberty, Anselm answers in the negative. Although

man has lost righteousness by sin, he, nevertheless, always possesses the power to retain it in *case it is bestowed upon* him ; just as a man, who has not actual vision of an object which is removed from his sight, possesses, nevertheless, the capacity to see it should it be placed before his eyes. Man has become the slave of sin to this extent only that he cannot of his own strength again attain to the righteousness which he has lost.

7. We cannot subscribe to these views of Anselm regarding the nature of Free Will—at least not to the theory as a whole. For if Free Will in general is the faculty of preserving righteousness for its own sake, then man in his fallen state is only potentially free. The actual exercise of the faculty is impossible to him—a consequence which is wholly inadmissible. It is only when the notion of Free Will is referred exclusively to things of the supernatural order, that Anselm's definition can be safely admitted; in this sphere man, since the fall, has only a possible or potential exercise of liberty.

8. Connected with and dependent on Anselm's doctrine of Free Will is his theory regarding Evil. As we distinguish two kinds of good, so we must distinguish two kinds of evil—the *malum injustitiæ* and the *malum incommodi*, the evil of unrighteousness, and the evil of unhappiness. The former is moral evil. The notion of moral evil is thus identical with the notion of unrighteousness ; it is not, therefore, anything positive ; it is merely the negation of that which ought to be, the privation of good, that is, of righteousness. The *malum incommodi* is a consequence of *malum injustitiæ*, and is itself primarily a negative conception, the privation of the suitable or convenient, that is, of happiness. However, from this privation of the suitable, other evils ensue, which are more than mere negatives, evils which have a positive character, such as sorrow, pain, etc. Hence the *malum incommodi* is not, like moral evil, negative in every respect ; in some respects it is negative, in others positive. (*De Casu Diab.*, c. 26).

9. Moral evil, or unrighteousness, being a privation of the good which should exist, can be accomplished only by an act of the Will desiring something which it should not desire. If we ask what it is the Will should not desire, we are answered : Every rational being is destined to eternal happiness ; it will attain this happiness by preserving righteousness, that is, by submitting its Will to the Will of God, and so giving Him the honour which is His due. If, however, it withdraws its Will from the control of the Divine Will, and thus in a certain degree makes its own will autonomous, it is striving by this act—for the Will of God alone is autonomous—to make itself, *per rapinam*, equal to God, and so robbing Him of the honour it owes Him. Thus it is unrighteous towards God, and this unrighteousness constitutes moral evil.

10. From this, it further follows that evil can have its origin only in Free Will. The reason why the Will abandons righteousness, that is, does evil, is to be found in the Will itself and not elsewhere. In this matter the Will is at once cause and effect, in its own regard.

The Will can abandon righteousness by desiring what it ought not to desire; but this power is not the cause of the evil; for the Will does not abandon righteousness because it *can* abandon it, but because it *wills* to abandon it. The Will acts wrongly because it *wills* so to act. In this matter there is no mere remote cause. Least of all can the evil be traced back to God; from God no evil can come.

11. Furthermore, it follows that evil actions are not evil in their merely physical character: they are such only in consequence of the wickedness of the Will to which they are attributable. It may, therefore, happen that one and the same action done by one man may be good, done by another may be evil, according to the different purposes of Will with which it is done. There are, however, some actions which cannot be good under any circumstances, because they are forbidden in themselves, such as perjury, adultery, etc. With regard to sensual appetites, these become sinful only when the Will consents to them; the consent of the Will is the only factor which can involve the element of evil. If the sensual appetites were evil in themselves they would be wholly obliterated by Baptism—a result which we know does not happen.

12. We will not enter here into Anselm's application of this theory of evil to the Fall of the Angels; this is a matter which belongs rather to the history of Theology than to the history of Philosophy.

The proof of man's Immortality Anselm finds in man's destiny to know and love God. If the soul is created for the knowledge and love of God, it is created to know God, and love Him eternally; for, it is then inconceivable that it should also be destined to be one day deprived of the love of God, whether through some deficiency in itself or by the interposition of another power. Hence the soul must be immortal. The same holds good of the souls which, through their own fault, fail to reach their destined end; for the divine justice requires the punishment of those souls, and there would be no punishment for them if they were deprived of existence. So they, too, must be immortal. (*Monol.*, c. 70-71).

5.—Peter Abelard.

§ 104.

1. From the path which the speculations of Anselm had indicated another celebrated thinker, who rose to great eminence at the beginning of the twelfth century, diverged widely in many respects. We allude to Peter Abelard. Abelard was born about the year 1079, in the village of Palais, in Bretagne (whence his nickname *Peripateticus Palatinus*). He studied under Roscellin, William of Champeaux, and Anselm of Laon, and distinguished himself by his remarkable dialectical acuteness and readiness. At an early age he began to teach at Paris, where, in a short time, his fame became so great that men flocked from all parts of Europe to become his pupils. His pride grew with his greatness, to such extent that, as he admits himself, he regarded himself as the only philosopher of his day. But

this pride was followed by a fall. His immoral relations with the niece of Canon Fulbert—the celebrated Heloise—and the vengeance which her relative took upon him for the injury done her are well known matters of history.

2. After his mishap, Abelard retired to the Abbey of St. Denis, and began a course of theological lectures. His success was as great as before. But his excessive rigorism made him enemies, and when, further, in 1121, his *Introductio ad Theologiam*, was condemned by a synod at Soissons, he was obliged to quit St Denis. He withdrew to the neighbourhood of Nogent-sur-Seine, where he erected an oratory, which he called Paraclete. Here, again, a large number of pupils gathered round him, and he continued to lecture as before. A little later (1126) he was elected abbot of St. Gildes de Ruys, in his native province, but he did not long occupy this dignity. In 1136 he returned to Paris, and resumed his functions as teacher. The erroneous doctrines which he continued to propound at last roused St. Bernard against him. His cause was judged at the Synod of Sens (1140), and judgment pronounced against his unorthodox theories. He resolved to go to Rome to defend himself there, but on his way he was induced by Peter the Venerable to stop at Cluny. Here he died in the year 1142.

3. The most important of Abelard's writings are his *Introductio ad Theologiam*, his *Theologia Christiana*, both following the same lines, and both incomplete. Further, we have from him a Commentary on St. Paul's letter to the Romans, the *Ethica*, which bears also the title *Scito te ipsum*, the *Historia Calamitatum*, an Autobiography, his letters to Heloise, a Treatise on Dialectic, an Apology, the book *Sic et Non*, in which, for each dogmatic thesis cited, the grounds for and against are stated without any decision; and a number of less important writings.

4. On the vexed question of Universals, Abelard declares against exaggerated Realism. He will not admit that the universal exists antecedently to the individual. But he has nowhere expressly attempted an exact solution of the problem as to the nature of Universals. He discusses it incidentally and polemically, but does not take it up *ex professo*. This explains how it is that different writers attribute different opinions to him in this connexion. He is usually accounted a Nominalist; but Ritter holds that the *Introd. ad Theol., II. 13*, shows him to be a moderate Realist.

5. John of Salisbury states *(Metal. II., 17)* that Abelard and his followers characterised Universals as "sermones," whereas Roscellin and his school described them as "voces." According to Abelard, a *Res* (thing) cannot be predicated of a *Res*, and since Universals, as a matter of fact, are predicated of individuals, they cannot be *Res*, and consequently cannot have any objective reality. The character of Universality, therefore, can only belong to the *word*, but it "belongs not to the word as such, as if the word were something universal (for each word is itself only a single word), but to the word *as applied to a class of objects*, to the word in so far as it is *predicated* of these objects, that is, to the *enunciation*, to the "sermo de pluribus prædicabilis." If, now, we ask how this Universal is obtained, we are told that it is by grouping a plurality of like objects under a common notion in virtue of their likeness, and by expressing this common notion in the *sermo prædicabilis*. This, it would appear, is the conceptualistic formula.

6. As for the attitude towards the Christian Faith assumed by Abelard in his speculations, we may assert it to be rationalistic. We

find him, indeed, laying distinct stress on the necessity for faith in revealed truth. But against expressions of this kind we can set others from his writings which are unmistakably rationalistic. In his *Historia Calamitatum* (c. 9) he tells us that he was requested by his pupils to furnish them with some rational arguments for the doctrine of the Trinity, "on the ground that one cannot believe what one has not first understood." He makes no protest against the position here assumed by his pupils, and proceeds to discuss the dogma of the Trinity in the spirit indicated by their appeal.

7. Nay, he expressly adopts and supports the principle in question. He rejects the notion that we must begin by believing, and thence advance to knowledge, and lays it down that we must not at once believe, but first inquire by reason whether we can and ought to believe, appealing in support of this view to the Scriptural text: Qui cito credit, levis est corde. And his meaning is, not merely that we should assure ourselves by scientific knowledge of the fact of a revelation, but that we should also examine rationally the content of the revelation to determine whether it be worthy of belief. For, he observes, that man believes in haste who, without discrimination and prudence, contents himself with what is told him, without examining, as far as possible, what is suggested to him in order to determine whether it is worthy of faith. The objection that a faith which is the outcome of scientific investigation is without merit, he puts aside on the ground that faith becomes meritorious when charity is subsequently united with and perfects it (*Intr. ad Theol.*, Lib. II. c. 3, p. 1060, Ed. Migne).

8. In consequence of this rationalistic attitude, Abelard is led to deny the supra-rational character of the Christian mysteries, and to hold the view that they can be known, proved, and explained by reason. To what purpose, he asks, would God reveal mysteries to us if we could not understand them? He applies this teaching, in the first place, to the mystery of the Trinity. Adopting the saying of Scripture that what is invisible in Him God has revealed to the heathen in His works, Abelard argues that from the revelation made of God in the world, the heathen could attain knowledge not only of the being of God, but also of His triune life. As a matter of fact, some of the ancient philosophers—Plato amongst others—did attain to a knowledge of the Trinity. And as they did, so can we also by reason alone establish the doctrine of the Divine Trinity. (Ib. p 1065. *Theol. Christ.*, p. 1313, sq.).

The Trinity and Creation.

§105

1. In establishing by mere speculation the doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard begins with the concept of the Supreme Good. God is the

supreme, the most perfect good. But He can be such only if, firstly, He is able to do all things; secondly, if He cannot deceive or be deceived; and thirdly, if He wills to accomplish and to ordain all things for the best. In other words, God can be the highest and most perfect good only if He is almighty, all wise, and all powerful. And it is precisely these three attributes of His being which are designated by the terms: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. By the term "Father," His omnipotence is designated; by the term "Son," His wisdom; and by the term "Holy Ghost," His goodness. Hence when we acknowledge God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we are equivalently acknowledging Him as the highest and most perfect good. In those three denominations we are merely expressing separately what we combine in the phrase "highest and most perfect good." (*Intr. ad. Theol.*, Lib. I., c. 7, *sqq.*)

2. This conception of the Divine Trinity would convert the Divine Persons into mere *modes*, for it would make them merely different aspects of the Divine Essence. No doubt Abelard endeavours to secure himself against this difficulty by insisting that he assigns these three divine attributes to the three several persons only *per appropriationem i.e.*, assigns to each that attribute which, though an attribute of the Divine Being, is specially in harmony with the special character of the Person to whom it is assigned. But, apart from the circumstance that this explanation destroys the scientific value of the previous reasoning, it is to be noted that Abelard's further development of his notion of *appropriation*, if it no longer makes the Persons mere modes of the Divine Being, introduces the conception of their *subordination* one to another.

3. In this development Abelard assigns Omnipotence to the Father absolutely. The Son, on the other hand, as the Divine Wisdom, is in a certain sense a *part* of this omnipotence, for wisdom is the *power* to discern the true from the false. The Holy Ghost, as the Divine Goodness, in no way includes any element of omnipotence, for the notion of goodness does not at all involve the notion of power. Hence the Son, as partial power, proceeds from the substance of the Father, who is absolute omnipotence; but of the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as his character excludes the notion of power, it cannot be asserted that He proceeds from the substance of the Father and the Son. Here we have distinctly introduced the conception of a subordination among the Persons of the Trinity, in the order fixed by St. Bernard: *Omnipotentia, aliqua potentia, nulla potentia.*

4. We have further to observe that in the Holy Ghost—the Divine Goodness—there is involved, according to Abelard, a necessary relation to the created order. For, he argues, if the Holy Ghost, as the Divine Love, proceeds from the Father and the Son, this love cannot have God Himself for its object; for no one is said, in strict propriety of language, to love himself. Love must always be directed towards another. Hence the Holy Ghost is, from the very nature of the concept, the Divine Love or Goodness for creatures—not the personal love of God for Himself.

5. Having given this rational *explanation* of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard proceeds to establish and defend the doctrine itself. He draws his arguments from three sources —Scripture, the authority of the ancient philosophers, and reason. The witness of the ancient philosophers in favour of the doctrine of the Trinity he finds chiefly among the Platonists. These philosophers, he contends, following the prophets, taught distinctly the doctrine of the Trinity. They held that the νοῦς was born of God, and was, like God, eternal. They appear also to have had before them the Person of the Holy Ghost when they taught that the World-Soul was a third person proceeding from God (*a Deo*),

and was the life and saving of the world. Thus Abelard discovers in the World-Soul the person of the Holy Ghost. He believes that Plato named the Holy Ghost World-Soul; inasmuch as through the goodness of God everything has life in His presence; nothing is dead, that is, without its proper utility.

6. In his rational arguments in favour of the doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard contents himself with adducing a few comparisons and analogies, but here again his reasoning points to a conception of the Trinity which reduces the Divine Persons to mere modes of being, and establishes a subordination between them. The most important of his comparisons is that of the seal. The seal, he says, is an unit, but we nevertheless distinguish three elements in it—the brass of which it is composed; the form by which the brass becomes a seal; and, lastly, the whole which actually seals—*i.e.*, impresses its form upon the wax (*æs ipsum, sigillabile, et sigillans*). In analogous fashion we must form our conception of the Divine Trinity. The seal is of brass, but is not brass simply; it is some brass determined by the form. In the same way the Son is of the Father, but is not, like the Father, Omnipotence simply, but a determined power—namely, the power to discern between the true and the false—which involves the concept wisdom. And, again, as the seal, through the union of matter and form, acts as a seal and impresses its image upon wax, so does the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father and the Son, and, as the Divine Goodness, restores in us the lost image of God, so that we put on the likeness of the Son of God—that is, we become like to Christ (*Intr. ad Theol., Lib. II*, c. 14, p. 1,087.)

7. Having thus established the doctrine of the Trinity, Abelard proceeds to examine more closely the three divine attributes: Omnipotence, Wisdom, Goodness, with which he identifies the Three Divine Persons. In reference to this portion of his speculations we have to note that he is led to maintain on the one hand the *necessity of creation*, and on the other a theory of *optimism* in reference to the created world. These views he expresses in the formula: God could not leave undone that which He is doing, and He could not do anything more or anything better than what He is actually doing. The following are his reasons for this opinion:

(*a*) God can only do what is good: now, if He did not do the good which he was able to do, He would be either niggardly or unjust, inasmuch as the doing of good costs Him no trouble. It is furthermore evident that in all that He does or omits God has a just cause for His proceedings, so that He does or omits only that which must be done or omitted, and which befits him to do or to omit. Hence, all that He does He *must* do; for if it is right that anything be done, it would be wrong if it should remain undone. For this reason everything done by Him is always the *best*. For if that which He leaves undone were as good as that which He does there would be no reason to do the one and leave the other undone, and without a reason God cannot act.

(*b*) We might object to this theory that, on the one hand, it does away with the contingent character of created things, and on the other is irreconcilable with the Free Will of God. But this objection, we are told, does not hold. For, in the first place, created things are of their own nature so constituted that of themselves they may be or not be—

though in God the will to create them is eternal and necessary. Hence, in themselves they are, and always remain, contingent entities. In the second place, Free Will does not consist in this, that we have to make a choice and determine ourselves for one course and against another, but in this that we are not constrained to do a thing against our will. Freedom means merely freedom from constraint. And this freedom can be attributed to God even in the hypothesis that He necessarily created the world, for He created of His own Will, not constrained to do so (*Intr. ad. Theol.*, Lib. 3, c. 5, p. 1112, s. 99, *Theol. Christ*, p. 1323, s. 99.)

Ethics.

§ 106.

1. In his ethical teaching Abelard starts with the principle that the Christian law of morality is merely the natural moral law reformed. The Christian law, therefore, adds nothing to the natural moral law, which was known and followed by the ancient philosophers. In keeping with this notion is Abelard's assiduous laudation of the virtue and moral perfection of the ancient philosophers. Not alone the doctrine, he says, but the moral life as well, of those old philosophers, was a thorough expression of the evangelical and apostolic laws of perfection. As their teaching was in many respects superior to that of Moses, so did their moral lives rise also to the Christian level. It was by their moral purity that they merited that lofty knowledge of theirs which so much excites our admiration.

2. Abelard distinguishes, in his teaching, between *Vitium*, *Peccatum*, and *Actio Mala* (vice, sin, and evil deed), *Vitium* is the inclination of the Will to evil; this is not in itself sinful, it is merely a weakness, a moral deficiency. Sin proper consists in the *consent* of the Will to the evil inclination or appetite; for this involves an injury to, and a contempt of, God. The *Actio Mala*, that is, the external exercise of the evil Will, does not add to the sin. No doubt the *Actio Mala*, is accompanied by pleasure, but this pleasure is not, in itself, sinful, and, cannot, therefore, add to the sin. (*Ethic.*, cc. 2, 3.)

3. Furthermore, all actions are, in themselves, indifferent as regards moral character. Their moral character depends exclusively on the subjective intention of the individual who performs them. If this intention is good the action is good, if it is evil, the action is evil. Hence, the same action may be good when done by one individual, and evil when done by another, according to the different intentions by which it is accompanied. Hence, also, an action done in ignorance or in unbelief, cannot be sinful. For when there is no trespass against conscience there can be no question of sin in the proper sense, and when the agent acts in ignorance or unbelief he does not offend against his conscience (*Ib.*, c. 37.)

4. Evil, it may be stated in general terms, is necessary in the world; in the sense, however, that God could not prevent it. For, as a fact. evil exists in the world; and since God could not create another

and a better world, it follows that when God creates He must at the same time permit evil. It is, however, to be noted that only grievous sins are sins in the strict sense of the word; the so-called venial sins are not, strictly speaking, sinful. Hence, God can forbid all sin without imposing an intolerable yoke, for we can, though with trouble and effort, avoid through our whole lives sin properly so-called, that is grievous sin. (*Ib.* c. 15.)

5. Abelard's teaching is proof how surely a rationalistic dialectic applied to the Christian mysteries will result in a complete perversion of their import. Abelard complains of the pride and perversity of the rationalistic dialecticians of his age. There is much reason to regret that he did not escape what he censures in others. St. Bernard had good cause for the opposition he offered him; and to St. Bernard's opposition we owe it that Abelard was not able to secure a following, and that his teaching remained without notable influence in the development of Christian philosophy.

Contemporaries and Successors of Abelard.

§ 107.

Abelard held the Philosophy of Plato in high esteem. In the same period we meet with several other notable teachers who exhibited strong leanings towards Platonism. They did not, however, wholly reject the teaching of Aristotle, but sought to bring it into harmony with Plato's doctrine. It is usual to describe these philosophers by the general epithet "Platonists." Amongst them are reckoned Adelard of Bath, Bernard of Chartres, William of Conches, and Walter of Mortagne. They all taught in the first half of the twelfth century.

(*a*) We have from Adelard two philosophical treatises:—*De Eodem et Diverso*, and *Quæstiones Naturales*, from which Jourdain (*History of the Aristotelian Writings of the Middle Ages*) gives extracts. The treatises are thoroughly Platonist in tone. It is interesting to observe how Adelard endeavours to combine the theories of Plato and Aristotle on the subject of Universals. "Aristotle," he says, "rightly regarded genera and species as existing in the individuals, inasmuch as the objects are individuals or species and genera, according as we regard in them their individual existence, or in the common elements in which they resemble one another. At the same time Plato was right in his teaching that these Universals in their absolute purity have existence only apart from the objects of sense, that is, in the Divine mind."

(*b*) Bernard of Chartres, a teacher in the town from which he took his name, is mentioned by John of Salisbury as the most remarkable Platonist of his age. Cousin (Œuvres inédits d'Abelard) has published some extracts from his principal work, a cosmography divided into two parts with the titles *Megacosmos* and *Microcosmos*. He holds by the three principles of the Platonists—God, the νους and the world-soul. The νοὺς is born of God, is one in substance with Him, and holds in Himself the ideas, the eternal archetypes of all genera, species, and individuals. From this Divine Reason the world-soul proceeds, by a process of emanation, and then, in virtue of its participation in the Divine ideas, brings forth, in the progress of time, all things that exist in the world in an unchangeable order. Matter is the cause of the imperfection and evil which exist in

the world. In addition to these points of Platonist doctrine, Bernard further admits the pre-existence of souls.

(*c*) The same theories appear in the teaching of William of Conches, who taught in Paris till late in the twelfth century. Like Abelard he identifies the world-soul with the person of the Holy Ghost, and he insists strongly on the doctrine of creation. He rejected the pre-existence of souls, and refused to believe that Plato really taught the doctrine. Called to account by William of Thierry, an antagonist of Abelard, for having identified the world-soul with the Holy Ghost, he gave up the point, saying that he preferred to be a follower of Christ rather than of the Academy.

(*d*) Walter of Mortagne, teacher in Paris, and subsequently Bishop of Laon (+1174), taught, according to John Salisbury (Met. ii., 17), in reference to Universals, that "the same objects according to the different states (status) in which they are considered, *i.e.* according as attention is directed to their difference or to their non-difference *indifferens* or *consimile*), are individuals, or genera and species." Thus Plato, as Plato, is an individual; as man, a species; as living being, a genus; as substance, an ultimate genus.

Gilbert de la Porrée.

§ 108.

1. A more important philosophical figure of this period than any of the Platonists we have named is Gilbert de la Porrée. He was born at Poitiers, studied under Bernard of Chartres and others, became professor at Chartres, and subsequently at Paris, was appointed Bishop of Poitiers, and died there in 1159. His most important writings are commentaries upon the works attributed to Boethius: *De Trinitate; De Prædicatione Trium Personarum; Quod substantiæ bonæ sint*; and *De Duabus Naturis et una Persona in Christo.* In addition we have a work *De sex Principiis*, treating of the six last categories of Aristotle. These writings are, for the most part, very obscure in style, but they exhibit an extensive acquaintance with the dialectical studies of the age.

2. According to Gilbert the laws which obtain in the natural acquisition of knowledge cannot be applied straightway in dealing with theological doctrines. In matters theological, which transcend our natural faculties, principles find place which differ widely from the principles of merely natural knowledge, though they do not contradict the latter. He adds that the neglect of this important truth gave rise to the heresies of Sabellius and Arius.

3. Dealing with Universals, Gilbert holds that they are founded on the conformity (resemblance) between the essential forms of certain things, which forms have their archetypes in the Divine idea. The whole of those objects whose *formæ nativæ* resemble one another, can, in virtue of this resemblance, be embraced under one notion which is applicable to each. The Universal, therefore, is the result of a process of abstraction applied to a number of individuals. These are represented as a unit in the Universal concept, not as if they all possessed one and the same individual nature, but only inasmuch as their resemblance to one another allows them to be

reduced to unity in thought. It is not, then, the multiplicity and diversity of accidental qualities which effects the multiplicity and diversity of individuals, but rather the former is the consequence and the token of the latter: things are in themselves multiple and diverse.

4. That by which a given individual is what it is, is its *οὐσία*. This *οὐσία* (essence) is also called subsistence, *οὐσίωσις*, in so far as it does not require any ulterior entity in which it should exist as in its subject. The essence or subsistence is, therefore, that by which the individual has being—*id quo est*. The individual itself is that entity which has being by such essence or subsistence—*id quod est*, and is, accordingly, styled a subsistent being. This subsistent being is denominated substance (*ὑπόστασις*) in so far as it is the sustaining substratum of accidental qualities; it receives the name person (*πρόσωπον*) when it is of a rational nature.

5. This fundamental conception enables him to fix the difference between Matter and Form. Form is that element by which the specific being of an object is determined; matter is the determinable substratum of this form. In the case of the individual, Form and Subsistence are one and the same thing. All forms of things have their highest and ultimate cause in the Primal Form, that is, in God; in the world of created realities, however, forms do not exist apart from matter.

6. The Aristotelian categories cannot, in strict accuracy, be applied to God, for God is the Absolute Primal Form, wholly dissociated from matter. God is not, in the proper sense, what is expressed by those concepts; they are applied to Him only in an analogous sense. This holds good even for the concept of substance, for substance implies accidents, and there are none such in God. Further, it is to be observed that when we apply these concepts in an analogous sense to God, we express by each of them only the incomposite (simple) essence of the Divine Being. In God there is nothing which is not His Divinity, nothing which is not His Essence. In God it is not one thing to be, another to be just, that by which He is, is that also by which He is just. And so of the other notions.

7. And yet when Gilbert is treating of the Trinity he introduces into the Divine Being the distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*, and so is led to admit a real distinction between the Divine Essence, and the three Divine Persons. The Divine Essence, he says, cannot, as such, be denominated God; it is only that by which God is God. Just as every thing is what it is because of its form—this form being different from that which is by means of it—so also we must admit some such form in God by which He is, but which is not God; this is the Divine Essence. We can call "God" only that which is by means of the Divine Essence (*id quod est*); and what so exists is threefold, Father Son and Holy Ghost.

8. Gilbert's conception of the relation existing between the Divine Essence and the Three Divine Persons would make the three Persons units capable of forming a number, which are, however, what they are through one Divine Essence. This oneness of Essence or Form, is the cause why, though differing from one another, they cannot be called three Gods. But, neither taken singly, nor taken together, *are* they the Divine Essence; there is an Essence, says Gilbert, *by* which these three Persons are, but which they are

not. This doctrine introduces a real distinction between the Divine Essence, and the Divine Persons, and makes of the Trinity a *Quaternity*. St. Bernard combated this false teaching: it was condemned in a Synod at Rheims (1149) and was, in consequence, abandoned by Gilbert.

Amalric of Chartres. David of Dinant.

§ 109.

1. In the second half of the twelfth century, and the beginning of the thirteenth, we meet with two teachers whose errors of doctrine were still more dangerous than those of Gilbert. The first of them is Amalric of Chartres (more properly of Bene in the district of Chartres) a professor at Paris. In his philosophical doctrines he adopted Scotus Erigena as his guide, and gave full development to the pantheistical principles embodied in that philosopher's system. According to Gerson, he taught that Ideas are created, and create in their turn. Through them things come forth from God in their multiplicity and diversity. But God is the ultimate end of all things, and therefore all things return to Him again and become in Him one undivided being—become what they were before they went forth from Him. This is clearly pantheistical. Still more distinctly so are the following principles which Gerson quotes: "As Abraham and Isaac were of one and the same nature, so are all things one, and that one being is God: God is the essence of all things: In love human nature ceases to be a created thing; it becomes one with God and is absorbed into His being. (Gers., *Concord. Met. cum Log.;* and *De Myst. Theol. Specul.*, Cons. 41.)

2. The second of the teachers we have mentioned is David of Dinant, a pupil of Amalric, and, like him, a professor at Paris. He lays it down in his work, *De Tomis*, i.e., *De Divisionibus*, cited by Albert the Great, that God is the Primal Matter, which forms the one substratum of all things corporeal and spiritual. He distinguishes three kinds of objects: *bodies*, *souls*, and *separated substances*. Bodies have their oneness in Matter; souls in the νοῦς; separated substances in God. But, in the last analysis, the three principles, Matter, νοῦς and God cannot be different from one another. If they differed, they should differ by their specific forms, and we should, therefore, have to assume a *universal* principle which could be reduced to these three species of being. But a higher genus of this sort is inadmissible. In such an assumption we conceive an ulterior Matter to account for the Primal Matter there is the same reason to conceive another to account for this, and so backwards without end. There is, therefore, nothing left us but to assert that Primal Matter, Spirit, and God, are one and the same thing.

3. It appears certain that in these strange opinions we may trace the influence of the Arabian Philosophy with which, at this

period, the West was beginning to make acquaintance. The doctrines of Amalric and of David of Dinant were condemned in a Synod at Paris (1209), in the Lateran Council under Innocent III. (1215); and their writings, as well as the works of Erigena, and the writings of Aristotle, to which they had appealed, were prohibited.

THE MYSTICS.

Bernard of Clairvaux.

§ 110.

1. In studying the history of Mediæval Mysticism, we must keep before us two important facts: In the first place, the Christian Mystics were far from regarding mystical contemplation as the ordinary path to intellectual knowledge; they rather held it to be something supernatural, dependent on an extraordinary gift of God's illuminating grace. The ordinary method of attaining knowledge was for them what it was for the other Scholastics.

2. In the second place, they never devoted themselves exclusively to the investigation and exposition of the processes of the ascetico-contemplative life; they always gave considerable attention to the work of speculation proper. Their speculative works, however, differ in this from those of other thinkers, that in them the products of abstract thought are exhibited against a back-ground of ideas furnished by the contemplative life. In this way their speculations come to us with a certain tinge of mysticism, and are, besides, set forth with a certain unction which renders them apt for purposes of edification as well as of instruction.

3. The founder of the Christian Mysticism of the Middle Ages was Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), on whom his contemporaries conferred the title of *Doctor Mellifluus*. The vigorous and far-reaching activity which this man displayed, and the profound influence which he exercised, as well on the ecclesiastical spirit as on the historical events of his time, have made his name immortal in the history of the Church.[1] But it is not with this aspect of his

[1] He was brought up by his pious mother, Aletha, in the fear of God, and at the age of twenty-three retired into the monastery of Citeaux. Three years later he was elected Abbot of the newly-founded abbey of Clairvaux. Soon he was called from his retirement into public life. He induced the anti-pope Anacletus to yield to the claims of the rightful Pope, Innocent II, and so averted a threatened schism. He combated the teaching of Abelard, and secured his condemnation in the Synod of Sens (1140). With equal energy he opposed Gilbert and the Cathari. Arnold of Brescia in his attempts at rebellion found in him his most formidable opponent. With outspoken boldness he condemned the abuses which had crept into the Church, and in this sense addressed his exhortations to the Pope himself, Eugene III., and called for reform. The second crusade, undertaken in 1147, was due wholly to him. In this fashion, strong in spirit, though weak in body, he worked on with untiring energy until his death.

life we have to do; we are concerned only with the doctrines which he set forth in his writings in reference to the life of mystical contemplation.

4. In the writings which treat of this life of mystical contemplation are included not only his sermons, but in particular the three treatises: *De Gradibus Humilitatis*; *De Diligendo Deo*; and *De Considerationc*. In his teaching, the basis of all mystical elevation is Humility, the virtue which renders man lowly and of small account in his own eyes. Through twelve stages or degrees this virtue rises to its highest perfection. Humility must then develop into the love of God; the flower of love must spring from the root of humility. This love will then bear the spirit aloft into the region of higher enlightenment.

5. When man, by humility and love, has attained to the higher life of the spirit, then it is given him to *contemplate* truth, and in prayer and reverence, to penetrate into its depths. And the deeper he enters, by contemplation, into the eternal truth, the more does his astonishment increase. It may happen, as a consequence of this bewildering astonishment, that the mind passes wholly out of itself, and in this state of rapture loses itself in the ocean of infinite truth. This condition is called *Ecstasy*.

6. In this state of ecstasy the soul enjoys, for a moment a foretaste of that condition into which it will enter after the death of the body. For, in that life to come this hard will of ours will become liquefied, and all our volitions will unite with and mingle with the will of God. As the drop of water falling into a vessel of wine passes wholly into the wine, so the soul, in that future life, will retain nothing of itself, but pass wholly into God. Not that its essence or substance will perish: these remain for ever. But they will assume a form wholly divine; the soul will be *deified*.

Hugh of St. Victor.

§ 111.

1. With St. Bernard we associate his contemporary and friend, Hugh of St. Victor (1037-1141). According to some authorities, he was born at Ypres, in Flanders; according to others, in Lower Saxony. His education was begun in the monastery of Hammersleben, near Halberstadt, continued and completed in the monastery of St. Victor, near Paris. He was soon appointed to preside over the school of the latter monastery, and in this post he laboured till his death. He was not a mystic merely—he was an earnest and profound thinker as well. Of this he gives evidence in his comprehensive work *De Sacramentis*, in which he sketches a fairly complete theological system, and this on the lines indicated by Anselm.

2. What we have observed above, regarding the intellectual labours of the mediæval mystics is specially applicable to Hugh's work, *De Sacramentis*. Through all the intricate speculations of the author, there runs a strain of the element of mystical contemplation which lends a peculiar charm to the work, that appeals alike to the intellect and to the emotions. As well in matter as in style, this treatise belongs to the most beautiful and most excellent which the Christian spirit of the Middle Ages has produced. We have in it a grace of thought and a refinement of sentiment, which are want-

ing in the writings of Anselm, and which remind us, in some way, of the works of Plato.

3. God, says Hugh, has from the beginning so ordained things that man could never know God fully, *i.e.*, in all His perfection, but in such wise also that he could never be wholly ignorant of God. If God had permitted man to know Him in the fulness of His perfection, there would have been no merit in faith, unbelief would have been impossible. If, on the other hand, God had hidden Himself wholly from man, faith would have been wholly unsupported by reason, and so unbelief would have found excuse. (*De Sacram.*, Lib. I, part 3, c. 2.)

4. If we ask: In what way has God made Himself known to man? we are answered that He has done so in two ways: through Reason and by Revelation. And in each of these ways of reaching the knowledge of God we must distinguish two methods. As for rational knowledge, man derives the knowledge partly from the contemplation of his own inner nature, and partly from the contemplation of visible nature. In the sphere of revelation, God either makes Himself known by divine inspiration, or man receives knowledge of Him by the teaching of others, the truth of which is confirmed by miracles. (*De Sacram.* Lib., I., p. 3, c. 3.)

5. Referring to the proofs for God's existence, Hugh lays special stress on the proof derived from the nature of mind. The mind knows itself as an existent something, and, in this self-knowledge, discriminates and distinguishes between itself and the body and from all else that surrounds it. At the same time that it apprehends itself as really existing, it also understands that it has not always existed, that it has, therefore, had a beginning, and that the cause of this beginning cannot have been itself. And thus it is inevitably led to recognise the action of a a creative power, which, as such, has been the cause of its existence. This power cannot have had a beginning, otherwise the same argument could be applied to it, and, thus, an endless series would be postulated. This power, therefore, exists of itself, and is eternal, that is, it is God. (*Lib.* I., l. 28).

6. The unity of God is demonstrated, in the first place, by the harmony of all things among themselves; for such a far extending harmony cannot be accounted for unless we assume a single ordaining mind. If we suppose a number of First Causes, which merely resemble one another, we have, indeeed, a kind of unity, an unity of resemblance to wit; but such an unity is not perfect, it only approximates to perfect unity. God, however, is the highest and most perfect being, and to Him every attribute must be assigned in its perfection. He is, therefore, a perfect unity, and this He can be only if He stands alone, having beside Him no being which resembles Him.

7. In God we must recognise a two-fold power: the power to do, and the power which makes God incapable of suffering. Under both respects God must be regarded as omnipotent. On the one hand, He can do whatsoever He wills, and on the other nothing can so act upon Him that He could be regarded as passive under its influence. God cannot, however, do anything which would conflict with His being, or His attributes, but that is no evidence of defective power; it rather proves His omnipotence, for if He could do such acts He would not any longer be omnipotent. And since God is omnipotent, there is no ground for the assertion that God could do anything but that which He has done, or make things better than He has actually made them. Such notions set bounds to the infinite power of God—they are self-contradictory and unwarrantable. (*De Sacra.*, L. 1, p. 2, c. 22).

8. We will not here enter further into Hugh's theoretical reasonings; we pass on to notice his mystical doctrines, which we find contained partly in the great work we have been noticing, and

partly in smaller treatises, such as *De Arca Noe mystica*, *De Arca Noe morali*, *De Arrha Animæ*, *De Vanitate Mundi*, *De Modo Dicendi et Meditandi*, &c. Here too, we may call attention to another of his remarkable works, the *Eruditio Didascalorum*, which contains a plan for a scientific encyclopedia, sketching the matter and the scope of the several sciences.

9. Hugh distinguishes three faculties in man's capacity for cognition: Imagination, Reason, Intelligence. To these three forms of the cognitive power in man correspond three forms of activity, *Cogitatio*, belonging to Imagination, *Meditatio* to Reason, and *Contemplatio* to Intelligence. *Cogitatio* deals with objects of sense, and is nothing more than the act of sensuous perception. *Meditatio* is the act of discursive thoughts, the persistent effort of inquiry into the inner nature and relation of things, which seeks to discover the *what*, and *how*, and *wherefore* of them. Finally, *Contemplatio* is the clear, unimpeded intuition of the mind in which, without any aid from processes of reasoning, it immediately beholds, and represents in consciousness, ideal objects.

10. Having given this explanation, Hugh proceeds to show that man is able, and is bound, to raise himself through the lower stages to the contemplative state. The fundamental requirement of this self-elevation is, in the first place, moral perfection in Christian charity, and in the second, the withdrawal of the soul within itself, and its renunciation of the things of sense. When the soul has thus fitted itself for mystical contemplation, its vision ranges without hindrance through the infinite sphere of Divine truth; the soul is lifted above itself, and is immersed in the ocean of the Divine light.

11. But Hugh will not admit, any more than does St. Bernard, that this mystical elevation is wholly the work of man; he regards it as a matter which is essentially dependent on God's illuminating grace. Man, he says, was originally endowed by God with a three-fold faculty of vision: the eye of the flesh (Imagination), the eye of Reason, and the eye of Contemplation. But owing to the darkness which fell upon his soul in consequence of sin, the eye of contemplation became wholly darkened; and the vision of reason also was troubled, so that it could no longer discern the truth clearly and distinctly. But the grace of Redemption has not only restored its clearness and brightness to the eye of Reason, it has also again opened the eye of Contemplation, so that man, thanks to illuminating grace, is again enabled to climb the heights of mystical contemplation.

12. This however, he can do only when the whole process of Contemplation is founded upon Faith. Faith must come to the aid of Reason, which sin has obscured, if man's efforts are to reach the result desired; and in the same way Faith must furnish the immutable basis of Contemplation. For Faith reveals to us what is hidden, and besides, presents those natural truths which would otherwise

remain unknown to the mind—forms of truth which its own unaided powers would never have enabled it to reach.

Richard of St. Victor.

§ 112.

1. Hugh's pupil and successor, Richard of St. Victor (†1173), a Scotchman by birth, followed in the footsteps of his master. Like Hugh, he combines the speculative and the contemplative elements in his system of doctrine, and in both departments his work is of singular excellence. As an example of his efforts in the field of pure speculation we may cite his work *De Trinitate*, which contains a fairly complete body of speculative doctrine regarding God, and the triune life of God. Of the works he has given to the literature of mystical contemplation we may mention *De Praeparatione ad Contemplationem* (Benjamin minor), and *De Contemplatione* (Benjamin major). Of importance, also, are his treatises *De statu interioris hominis*, and *De Exterminatione Mali*.

2. As the basis of Richard's teaching in the sphere of mystical contemplation we find Hugh's threefold division of the cognitive faculties (Imagination, Reason, Intelligence), and of the cognitive functions (*Cogitatio*, *Meditatio*, *Contemplatio*). Like his master, he regards moral perfection and the retirement of the soul within itself as the necessary conditions of a life of mystical contemplation. Richard compares Will and Reason with Jacob's two wives, Leah and Rachel. Jacob was first united with Leah, and by her he became the father of sons and daughters; subsequently Rachel became his wife, and bore to him Joseph and then Benjamin. In the same way the Will must first be impregnated by God's grace, so that it may bring forth virtues from itself and in itself; the soul must then retire within itself, and contemplate itself as the image of God, so that self knowledge, the "Joseph" of spiritual life, may be generated within it. Only in this wise can it raise itself to the functions of contemplation, only thus can "this Benjamin" of the spiritual state attain life and form within it.

3. These principles being established, Richard proceeds to classify the objects with which contemplation has to do. He finds of these six orders or degrees:

(*a*) The first order is, "in imaginatione et secundum imaginationem." Here contemplation turns to the sensible world to behold in its beauty the beauty of God.

(*b*) The second order is, "in imaginatione et secundum rationem." Here contemplation goes back to the causes of visible things, in order to observe and admire in them the power and wisdom of God.

(*c*) The third order is, "in ratione et secundum imaginationem." Here contemplation is directed to the supra-sensible manifested in sensible things, *i.e.*, to the ideas of these things in so far as they exhibit a reflex of the Divine essence.

(*d*) The fourth order is, "in ratione et secundum rationem." Here contemplation

takes as its object purely spiritual beings such as the human soul and the angels, and, in these beings, God in His "image," for spiritual beings exhibit the "image" (imago) of God.

(*e*) The fifth order is, "supra rationem sed non præter rationem." Here contemplation rises to the consideration of God Himself, but of God only in so far as He can be known by Reason, that is to say, as He is represented by the concept of essence and attributes.

(*f*) Finally, the sixth order is, "supra rationem et præter rationem." Here contemplation is directed to those impenetrable Divine mysteries which transcend all our powers of knowledge, that is, in the first place, to the Divine Trinity, and then to the mysteries of Revelation.

4. But it is not merely the differences between the objects contemplated which enable him to establish different degrees of contemplation; he also enumerates varying degrees in which the difference is one of *intensity* in the act of contemplation itself. In this respect there are three degrees.

(*a*) In the first degree we have an *expansion* of the mind (mentis dilatatio), that is to say, the range of contemplative vision is extended, in consequence of which the hardness and dryness of the affections disappear, and the mind becomes, after a fashion, dissolved, like wax.

(*b*) In the second degree we have an *elevation* of the mind (mentis sublevatio), a condition in which, in consequence of the influx of divine light, contemplation transcends the limits within which the ordinary operations of the human mind are confined.

(*c*) The third degree is a state of *rapture* (mentis alienatio); the mind attains to a condition in which all the lower mental faculties are reduced to silence, individual consciousness is suspended, and the mind in its act of contemplation sinks wholly into the ocean of divine light, so that it is lost in the intuition permitted it.

5. This transport of mind, or *Ecstasy*, is the highest point to which man can reach. Here Rachel dies in giving birth to Benjamin; that is to say, the birth of the higher life of ecstasy is possible only on condition that Sense and Reason are rendered inactive, and the eye of Intelligence alone remains open to the light. But this degree of mystical elevation cannot be attained by man's unaided efforts. His powers are of no avail here; everything must be done by God's illuminating grace. Man may, indeed, prepare and dispose himself for this stage of the mystical life, but he must wait for the coming of the light. Furthermore, what he has seen in his condition of ecstasy must subsequently be tested by comparison with Sacred Scripture: if it is contradicted by Scripture it is illusion; if it is not confirmed by Scripture it is to be suspected, or, at least, held uncertain.

6. Of the school of writers here under notice there remains to be mentioned Walter of St. Victor, Richard's successor in the office of Prior. With him mere speculation is much less in favour than with his predecessors. The overweening pretensions of the "modern Dialecticians" of the period led him to adopt this attitude. In matters theological he will not take his stand upon merely rational grounds; above and beyond all he relies on the authority of the Fathers. He composed a work "Against the four Labyrinths of France" (Abelard, Gilbert, Peter Lombard and Peter of Poitiers). He cites various propositions from the works of these writers, which he declares to be heretical, and sets in contrast with these views what he regards as the genuine Catholic doctrines. There can be no doubt that he went too far in his condemnation of scientific speculation.

7. We have now to notice three men with whom we may fitly close our account of the Theological and Philosophical movement of the first mediæval period, inasmuch as they brought together and

reduced to orderly arrangement the results obtained during the entire period. These writers are:

8. Peter Lombard, Alanus of Ryssel and John of Salisbury.

§ 113.

1. It is customary to regard Hildebert of Lavardin, Archbishop of Tours, as the writer who, in the beginning of the twelfth century, in his *Tractatus Theologicus*, first gave a general account of the dogmas of religion. But this merit does not belong to Hildebert; it belongs of right to Hugh of St. Victor. The proper systematic treatment of religious dogmas was the work of a later period of the twelfth century. We find it accomplished in certain collected theological treatises known as *Libri Sententiarum*. Works of this kind are ascribed to Robert Pulleyn (+1150), Robert of Melun, Hugh of Rouen (+ 1164), and Peter of Poitiers, Chancellor of the University of Paris (+ 1205). The most remarkable work of this description is, however, the *Quatuor Libri Sententiarum*, by Peter Lombard, Professor at the Paris University (+ 1164).

2. The *Libri Sententiarum* of Peter Lombard are nothing more than a compendious, systematically arranged catalogue of the Christian dogmas and the principles immediately derived from them. In carrying out his plan the author first states the dogma or the derived truth, then adds the proofs from Scripture or the Fathers, or from reason, which go to support it; after which he refutes the arguments urged against it, or endeavours to reconcile with his teaching the passages from the Fathers which might be cited against it. A work carried out according to this plan is specially suited for theological teaching; hence the general adoption of Lombard's work as a text-book in the theological schools of the middle ages: hence also the numerous commentaries on the *Sentences* which we owe to the Schoolmen.

3. In the arrangement of the material with which he dealt, Lombard's plan is in many respects defective; but it had at least this merit, that it prepared the way for the more perfect systems produced at a later period in those works which bore the title *Summa*. Lombard divided the entire subject matter which he undertook to treat into two broad divisions—the doctrine of *things* and the doctrine of *signs*. By *thing* he understood that which is not employed to signify or symbolize something else; by *signs* he understood the Sacraments, for these are the effective signs or tokens of grace. In the doctrine of things he makes, further, a fourfold division. He distinguishes between those things which are objects of *enjoyment*, those which are objects of *use*, those which are at once objects of *enjoyment* and *use*, and lastly, those things which *use* and *enjoy*. The object of enjoyment is God; the object of use, the

things of the created world; the objects of enjoyment and use, the virtues; the objects which use and enjoy, men and the angels. Lombard treats first of God and of the Divine Trinity, then of created things in general, next of the angels and of man; lastly, he has a treatise on the Sacraments.

4. In Lombard's *Sentences*, positive theology is assigned the first and principal place; speculation is admitted only in subordinate measure. In the works of Alanus of Ryssel, on the other hand, the philosophical element is in the ascendant. Alanus was a native of Lille (Ryssel, *ab insulis*), in Flanders, entered the Cistercian order at Clairvaux, and became a pupil of St. Bernard. He subsequently became professor at Paris, where he won for himself the honourable title of *Doctor Universalis*. He died Bishop of Auxerre in 1202. His chief work bears the title: *De arte sive de articulis fidei Catholicæ ad Clementem III.* In addition, we have from him the treatise, *Regulæ Theologicæ*, and five books against heretics.

5. In the first of the works here named, Alanus enunciates the dogmas of Catholic teaching in brief epigrammatic propositions, adding to each, in the same concise fashion, the arguments from Reason which the schools had hitherto employed to support them. The order followed in the arrangement of the propositions cited is, in general, the same as that adopted by Lombard. His reasons for insisting mainly on the philosophical proofs for these propositions (at least in his principal work) are stated in his dedication of the work to Clement III.

6. The attacks upon the Faith by Mohammedans, Jews, and heretics furnished, he says, the occasion for his work. His purpose is to defend the doctrine of the Church against these opponents. He will not, therefore, appeal to miracles or to the authority of the Fathers, for such sources of argument would not be recognised by his antagonists. He will abide by the arguments furnished by mere Reason, to which no exception can be taken. Hence, his work is an apology rather than a treatise of dogmatic theology. Alanus is, however careful to point out that rational arguments on the subject of the Mysteries are not strictly demonstrative in their force. They are merely probable reasons, though, as such, very convincing (probabiles rationes, quibus perspicax ingenium vix possit resistere).

7. We come now to John of Salisbury. He was born about 1110 (according to some authorities in 1120) at Salisbury, in England; passed over to France in 1136 to give himself to the study of the sciences, and had the advantage there of the teaching of the ablest men of the period (Abelard, Alberich, Robert of Melun, William of Conches, Gilbert, Robert Pulleyn, etc.). Like Abelard and Bernard of Chartres, he embraced within the range of his studies the classical authors of antiquity as well as the sciences of Logic and Theology. In the year 1151 he returned to England, where he became chaplain to the Primate, Theobald of Canterbury, and after the death of the

latter was appointed secretary to the new Archbishop, Thomas Beckett, to whom he remained, during the whole of his administration a staunch friend and supporter. Subsequently he was appointed Bishop of Chartres. He died in the year 1180.

8. The most remarkable works of John of Salisbury are the *Polycraticus, seu de Nugis Curialium*, in which he describes and strongly censures the Court manners of the period; the *Entheticus*, and, lastly, the *Metalogicus*, in which he discusses the merits of Logic, and undertakes its defence. For our special purpose the last work is alone of importance. While undertaking the defence of Logic, the author of the *Metalogicus* does not omit to condemn emphatically the abuse of it by the "Modern Dialecticians" of his time. He rebukes them for making Dialectics the one source of argument in every question, and disregarding the authority of the Fathers, a method which leads them to the wildest assertions. In this respect these "Modern Dialecticians" are far from being followers of the ancient philosophers. The latter have, no doubt, fallen into grievous errors, but their method was much better than that of the *Cornificii* (a nickname for the sophistical logicians).

9. Applying these principles, John of Salisbury recommends caution and a wise scepticism in scientific matters. Truths immediately evident to the mind, and the propositions which follow of necessity from them, must not be questioned; neither can the facts of experience, nor the principles of the Faith; all these truths are lifted out of the region of doubt. But in matters in which we have not the guarantee of Faith, nor the sure testimony of our senses, nor an inference from the evident principles of Reason to guide us, we must not assert boldly and recklessly; but, after the manner of the Academicians, withhold our judgment, and thus avoid adopting as certain what is not certain in reality. Again, we must not spend overmuch time upon useless problems, lest we lose sight of those which are of real importance; we must not act as, *e.g.*, the Dialecticians do in reference to the theory of universals, upon which each author sets up an opinion for himself (he enumerates eight of those which were current at the time) for which he endeavours by every means to secure favour. This advice notwithstanding, the author himself gives us his views on this question, which, however, do not materially differ from those of Boethius and Gilbert.

10. Abandoning the arena of the useless controversies of the schools, John of Salisbury aims at giving philosophy a higher *ethical* tendency. Philosophy, he holds, must proceed from love of truth and love of God, and must have both these objects for its ultimate end. Just as the Law and the Prophets stimulate love for God, so must philosophical knowledge strengthen and develop that love, and by that means strengthen and promote virtue. Whatever in the doctrines and labours of the philosopher is not directed to this end is mere empty chatter, mere idle figments.

SECOND PERIOD.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Preliminary Remarks.

§ 114.

1. It has been stated in an earlier part of this work that, apart from the growth of the university system in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the extraordinary advance of Scholastic Philosophy in the thirteenth century was due chiefly to the fact that the whole body of Aristotle's writings was then made accessible to the scholars of the West. Their first knowledge of them was obtained through the Arabians and Jews, but shortly afterwards the original Greek text was brought into Western Europe—from Constantinople for the most part—and was translated directly into Latin.

2. Previous to this, the Arabian philosophy had exercised an occasional influence on Christian Scholastics. About 1150, at the request of Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo, Johannes Hispalensis and Dominicus Gundisalvi translated into Latin, from a Castilian version of the Arabian text, the principal works of Aristotle, together with the physical and metaphysical writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel, and Avicebron's treatise, "Fons Vitae." Soon after 1150 a Latin translation of the book, "De Causis," had been circulated as a work of Aristotle, and was, as we have seen, quoted by Alanus. A little later the so-called "Theologia Aristotelis" became known in a Latin version, and it cannot be disputed that this treatise, as well as the "Fons Vitae" of Avicebron, and the book, "De Causis," influenced the writings of Amalrich and David of Dinant. In the early part of the thirteenth century the knowledge of the writings of Aristotle became general.

3. As a result, the Aristotelian philosophy in its entirety was adopted in the schools of Christendom. Just as the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard formed the groundwork of theological instruction, so the writings of Aristotle became the basis of all philosophical teaching. The Peripatetic philosophy was regarded as the philosophy κατ' ἐξοχήν: the explanation and development of it was considered the chief, nay, almost the sole, task of the professors of philosophy; Aristotle was alluded to simply as "the philosopher." Hence the numerous commentaries on the works of Aristotle, written by the Schoolmen of this and the following period,

commentaries not less brilliant and copious than those dealing with the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard.

4. The form of theology could not remain unaffected by this adoption of the Peripatetic philosophy. The theologians appropriated from Aristotle's works the philosophic principles necessary for the speculative development and proof of the truths of revelation, and employed them in what they conceived to be the correct manner. Consequently the entire theological speculation of this and the succeeding mediæval period is permeated by the philosophy of Aristotle. The speculative element in it is thoroughly Aristotelian in form. The most complete expression of this fusion of the Peripatetic philosophy with Christian theology are the great "Summae Theologiae," which were begun in the thirteenth century, and in which the tendency of the age to reduce everything to a system culminated.

5. In fact, owing to the adoption of Aristotle's philosophy, mediæval speculation underwent a complete transformation. The form in which it was cast shared in the change. Hitherto teachers had not reduced their teaching to any fixed invariable form; now the Aristotelian method became general. In this method the thesis (quaestio) is first proposed, and is followed by the arguments, for and against, in a continuous series. Then comes the solution (solutio) which is first asserted and explained categorically, and then established by a syllogism. The refutation of the arguments which seem to invalidate the "Solutio," closes the discussion. Every thesis was separately treated in this manner. This rigid logical method had a most favourable influence. It promoted exact definition and an accurate determination of the limits of each thesis, and close reasoning in establishing its truth. In these respects scholastic philosophy will always enjoy an undisputed pre-eminence.

6. The adoption of the Peripatetic system was not without danger for Christian philosophy. Aristotle's works had been obtained at first through the Arabians, and with the works came the commentaries written by the Arabians on Aristotle, together with all the errors that had accumulated in these commentaries. There was, therefore, good reason to fear that with Aristotle's philosophy would also be accepted the erroneous doctrines which the Arabian commentators had developed in discussing it. Indeed, there were many teachers who did not escape this pitfall.

7. The errors of Amalrich and David of Dinant arose, at least in part, from Arabian influence. In the year 1269 an assembly of the professors of Paris University, under the presidency of Bishop Stephen, condemned several propositions taken wholly from the writings of the Arabian philosopher, Averroes,—*e.g.*, the doctrine of the eternity of the world, of the unity of intellect in all men, of the mortality of the soul, of the limitation of the divine knowledge and providence to the universal, &c. Not long after, in 1277, a similar fate befell several other theories received from the Arabians.

8. There was evident danger that the errors of the Arabian philosophers would gain a footing in the Christian schools, side by side with the writings of Aristotle. This explains why the ecclesiastical authorities looked at first with suspicion on the adoption of Peripatetic philosophy in the schools of Christendom, and even frequently prohibited the teaching of it. In 1210 a synod held in Paris forbade the expounding of Aristotle's "Physics" for three years. In 1215 the Papal legate, Robert de Courson, directed Aristotle's works on Dialectics to be studied, but prohibited the teaching of his metaphysical and physical treatises. In 1231, the "libri naturales" of Aristotle having been condemned by a provincial synod, Pope Gregory IX. commanded that they should not be used in the University of Paris until they had been examined and purged of every suspicion of heresy. The Church was entirely justified in these measures by the manner in which the principles of Aristotle's philosophy were misapplied by many of its disciples.

9. A further circumstance must be noted. Those who accepted the erroneous doctrines of the Arabian followers of Aristotle adopted also the theory that philosophy and religion are independent provinces of knowledge. They asserted that a proposition might be at once true in philosophy and false in theology. In this way they attempted to protect doctrines entirely opposed to theological teaching, to justify themselves in maintaining such opinions as philosophical truths, though they rejected them in the domain of faith. On this point the Church had to speak plainly. The proposition that "something may be true in philosophy and at the same time false in theology" is to be found among the doctrines which the ecclesiastical authorities condemned in the middle of the thirteenth century.

10. The misuse of Aristotle's philosophy, due to the influence of the Arabian thinkers, was, however, merely sporadic. Only at first does it appear to have prevailed to any large extent. More correct views soon obtained a decisive mastery, and the most renowned ecclesiastical teachers began to comment on all the writings of Aristotle, including the "Physics." In 1254, without opposition from the Church, the exposition of the Aristotelian physics and metaphysics was sanctioned by the University of Paris, and the sway of Aristotle over the Christian schools was finally established. But the great thinkers of the thirteenth century took up an attitude towards Aristotle quite different from that of the Arabian philosophers.

11. In the first place, they were far from imitating the slavish admiration bestowed on Aristotle by his Arabian followers. The latter, including Averroes, had completely sacrificed their own freedom of opinion, and proclaimed that Aristotle should not be contradicted in any single particular. This was not the view of the Christian scholastics. They esteemed Aristotle very highly, and regarded him as the "Præcursor Christi in naturalibus," as St. John the Baptist was the "Præcursor Christi in gratuitis." But they dissented from him, and refuted his teaching, on all points where they were convinced of his errors. Aristotle was not a Deity. He could be, and had been, in error on many points, more especially where he treated of the more sublime truths. This was the

principle which guided the Scholastics in their explanation of Aristotle. They had no desire to detract from his greatness; the excuse for his defects was evident: Aristotle had not been blessed with the light of Divine revelation.

12. The intellectual independence which the Christian Scholastics thus maintained against Aristotle they also maintained against the Arabian philosophers. The commentaries of Averroes were highly esteemed, but the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century resolutely rejected the neo-Platonic tendency that appeared to prevail in these works. They even defended Aristotle on some points against such an interpretation of his teaching. To accuse the Scholastics of the thirteenth century of imparting a neo-Platonic colouring to Aristotle, as has been done recently, is to reverse the facts of history.

13. The leading Scholastics of the Middle Ages rejected vehemently the Arabian theory that 'a doctrine might be true in philosophy and false in theology, and *vice versa*.' That theory was maintained only by individuals; it never found general acceptance among the Scholastics. On the contrary, they opposed it most energetically. What is true in theology is also true in philosophy,—no contradiction can arise between Reason and Revelation,—this was the universal teaching of the Schoolmen. It is absurd to attribute the contrary Arabian theory to the Scholastics, or to assert that they originated it. The truth is wholly the other way; there were none so resolute as the Scholastics in opposing this doctrine.

14. On this account they regarded as both theologically and philosophically false every speculative proposition that was in conflict with the teaching of religion. They did not rest satisfied with a mere assertion in the matter; they always tried to demonstrate clearly on rational grounds that the propositions in question were false from the standpoint of philosophy. While revelation was regarded as absolute, indisputable truth, human reason was held to be open to error. Whenever, therefore, reason and revelation were in disagreement, the error lay on the side of reason, and it was not allowable to maintain this error in opposition to revelation. The duty and mission of philosophy was rather to exhibit the error in its true colours, and to refute it by philosophical means.

15. The relation between philosophy and theology was thereby established. Theology, as the science of revealed truth, should be placed in a higher rank than philosophy, the science of speculative truth. But the latter must be employed in theology for the speculative development and proof, as well as for the systematic exposition, of revealed dogmas. From this point of view philosophy was regarded as the "Ancilla Theologiæ." Aristotle had described all the other parts of philosophy as the "hand-maidens" of "Philosophia prima." Following the example of Johannes Damascenus, the Scholastics transferred this epithet to the relation of philosophy to theology. They had no intention of depreciating philosophy, just as Aristotle was far from wishing to express any contempt for the other parts of philosophy, as distinct from the "Philosophia prima;" they merely desired to indicate the natural relation between them.

16. With these general observations we now proceed to an account of the chief Scholastics of the thirteenth century. The first in point of time are:

Alexander of Hales, William of Auvergne, Vincent of Beauvais.

§ 115.

1. Alexander of Hales was the first who, being acquainted with the whole of Aristotle's philosophy and with a part of the Arabian commentaries, made extensive use of both in theology. He was a native of Gloucestershire, in England, and derived his surname from the abbey of Hales, in which he had been educated. He studied at Paris, joined the Franciscan Order, and subsequently became a professor of repute in Paris. He received the title of "Doctor irrefragabilis et theologorum monarcha" (†1245).

2. By command of Innocent IV., Alexander wrote a "Summa Universæ Theologiæ."[1] In this he attempted, with the help of Aristotle's collected works, to develop and set forth in one comprehensive plan an entire system of theological science, based on the writings of Hugh of St. Victor, and the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard. Innocent IV. had this work examined by seventy theologians, and, after they had approved of it, recommended it to all professors of theology. This was not the first "Summa;" Robert of Melun and Stephen Langton had previously written "Summæ;" but it was, as yet, the most important work of its class.

3. It would be out of place to give here an exhaustive summary of the contents of this work, which properly belongs to the history of theology. The following brief remarks will suffice. According to Alexander, God is at once the archetypal, the efficient, and the final cause of all things. The ideas of things are not entities existing outside God; they exist in the divine intellect. They are in fact nothing but the Divine Essence itself, in so far as it is recognised by God as the prototype, the "causa exemplaris" of all things. Consequently the ideas are, in objective reality, one, and only relatively different, because God perceives in His essence the types of many different things. God has created all things out of nothing, in conformity with the prototypal ideas. The divine ideas are, therefore, manifest in things, and in the imitation of them the form of things consists. As the universal is reduced to this form it cannot exist *per se*, but only in individual things.

4. God is the "summum bonum," and, as such, the highest end to which all things converge. From this results the universal harmony which is not destroyed by the evil existing in the world, since this evil must contribute indirectly to the harmony of the whole. In this universal harmony consists the beauty of the world, which must be regarded as a revelation of God's majesty to his creatures.

5. About the same time that the lectures of Alexander of Hales collected round his chair students eager for knowledge, another scholar, belonging to the secular clergy, was working with no less success in the University of Paris. This was William of Auvergne, also called William of Paris: he was born at Aurillac, became Bishop of Paris, and died in 1249. Besides several dissertations on practical theology, he wrote a philosophical work, entitled "De Universo," to which are appended two smaller treatises, "De Anima," and "De Trinitate."[2]

6. These writings display not merely a penetrating and subtle intellect, but also a vast erudition. Besides a thorough acquaintance with the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, William had completely mastered the Arabian philosophy. The positions he regards as unsound, he attacks and refutes, especially in his great work "De Universo." He follows the Arabian theories step by step; disproves them with a copious display of dialectical resources, and strives at the same time to establish the truth of the opposite doctrine.

7. William teaches that there is a double predication—a "Prædicatio secundum essentiam," and a "Prædicatio secundum participationem." But the former is antecedent to the latter. If we assert, for instance, that a being is good through participation in the goodness of another, and that the latter is good through participation in the goodness of a third, and so on, then this participation either extends to infinity or terminates finally in a being that is good; not "per participationem," but, "per essentiam." The former alternative is absurd: the latter must be accepted.

8. Applying this principle to existence, we are inevitably led to God as the Being existing "per se" and "a se." There are things which attain to existence only by participation, because, considered in themselves, they can either exist or not exist. This

[1] Originally printed at Venice, 1475, again at Nuremberg, 1482, and Venice, 1576. The glosses to Aristotle's Metaphysics, printed at Venice, 1572, have also been ascribed to Alexander of Hales. They were not, however, written by him, but by Alexander of Alexandria, who was also a Franciscan.

[2] Pub. at Venice 1591. There is a more exact and complete edition by Leferon, 1674.

being the fact, if we wish to avoid an absurd series extending to infinity, we must postulate a Being to whom existence belongs not "per participationem," but "per essentiam": such a Being exists necessarily and from itself, for otherwise we could not possibly predicate existence "per participationem." The Being existing necessarily and from itself is God.

9. It immediately follows from this that all things outside God exist only through participation in the divine existence. Therefore they are the works of God. Their possibility is to be traced back to the Divine Omnipotence that brings them into existence. A philosopher has no justification for assuming a foundation for possibility outside God. If matter is posited as the basis of possibility, an existence is thereby assigned to it, and the further question at once arises: "From what does it derive this existence?" If we reply matter is itself possibility, the assertion is absurd; for possibility, as such, is only a definite relation to actuality, and a relation, which belongs to the category of accident, can never exist by itself.

10. The Divine Omnipotence, which gives existence to things, must be conceived as the highest and most perfect power. God, as the absolutely perfect Being, excludes every limitation, and, consequently, all limit to His power. But His would not be the highest and most perfect power if it were determined merely to one course of action, it must rather be indifferent in regard to several. If so, it can be put in motion and determined to a definite action only by a will. Therefore, we must ascribe to God a will, and, indeed, a free will, and since a free will is not conceivable without intelligence by which it can be guided, we must conceive God as an intelligent Being.

11. From this it follows that the existence of things is to be immediately referred to the Divine Omnipotence, but only as this is moved by the free will of God, and determined by His knowledge. Accordingly, the Divine Intellect contains in itself the prototypal ideas of things: the Divine Will resolves to create after the types of eternal Wisdom, and the Divine Omnipotence executes this resolution.

12. The doctrine of the Arabian Philosophers that God produces everything outside Himself by means of His thought alone is entirely false. No creation is possible without the Divine Will. It is just as absurd to maintain, with the same philosophy, that only the First Intelligence proceeds immediately from God, whilst the multitude of things is derived only mediately through this Intelligence. The Divine Intelligence stands in the same relation to all that is knowable; one object is not more closely related to it than another. All ideas of things are similarly contained in the Divine Wisdom, therefore God creates everything immediately. The proposition "Ab uno non est nisi unum" is true only of natural, not of free causes, and God must be conceived as a free cause.

13. Furthermore, the world cannot be eternal, as some philosophers assert: it must have had a beginning. William tries to establish this proposition by various arguments. Of these we may quote two:—

(*a.*) As the world does not exist necessarily, it is in itself only possible. But the relation between potentiality and actuality is the same as between non-existence and existence. Consequently the world of itself is non-existent, and only receives existence from without, through the Divine Cause. But what a thing is of itself, is always prior to what it receives from without. Therefore the world must have been non-existent before it became actual: it received existence after a period of non-existence, *i.e.*, there was a beginning to its existence.

(*b.*) Again, on the supposition that the world received its existence from God, it necessarily follows that there was a first moment of possessing this existence, after God's gift of it. This first moment is simply the world's beginning.

14. William also attacked the theory put forward by the Arabian Philosophers, regarding the limitation of the Divine Providence to the universal. If God, he says, has created things with intelligence and freedom, nothing, not even the smallest object, can possibly have escaped His knowledge and foresight. As God has created all things with free self-determination, He had an end in view for each one of them. He must, moreover, guide it to this end, as far as it is in His power, because He must, as far as possible, accomplish all His designs. The evil in the world is no argument

against the Divine Providence, since this evil is finally made serviceable to the good.

15. Some philosophers had separated the "Intellectus agens" from the soul, and described it as being one for all men. In William's opinion, this is a groundless assumption. Knowledge is not conditioned by the irradiation of the soul by an unknown intelligence, but rather by those evident first principles of knowledge which the soul naturally possesses. The soul recognises these principles in the Divine Word which is ever present to it. The Word resembles a mirror in which the soul can contemplate, according to its capabilities, the eternal laws of truth and goodness. The "intellectus agens," and "intellectus possibilis," are not distinguishable, since the faculties of the soul have no real distinction from one another.

16. William of Auvergne was succeeded somewhat later by Vincent of Beauvais,[1] a Dominican monk, who filled the position of tutor to the sons of St. Louis († 1264). He composed a large comprehensive work under the title of "Speculum," in which he compiled, from all the writers known to him, an encyclopedia of human knowledge embracing speculative philosophy, natural science, and history. From this work he received the title of "Speculator." The work is divided into three parts:—"Speculum "doctrinale," "historicale," and "naturale." To these he intended adding a "Speculum Morale," but death prevented him from completing his design.[2] The "Speculum Naturale," he tells us, was to contain Nature and its properties; the "Speculum Doctrinale," the matter and form of all Science; the "Speculum Morale," the virtues and vices; and the "Speculum Historicale," the events of all ages in their proper order. The work is, however, of small importance for the development of philosophy.

17. Mention must also be made of Robert Grosseteste (Robertus Capito), Bishop of Lincoln († 1253), who wrote a commentary on the mystical theology of the Areopagite and on the second "Analytic," and Physics of Aristotle. He adopted a very hostile attitude towards the Holy See, in consequence of which he died under excommunication.[3] Michael Scott, born in Scotland, 1190, devoted himself largely to Natural Science, and obtained in this way a reputation for sorcery. At the request of Frederick II., who invited him from Paris to his dominions, he translated several of Aristotle's writings, together with the accompanying commentary of Averroes; he also compiled some original works that are extant mostly in manuscript.[4] The last to be noticed is John of Rochelle, a Franciscan

[1] Comp. upon Vincent Schlosser: "Vincent of Beauvais," 1819. The "Speculum" was first printed in full at Venice, 1494.

[2] The portion we possess was compiled by later writers.

[3] Comp. regarding him, J. Pauli: "Bishop Grossteste and Ad. v. Marsh." Tubingen, 1864.

[4] Three of these works have, however, been printed,—"Super Auctorem Sphæræ," Bologna, 1495, and Venice, 1631; "De Sole et Luna," Strassburg, 1622; and "De Chiromantia," frequently reprinted during the fifteenth century.

and a pupil of Alexander of Hales, who wrote a work "De Anima" (1271).

Albertus Magnus.

§ 116.

1. Alexander of Hales had employed the Peripatetic philosophy merely for the construction of a systematic theology. Albertus Magnus was the first Christian Scholastic to write formal commentaries on the writings of Aristotle. His aim was two-fold: in the first place, he desired to introduce the Aristotelian philosophy into the domain of Christian thought: in the second place, he wished to turn this philosophy to account in the construction of a system of Christian theology. We see him exerting himself in a double direction, corresponding to this two-fold design. He is active in the domain of philosophy, as well as in that of theology. He appears before us as the critic of the Peripatetic philosophy, and as the expounder of the Divine Word, but he regards these offices as entirely distinct. If he is explaining the Peripatetic philosophy, he follows exclusively the course of Aristotle's mind, without referring at all to theology, and without putting forward his own philosophical views. But if he approaches the explanation of the Divine Word, or the speculative development and proof of the dogmas of faith, then he regards these as absolute truth, and rejects and philosophically refutes every tenet of the Peripatetic philosophy which is at variance with the teaching of faith. We can learn the peculiar philosophical views of Albertus only from those works in which he writes as a theologian rather than as an expounder of the Peripatetic philosophy, and from some others in which he presents "ex-professo" his own opinion. We will enumerate these later on.

2. Albertus Magnus was born at Lauingen, in Suabia, in 1193, and belonged to the noble house of Bollstädt. He studied at Padua, where Jordanus, the famous Provincial of the Dominican Order, persuaded him to join that body. As soon as he had completed his theological studies at Bologna, he was sent to Cologne to teach the natural and sacred sciences in that city. He was summoned thence to Paris, in order to continue his lectures in the Abbey of St. James, but soon returned to Cologne for a similar purpose. His fame as a teacher increased day by day, and thousands of students assembled round his professorial chair. In 1254 he became Provincial of his Order in Germany, and his activity in this capacity was far-reaching and successful. He was appointed Bishop of Regensburg in 1260, but soon resigned this position, and, returning to Cologne, continued his scientific and professorial labours until his death (†1280). He received the title of "Doctor Universalis."

3. His works were published in 1651, in twenty-one folio volumes, by the Dominican friar, Jammy. In accordance with the two-fold character of Albertus' labours, alluded to above, his works may be

divided into two classes. The first contains those in which he comments upon the writings of Aristotle, and these have been arranged by Jammy in the same order as Aristotle's works. The most important are the treatises "De Anima," II. 3. "Metaphysicorum," II. 12, and "De causis et processu universitatis." Among these writings are also to be found several original philosophical essays, viz:—"De natura et origine animæ," "De unitate intellectus contra Averroem,"(which Albertus wrote at the request of Alexander IV., to refute the doctrine of Averroes), and "Tractatus de intellectu et intelligibili." To the second class belong the theological treatises, of which the most important are—the Commentary on the Areopagite; the great commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard; the "Summa Theologiæ," and the "Summa de Creaturis."

4. The whole of Aristotle's works were accessible to Albertus, partly in Latin translations from the Arabic, and partly in Latin translations from the Greek. He compared these with one another, in order to ascertain the genuine text, and every means at his disposal was directed to this same purpose. In his explanation of Aristotle he relies chiefly on Avicenna. His familiarity with the Peripatetic doctrines was equalled only by his ignorance of the historical development of Greek Philosophy. He had no means of acquiring a knowledge of it, and therefore fell into some amusing mistakes, as when he describes Plato as "Princeps Stoicorum," and Zeno the Eleatic as the founder of Stoicism. Albertus distinguished himself above all his contemporaries by his knowledge of natural science. He has been unjustly styled the "Ape of Aristotle," for no one criticises Aristotle's opinions more freely and impartially than he does.[1]

5. Albertus draws a clear distinction between theology and philosophy. Theology rests on faith, philosophy on the understanding; the first takes its proofs from revealed authority, the latter from reason. Theology treats of God, inasmuch as He is the ultimate object of our enjoyment and happiness, and of God's works as far as they are related to this end, *i.e.*, to our salvation. On the other hand, philosophy deals with being as such, and, therefore, with the First Being, God, only as far as He is the First Being, and of the attributes that belong to Him as the First Being. Theology is primarily intended to lead us to piety, and through this to salvation; it is, therefore, essentially a practical science; it strives after knowledge, not for its own sake, but as a means to salvation. Philosophy has knowledge as its immediate object, and is, therefore, not a practical, but a speculative science.

6. In questions which involve the scientific investigation of

[1] The folg. may be consulted regarding Albertus Magnus—Rudolf Noviomagensis, De Vita Alb. Mag. Cologne, 1499; Sighart, "Albertus Magnus, his life and doctrines," Regensburg, 1857; Haneberg, "On the theory of knowledge of Avicenna and Albertus Magnus," Munich, 1865; M. Joel, "The Relation of Albertus Mag. to Moses Maimonides," Breslau, 1863, &c.

revealed truths, faith takes precedence of knowledge; only through faith can we arrive at certain knowledge. The knowledge thus obtained is useful for three purposes: first, the articles of faith are thus more thoroughly known; then men are more easily led to believe these articles; and, lastly, the enemies of faith are refuted by reason.

7. The principles of the being of corporeal things are Matter and Form. Matter is the substratum, indeterminate in itself, and as such merely the possibility of a determined thing; Form is the determining principle, and as such the actuality of the thing determined. From the union of Form and Matter results the "Compositum"—the determinate and real substance. In the case of spiritual beings, which are immaterial, the composition of the "quo est" and the "quod est," *i.e.*, of essence and "suppositum," takes the place of the union of Matter and Form.

8. The Form is already potentially contained in the matter, and the production of a thing consists merely in this, that its Form is educed from the Matter by an efficient cause. The forms of things differ *inter se*, and on this difference rests the specific distinction between things. The individual distinction between the single members of a species is, however, conditioned by the matter, not inasmuch as it is matter, but only because in corporeal things it is the first subject or the "suppositum" of their nature. The "principle of individuation" is, therefore, generally speaking, the "quod est" or "suppositum"; in corporeal things it is more especially the matter, because this is the "quod est" in them.

9. Form is the rational idea which is realised in Matter as the substratum. The form is everywhere the work and the revelation of intelligence. Consequently, every work of nature, since a form is realised in it, is also, directly or indirectly, a work of intelligence. And as the form is the work and revelation of intelligence, the intelligibility of things is conditioned by their form.

10. Universality is a property of form, not of matter—"esse universale est formæ, non materiæ." For the universal is a form or essence which can be realised in several individuals:—"essentia seu forma apta dare multis esse." In this sense, the universal is objectively real, but not in the sense that it is something real in its universality. If the universal as such were objectively real in things, then it must be one with the things of which it is predicated. From this it would follow that the individuals of which one and the same universal concept is predicated would be no longer different from one another, but would be one thing. The universal as such exists only in the intellect—"ante rem" in the Divine Intellect, and "post rem" in the human intellect. In these it is actual; in things it is, properly speaking, only potential. For the form of the individual members of the same species can be apprehended by the intellect without the matter, and can be thus conceived as something which is predicable of each and every individual member.

God and Creation.

§ 117.

1. Our natural knowledge of God is mediate only, acquired through created things, since the latter, as effects of the creating Cause, point back to, and give us knowledge of, this Cause. Only through a process of reasoning can we ascend from created things to God. The reason can know God only in as far as the first principles, from which it starts in its chain of arguments, render such a knowledge possible. And this possibility does not permit of the reason attaining by its own unaided efforts to a knowledge of the triple personality of God. Reason left to itself would hold to the principle, that a simple and indivisible nature cannot subsist in three persons distinct from one another. It, therefore, requires the light of faith in order to arrive at a knowledge of the Divine Trinity. By reason alone we can know only the essence and the essential attributes of God.

2. The proposition "God exists" is not self-evident in the sense that no medium is necessary whereby to attain a knowledge of God. Created things are the first objects of our knowledge, and lead us to a knowledge of God. It is only when we understand by "self-evident" that the truth of a proposition is immediately apparent as soon as the subject and predicate are known and compared that we can assert the proposition "God exists" to be self-evident. Even then it is only such for the learned who have a clear and intelligent idea of God as the most perfect being, and of the predicate of existence.

3. Consequently, proofs of God's existence are necessary. They cannot, however, be of a direct (ostensive) character, because God has no cause above Himself, nor does He display Himself completely in His work, nor has He given any signs which fully express His Being. But, indirectly, proofs of God's existence can be given by showing that absurdities and impossibilities result from denying His existence. Albertus borrows nearly all his proofs from his predecessors, and places in the forefront the cosmological proof.

4. The proof which Albertus, following St. Augustine, draws from the necessity of assuming a First Being is interesting. Since the things in this world follow one another causally, and, therefore, are related to one another as subordinate to superior, we must necessarily suppose a First Being, with which the series begins. Now, everything in the world is either material or immaterial. The First Being cannot be material, for the material is composite, and pre-supposes the existence of its simple elements. The First Being must, therefore, be immaterial or spiritual. Furthermore, everything is either mutable or immutable. But what is mutable is mere potentiality in regard to a higher being that exercises a motive influence on it, and is the cause of its actual change. Consequently, the First Being cannot be mutable. Now, the souls both of men and angels, though immaterial,

are still mutable; therefore, none of these can be the First Being. There must still be a higher nature, not merely immaterial, but also immutable, and this must be the First Being. This nature, at once immaterial, immutable, and raised above all things, we call God.

5. God, as the infinite, is incomprehensible, but not unknowable by our intellect. As our knowledge of the existence of God is obtained from His creatures, so also our knowledge of His being and of His attributes is derived from the same source. But it is imperfect knowledge, because created things, although God reveals His attributes in them, do not resemble Him fully, are but a very inadequate reflection of the Divine glory.

6. Taking God to be the first principle of things, we must conceive Him as existing independently and necessarily, and also as absolutely simple, both physically and metaphysically. Physically simple, for, did God consist of parts, the latter would be prior in existence to Him, and He would no longer be the absolutely First Being. Metaphysically simple, for if there were a perfection in God, really distinct from His essence, it must be regarded as a "superadditum" to the essence, and must have either a cause distinct from God, or God Himself as its cause. In the first case the independence of God would be destroyed; in the second, God would be at once active and passive, which can only occur with physically compounded beings. Therefore, whatever is in God is Himself—each of His perfections expresses His entire being.

7. This admitted, it follows at once that God must necessarily be apprehended as Intelligence; for what is distinct from matter and exists independently in the separated state, can only be conceived as intelligence. But God must not be regarded as an "intellectus possibilis," for this becomes all that it is by the act of knowledge. Now God cannot become anything, since He is *actu* all that He is or can be. God must, therefore, be conceived as "Intellectus Agens," and as He is the first cause of everything, he must be thought of as the "universally active intellect" ("intellectus universaliter agens.") From Him proceed all intelligences and all forms, and thus He is the highest principle of all created intelligence as well as of all intelligibility.

8. God is also the Absolute Will. It is an error to deprive God of all will, as many Peripatetics do. The notion of Will can be understood in three ways:—first, as a rationally-founded craving after something which one does not previously possess but aims at possessing; next, as an unchanging satisfaction in a "summum bonum" that one possesses; and lastly, as a freely-acting power of the soul, whereby it determines itself in all its actions. In the first meaning, a will can in no way be attributed to God, but that it can in the second and third meanings is self-evident.

9. Finally, we must ascribe to God, as the First Principle, the power of producing things external to Himself, because without

this power He cannot be conceived as the First Cause. By means of this power, so far as it is determined by his His free will to activity, God produces things not merely as to their form, but also as to their matter, that is, He creates them out of nothing. Matter cannot be eternal and uncreated: for were it such, the First Principle would cease to be the universal cause of all existence, the existence of matter would not then be dependent on Him. This would simply destroy the entire idea of God. God created at the beginning and all at once the four "Coaequaeva":—Matter, Time, Heaven, and the Angels.

10. The world being created, it follows that it cannot be eternal, that it must have had a beginning. If, writes Albertus, the Peripatetic arguments for the eternity of the world are closely examined, they will be found to prove nothing more than that the world and motion cannot have originated through natural generation, and cannot end by natural corruption. This everyone will readily grant. But there is another kind of origin,—viz., the origin through creation. The old philosophers could never rise to the idea of creation, because they always remained content with the mere natural principles of things. They inquired into the immediate, not the ultimate causes of things, and therefore did not go beyond the proposition "nothing comes of nothing," which is universally valid in the domain of nature. Thus they could not arrive at a beginning for time and motion; nay, more, they were directly obliged to exclude it, if they restricted themselves, as they did, to the mode of production peculiar to nature.

11. It being demonstrated that the world was created, it is proved that it had a beginning, for it began with the creation. In the concept of "creation from nothing," the "from nothing" means that not only was there no "substratum" present from which the world was formed, but it also implies that before the creation there was nothing—no being, no duration, no time; the notion contains, therefore, in itself the idea of "post nihilum." This being so, we cannot get rid of the notion of a beginning for time, for the world and for motion; and reason thus forces us to admit a beginning of the world in time.

12. The multitude and variety of things in the world are not to be explained, with some philosophers, as a progressive descent of the creature from God, they have their foundation immediately in the divine essence itself. The artist forms his masterpiece out of several different parts which he joins into a whole, for in this way alone can a work of art be produced. So God in his Wisdom constructed the great universe out of many different parts that He might thereby reveal His wisdom, His goodness, and His power.

Psychological Principles.

§ 118.

1. Albertus proves the spirituality of the human soul thus:—

Intellectual activity cannot proceed from a bodily (material) organ: it is, therefore, of an immaterial nature; whence it follows that the principle from which it arises must be an immaterial, spiritual being. While he appeals to the essential character of thought, which, being simple in its nature, cannot have its source in a composite material principle, he relies also on the freedom of the will, which cannot possibly be explained on the assumption that man is a purely material being.

2. Hereby is also proved the immortality of the soul. For if the soul has a being and substantiality of its own, distinct from the body, and if it is of a simple and immaterial nature, it is impossible for it, being without parts, to dissolve and perish with the body; it must rather survive it. And since its intellectual activity is not united to any material organ, it must also continue to exercise its intelligence after the death of the body; that is, it must be immortal. All the more so because the soul bears in itself the likeness of the Trinity; and it would be inconceivable that this image of the Godhead should be so immersed in matter as not to be able to exist without the body; seeing that God, in whose likeness it is made, has no body.

3. The soul is related to the body as its *essential form*. Man is differentiated from the animal by possessing a rational soul. But the differentiating element is in all cases the form. The "intellectus agens" and "intellectus possibilis" are not principles separate from the individual soul, but only essential powers of it. The "intellectus agens" abstracts the intelligible forms from sense-objects, and thereby makes the latter intelligible "in actu." The "intellectus possibilis" is modified by these intelligible forms, and attains thereby to a knowledge of things according to their intelligible being or essence.

4. The *freedom of the will* consists in this, that the individual is under no external or internal constraint, and is, therefore, able to choose. The possibility of a moral life rests on the freedom of the will and on conscience, by which the known law is applied to our actions. Man is destined for eternal happiness in the intuition and love of God. The means of reaching this state is virtue; the moral duty of man is to strive after virtue. Virtues are partly acquired, partly infused.

5. Here we must stop. What we have selected from the teachings of Albertus is, indeed, but a small part of the rich store of thought contained in his works; it must, however, suffice as a specimen of the manner in which he employed the Peripatetic philosophy, correcting it where necessary, in order to make it conform to Christian beliefs. We now turn to one who, though a pupil of Albertus, was greater than his master, the thinker in whom Christian scholasticism reached its perfection.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

§ 119.

HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS—HIS PHILOSOPHICAL STANDPOINT.

1. Thomas Aquinas was born at Rocca Sicca, near Monte Cassino, in 1225. He was a younger son of a Count Landolf of Aquino, who was related to the family of the Hohenstauffen Emperors. He received his education at Monte Cassino and Naples. Overcoming the opposition of his parents and family, he joined the Dominican Order at Naples. He continued his studies at Cologne and Paris, under the guidance of Albertus Magnus, and, after completing them, he filled the professorial chair at Cologne, Paris, Bologna, and Naples. He lectured on philosophy and theology, and his renown soon eclipsed that of his master. Crowds of youthful students came from every country in Christendom to hear from his mouth the teachings of wisdom. Finally, he was summoned from Naples by Gregory X. to attend the Council of Lyons, but died on the way, at the Abbey of Fossa Nuova, in the year 1274. He was canonized in 1323 by Pope John XXII., and is known to scholastic philosophers as the "Doctor Angelicus."

2. In the Roman edition of 1570, the works of St. Thomas fill seventeen folio volumes.[1] Like his teacher, Albertus, St. Thomas devoted himself to the exposition of Aristotle's Philosophy, as well as to Theology.

The order in which his writings are published exhibits their double purpose. The first five volumes contain the commentaries of St. Thomas on Aristotle's writings, including the "Tractatus de Ente et Essentia," and the commentary on the "Liber de Causis." Then follow independent philosophical and theological writings, viz.: —the great commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard; the "Quæstiones Disputatæ (de potentia Dei, de malo, de spiritualibus creaturis, de anima, de virtutibus, de veritate; and "quæstiones quodlibetales"); the "Summa Contra Gentiles," and the "Summa Theologiæ." Next are arranged the explanatory commentaries on several books of the Holy Scriptures, and the sermons; then the "Opuscula," which treat of various philosophical and theological subjects, including "De æternitate Mundi," "De principiis naturæ," "De natura materiæ," "De principio individuationis," "De natura generis," "De natura accidentis," "De intellectu et intelligibili," &c.; and last of all, the "Compendium Theologiæ," and the commentary on Bœthius' work, "De Trinitate."

3. The most important of these works are undoubtedly the "Summa contra Gentiles," and the "Summa Theologiæ." The latter was left in an unfinished condition, and was completed by the pupils

[1] They were published later at Venice, 1594, at Antwerp 1612, at Paris 1660, at Venice 1787, at Parma 1852, &c. The editions of individual works are very numerous, especially of the "Summa Theologiæ."

of St. Thomas. The "Summa contra Gentiles" is a kind of "Apologia" for Christianity. In it the truths of Christianity are proved on rational grounds, in opposition to unbelievers and heretics, and the opposing theories of heathen, Arabian, and schismatical philosophy are logically refuted. In the "Summa Theologiæ," his latest and most matured work, St. Thomas sets to work constructively. He endeavours to develop speculatively the manifold meaning of the truths of Christianity, and to reduce this speculative development to one great system of doctrine. His other works were merely intended to fill up any gaps in these two great designs. Of these the only works of importance for understanding the Thomistic teaching are the "Quæstiones Disputatæ," and the commentary on the "Sentences."[1]

4. First of all, St. Thomas distinguishes truths of two kinds—viz., rational and super-rational truths. Rational truths are those which the reason, by its own powers alone, can discover and prove to demonstration. Super-rational truths are those which lie beyond the natural powers of man's intellect, and which can only be known to us by revelation. The distinction is, therefore, not grounded in the essence of these truths, but on the different relations in which our intellect stands to them.

5. Though these two kinds of truths are different, they are not however, contradictory. For the rational as well as the super-rational truths have their ultimate and highest foundation in the Divine wisdom, which cannot contradict itself. A contradiction can never exist between reason and revelation. All the rational arguments which have been urged against the truths of faith are either not convincing—mere probable reasonings—or they are simple fallacies. If reason starts from true principles, and draws its conclusions rigorously, it cannot possibly arrive at a result contradictory to the teachings of faith.

6. Consequently, though reason cannot demonstrate the super-rational truths or mysteries of Christianity, it is able to refute all the objections that have been made against these truths, and to

[1] Among modern works upon St. Thomas Aquinas we may mention,—Hörtel, "Thomas Aquinas and his Age," Augsburg, 1846; Carle, "Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de St. Thomas," 1846; Ch. Jourdain, "De la Philosophie de St. Thomas," Paris, 1858; Cacheux, "De la Philosophie de St. Thom." Paris, 1858; Liberatore, "The Theory of Knowledge of St. Thom. Aquin.," transl. by Franz Mainz, 1861; Werner, "Thoma Aquinas," Regensburg, 1858; E. Plaszmann, "The School of St. Thomas Aquinas," Soest. 1857-62; Anton Rietter, "The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas," Munich, 1858; Morgott, "Spirit and Nature in Man according to St. Thomas' Teaching," Eichstätt, 1860; and "The Theory of Feeling in St. Thomas' System," Eichstätt, 1864; Gaudin, "Philosophia Juxta D. Thomae Dogmata," new edition, by Roux Lavergne, Paris, 1861; Oischinger, "The Speculative Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas," Landshut, 1858; Al. Schmid, "The Thomistic and Scotist Theories of Certitude," Dillingen, 1859; H. Conzen, "Thomas Aquinas as a Politico-Economic Writer," Leipsig, 1861; Jacob Merten, "On the Importance of the Theories of Knowlege of St. Augustine and St. Thomas for the Historical Development of Philosophy, etc.," Treves, 1865, etc. Compare also the essay on St. Thomas Aquinas in Dr. Stöckl's "History of Mediæval Philosophy," Vol. II.

prove to demonstration that the latter are in no sense irrational. In this consists its first duty in regard to the Christian mysteries. But this is not its whole task. Created things do not, it is true, afford us grounds for a demonstrative proof of these mysteries, but they present certain analogies on which to base arguments *ex congruentia*, and thereby render possible a speculative knowledge of these mysteries, thus bringing them, to some extent, within the range of human reason. To strive after this speculative knowledge is the second duty which reason has to perform in reference to the mysteries of religion (*Contra Gent.*, L. 1, c. 8 & c. 9).

7. Rational truths, considered in themselves, do not need revelation to make them known, but truths of this kind are also found among the truths contained in revelation. The question therefore arises why God should reveal these at all. According to St. Thomas, the explanation lies in the fact that without revelation very few persons, and even these only after a long interval and with the admixture of many errors, could arrive at a knowledge of such rational truths, if they depended on the resources of reason alone.

8. The mental research which must be expended on such truths is very laborious, presupposes a large store of knowledge, and demands a long training in the exercise of thought. Most men are incapable of undertaking so long and tedious an intellectual labour, partly from lack of talent, partly through preoccupation with material concerns. Even those who attempt the task usually arrive at the goal only in later life, and even then they are uncertain whether the result of their labours can claim to be true in every respect, since reason, in consequence of its limitation, is liable to error. Hence it follows that certain rational truths were revealed by God in order that all men might share in the knowledge of them, at least through faith, since such a knowledge is indispensable to men if they are to fulfil their destiny (*Contra Gent.*, L. 1, c. 4).

9. The truths cognisable by the natural light of reason are the "præambula fidei;" for, in general, nature is the forerunner of grace, is not destroyed but perfected by it (gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit). Natural truths must therefore be known through demonstration, or at least through faith, before faith in the mysteries of Christianity becomes possible. Besides these "præambula fidei," proofs of the trustworthiness of revelation are also *a priori* conditions of faith. Divine revelation has established its claim on human reason by miracles, fulfilment of prophecies, etc. These miracles, fulfilments of prophecies, etc., are proofs of the trustworthiness of revelation, and, as such, naturally precede faith (*Ibid.* L. 1, c. 6).

10. The distinction between philosophy and theology follows at once from these premises. The subject matter of philosophy is rational truth. The subject matter of theology is revealed truth. If a truth is at the same time a truth of reason and of revelation,

philosophy treats it in its former character, theology in the latter. Philosophy takes the principles of reason as the basis for its arguments—theology, the principles of revelation. Philosophy ascends from created things to God; theology, on the contrary, begins with God and then descends to His works. Philosophy endeavours to discover the essence of created things; theology considers the latter only in so far as they stand related to God and have their purpose in Him.

11. Theology agrees with philosophy in this, that, like the latter, it is of a pre-eminently speculative nature. But it stands higher in rank than philosophy; on the one hand, because of the greater certitude that it possesses, since it rests upon the infallible light of the Divine Wisdom; while philosophy is restricted to the fallible light of reason: on the other hand, because of the sublimity and wealth of its subject, since it treats for the most part of those truths which transcend the natural powers of reason. And since theology employs the truths of philosophy in order to rise to a speculative knowledge of the mysteries of faith, philosophy may be called the handmaid of theology.

12. From this account of the general principles of St. Thomas, we turn to give a brief outline, first of his Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge. We shall then treat of his Theology and Theory of Creation, and finally of his Psychology and Ethics.

Metaphysics.

§ 120.

1. Like Aristotle, St. Thomas starts from the concept of "first substance," *i.e.*, of the individual. To confine our attention to material objects: in these the principles of the "first substance" are Matter and Form. In the concept of Matter, a double aspect must be distinguished—a negative and a positive. According to the former it is the negation of all determinateness; according to the latter, it is potentiality to be determined. The potentiality for determination is the same thing as potentiality for becoming actual; for only what is determinate is actual. Form is, in the first place, the principle of determination; and, in the second place, the principle of the actuality of the "first substance."

2. But there are different kinds of forms. We must first distinguish between essential (substantial) form and accidental form. The former is that by which the substance is constituted as such in its being, and becomes actualised. The latter is that which is added to the substance thus constituted, and imparts to it an extrinsic determination. (De Anim., qu. unica, art. 9, c.) A further distinction must be drawn between material or inherent forms, and subsistent forms. The former have their existence only in matter, and therefore cannot be actual or active without matter;

the latter have a proper existence of their own, and can, therefore, be actual and active apart from matter.

3. The subsistent forms, as such, exclude all matter, and are therefore, of a spiritual and immaterial nature. Consequently all spiritual beings are to be regarded as subsistent forms, while the objects of the physical world are informed and actuated only by material forms. The subsistent forms, however, are also of two kinds: they either exist as complete substances, and cannot, in this case, communicate their existence to any matter; or they exist in such a way that, though not requiring matter for their existence, they require it for the completion of the specific nature to which they belong. The former are the pure spiritual beings, such as the angels; the latter are the souls of men.

4. We must further distinguish in things between essence and existence. A determinate essence (substance) is not actual because it is an essence; to become actual it must receive existence from some efficient cause. Existence is, therefore, really distinct from essence and is related to the latter as actuality to potentiality. This composition of essence and existence is to be applied to all created beings without exception—even to spiritual beings. These latter only exclude the composition of matter and form, but not the composition of essence and existence. (*Contra Gent.*, I, c. 53-54.)

5. With regard to essence in particular, it is, according to its concept, nothing but the determinate being of the thing. In spiritual beings the essence coincides with the form, they are pure forms. In material beings on the contrary, the essence is always constituted by matter and form. Since many things actually exist which have the same matter and the same form, the essence in relation to these things is common: the question, therefore, arises, What is the principle of individuality?

6. According to St. Thomas, this principle is the "materia signata," or "materia individualis," as opposed to the "materia communis." By this "materia signata," is to be understood merely the determinate, quantitatively defined matter which belongs to a certain individual, together with all those individual accidents with which this matter is united "in concreto." By this, and by this alone, the essence—which in itself is common—becomes individualised. While, therefore, spiritual beings, as not consisting of matter and form, are individualised by their very essence, material objects are individualised, not by their essence, but by the "materia signata." (*Contra Gent.* L. 1, c. 21; Sum. Theol., I., qu. 3, Art. 3).

7. From this results the distinction between "quiddity" (essence) and "suppositum." The essence is related to the individual being as its "quiddity," because, through it the individual is what it is. The individual itself, determined as to its nature through this quiddity (its form), is the "suppositum" of this "quiddity." It is the "quod est," in opposition to the quiddity, or "quo est." In material things, therefore, the "suppositum" is not

the same as the "materia signata." The latter forms an element in the "suppositum," since the "suppositum," according to its definition, is not the principle of individuation, but, rather, the individual itself determined by the "quiddity." In spiritual beings, however, the "suppositum" is one and the same with the quiddity, because these have no principle of individuation different from the essence, but are individualised of themselves. (*Ib.*, I, c. Quodl. 2., qu. 2., Art. 4).

8. The essence common to several individuals has actuality only in these individuals, in so far as it constitutes their "quiddity" or form. This does not prevent us from abstracting in thought from the individuality, as it is conditioned by the principle of individuation, and thinking only of the common essence as such. When we do this the result in our thought is the Universal Concept. Consequently, the latter presupposes a plurality of individuals with the same essence. As this occurs only with beings composed of matter and form, only such beings can be classified under a general concept as species and genus. Spiritual beings do not come under any general concept: each single being among them is at the same time a species in itself.

9. These notions enable us to determine how the Universal is to be conceived in its relation to things. The Universal, as such, is merely a mental product, and can therefore exist only in an intellect. There is no Universal, as such, in the objective order; the Universal exists there actualised in individuals. In the objective order, there are only individuals with the same or a common essence, but not a common essence by itself apart from the individuals. Accordingly, the Universal, from its meaning, is objectively real in all the individuals of which it can be predicated, and is inseparable from these individuals, except in thought. It receives the form or "intention" of universality only through the intellect which thinks the essences of things, apart from the individuals in which they are realised, as common essences, and therefore as universal. (S. Theol., I, qu. 85, art. 2, c.)

10. As there are two intellects which think the essences of things, as common essences, viz.:—the divine, and the human—the Universal, as such, exists in the divine, as well as in the human intellect. In the former the Universal precedes the existence of the individual and is its prototypal idea; in the latter it follows it, being merely the representative thought, obtained by the intellect through abstraction from the individual. Consequently there are "Universalia ante rem" in the divine Intellect; "Universalia in re," the common essences of things in so far as they exist individually in several individuals; and "Universalia post rem" in the human intellect.

Theory of Knowledge.

§ 121.

1. The theory of knowledge of St. Thomas is based on the foregoing metaphysical principles. The fundamental proposition in this theory maintains that knowledge can only arise if a likeness of the object known is produced in the knowing subject by the combined action of the known and the knowing. A likeness is generated in the subject knowing, when the cognitive faculty assimilates itself in some way to the object. "Omnis cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti." (Contra Gent., L. 2, c. 77). This likeness is called the "species," or mental form. The "species," however, is not that which is known, but rather that by which the object is known. It is the informing principle of knowledge, inasmuch as through it the faculty of cognition becomes active, and actual knowledge of the object corresponding to it is produced. The result of the act of knowledge is the "intention," or internal "Word," by which the soul expresses the object in and to itself. (C. G., L. 3, c. 53).

2. Sense and Intellect (or understanding) are essentially different from one another; and we must therefore distinguish between "species sensibilis" and "species intelligibilis." The first is the formal principle of sense-cognition, the second of intellectual knowledge. The first presents the object according to its sensuous appearance, the second according to its intelligible being, according to its essence. Notwithstanding the difference between intellect and sense, the former is still so far dependent on the latter that all our intellectual knowledge begins from sense-experience and has its basis in it. "Omnis nostra cognitio intellectualis incipit a sensu." There are no innate ideas. The intellect in itself is like a "tabula rasa;" if its original emptiness is to be filled up by knowledge, it must start from experience.

3. The reason of this is that the intellectual principle in man is united with the body, and that to this union it is destined by nature. If this union were unnatural, as it is in Plato's view, it would be quite consistent to attribute innate knowledge to the soul. But as it is natural, and not forced, it follows that it must be in the nature of intellectual knowledge to rise from the sensible to the suprasensible.

4. The primary and direct object of our intellectual knowledge is the intelligible in sense-objects. Intellectual knowledge in man is concerned directly and immediately with the essences of material things. And these become known to the intellect by the phenomena which are reproduced in the sense-image. (*S. Theol.*, I, qu. 84, art.7). The soul knows itself only secondarily and indirectly, when it reflects upon itself in its act of thought. Last of all, the

intellect rises to a knowledge of God by the use of reasoning, so that the knowledge of God is indirect and mediate.

5. If it be further asked how and in what way the intellect cognizes its immediate object—the intelligible in sense-objects—the answer is that the "species sensibilis" by itself does not suffice for this knowledge. The intellect possesses, besides, an activity by which the object, presenting itself under a phenomenal aspect in the sense-image, is stripped of its phenomenal characteristics, and is then placed before the intellect in its purely intelligible being. The senses, therefore, are merely receptive; the "species sensibilis" results immediately from the apprehension of the object by the sense-faculties. But the first stage of the intellectual process is an active process; it must generate or abstract the "species intelligibilis" from the sense-phantasm, before it can receive the abstracted "species" in itself.

6. A distinction must, therefore, be established between the "intellectus agens," and the "intellectus possibilis." The "intellectus agens" makes the sense-objects, which in themselves are merely potentially intelligible—actually intelligible; it produces the "species intelligibilis" by abstraction; the "intellectus possibilis" then receives this "species intelligibilis," is informed by it, and through it, as the informing principle of knowledge, cognizes what is intelligible in the object. As the result of sense-cognition is the "sense-image," so that of intellectual cognition is the "concept" of the object. This concept belongs to the "intellectus possibilis," not to the "intellectus agens." By means of concepts the "intellectus possibilis" forms judgments, and thus attains to a knowledge of the truth.

7. Intellectual knowledge proceeds from universals to particulars. The most general and therefore the most indeterminate notions are first formed in the intellect; only through these is it possible to proceed to particular and determinate concepts. A natural disposition must be ascribed to the intellect, in virtue of which it at once forms these most general notions as soon as it begins to exercise its powers, and thus obtains a foundation for the formation of other concepts.

8. In possessing itself of these ultimate general notions the intellect at the same time possesses itself of the first principles of all reasoning. First principles are as necessary for the reasoning processes as general notions for the formation of particular notions. They must, therefore, be apprehended by the intellect before it can proceed further in the process of knowledge. It follows that the intellect must be so constituted by nature that it forms not only fundamental concepts, but also fundamental propositions from these concepts, as soon as it begins to exercise its functions.

9. This "habit of principles" is what conditions and renders possible the advance from intuitional to discursive knowledge. The capacity to attain further knowledge by inference formed on these

principles is called Reason. Reason is thus, in a certain sense, the complement of intellect (of the intuitive or apprehensive faculty). By far the larger part of the truths within our reach are attainable only by the discursive or inferential processes of Reason. Reason is the faculty of scientific knowledge; the intellect, with its "habit of first principles," is the basis or pre-required condition; the principles themselves are, as it were, its germs or seeds. Reason and intellect or understanding are not, however, two really distinct faculties; they are the same faculty differently applied.

10. These are the mental processes by which knowledge is attained. We have no intuition of the truth immediately in God. God is not the first object of knowledge; He is rather the last known. We attain knowledge of truth by the light of our own reason: that is, by the first principles of knowledge which the intellect by means of its "habit of first principles" generates naturally in itself. God is the first principle of our knowledge only inasmuch as the light of reason is a participation in the Divine light, and this in a two-fold sense: first, the human mind is created after the likeness of the Divine mind; and secondly, the first principles of our knowledge have their ultimate ground in God. In this sense it can be said that we know all truth in the light of God; but not in the sense that God is directly the medium through which we know everything.

Theology.

§ 122.

1. We must distinguish a three-fold knowledge of God—the "cognitio intuitiva," the "cognitio per fidem," and the "cognitio per rationem naturalem." The intuitive knowledge is essentially supernatural, and is reserved for us in a future life. In this life we know God by faith and also by natural reason. It is an error to ascribe all our knowledge of God to faith alone. The saying of the Apostle, "Invisibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur," is proof to the contrary. If we can reason generally from effects to their causes, why not from the works of God to God Himself? (*C. Gent*, L. 1, c. 12; *De verit.*, qu. 10, art. 12, c.)

2. Taken objectively ("quoad se"), the proposition, "God exists," is, of course, self-evident ("propositio per se nota"), because the predicate "existing" is essentially contained in the subject—is even identical with it. But for us ("quoad nos") it is not a self-evident proposition ("propositio per se nota"). It could only be such if we had a direct, clear, and evident idea of God—if we knew God "per speciem propriam"—for then we should know immediately that the predicate "existing" was contained in the idea of God. But a direct knowledge of God "per speciem propriam" is essentially an intuitive

knowledge; and, as has been already stated, we do not possess such knowledge in our present life. Consequently, the proposition, "God exists," can never be a "propositio per se nota" to us in this life. If, then, we are to attain to an evident knowledge of the truth of this proposition, its truth must be proved. Proofs of the existence of God are thus necessary (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 2, art. 1).

3. The argument of St. Anselm, based upon the mere idea of God, is not a valid demonstration of the existence of God. For, in the first place, all who believe in a God do not conceive Him as the highest being beyond Whom a higher is not conceivable; many of the ancient thinkers regarded the world as God. Secondly, even if it be granted that all have this idea of God, His objective existence is by no means proved thereby. For what is true of a term holds good of the definition, which is its equivalent. Now, if I think "God" in my mind, it does not therefore follow that this "God" is also actual. As little does it follow, if I define the name "God" and understand by it a being above whom there is none greater, that the being thus defined is actually existent. From the mere thought of an object we cannot argue to its existence. It is, however, true, that whoever knows there exists objectively a highest being can infer from this that the being in question exists of necessity (*C. Gent.*, L. 1, c. 11). The proofs of God's existence can, therefore, be only "a posteriori," and we must argue from the works of God to His existence as their cause.

4. This being premised, St. Thomas offers five principal proofs by which the existence of God is demonstrated. The first argues from motion to a first moving cause; the second from the dependent existence of things to a cause existing independently; the third from the contingency of things to a necessary being; the fourth from the grades of perfection in the things of this world to a supremely perfect being; and the fifth from the universal order in nature and natural beings to a regulating, and therefore intelligent and volitional, cause. (*S. Theol.*, p. 1, qu. 2, art. 3.)

5. As First Cause, God is pure actuality (actus purus)—all potentiality is excluded from His being. In the most general sense, actuality is prior to potentiality, because potentiality presupposes an actual being by whose activity it is made actual. Therefore, if God admitted an element of potentiality in Himself, *eo ipso*, He would no longer be the First Being nor the First Cause, because He would then presuppose a higher cause to which His actuality should be referred.

6. But, if God is pure actuality, He is also an absolutely simple being. God's being must not only exclude all matter, because matter is essentially potential, but in God's being there can be no metaphysical composition of essence and existence. If, in God, existence were as really distinct from essence as it is in created things, then the essence would be merely potential in reference to existence, and would require to be brought into existence either by itself or by an

external cause. But, in the first place, all potentiality is excluded from God; and, secondly, He cannot be brought into existence by an extraneous cause, since He is Himself the first cause. Neither can He produce Himself, for he would then need to be active before being actual, which is absurd (*S. Theol.*, 1., qu. 3, Art. 4, c.; C.G., L. 1, c. 22).

7. In God, therefore, essence and existence are not really differentiated. His existence is His very essence; He exists in virtue of his essence. As there is in God no composition of essence and existence, so is there no composition of substance and accidents, for the substance would be potentially related to the accidents. Similarly, genus and species are not to be distinguished in God. For, the difference by which the genus is reduced to the species stands in the same relation to the genus as actuality to potentiality; God stands, therefore, above and outside of every genus.

8. God is not alone the absolutely incomposite (simple), but also the infinitely perfect Being. As First Cause, God is pure actuality. But every being is perfect according as it is actual (*in actu*), since potency as such, is the same thing as defect. Consequently, God, as pure actuality, must be absolutely perfect; every defect, every deficiency, is excluded from Him. God is being simply; being subsisting of itself and by itself. He must, therefore, contain in Himself the entire fulness and perfection of being. No non-existence, no imperfection, can be attributed to Him.

9. This being so, all perfections which we recognise in created things are primarily contained in Him as in the First Cause. Were they not in Him as the cause they could not be in the effect of that cause. Nor are they contained in Him with the limitations which they present in created things, but in that far higher and more perfect manner which the infinite perfection of God requires; and since God is the absolutely Simple Being His perfections are contained in Him, "unite et indivisim," *i.e.*, there is no real distinction between them as they exist in God.

10. There is not a *real* distinction between the perfections of the Divine being, but a *virtual* distinction is necessitated by our mode of thought. All perfections are, in fact, one in God, yet we cannot conceive God by our powers of thought in the absolutely simple fulness of His perfection. We can only think of Him by making distinctions in what is one in Him, and regarding Him, now according to one perfection, now according to another. Having to do this we consider God under different aspects. We cannot place His various perfections before our mind as identical or synonymous, but must then keep them distinct from one another. This is the virtual distinction as opposed to the real. (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 13, a. 4, c.; *In lib. sent.*, 1, dist. 22, qu. 1, art. 3).

11. This doctrine of a virtual distinction between the Divine attributes is a just mean between the opposing conceptions that we have observed in the Arabian and Hebrew philosophy. The real distinction between the Divine attributes which the Arabian "Motekâllemin"

accepted is entirely rejected. But the other extreme adopted by the Arabian Aristotelians and by Moses Maimonides is also done away with. According to the view of the latter there was no distinction between the Divine attributes ; they were purely synonymous, and the entire distinction was reduced to one of words or names.

12. As the absolutely Perfect Being, God is also the Absolute Intelligence; the former is inconceivable apart from the latter. On the immateriality of a being depends its capacity for knowledge. God is absolutely immaterial; He must, therefore, be conceived as the Absolute Intelligence. Again, the "species intelligibilis" of His knowledge can only be His own essence, for we cannot conceive God's knowledge as dependent on any other being. (*C. G., L.* 1, c. 46). Hence the primary object of God's knowledge is Himself; what is known "per speciem propriam" is first in the order of knowledge, and God's essence is manifestly the "species propria" for the knowledge of God Himself. God is therefore, Absolute Self-consciousness: He knows Himself according to the entire fulness of His perfection.

13. God knows things that are objectively different from Him only secondarily, and of course, only through His own essence. As He knows himself perfectly, He must know Himself perfectly as the First Cause. But that could not be unless He knew everything that He, as cause, could produce. Consequently God's knowledge must extend to everything that is in any way possible or actual. And this the more that effects must pre-exist in their cause in an intelligible manner; and nothing can exist in God without His actually knowing it. God's knowledge is, therefore, in no sense confined to the universal, but includes every individual. (*De Verit.*, qu. 2, art. 5, c.)

14. Here we have the basis of the doctrine of ideas. If by idea is understood the type after which things are created, then the Divine Essence is itself the Idea of things. Not indeed the idea of things as they are in themselves, but only as that Being is capable of being imitated outside itself by created things. Knowledge of things is essentially involved in the idea of things, but the Divine Essence is to be regarded as the Idea of them only in so far as it is conceived by God as the type of created things. God, contemplating His own essence, knows it not merely as it is in itself, but also as it is capable of being imitated outside Himself by created things. Inasmuch as He conceives it in this way it is the idea of things. There is, in reality, only one idea; the Divine Essence, as well as the Divine Thought, is one. The term plurality of ideas can be employed only in a relative sense, inasmuch, that is, as the Divine Essence may be imitated in many various way, and God conceives it as the type of many different things. (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 15, art. 2, c.)

15. Not only is God Absolute Intelligence, He is also Absolute Will. Will naturally follows upon intelligence. No natural being can be conceived without a tendency towards the good corresponding to it;

hence no intelligent being is conceivable without will. If God is Absolute Will, then He is Himself the first object of His will, as well as of His knowledge. Only secondarily does God will anything other than Himself. And there is this further difference, that God wills Himself necessarily, while He wills other things freely. It is impossible for Him not to desire Himself the infinite good. On the other hand He freely chooses other things because they are in no way necessary to His absolute perfection and happiness. (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 19, art. 3, c.) As God freely wills other things, He must also have the power to produce them. Therefore God cannot be conceived as Absolute Will without being also conceived as Absolute Omnipotence.

16. St. Thomas includes the Trinity of God among those truths which the reason by itself without faith, is unable to discover, or even to completely understand. Creative power and activity do not belong specially to one of the three Persons; they are the essential power and activity of God as God. It follows that the effects of this creative power and activity of God cannot lead us further than to a knowledge of the unity of God according to His essential attributes. However, with the help of faith we can penetrate to some extent into the mystery of the Trinity, and attain to a speculative knowledge of it. The two attributes of the Divine Intelligence and the Divine Will afford us a basis for this. Since God knows Himself, the adequate thought of Himself is brought forth from Him, and this is the Personal Word of God—the Son. Similarly by the action of His will, whereby God loves Himself, love proceeds from Father and Son, and this love is also personal—the Person of the Holy Ghost. (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 27 art. 3, c.)

Theory of Creation

§ 123.

1. The idea of Creation, as it is represented in Holy Scripture, involves three elements:—First, it denies all pre-existent matter from which God might have formed the world. Secondly, it implies that non-existence is primarily the state of the created being rather than existence; that is, the created being of itself is non-existent, but receives existence from God and is therefore distinct from God. Lastly, the idea of creation implies that the created being is subsequent, not merely in the order of nature but also of time, to nothing, and consequently, that there has been a beginning to its existence. (*In lib. Sent.*, 2, dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 1, c.—*S. Theol.*, qu. 45, art. 1, c.)

2. So much being premised, St. Thomas teaches that creation from nothing can be proved by natural reason as regards the two first-named elements of its concept, but not as regards the last-mentioned. In other words, it can be demonstrated by reason that

the world could have come into existence only by the creative agency of God. But not that its existence had a beginning. While, therefore, creation out of nothing, in the sense that created things have been formed neither from a pre-existent matter nor from the substance of God Himself, is a rational truth, the beginning of the world is purely an article of faith that cannot be demonstratively established by reason. (*Ibid., loc. cit.*)

3. The proof which St. Thomas brings forward for the first part of the thesis, *i.e.*, for the existence of the world by creation, is based essentially on the fact that God must be conceived as the First Cause of all existence. As God is the First Cause of all being, created things cannot derive their existence merely in part, *e.g.*, as to their form, from Him; their entire being, their matter as well as their form must be produced by God. And since there is no matter in God Himself, the matter of created things cannot emanate from God. The matter and form must both be brought into existence out of nothing by God, *i.e.*, they must be created.

4. As regards the second part of the thesis, *i.e.*, that the beginning of the world is not demonstrable by reason, St. Thomas sets about establishing this proposition in the same manner as Moses Maimonides. The rational proofs which are adduced for the beginning of the world are, he says, inconclusive. It is asserted that the "ex nihilo" involves at the same time the "post nihilum." But this inference is not justifiable. The idea of creation out of nothing merely implies that nothing precedes being in *nature*, but not that it is prior in *time*. A further assertion is that on the supposition of the non-beginning of the world, the antecedent series of generations must be infinite, and that a "regressus in infinitum" is not admissible. St. Thomas replies that such a "regressus in infinitum" is non-admissible only in the case of causes acting simultaneously, but the reasoning does not apply to causes acting in a successive series. If it be further urged that, on the supposition of the eternity of the world, an infinite number of human souls must now exist, the answer is that it is not at all necessary to assume that the human race had no beginning. We may allow that it had a beginning without asserting the same of the rest of the universe.

5. If it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world necessarily had a beginning, then we must acknowledge that the eternity of the world is, from the standpoint of reason, at least, possible. But we must stop there. We cannot prove that the world necessarily had a beginning, but neither can we demonstratively establish that it must necessarily be eternal. If it were assumed that a creature must necessarily have had no beginning, then this creature must exist necessarily. But on what is this necessity based? It cannot have a foundation in the creature itself, because every creature, as such, is contingent. Neither can it have any foundation in God—first, because God does not act necessarily but freely with regard to external things; and, secondly, because

created things are not necessary for God Himself. Consequently, there can be no question of a necessity attaching to the existence of a creature, and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that the world must necessarily be eternal.

6. Accordingly, the non-beginning, as well as the beginning, of the world must be admitted as possible. The world can just as well have had a beginning as not. Which of the two possible alternatives has actually occurred cannot be decided by unaided reason. It follows that in order to be enlightened on this point we must have recourse to revelation, and that the proposition, the world has had a beginning, is wholly an article of faith (*De ætern. mundi, opusc.*, 37.)

7. The end for which the world was created is the manifestation of God's perfection and goodness in created beings. Everything in the world is directed towards this end in the most perfect manner. This is the doctrine of Optimism in reference to the created world. And as everything is directed towards one end, so everything is arranged and guided towards this end by God. This is God's Providence. It extends not merely to the universal but also to the individual. The presence of evil in the world is no contradiction of it. A prudent government implies that the governor permits a partial defect to exist here and there, if the perfection of the whole is thereby increased. And such is actually the case in our universe, for evil must work for good in the end. (*C. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 71.)

Psychology.

§ 124.

1. Man stands midway between the spiritual world of the angels and the material world, inasmuch as he unites in himself both the spiritual and the material. The angels are pure spirits, subsistent forms which are separated from all matter (formæ separatæ); the things of nature are purely material; in them the forms are wholly immersed in matter, and have no existence apart from it. Finally, man is at once spirit and body, and, therefore, the connecting link between the two opposite poles of creation.

2. By the general term, Soul, is to be understood the primary principle of life in the living beings of the sublunary world. As such, it is the "actus primus," the first "entelechy" of the physico-organic body. Souls are of different kinds; souls are, therefore, to be distinguished according to the differences of living beings; the vegetable soul, the animal soul, the human soul, are different kinds of souls. The two first-named are purely material forms or "entelechies"; the human soul, on the other hand, is a subsistent form, a spiritual being. This requires proof.

3. St. Thomas demonstrates the immateriality of the human soul in the same way as his teacher, Albertus Magnus. He first proves that the operation of thought cannot be the function of a bodily organ, because a knowledge of the intellectual, of the universal, of the spiritual, would be rendered impossible in that supposition. From the inorganic and immaterial nature of thought he concludes that the principle and agent of thought must be also an immaterial substance essentially distinct from the bodily organism. St. Thomas adduces another proof from self-consciousness. This involves a turning back of the mind upon itself in thought, but it is impossible for a material agent to reflect upon itself. Consequently, thought must necessarily be regarded as a spiritual operation, and the soul, as the principle of thought, is a spiritual being.

4. In reply to the objection taken from the fact that sickness and infirmity of body impede thought, St. Thomas says that we are not justified in arguing from this that thought is an organic activity, and therefore it proves nothing regarding the immateriality of the soul. The cause of the phenomenon in question lies in the fact that thought is dependent on the faculty of sense-cognition. Thought presupposes the phantasms of the imagination, and the latter can be presented to, and suitably prepared for thought only by, the sense-faculty of knowledge. If this is so, any derangement of the faculty of sense-cognition must result in a derangement of thought. Since the former result is brought about by a morbid affection or weakness of the organs to which it is essentially united, such a morbid affection of the body must eventually constitute an impediment to thought (*Cfr. S. Theol.*, I., qu. 75, art. 3, ad 2.)

5. As the soul is an immaterial spiritual being, and, as such, a subsistent form, its incorruptibility is thereby assured. All corruption consists in the separation of the form from the matter; where there is no matter there can be no question of corruption. Furthermore, the form is the reason of the existence of a thing; the thing is actualised by its form; so long, therefore, as the form subsists, the being to which it belongs is existent. If the form itself is the being (*i.e.*, if the form is subsistent), such a being cannot lose existence. But the soul is a subsistent form, consequently it is essentially incorruptible. If to this is added the natural longing of the soul for an eternal continuance in existence—which longing, since it is natural, cannot be unavailing—it is impossible to doubt of the incorruptibility of the soul.

6. The soul is not only incorruptible, it is also immortal—that is, it continues to exist after its separation from the body, as a being possessed of intelligence and will. The intellectual activities of the soul are not exercised through any bodily organ, and can, therefore, be exercised by the soul apart from the body. That this will actually be the case is evident from the fact that we cannot conceive the soul —a spiritual being—devoid of all vital activity. The soul apart

from the body does not, it is true, exercise its intelligence in the mode natural to it while it is dependent on the senses. It knows in the same way as purely spiritual beings—a mode of knowledge which is, indeed, "praeter naturam," but not "contra naturam."

7. The soul is related to the body, in the first place, as its essential form. The nature of every being is manifested by its activity; as a thing acts, so it is. But the activity peculiar to man, as such, is thought, for by this he is distinguished from all other animal beings. Consequently, the specific nature of man must be determined by the principle from which this activity proceeds. But what determines the species of a thing is its essential form. Therefore, the principle of the thinking power in man, or the intellectual soul, must be held to be the essential form of man. (*S. Theol.*, 1, qu. 76, art. 1.)

8. The soul is, in the second place, the moving principle of the body, that is, it is the principle of all the bodily activities of man; for, as every being becomes actual through its form, the human body is active through its form, and through this alone. Therefore, there cannot be in man any activity of which the soul is not the principle; it is thus the "primus motor" in the body. It is, however, to be noted that the soul is the form of the body by reason of its essence, and the principle of movement in the body through its faculties.

9. It follows from this that a special soul, distinct from the intellectual soul, cannot be postulated for the vegetative and sensitive functions in man. The same soul is vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual—this, of course, by means of and according to, distinct faculties. In fact, the unity of being in man can be maintained intact only on this condition. Were two or more souls (forms) to be assumed in man he would possess as many essences as he possessed souls, and he would then be only an aggregate of several essences, not an individual nature.

10. A pre-existence of the soul cannot be accepted. As the soul is the essential form of the body it is natural to it to be united with the body; its separation from the latter is not, indeed, "contra naturam," but still "præter naturam." Now, what is natural is always first in order of time, because what is "præter naturam" for a being can only belong to it "per accidens." Therefore, the soul cannot have previously existed in a state of separation from the body; in the moment when it becomes actualised, existent, it is united with the body. But its origin cannot be reduced to a mere generation, for generation is a material, corporeal operation, and this cannot produce an immaterial spiritual being; otherwise the effect would transcend the cause; souls are produced, therefore, by divine creation. They are infused by God into the body when the embryo, after passing through the vegetative and sensitive stages, has attained to the maturity and disposition suitable for receiving the intellectual soul as form. Displaced by this latter, the vegetative-sensitive form perishes (is corrupted). (*C. Gent.*, L. 2, c. 87; *Quodl.* 1, art 6.)

11. The "intellectus agens" and "intellectus possibilis" are not things separate from the individual soul, they are its essential faculties. On any other assumption, man would no longer be specifically distinct from the brute, which is absurd. The intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, but it would not be such if one intellect were common to all men. The doctrine of a universal intellect is unjustly ascribed to Aristotle. He calls the intellect expressly a "pars animæ, qua anima cognoscit et sapit." When he speaks of the intellect as "separatum et immixtum," his meaning is that the intellect is not an organic faculty, but a supra-organic power, not necessarily dependent on matter.

12. The "root" of the freedom of the will lies in the fact that the will, as an immaterial power, determines itself to act, or not to act. Inasmuch as it is the power of self-determination, it is in a state of indifference to various courses of action, and can, therefore, make a choice between them. This "facultas eligendi" is its freedom. The will is, indeed, necessarily impelled towards good in general, and towards happiness. But it is able to choose between the various means of attaining happiness so long as they are of such a nature as not to be necessarily connected with perfect happiness, or so long as this necessary connection is not fully recognised by the intellect. Knowledge is pre-supposed for the exercise of free will, for we cannot will what we do not know; but the intellect influences the will, not "per modum agentis," but only "per modum finis." Corresponding to the division of the appetitive faculties of sense, the passions are distinguished as "passiones concupiscibiles and "passiones irascibiles."

Ethics.

§ 125.

1. The faculty of sensuous appetite is subordinated to the will in the same manner as sense to intellect. This faculty contains in itself two elements, concupiscibility and irascibility. The "bonum simpliciter," good as such, is the object of the former, the "bonum arduum," good as difficult of attainment, of the latter. The "passiones animales" play a part in the sphere of the sensuous appetitive faculty. They are merely a vigorous excitation of that faculty occasioned by the presentation of some particular good or evil.

2. The highest end of all beings is perfection, and this consists in likeness with God. This principle holds good when applied to man. But in the case of man, perfection is also the highest happiness; both alike consist in the possession of the good corresponding to his nature. The highest end of man, as being his highest perfection, is also his greatest happiness. Hence the desire for happiness is implanted as an ineradicable impulse in the nature of man. But in what does this highest happiness of man consist?

3. In answering this question St. Thomas follows Aristotle in every particular. Pleasure cannot constitute the highest happiness of man; that happiness lies in action. For according to the plan of nature action is not for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse is true, *i.e.* pleasure is for sake of action. The activity upon which human happiness is based must on the one hand be the noblest and highest for which man is qualified by his nature, and on the other hand it must be directed towards the noblest and highest object.

4. But the noblest and highest activity of man is not the will, because this merely follows upon and is conditioned by knowledge. It must rather be knowledge itself. The noblest and highest object is God. Consequently the highest happiness of man consists in the knowledge of God. With the knowledge of God must of course be joined the love of God; but the latter is not the essential element of perfect happiness; it is merely a necessary complement of it. (S. *Theol.*, 1, 2, qu. 3, art. 2, c—*C. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 25, 26.)

5. It has been said that the knowledge of God can be attained in three ways:—by demonstration, by faith, and by intuition; the further question now arises: which of these three kinds of knowledge is the foundation of man's highest happiness? It cannot be knowledge by demonstration, for happiness must be something universal and attainable by all men, but only very few succeed in arriving at a knowledge of God by demonstration. Just as little can knowledge by faith be a basis for perfect happiness. The latter consists "principaliter" in the activity of the intellect, but in faith the will claims for itself the principal part, for here the will must determine the intellect to give its assent. Consequently happiness can only consist in the intuitive knowledge of God; and since this is attainable only in the next life, it follows that the ultimate destiny of man extends beyond this temporal world into eternity. Finally, this happiness must be everlasting, because it would not be perfect if it did not endure for all eternity. (*C. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 38, sqq.)

6. The law of God, in so far as it is known by the reason, forms the rule of human conduct. The act by which the law of God is applied to individual actions is Conscience. Accordingly, moral goodness consists in the harmony of our will and actions with the law of God, and, therefore, in their conformity with the moral order. Further, that an action may be morally good, a triple harmony with the law is requisite, viz.:—a harmony of the object, of the intention, and of the accompanying circumstances. Only when an action harmonises with the law in this threefold relation, is it, in the true sense of the word, morally good.

7. Moral evil is nothing but the privation of this harmony of an action with the law of God—the transgression of the law on the part of the will. From this definition of moral evil it is evident that the cause of evil is, not so much a "causa efficiens" as a "causa deficiens." The act of the will is evil when it deflects from the line of conduct indicated by the law, and, therefore, "ab ordine deficit."

Evil is, consequently, a negation: it is nothing positive; not a positive entity, but only a privation of the positive—of that which ought to exist.

8. Moral Virtue is a habit by means of which the human will acquires a facility for, and is inclined to, moral good. There are, indeed, intellectual virtues which, being habits of the intellect, determine it to its proper activity. These are, however, only "virtutes secundum quid"; they condition merely the possibility, not the actuality, of the corresponding activities. The moral virtues alone are virtues in the strict sense (virtutes simpliciter); under their influence man not only *can* act rightly; he actually *does* so. The cardinal virtues are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. To these may be added the infused virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity.

9. Here we will conclude our analysis of the system of St Thomas. We have been able only to sketch its most general characteristics; the wealth and variety of matter which it contains cannot be even approximately indicated in the summary to which we are obliged to confine ourselves. But, from the few points to which prominence has been given, it can be gathered how wonderfully the entire edifice of his philosophy is constructed, and how its author has concentrated in it all the previous developments of philosophy and theology, and reduced them into a mighty and admirable system of doctrine.[1]

ST. BONAVENTURE.

§ 126.

1. We come now to another distinguished light of the thirteenth century—one scarcely inferior to his contemporary, St. Thomas, in depth of thought, breadth of view, and acuteness of insight. John Fidanza, known in religion as Bonaventure, was born in 1221 at Bagnarea, in the Papal States. He entered the Franciscan Order, and studied at Paris, where he is said to have been the pupil of Alexander of Hales. Soon after he undertook the duties of Professor of Theology at Paris. He became General of his Order, and was created a Cardinal by Gregory X. Having been summoned to the Council of Lyons, he died during its progress in the year 1274. He received the honourable appellation of "Doctor Seraphicus."

2. In the Lyons edition of 1668 the works of St. Bonaventure occupy seven folio volumes. The first two volumes contain exegetical

[1] What St. Thomas Aquinas was in the domain of science Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) was in the region of poetry. His immortal "Divina Commedia" exhibits the same weaving together of Peripatetic philosophy and Christian theology as the "Summa Theologiæ" of St. Thomas. The history of philosophy has not to deal *ex professo* with him, but it must at least mention his name with honour.

treatises, among them the "Hexaemeron;" the third volume contains the sermons; the fourth and fifth the great commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard; the sixth and seventh the "Opuscula," of which the most important are the "Reductio Artium ad Theologiam," the "Breviloquium," the "Centilogium," "Meditationes vitæ Christi," "Formula Aurea de Gradibus Virtutum," "Speculum Animæ," "De septem gradibus Contemplationis," "Soliloquium," the "Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum," "De septem itineribus eternitatis," "De sex alis Seraphim," "Incendium Amoris," etc., etc.

3. From the titles of these works it is evident that St. Bonaventure did not confine himself to scholastic speculation, but cultivated also the field of mysticism. It is especially in the latter sphere that St. Bonaventure has gained his laurels; he is pre-eminently a mystic. It must not be supposed, however, that his labours in the field of scholasticism were of little importance; his great commentary on Peter Lombard is scarcely surpassed by that of St. Thomas; still he is chiefly famous as a mystic. This does not imply that he constructed his mysticism on new foundations; on the contrary, he attached himself closely to the St. Victors; his entire mystical doctrine is only the continuation and development of what they had already laid down. The fact that St. Bonaventure is pre-eminently a mystic justifies us in regarding him chiefly from that point of view. We will select from his strictly scholastic works only a few points of teaching, on which, as representing the Franciscan School, he is at variance with St. Thomas.

4. First in order we take his doctrine of Matter. Alexander of Hales, the founder of the Franciscan School, had adopted the theory of Avicebron that matter is a constituent element of even spiritual beings. Bonaventure followed him in this. Matter, he says, must be assigned as a constituent element to corporeal and spiritual beings alike. A spiritual being is a created being, and as such, is not absolutely incomposite (simple), it includes in itself a potential and an actual element (potentia et actus). Now, the notions Potency and Act may be connected with the notions Matter and Form; it follows that spiritual beings are compacted of Matter and Form. Form is that which gives determination and actuality to a thing; but determination and actuality suppose a substratum which they affect; this substratum is Matter. If, then, a spiritual being is a determined, actual being, it cannot be devoid of Matter.

5. The Matter which goes to constitute spiritual beings is not, however, subject to the processes of generation and dissolution, nor, does it fall under the category of Quantity. But, in the last analysis it does not differ from the Matter of corporeal things; one and the same kind of Matter is the substratum of spiritual and corporeal beings alike. Matter is one in all beings, though not in all the same. When a number of vessels are fashioned out of one piece of gold, we say that all the vessels are made from one metal, though the gold which forms one is not the same gold which forms another.

In the same way the Matter which goes to constitute all spiritual and corporeal things is one, though we cannot say that the Matter of spiritual beings is the same as the Matter of the corporeal.

6. Again, Bonaventure denies that the duration of the world could be eternal and without a beginning. If we assumed that the Matter of which the world is formed had eternal existence apart from God and His action, it would be consistent to hold that the world was eternal and had no beginning. But this assumption is inadmissable; Matter is not eternal; both the Matter and Form of the world have been created by God. The higher and more perfect the cause, the more completely the effect is due to its influence. Where the highest and most perfect cause is operative, everything in the effect is due to its action; it produces in the effect both Matter and Form, that is, it creates the effect.

7. If we admit this, the assertion that the world is eternal, or rather that it is produced from all eternity, is at variance with truth and with reason. It is self-contradictory. It is a self-contradiction to assert that a thing whose existence was preceded by its non-existence exists from eternity. The existence of the world was preceded by its non-existence, for God created the world "out of nothing." Manifestly, the "nothing" in question cannot be conceived as Matter out of which God created the world. The expression "out of nothing" connotes an order of antecedence and sequence; it can mean only that at first nothing existed, and then, by the creative action of God, something came to exist. As a fact, then, the existence of the world followed its non-existence, and, this being so, it is a contradiction to speak of it as eternal and without beginning.

8. So much for St. Bonaventure the Scholastic. Let us now turn our attention to St Bonaventure the Mystic. He has given us the shortest and most complete summary of his mystical teaching in his "Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum." Starting from the distinction of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor between "Cogitatio" corresponding to the Imagination, "Meditatio" corresponding to the Reason, and "Contemplatio" corresponding to the Intelligence, he attempts in the "Itinerarium" to point out the path along which Contemplation proceeds; or, in other words, to represent the progress of Contemplation from its lowest to its highest stage. The conditions necessary for contemplation are grace from above, a pious life and fervent prayer on the part of man. On this soil and on this alone does Contemplation flourish.

9. Contemplation must puruse the same course as our rational knowledge. It must begin with created things, so as to rise by their help to God Himself. In the world of creatures we have two great divisions—the corporeal and the spiritual. The former displays the footprints of God, the latter reveals His very image. Consequently, the first step in the ascent to the knowledge of God is by the corporeal world; the second by the spiritual; in the third and

last stage we attain immediately to God Himself. Contemplation has in like manner to pass through three main stages. We must first apply ourselves to the material world in order to contemplate God in it, so far as His footprints are revealed in corporeal things. Then we must turn our gaze in upon ourselves that we may regard God in ourselves, so far as He displays Himself in our soul as in a mirror. Finally, we must fix our gaze directly on God in order to contemplate Him in Himself.

10. Each of these three principal stages is again divided into two minor ones, and thus we obtain in the end six stages of contemplation, which are, however, always connected, two and two, with each other.

a. In the first stage of contemplation, the soul contemplates God *per vestigium.* It observes everywhere in external things weight, number, measure, and a continuous gradation in the order of perfection. The contemplative is thus led to understand the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, therein displayed.

b. In the second stage of contemplation, the mind contemplates God *in vestigio.* The mind observes how the "species sensibilis" of external objects is produced in the imagination, and how we thereby derive a certain pleasure from the object. This leads to the contemplation of the eternal generation of the Son of God as the perfect image of the Father, and of the infinite happiness which the Father enjoys in the Son, and the Son in the Father.

c. In the third stage of contemplation, the mind regards God *per imaginem.* When we observe our soul, and direct our attention to its faculties, our contemplation is necessarily extended to God.

α. If we examine the intellect closely, we find that it is specially engaged in the formation of ideas. Now, in the idea we apprehend the being of a thing. Consequently, in order to be able to think a thing through an idea, and to define it, the intellect must previously possess the idea of being in general. But it knows being as perfect and imperfect, as complete and incomplete, as mutable and immutable; in short, it knows not merely the positive but also the negative aspects of being. But the negative is only knowable through the positive. The intellect must therefore possess previously in itself the idea of the most perfect and most real being *i.e.*, the idea of God, so as to be able to think and define the being of things. The consideration of the other operation of the intellect —the judgment—leads to the same results. We become acquainted in the judgment with necessary and immutable truths. We cannot, however, learn these from ourselves alone, because we are contingent and mutable beings. We must, therefore, perceive them by the necessary and immutable light of the Divine Word. Thus we are, in every case, led to the contemplation of God.

β. The same holds good in relation to the activity of the will. If we make a choice, this choice always presupposes a judgment whereby we determine which of several goods is the better and more

preferable. Now, as one good is better or more preferable than another, only in so far as it approaches more closely to the best and most perfect being, we must of necessity possess in ourselves the idea of the best and most perfect being in order to be capable of forming the judgment in question, and of choosing in accordance with it. In this way the consideration of the activity of will leads to the contemplation of God.[1]

d. In the fourth stage of contemplation, the mind beholds God *in imagine*. Here the gaze of contemplation is turned upon the supernatural life of the soul, in so far as it is equipped with, and perfected by, the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Here the mind is raised to the contemplation of God as the author of the soul's supernatural life.

e. Finally, in the fifth and sixth stages, the mind contemplates God as existing above and beyond itself. Here it abandons footprint and image, and fixes its gaze directly upon God Himself. In the fifth stage contemplation is still directed only to the being and essential attributes of God. In the sixth it rises yet higher and penetrates even to the triple personality of God.

11. The progress of contemplation unfolds itself in this way from the lowest to the highest stage. But in degree of intensity contemplation can reach a higher or lower pitch. The highest degree of contemplation is ecstasy. In this the mind passes out of itself. It lays aside all natural cognitive activity, both of sense and intellect. It is elevated above everything sensible and supra-sensible; above all existence and non-existence. And while it enters into this state of sacred non-cognition it is entirely lost in the contemplation of that divine unity which stands above all being and all knowledge. Then is kindled that flame of love, which, as it were, destroys all individuality and makes the soul, through its emotion, to be one with the Divine Will. But no one knows this state unless he has experienced it himself, and no one experiences it except through divine grace. Ecstasy is something entirely supernatural.

12. Having made acquaintance with the two great representatives of scholasticism and mysticism in the thirteenth century—St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure—we must now turn our attention to their less famous contemporaries.

Henry of Ghent, Roger Bacon, Raymund Lully, and Others.

§ 127.

1. Among the contemporaries of St. Thomas may be mentioned, Lambert of Auxerre, Robert Kilwardeby, Ægidius Lessinensis,

[1] The propositions laid down in the foregoing proofs are apparently favourable to Ontologism. It would be rash to conclude from this, without further inquiry, that St. Bonaventure was an Ontologist, since there is no trace of Ontological leanings in his purely philosophical works. The above reasoning is essentially that of St. Augustine; it must not be urged too far, otherwise we should bring St. Bonaventure into contradiction with himself.

Bernard de Trilia, Ægidius Aurelianensis, Peter of Auvergne, etc. More important than any of these was Henry of Ghent (Henry Göthals). Born at Muda, near Ghent, about 1217, he studied at Cologne under Albertus Magnus, and was afterwards professor at Ghent and Paris. He received the surname of "Doctor Solemnis." He died in the year 1293. His most important works are the "Quodlibeta Theologica," the "Summa quæstionum ordinariarum," a commentary on the "Sentences," and a "Summa Theologiæ."

2. Henry reproduces in his theory of Universals the teaching of Avicenna. Essence, as such, is indifferent both to particularity and to universality. It is particularised in objective reality; it is universal in the intellect. Henry would admit no real distinction between essence and existence. He does not hold matter opposed to form as pure potentiality to actuality. According to his view, an existence of its own must be assigned to matter, by means of which it is "in actu," even when separated from the form. Matter does not receive existence or mere actuality from the form, but only a determinate existence, a determinate actuality.

3. Henry diverges still further from St. Thomas in this, that, unlike the latter, he will not admit a distinct idea in God for every individual. On the contrary, he teaches that the "species specialissimæ" alone are pre-existent as ideas in God. As many ideas must, therefore, be admitted to be in God as there are species of things possible, but no more. Individuals pre-exist in God as ideas only inasmuch as the ideas of them are contained in the idea of the species. For, on the one hand, the divine idea represents the essence, in itself indifferent to particularity and universality; on the other, it represents the same essence in its relation to the individuals, in so far as it contains in itself the possibility of being realised in the individuals. Involving this relation, the idea of the species includes within it the idea of the individuals.

4. According to Henry, God is the first object of our knowledge, since He is included in the idea of indeterminate being. Henry identifies the idea of indeterminate being, which is undoubtedly the first known to us, with the Divine Being, and thus arrives at the opinion that God is the object first known in our *natural* knowledge. This is true, of course, only of our *natural* knowledge; we do not acquire a *reasoned* knowledge of God until later on; but we could not acquire the *reasoned* knowledge if this first *natural* knowledge of God did not precede it.

5. Henry of Ghent was followed by Richard of Middleton (Ricardus de Media Villa), a Franciscan, who taught at Paris and Oxford (+1300). According to him, the Universal has no objective reality, whether in things or apart from them. It cannot, indeed, be doubted that the Essence which forms the content of the Universal is real in the individuals, but it is not real in them in the sense in which it is real when conceived in thought, apart from the individuals. Still less is it real in them with the universality which

it receives from thought. An Universal with these characteristics cannot exist apart from thought. The principal writings of Richard are a commentary on the "Sentences" and "Quodlibeta."

6. Still later flourished Aegidius of Colonna (+1316), a member of the Order of Augustinian Friars, "Doctor Fundatissimus," professor of theology at Paris. He defended St. Thomas against the attacks of the Oxford Minorite, De Lamarre, and replied to his "Reprehensorium," or "Correctorium Fratris Thomae," by a refutation entitled "Correctorium Corruptorii." He also wrote "Quodlibeta," a tract "De ente et essentia," "Quaestiones metaphysicales," etc. He held no peculiar philosophical opinions.

The same may be said of Godfrey of Fontaines (Godefredus de Fontibus), who also wrote "Quodlibeta." Mention must also be made of Petrus Hispanus, who died in 1277, as Pope John XXI., and who by his "Summulae logicales," extracted from the "Synopsis" of Michael Psellus, exercised considerable influence on the school study of logic. The "Summulae" contain in their first form the well-known mnemonic lines, "*Barbara*," "*Celarent*," etc.

7. In Roger Bacon (1214 to 1294), a native of England, we meet with a thinker of a new type. He devoted himself, while at Paris and Oxford, to the study of the natural sciences; joined the Franciscan order, and became a professor of repute in the University of Oxford. The numerous errors into which he was led by his astrological speculations brought him into conflict with the General of his Order, and he was thrown into confinement; but he was set at liberty again by Pope Nicholas IV. His great work is the "Opus Majus ad Clementem IV." In addition to this he wrote "Epistolae de secretis artis et naturae operibus atque nullitate magiæ," fragments of an "Opus Minus," an extract from the "Opus Majus," together with an introductory tract, "Opus Tertium."

8. In his scientific studies, Bacon occupied himself chiefly with the natural sciences. He was emphatic in censuring the neglect into which the study of natural science, of mathematics, and even of grammar, had fallen. These sciences, he held, are of the greatest importance for theology. Accordingly, in his "Opus Majus" he sketches a complete outline of optics, astronomy, and mathematics. In this direction he was only following in the wake of Albertus Magnus, who, as is well known, had set a brilliant example in encouraging the natural sciences. What Bacon accomplished for natural science was of great importance for his age, and deserves our fullest approbation.

9. Following his predilection for natural science, Bacon, in his theory of knowledge, lays great stress on experience. Without experience, he says, there is no perfect knowledge. He who discovers by experience the cause of a phenomenon, alone possesses perfect wisdom. Demonstrative knowledge deduces the truth of a proposition from given premises, but it does not remove all doubt. The mind can be certain of this truth only when it re-discovers it by way of

experience. Bacon understands, however, by experience, not merely sense-experience; he admits also an internal intellectual experience resting on the divine enlightenment and inspiration. In his view, natural science is based upon the experience of our senses, while all the higher sciences, which deal with the supersensible, have their ultimate foundation in this internal intellectual experience. This explains how Bacon, following Avicenna, separates the "intellectus agens" from the individual soul, and regards it as a transcendental principle to which is due the divine enlightenment whereon this internal experience rests.

10. Bacon was an ardent student of Astrology. In his opinion, the stars exercise a determining influence on the destiny of man, and on the events occurring amongst men. No important work should, therefore, be undertaken without consulting astrology, for the work can be accomplished only at the suitable time. By the aid of astrology we can also show the necessity for, and the difference between, the six religions and cast a horoscope for them. These are plainly doctrines which cannot be pronounced free from the taint of superstition.

11. The philospher who next claims our notice is Raymund Lully. He was born about 1235 in the island of Majorca. After having led a very worldly life at the court of King James of Aragon, he withdrew into solitude with the intention of renouncing the world, and devoting himself to the study of the sciences. Scientific knowledge he proposed to use as a means for the conversion of the unbelievers. During the ten years which he devoted to solitary study he invented a new method,—which he believed he owed to special divine enlightenment. This was the "Great Art" by which he thought himself in a position "to give an answer to all scientific questions without any effort of study or reflection." Having made this discovery he came forth from his solitude, and endeavoured to turn his "Great Art" to practical account. He made a tour of all the chief cities of Europe with the twofold purpose of teaching his "method" and of arousing the zeal of the ecclesiastical and temporal princes for the conversion of the Mohammedans. He made three journeys to Africa in order to labour in person for the conversion of the unbelievers. On each occasion he was made prisoner and cruelly ill-treated. He obtained his freedom through the intervention of Christian merchants. On his return from his third voyage to Africa, he died from the effects of the treatment he had suffered during his last captivity (+1315).

12. In the Mainz edition (1721-42), compiled by Salzinger, Lully's works fill ten folio volumes. The writings which refer to the "Great Art" were issued separately at Strassburg, in 1598, under the title "Opera ea quae ad inventam a Lullo artem universalem pertinent." This collection includes the "Ars brevis," the treatise "De auditu cabbalistico"; also, "Duodecim principia philosphiæ seu Lamentatio philosophiæ contra Averroistas," the "Logica nova," the

tract "De venatione medii" and "De Conversione subjecti et praedicati per medium"; the "Rhetorica," the "Ars Magna"; and the "Articuli fidei sacrosanctae." These are the most important of Lully's works.

13. The "Great Art" of Lully is nothing but a logico-mathematical method of arranging certain class-notions in various combinations, and solving by these combinations all scientific problems. It was to be "a universal key to the discovery of whatever can be made known, determined, differentiated, or proved, regarding each object." The entire method is constructed on purely mechanical principles. Lully distinguishes nine subjects, nine absolute and nine relative predicates, nine virtues, nine vices, and nine questions. He places these beside one another in a definite order, arranged in seven concentric circles on revolving wheels. These may be moved in such a manner that each of the notions marked on the figure comes, as a result of the rotation, under all the other notions, either by itself, or in union with any other that may be selected. When the machine is set in motion, different combinations of these ideas result. From these manifold combinations all the questions that can arise, in reference to one or other of these ideas, can easily be solved.

14. From this description it is evident that no true scientific value can be attributed to this method. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that, not only did Lully himself believe that he had discovered in his "Great Art" the key to all science and all wisdom, but that he found many enthusiastic adherents in this belief. The latter were known as Lullists. As late as the 16th and 17th centuries, men were to be met with who believed they had discovered great secrets by Lully's "Art," and who busied themselves with an explanation of its secrets.

15. Lully's further literary activity was devoted to combating the followers of Averroes in the Christian Schools. The doctrine that philosophy can lead to results which are opposed to Christian faith, and that philosophy is justified in maintaining them as philosophical truths was absolutely rejected by him. In his "Duodecim Principia Philosophiæ" he sets himself to show that philosophy of its nature must fail to prove the articles of faith to be rationally false and erroneous; that, on the contrary, it is in agreement with them in every respect.

16. Lully was, of course, right in this, but, in the ardour of the controversy, he allowed himself to be hurried into the other extreme. Instead of contenting himself with showing that reason cannot establish anything which is opposed to faith, and that, therefore, the mysteries of faith cannot be contrary to reason, he went so far as to assert that reason, of itself, can establish, by a perfect demonstration, all the mysteries of Christianity, even those which refer to mere matters of fact. He will have it that not merely probable, but absolutely demonstrative, proofs can be brought forward for all the Christian mysteries. In his work, "Articuli fidei sacrosanctæ," he

attempts to establish, by rational demonstration, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption, etc., in all their bearings. We cannot follow him further in these speculations. But, it is evident that he has here reached the standpoint of Theosophy, and, that, in this respect, Lully was in complete opposition to the scientific views of his contemporaries.

6.—John Duns Scotus.

§128.

1. Although the teaching of St. Thomas was held in the highest favour during the thirteenth century, it did not secure undisputed sway. While the religious brethren of St. Thomas, the Dominicans, supported his philosophical system, an opposing school was formed in the second of the two great mendicant Orders, the Franciscans. The system of St. Thomas, as such, was not openly attacked, but exception was taken to many of its most important doctrines. The Franciscans sided with the leaders of their own order, with Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure. Laying great stress on those points, in which the teaching of their own philosophers diverged from that of St. Thomas, they were naturally led to oppose and attack the contrary Thomist doctrines.

2. A distinguished leader of this opposition was William De Lamarre, of Oxford, who, in the year 1285, published a work directed against the Thomist position, which was couched in the most violent language. He gave it the title of "Reprehensorium seu Correctorium fratris Thomae." It is a summary of all the objections that had been made by the Franciscans to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Lamarre is convinced that the teaching of St. Thomas is injurious to faith, and leads to heresy; to this view his countryman, William Varron, also assents. It has been already mentioned that Aegidius of Colonna wrote a reply to the "Reprehensorium."

3. The principal opponent of St. Thomas, among the Franciscans, was John Duns Scotus. He it was who collected all the objections that had been urged by the Franciscans against the Thomist doctrine, and reduced them, together with the positive teachings of the Franciscans, to a complete system. This system was adopted by the Franciscans as their own, and upheld by them in opposition to the Thomistic School of the Dominicans. In this way the Franciscan School exalted Duns Scotus above their founder, Alexander of Hales, and acknowledged him as their chief.

4. Duns Scotus was born about 1266, according to others, in 1274, entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, and made his studies at Oxford. He is said to have displayed, at first, a great pre-

dilection for Mathematics. At the age of twenty-three he became Professor of Theology at Oxford. He was afterwards transferred to Paris, and, finally, to Cologne, where he died in the year 1308. In the Lyons edition of 1639, his works occupy twelve folio volumes.[1] The first four volumes contain commentaries on Aristotle's works; on Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics, and also on the book, "De Anima." The third volume includes the "Tractatus de rerum principio," the Tractatus de primo principio," the "Theoremata subtilissima."

5. The great commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard (Opus Oxoniense) the principal work of Duns Scotus, and the one in which his philosophical system is expressly set forth—extends from the fifth to the tenth volume. In the eleventh volume is contained the Reportatorum Parisiensium Ll.4 (Opus Parisiense), a further Commentary on the "Sentences," formed of notes taken by his hearers in Paris, and having the same subject matter as the Oxford commentary. In the twelfth and last volume are to be found the "Quaestiones quodlibetales." It it truly amazing how Duns Scotus could complete so many and such comprehensive works in so short a lifetime.

6. Duns Scotus is remarkable for his subtlety, and his acute power of drawing fine distinctions. By these he was frequently betrayed into mere hair-splitting, and on this account received from his contemporaries the epithet, "Doctor Subtilis." His gifts fitted him pre-eminently for the task of clearing away what seemed to him the defects of the doctrines of his scholastic predecessors, and thoroughly sifting the entire traditional subject-matter of philosophy and theology. Herein lay his chief merit. He succeeds better in refutation than in positive argument, in destructive criticism of the theories of others than in the construction of his own. But, just for this reason, his philosophy is not such a well organised system of doctrine as St. Thomas's. The long-winded refutations with which each of the "Quaestiones" is crowded render it extremely difficult to follow him, and the rough uncultured language in which he clothes his thoughts does not contribute to making the perusal of his works a pleasure.

7. As regards the general principles of the Scotist system of philosophy, they deviate only in some points from the Thomist doctrine. Duns Scotus establishes the necessity of revelation on the ground that reason does not teach us, clearly and plainly, the highest end of our existence—the intuition of God. In addition to natural knowledge, or philosophy, a still higher and inspired teaching is necessary to enable man to know the fulness of truth and, on the basis of this knowledge, to fulfil his eternal destiny. Revelation

[1] This edition was prepared by the Irish fathers of the College of Isidore, in Rome; it is usual to name Luke Wadding, the annalist of the Franciscan order, as the editor, owing to the prominent part he took in the matter.

is, therefore, a supplement to, and a perfecting of, rational knowledge; and, consequently, no contradiction can exist between them.

8. The object of theology is God, as God, "sub ratione deitatis;" while philosophy only treats of God in as far as He is the First Cause of things. Theology is essentially a practical science; its teachings are directed not so much to the removal of ignorance and the extension of our knowledge as towards the furtherance of our salvation. The contrary is true of philosophy. Theology is not subordinated to any other science; nor is philosophy subordinated to theology, since it has its own principles, and does not borrow them from theology.

Doctrine of Matter and Universals.

§ 129.

1. In his theory of matter, Duns Scotus follows Henry of Ghent. An existence, or actuality of its own, must be ascribed to Matter, apart from Form. As it is the product of divine creation, it cannot be conceived as non-existent; otherwise the divine creation would have no real efficacy. Of course, Matter is not created without Form; but in the order of nature Matter is prior to Form, and existence must, according to this priority, belong to it before it belongs to the Form. Matter does not, therefore, receive simple actuality from the Form, but merely a determinate actuality, which the Form brings with it. As Matter, it possesses actuality without the Form, through divine creation. (De rer. princ., qu. 7, art. 1, 2.)

2. Matter is not confined merely to corporeal beings; all beings, even those that are spiritual, are compounded of Matter and Form; God alone is Pure Form. In every created being we have a composition of potentiality and actuality; God alone is Pure Actuality. In relation to actuality, potentiality is the indeterminate, which becomes determinate only through the actuality. But the indeterminate is Matter; the determining principle is Form. Consequently, every created being must be composed of Matter and Form. There remains the question: Is Matter uniform in all beings, material as well as spiritual? Scotus answers the question in the affirmative; on this point he is, as he expresses it, altogether in agreement with the opinions of Avicebron. (Ib., qu. 8, art. 4, 24, sq.)

3. He distinguishes three meanings of the term Matter—the "materia primo prima," the "materia secundo prima," and the "materia tertio prima." By the first, he understands the purely formless Matter; by the second, the Matter which is the subject of generation and corruption; and by the last, the Matter which is the substratum for external plastic forces acting on it by external formative influences. Having premised so much, Duns Scotus teaches that the "materia primo prima" is uniform in all created

beings, material as well as spiritual, and, therefore, that it must be regarded as the universal and uniform basis of all created existence.

4. If the "materia primo prima" were manifold, this plurality would require an antecedent unity, wherein the plurality has its origin, and, consequently, no one of these different kinds of Matter would be the first. Again, these kinds of Matter should be differentiated from one another; but they could be differentiated only by a Form; they should, therefore, already possess some Form, and they would thereby cease to be the "materia prima." Moreover, development always proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. This must be the case in the world, taken as a whole. We cannot conceive the creation of the world otherwise than as a progress, under the influence of divine power, from that which was undeterminate in itself to a determinate order of things, that is, as a progress from the "materia primo prima." If this be so, then the primal Matter was the same in all things.

5. We may represent the world as a noble tree, of which the "materia prima" is the seed and root; the accidents are its leaves; corruptible creatures its twigs and branches; the rational soul its blossom; and, finally, the pure spirits or the angels its fruit. As the parts of a plant or an animal form an organic whole simply because they have all grown out of a common germ, so the unity of the world can result only from an analogous connection of its parts with a common basis. This common basis is not the Form, for this is the differentiating element; therefore, it can be nothing but one and the same Matter. (Ib. n. 30.)

6. Closely connected with the preceding is the theory of Duns Scotus regarding Universals. The universal natures of things constitute the content of universal ideas. These universal natures cannot be conceived as the mere products of thought, they must be acknowledged as objectively real. For if there were no universal natures in the objective order, but simply individual things, then we could, in truth, assert regarding each individual merely that it was that individual. There would be no common measure by which particular things might be judged; one individual would not be more or less different from another, because numerical distinction would alone possess any meaning. But the question now arises: How are these universal natures to be conceived as existing in the objective order?

7. In the individual object we must distinguish between individual and specific (formal) unity. Every individual, as an individual, is an absolute unity in itself; but in so far as it belongs to a definite species opposed to other species, it is in this respect also a unity undivided in itself and is distinct from every other species. The individual unity is absolutely incommunicable, while the specific or formal unity is communicable; the specific nature of the individual is such that it can be actualised in other individuals. The

specific or formal unity is consequently less a unity than the individual unity.

8. Hence it follows that universal natures cannot be conceived as "actu universales" in the objective order, for in that case the specific unity would no longer be a lower order than the individual unity. In fact the two unities would merge in each other; a substantial distinction would no longer exist between the individuals. One and the same nature would be predicated numerically of several individuals, which is inadmissible. Consequently the universality attributable to universal natures in objective reality must be regarded as potential, and may be described as follows:—

9. The universal nature is prior in objective reality to the individuals. In this priority it is in a state of indifference towards individuality and (actual) universality. In itself it is neither one nor the other: it is only what it is and nothing more. But there is contained in it the possibility, on the one hand of being realised in a plurality of individuals, and on the other of being conceived by the intellect as "actu" universal. In this way it is potentially universal, and this in a two-fold sense: it is potentially universal first, in so far as it can be realised in a plurality of individuals, and secondly, in so far as it can be apprehended by the intellect as universal. (In l. sent., 2, dist. 3, qu. 1, n. 7).

10. It may be asked how the universal nature is individualised in the individuals; or in other words: What is the principle of individuation? First of all, it is clear that Matter cannot be this principle, for it is essentially universal. The principle of individuation must therefore lie in the Form. It cannot however be sought for in the universal nature, just because this is universal; the principle of individuation must therefore be a form which is added to the universal nature. This form is given in the individual difference. For the "genus" is determined to the "species" by the specific difference; consequently in reference to the "genus," the specific difference is a form. The "species" is again determined to the individual by the individual difference: as before, the individual difference is a form in reference to the species. This is the last form, to which no other can be joined, and this last form is the principle of individuation. The Scotist school designates this form by the technical term "Haecceity," (*Ib.*, l. c., qu. 6, 11).

11. From this it is also evident how far a distinction must be drawn between the universal nature and the individuality of a thing. A distinction must exist in every case between them, and not merely a distinction which is drawn by the intellect (distinctio rationis) but an objective distinction *a parte rei*. The universal nature is in itself prior to the individual, and is then reduced to individual being by the individual difference added to it as final form.

12. The distinction is not, however, strictly speaking, a *real* distinction such as subsists between "res" and "res," for the ultimate

form which is the principle of individuality cannot be conceived as a thing (res) which is added to the species as to another thing, but only as a reality which is joined to the reality of the species. It is merely the last formal reality of the thing giving it its individual determinateness. The distinction is therefore one between reality and reality, and this cannot be described as actual, nor yet as merely conceptual. It occupies a position midway between the two, and as being distinct from both, must be called a *formal* distinction. Hence the doctrine of Formalism. (*Ib.*, l. c., n. 15).

13. Diverging again from the teaching of St. Thomas, Scotus answers in his own way the question as to the "primum cognitum," the first principle of knowledge. He distinguishes between clear and confused knowledge. As regards *confused*, ill-defined knowledge, what is first known are the "Species specialissimae." For every natural cause produces, as far as in it lies, the most perfect effect. The most perfect knowledge is not the knowledge of the most general species, but rather the knowledge of the "species specialissimae." If it is a question of *clear* knowledge, then in this, the most universal ideas are those "first known." For an object cannot be clearly known, unless the idea of being which recurs in all ideas, as well as the other universal ideas that are included as elements in the concept of a definite object, are known.

Theology and Psychology.

§ 130.

1. In reference to the proofs of God's existence, Duns Scotus establishes the existence of God by means of the concept of highest Efficient Cause; next by that of the highest Final Cause and lastly by that of the most Perfect Being. He names these the three "primaries." They mutually involve one another, since the first efficient cause must necessarily be the last final cause—for it cannot act on account of an end lying outside itself—and further, as "causa aequivoca," it necessarily contains in itself all the perfections of actual and possible things. The Being of whom these three primary notions are to be predicated is God.

2. God is the infinitely Perfect Being, and, as such, is also the absolutely incomposite (simple) Being. Every composition is excluded from Him. But now the question arises: If we attribute distinct perfections to God, how is this distinction in God to be conceived? Duns Scotus answers this question by applying here the idea of formal distinction, drawn above, between the universal and individual in things.

3. The distinction between the divine attributes is, in his view, not a "real" distinction, as between "res" and "res"; neither is it a mere virtual distinction—that, as such, would simply

have its foundation in God, but would be constituted by the intellect. It must be described as occupying an intermediate position, *i.e.*, as a formal distinction. It is a distinction between realities, one of which, according to its formal idea, is not the same as another. "Divinæ perfectiones distinguuntur a parte rei, non realiter quidem, sed formaliter,"—such is the formula in which Duns Scotus expresses his doctrine. (In l. sent., i., dist. 8, qu. 4, n. 17, sqq).

4. According to Duns Scotus, the Divine Essence is not the "ratio idealis" of things. This doctrine would require the Divine Essence to contain, in itself, a real relation to things, which is inadmissible. The "ratio idealis" of things is, therefore, to be placed solely and entirely in the divine intellect. Of course, since God knows His essence, as capable of being imitated outside Himself, He thinks things on the basis of this knowledge, and thus possesses the ideas of them in His intellect. But the Divine Essence is related to the thought by which God conceives things, not as "species informans," but only as the sufficient reason for the thought by which the Divine Intellect thinks things outside God, and produces ideas of them.

5. As to the Divine Omnipotence, if by this is meant the power of God to produce every possible thing immediately, that is, without the concurrence of any other efficient cause, then God's omnipotence, in this sense, cannot be known and demonstrated by reason alone—it is made known to us only through faith. Although it is true that the First Cause possesses a higher power than all subordinate causes, that it contains, in itself, "eminenter," the power of all subordinate causes, yet it does not follow from this that it can produce, immediately, the effects of these secondary causes. The sun has a much higher causal efficacy than any animal being, still it cannot immediately generate an animal being. No philosopher has attributed such a meaning to the term, Divine Omnipotence. (In l. sent., 1., dist. 42., qu. unica).

6. The human soul is related to the body as its essential form, and is, therefore, both the principle of intellectual, and of sensitive and vegetative life in man. Still, it is not the only form in man: a "forma corporeitatis," by which the body is constituted, as such, must also be accepted. The plurality of spiritual beings, within the same species, is not dependent on their union with a body. Every nature, as such, is already communicable to several individuals. We cannot say that each angel forms a species of its own. Neither can we assert that human souls are classed under one and the same species, simply because they are joined to the body.

7. Scotus holds the incorruptibility and immortality of the human soul to be a truth of faith, one which cannot be demonstratively proved by reason. Apart from the fact that Aristotle was not at all clear about it, all rational proofs that have been adduced for the

immortality of the soul are inconclusive. It is argued that the soul has a "per se esse," does not, therefore, depend for its existence on the body, and, consequently, cannot lose its existence through the death of the body. If, by this "per se esse," is meant an existence, such as belongs to a "Compositum in genere substantiæ," it is false to attribute this property to the soul. If such a "per se esse" belonged to the soul it could not share its existence with the body. If, on the other hand, we mean by "per se esse," the condition of substantial being, which is opposed to the accidental "in esse," then we cannot from this infer the immortality of the soul, because other forms also possess a similar "per se esse." In like manner, all the other rational proofs of the immortality of the soul may be refuted.

8. The freedom of the will is steadfastly maintained by Duns Scotus, and this in the sense of absolute indifferentism. The will determines itself according to its own choice; to it alone is to be ascribed the determination to any action: it is the entire cause of its volition. The object of will, in so far as it is known by the intellect, is, therefore, not the determining cause of the will's act. The object is a "naturaliter agens." If the will is moved by the object as actuating cause, it no longer lies in its power to will or not to will, for the "naturaliter agens" acts necessarily, and the freedom of the will is thus annulled.

9. The intellect does not take precedence of the will: the contrary is true. The intellect exercises no actuating influence on the will; its entire function is limited to representing to the will the object of its desire, and it is thus merely the attendant of the will. On the other hand, the will governs the intellect, inasmuch as it lies in the power of the former to direct the intellect towards the objects of its knowledge, or to withdraw it from them. If the will takes precedence of the intellect, it follows, of course, that the highest happiness of man must consist formally not in the act of knowledge, but in the act of willing—not in the intuition, but in the love of God.

10. We will not pursue the Scotist system further, as we have now called attention to the chief points in which Duns Scotus differs from St. Thomas. Among the immediate pupils and successors of Duns Scotus, mention must specially be made of Franciscus de Mayronis (+1325) the "Doctor illuminatissimus." He instituted the famous Sorbonne disputations, which were held every Friday, and in which a disputant had to defend his thesis without intermission from six o'clock in the morning till six in the evening against all comers. He wrote a commentary on the "Sentences" and "Quodlibeta." We may also mention Joannes Jandunus, Antonius Andrea, the "Doctor dulcifluus" (+1320), Joannes Bassolius, and Peter of Aquila. Prominent among the opponents of Duns Scotus were Gerard of Bologna, Radulphus Brito, Hervæus Natalis (+1323), who wrote a commentary on the "Sentences," and "Quodlibeta," in which he boldly attacked the Scotist doctrines from the Thomist point of view; lastly Thomas Bradwardine (+1349).

THIRD PERIOD.

DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

Prefatory Remarks.

§ 131.

1. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Scholasticism made no substantial progress. The two great Scholastic systems of the thirteenth century—the Thomist and the Scotist—were followed by the two main schools which held this field till the end of the Middle Ages, and in which the scientific activity of the last two centuries of the period was especially concentrated. The members of the Thomist School are also called Realists; those of the Scotist, Formalists; not as if the Scotists were not also favourable to Realism; we have, in fact, seen that Duns Scotus held much more advanced opinions on the reality of Universals than St. Thomas; but because the Scotists, following Duns Scotus, inserted between the real and virtual distinctions the formal distinction, which the Thomists did not recognize.

2. To these two great schools a third, the Nominalist, was added in the early part of the fourteenth century. Nominalism had been completely overcome in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and had disappeared from history; but it suddenly reappeared in the beginning of the fourteenth century and attained such importance that it formed the chief doctrine of a school which lasted to the close of the Middle Ages. This school was never, indeed, accorded a commanding position; the Thomist and Scotist schools, with their Realism, always occupied the forefront of the scientific movement. Still, Nominalism was able to acquire a much greater importance at the close than in the beginning of the Middle Ages.

3. There arose, besides, a fourth school, if we may so call it, the school of the German Mystics. The rise of this school dates from the end of the thirteenth century, and it continued during the last centuries of the Middle Ages. This mystical school is only little less important than the great Scholastic schools. Its supporters were, for the most part, preachers, who expounded their mystical doctrines, not in the Latin of the schools, but in the language of the common people. They endeavoured to lead the people, through mysticism, to a more perfect Christian life. They

appealed in their sermons, not only to the Fathers of the Church, but also to the "Masters of the Schools," and to Aristotle himself, and sought to borrow from them proofs for their teachings. German Mysticism does not, therefore, owe its origin to a direct opposition to Scholasticism, though in its development it arrived at results at variance with Scholastic ideas.

4. It is usual to describe the last centuries of the Middle Ages as the period of the decay of Scholastic philosophy. This is only partly true. In the strict sense of the word, it is allowable to speak of the "decay" of a philosophic movement only when philosophy has fallen into decay in point of matter—that is, when the fund of genuine speculative truth is gradually diminished and a false philosophic view of the world takes its place. This was certainly not the case with the Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It remained faithful to the principles of the great thinkers of the thirteenth century, and the changes in its teaching never touched the foundations of Christian speculation. Nominalism alone would have been likely to lead philosophy into the paths of empiricism and scepticism; but, on the one hand, the Nominalists never pursued their system to its final consequences, and, on the other, as has been already said, the Nominalist school never attained a commanding influence, but held throughout a subordinate position.

5. If we speak, therefore, of a decay of Scholasticism it can only be in reference to its form; and we will not deny that in this sense a change for the worse took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the first place, the language of Scholasticism became more and more uncouth and barbarous, and its mode of expression harsher and less ornate. The fluent, pleasing style of writing which prevailed in the earlier Middle Ages was almost entirely lost. The form of expression became so utterly neglected that one might believe that thought was everything to these writers and language nothing.

6. Secondly, the method, modelled on Aristotle's, which had been introduced during the thirteenth century, was carried to an extravagant excess. In discussing a question, the later Scholastics state all the possible opinions on the point, together with the arguments supporting them; then they refute the arguments adduced for the opinions which they consider false; next, they bring forward the objections which might be urged against the refutations, and refute these objections in their turn; and so onward, with the result that it is very difficult to follow a long-winded "quæstio" of this kind without losing the connecting threads. This was plainly a grievous defect which could not but prove detrimental to Scholasticism.

7. In the third place, as an unfortunate result of the division into the various schools enumerated above, many Scholastics thought they had done all that was necessary, if they adhered rigidly to the doctrines of their own school, and defended them against all others.

In consequence, no genuine originality of thought appears amongst them; the further development of philosophy and theology was arrested. Questions, which had been already sufficiently discussed, were argued in an unchanging round. In the treatment of these questions, acuteness degenerated into hair-splitting. Scientific zeal was thus lost, and barren ostentation took its place. The public disputations dwindled into passionate wrangles; propriety and dignity were outraged to such an extent that stern commands had to be issued by Popes and Bishops to bring the disputing parties to peace and order.

8. These are improprieties that call for the censure of the historian. Still, they indicate merely a decay in the form, not in the subject matter of Scholastic philosophy. The kernel of Scholastic doctrine remained sound, though incrusted with a hard and bitter rind.

The opinion, so often expressed now-a-days, that a separation was effected in the later Scholastic philosophy between philosophy and theology, in the sense that the possibility of a contradiction arising between them was admitted, is entirely false. The later Scholastics maintained, just as resolutely as their predecessors, that a proposition could not at the same time be true in philosophy and false in theology, and *vice versa*. At most, the opposite view made its appearance sporadically. The separation of philosophy from theology, in the sense that the former was looked upon and treated as a science in itself, distinct from the latter, was, of course, adhered to by the later Scholastics. This was, however, no new doctrine; it had been taught and acted on by the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century.

9. These general remarks being premised, we will treat first of the most prominent Nominalists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, then of the most important Realists (among whom the Formalists will be included). We shall conclude with a notice of the "German mystics."

I.—THE NOMINALISTS.

Petrus Aureolus, William Durand, William of Occam, John Buridan, Pierre D'Ailly, etc.

§ 132.

1. Nominalism at this period came from both Scotist and Thomist schools. The first Scotist, who paved the way for (Nominalism, was Petrus Aureolus, a Franciscan professor at Paris (+1321). He wrote a Commentary on the "Sentences" and "Quodlibeta." He taught that universal ideas are purely the

creation of the intellect; in reality, there are only individual things. The universal has, therefore, merely an "intentional" existence; it is only a concept (conceptus), nothing more. Consequently, the dispute about the principle of individuation is entirely superfluous. Every reality is, as such, individual. If we speak of a principle of individuation, we can only allude to the efficient cause which gives existence to the thing. No "species," in the sense of "forma specularis," is to be assumed as an explanation of intellectual knowledge.

2. On the Thomist side, William Durand de St. Pourcain led the way towards Nominalism; he was a Dominican; lectured (in 1313) at Paris, and died, Bishop of Meaux, in the year 1332. His principal work was a Commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard. His conception of the Universal is the same as that of Aureolus. The Universal does not exist independently in things, but is merely a creation of the intellect, based on the fact that we compare things together, and think those things which we recognise as similar, apart from the differences which distinguish each from the others. Universal and particular, in our knowledge, denote one and the same thing, only the former denotes it in an indeterminate, the latter in a determinate, manner. Universal knowledge is, therefore, indeterminate and confused. No "species" are necessary to explain our knowledge, and consequently the distinction between the "intellectus agens" and "possibilis" is of no value.

3. We will not pursue the teachings of these thinkers further, but pass on at once to the proper founder of Nominalism, because in his system all the Nominalist doctrines and their consequences are fully represented. In his system we can follow most readily the Nominalist course of thought, as it appeared in the last half of the Middle Ages. This philosopher to whom we allude is

William of Occam.

§ 133.

1. Born in the village of Occam, in Surrey, England, he joined the Franciscan Order, and was a pupil of Duns Scotus both at Oxford and Paris. He became subsequently professor at Paris, where he acquired considerable renown by his Nominalist innovations, and collected a host of students round his chair. He received from his followers the title of "Doctor Singularis" and "Venerabilis Inceptor," (*i.e.* Nominalium).

2. Occam gained for himself a by no means brilliant name in ecclesiastico-political affairs. In the quarrel between Boniface VIII. and Philip the Fair, he took the side of the latter and defended him

against the Pope. He joined afterwards the fanatical "Spiritualist" party in his Order, and revolted with them against the decrees of Pope John XXII. He issued a manifesto against the latter, entitled "Defensorium," which was full of bitter invectives against the Pope and the ecclesiastical dignitaries. Called on for an explanation, he fled with his companions to Louis, the Bavarian, and supported the latter in his opposition to the Papacy. "Defend me with the sword," he said, "and I will defend you with the pen." He died at Munich about the year 1347.

3. The following are the most important philosophical works that he has left us: (*a*) "Super libros sententiarum subtilissimae quaestiones"; (*b*) "Quodlibeta Septem"; (*c*) "Summa Logices" and "Major Summa Logices"; (*d*) "Quaestiones in libros Physicorum"; (*e*) Expositio aurea in Porphyrii praedicabilia et Aristotelis prædicamenta"; and (*f*) "Centilogium Theologicum."

4. According to Occam knowledge begins with intuition by the senses, and progresses from this to intellectual knowledge. Again, intellectual knowledge is primarily intuitive and only secondarily abstractive. In intuitive knowledge the intellect thinks the thing as existing, and according to its properties as made known through experience. In abstractive knowledge, on the contrary, the intellect abstracts from the existence and empirical properties of the object, and thinks of it merely in an indeterminate manner. If the question is asked: Which is first known to us, the Universal or the Particular? The answer is plain: If the question refers to intellectual knowledge in general, the individual is first known because intuitive knowledge precedes abstractive. If it refers to abstractive knowledge the reverse is true, for here the first-known is the most universal and most indeterminate; only from this can we advance to the "species specialissima."

5. This being established, a further problem remains for solution: How is knowledge itself to be explained? Like Aureolus and Durandus, Occam rejects the theory of "species" in regard to this question. In explaining sense-knowledge especially, no "species sensibilis" ought, in his opinion, to be postulated. "Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora." The object and the faculty of perception are sufficient by themselves to explain the phenomenon of perception. An additional element ought not to be dragged into the explanation, it is altogether useless. We have as little ground for speaking of a "species intelligibilis." The reason for assuming the existence of the latter is that the material object, as, such, cannot immediately produce knowledge in an immaterial intellect. But is not the "species intelligibilis" also immaterial? How, then can a material object produce it? The theory of the "species" is thus untenable in every respect. And with it disappears the necessity for distinguishing between an "active" and a "possible" intellect, since this distinction was introduced merely for the purpose of explaining the origin of the "Species intelligibilis."

6. Occam, however, assumes a certain similarity between knowledge and the objects of knowledge in order to account for the former. But in his opinion, this similarity is no other than that which exists between the thing and its symbol. Consequently, image and idea are for him mere signs of whatever they are referred to as their object. Of course, they are not arbitrary, but natural signs of their objects. Occam does not base knowledge on that self-assimilation of the knowing subject to the object known, which is postulated in the theory of the "species," but founds it merely on that similarity which exists between the idea as sign and the object as the thing signified. He conceives the idea to be merely a "term;" whence the Nominalists are also called "terminists." But, taken subjectively, the idea is for him nothing more than the act of thought in so far as it is directed towards the object.

7. This being so, the immediate and direct object of our knowledge is not the thing itself, but rather its sign in our mind; and only through this sign do we know the object which is denoted by it. But how, and to what extent, do we, by means of the idea as sign of the thing, know the thing itself? In this way, replies Occam: the idea is thought of as the sign of the thing which it denotes. A twofold distinction must be here established. The idea can either be thought by itself, that is, be conceived purely as an idea; when this occurs, our knowledge does not concern itself with the object. Or the idea, inasmuch as it is the sign of a thing, can be thought of as that thing, and thus be apprehended in its relation to the thing. In this event, our knowledge is relative to the thing itself, and the latter becomes known to us through the idea.

8. In accordance with this distinction a difference between *rational* and *real* knowledge is established. Both have for their object ideas as signs of things, but the former considers them by themselves, while the latter regards them as standing for things. The distinction between "first and second intention" follows from this. An idea is called "first intention," when it refers to a thing, and can therefore be thought of as the sign of that thing—*e.g.* man. An idea is called "second intention," when it refers not to a thing but to another idea, that is, to a first intention, and, therefore, can only represent the latter—*e.g.* genus, species, individual.

9. Occam's doctrine regarding Universals is based on the foregoing principles. Answering the question: How does the universal concept arise in the mind? Occam refers us to the distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge. If in intuitive knowledge the intellect thinks of the object as that individual thing which represents itself to the mind, it has *determinate* knowledge of the object. But if in abstractive knowledge, it disregards the individual determinateness of the object then it thinks of the latter as indeterminate; it does not distinguish the object, and the other individual objects that are similar to it. This indeterminate knowledge of the object is the Universal.

10. It follows that the Universal, as such, has not objective reality; nor has it any foundation in the objective world; it is wholly a product of the intellect, resulting from the abstractive knowledge of the latter. It is merely indeterminate thought produced by abstractive knowledge, as opposed to determinate thought which results from intuitive knowledge.

How we are to regard the Universal in its relation to the things themselves is now easily seen. The Universal is nothing but an idea which is capable of being used as the sign for a plurality of things. Considered as a concept, the Universal is altogether singular, like every other thought; it is only universal in so far as it can stand as the sign for many things. Consequently the division of things into "genera" and "species" does not rest upon a relation having its foundation in the objects themselves, but on the fact that one idea can stand as the sign for more things than another idea. There can be no question of a principle of individuation, simply because the Universal has no reality whatever. The discussions on this point are wholly nugatory.

11. These are the fundamental principles of Occam's Nominalism. We will now consider briefly the consequences that he deduces from them.

a. It is self-evident that in assuming ideas to be mere symbols, in denying the objective reality of Universals, the connection of thought with the objective world is seriously imperilled. It is not, therefore, surprising to notice certain sceptical tendencies in Occam's writings. These are manifest at once in his theory that the proofs, adduced by reason for God's existence, are in no way demonstrative and conclusive. It cannot, he holds, be proved that there is anything created except those bodies of the sublunary world which admit of generation and corruption. As regards the heavenly bodies, substances existing apart from matter, and the souls of men, it cannot be established with demonstrative certainty that they are created and not eternal. The causality of the heavenly bodies and of natural causes in this world is sufficient for the production of those bodies which admit of generation and corruption; no further causality need be sought for. Consequently, we cannot, from the existence of the things of this world, argue with certainty to the existence of a God, standing above the world, as its Cause.

b. The unity and infinitude of God, like His existence, cannot be proved conclusively by reason. As regards the unity of God, we can conceive several worlds with several rulers, or even one world with several rulers, acting in harmony. As to the infinitude of God, every effect of the divine causality is finite, and, this being so, no one of these effects, nor even all these effects taken together, justify us in concluding anything as to the infinitude of their cause. By faith alone can we attain to complete certainty as to all these truths. The same holds good for the question as to whether the world is eternal or has had a beginning.

c. From his nominalist premises Occam draws the further conclusion that no distinction exists between the divine perfections. He teaches that all the perfections which we attribute to God are only mental designations (conceptus vel signa), by which, and in which, we conceive God. The distinction between them is not founded at all on the Divine Essence, but only on the fact that we apprehend God now under one concept, now under another. Strictly speaking, they ought not to be called perfections or attributes, because perfection or attribute involves existence, while we have to deal here merely with different mental designations. The Ancients were more accurate when they spoke of the different names of God, not of His different attributes.

d. Again, human thought is not a subjective modification of the soul, but possesses an objective existence of its own; that is, it is not based on any "species intelligibilis," but is a mere sign for the thing. The same holds true of the Divine Ideas. God does not think of things through His Essence as "species intelligibilis"; the idea is in God nothing more than the creature itself, as it is conceived by God. An objective and not a subjective existence belongs to the idea in the divine intellect. The idea is, in fact, nothing else than the act of divine thought, in so far as it has for its object something outside God. In no way can the "ratio idealis" of things find place in the Divine Essence itself.

e. What follows is a matter of easy inference. There are as many ideas in God as there are individual things, actual or possible. This is the whole account of the matter. Only the individual, as such, has an idea in God, not the Universal. The Universal, as shown possesses no reality; it is merely a subjective product of our intellect, an indeterminate thought, which, as such, is much more incomplete than determinate knowledge. On this account it cannot be pre-existent in the divine mind; God knows the Universal only in our soul. Since He knows our soul, He knows also the operation by which we form Universal ideas, and therein He knows these ideas. But it is absurd to speak of an ideal prototypal existence of the Universal in the divine Intellect.

f. As regards the human soul, it can in no way be proved conclusively to be an immaterial spiritual substance. Certainty on this point is obtained through faith. The soul is related to the body as its essential form, because man is distinguished from the brute precisely by possessing a rational soul, and the differentiating element is, in general, the form. But the soul is not the only essential form of the body. Besides the soul, the "Forma corporeitatis" belongs to the body as such; and, further, the sensitive soul in man is also really distinct from the intellectual soul. One and the same form cannot at the same time be material and immaterial, extended and unextended. But the sensitive soul is material and extended, the rational soul immaterial and unextended; they must consequently be really distinct from each other.

g. The faculties of the soul are neither "realiter" nor "formaliter," distinct from the substance of the soul or from one another. The soul does not act through faculties distinct from its own substance, it acts directly by itself. "Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora." Why, then, assume distinct faculties for the operations of the soul when we can explain these operations by the substance of the soul itself?

h. It cannot be proved by reason that no good other than God can satisfy the will. It is, therefore, impossible to show that God is the highest good of man. Apart from other reasons, it cannot even be demonstrated that a created will is capable of obtaining an infinite good, since the latter is not anything natural, but belongs to the region of the supernatural. Just as little does it admit of proof that a supernatural grace is necessary as an habitual Form in man, in order that God may bestow eternal (supernatural) bliss on him, or that God cannot abandon a man to guilt and punishment, without having bestowed on him the gift of grace.

i. On all these points we must distinguish between the "Potentia Dei absoluta" and the "Potentia Dei ordinata." According to His "Potentia ordinata" God cannot bring anyone to salvation without the "caritas creata," cannot impute guilt to and punish anyone without having imparted grace. But He can do all this according to His "Potentia absoluta." Which order the divine power follows in its works, is determined solely by the free will of God. Reason has no ground for inference as to God's actual methods.

12. So much for the Nominalism of Occam. He drew to himself numerous supporters. His bold demeanour, his open opposition to the existing schools and their adherents, as well as his violent quarrel with the Pope, brought to his side all who were discontented with the current teaching and eager for novelty. Among his disciples were Adam Goddam, a Minorite and professor at Oxford; Armand de Beauvoir, and Robert Holcot (+1349), two Dominicans, the latter of whom is represented as favourable to the doctrine that a proposition can be true in philosophy and false in theology, and *vice versa*; Gregory of Rimini (+1358), General of the Augustinians; Richard Suinshead or Suisset (about 1350); John of Mericuria, who embraced the theory of determinism, and asserted accordingly that sin is willed by God, and is, therefore, more good than evil; and Nicholas of Ultricuria, also a teacher of erroneous and heterodox doctrines.

13. Among the supporters of Occam's teaching, special mention must be made of

John Buridan and Pierre D'Ailly.

§ 134.

1. Buridan was a pupil of Occam, and a famous professor at Paris, whence, later, he betook himself to Vienna. He is said to

have brought about the founding of the University in this latter city (1356), but the matter is by no means certain. He wrote a "Summa de Dialectica," a "Compendium Logicæ," and "Quaestiones" on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Physics. In his "Logic" he undertakes to propound a method for discovering the "middle term," which serves as a bridge between the major and minor terms. According to Aristotle, acuteness of mind is shown in quickly finding the middle term; Buridan's method, which was to benefit the stupid in particular, was, therefore, called the "pons asinorum."

2. His view of the freedom of the will is interesting. In this connection he adopts a theory of intellectual determinism. He teaches that the will is subject to the determining influence of the intellect. The former acts according as the latter judges. If the intellect judges with full certainty that a good presented to it is perfect and good under every aspect, and that every "Ratio mali" is absent from it, the will must certainly strive after this good. Hence, it follows, that if the intellect apprehends one good as higher, another as lower, other circumstances being the same, the will cannot but select the higher good. If the intellect judges the two goods to be exactly equivalent, the will cannot exercise its activity at all. (From this may have arisen the theory of "Buridan's Ass," the theory that an ass would starve if placed mid-way between two exactly similar bundles of hay.)

3. In answer to the question: How, on the assumption of this intellectual determinism, can free self-determination be attributed to the will? Buridan replies as follows:—"In the moment when the intellect pronounces the judgment, that one good is higher than another, the will cannot, of course, choose the lower good. But, it can choose it at another time when this judgment is not present; it can divert the intellect from the higher, and direct its attention to the lower good; then the comparison ceases, and the will can devote itself to the lesser good. Lastly, in certain cases the will can defer its decision, and when this occurs, the judgment of the intellect may be altered by a further examination of the circumstances, and that good appear to it as the higher, which it previously regarded as the lower. A sufficient field of action thus remains for the free self-determination of the will."

4. The University of Paris vigorously opposed the spread of Nominalism among its students. A decree was issued in the year 1339, forbidding the expounding of Occam's doctrines. A second decree, to the same effect, was issued in the following year, 1340. In the year 1347, the doctrines of John of Mericuria were condemned, and in 1348, Nicholas of Ultricuria had to make a recantation of his attacks on Aristotle's philosophy, and of his erroneous opinions, particularly in regard to the eternity of the world. In the year 1473 all professors at Paris were obliged to teach Realism, and the statute imposing this obligation remained in force till the year 1481.

But Nominalism still held its ground. Among its chief professors in the later half of the fourteenth, and the beginning of the fifteenth century, was Pierre d'Ailly, (Petrus de Alliaco), professor of philosophy, Chancellor of the University of Paris, and, later, Bishop of Cambrai, and Cardinal (1350-1425). His most important philosophical writings are a Commentary on the "Sentences," and a "Tractatus de Anima." He adopted all the theories of his master, Occam, and endeavoured to elucidate and establish them by fresh explanations and arguments.

5. It is to be noted that Pierre d'Ailly does not ascribe the same certainty to sense-cognition as to self-consciousness or to the first principles of reason and the necessary deductions from them. He holds self-consciousness and pure rational knowledge to possess absolute certainty, but sense-knowledge to be only conditionally certain. It is not absolutely certain, because God could annihilate all external objects, and still allow their representations to persist in our senses, and, because He can, by miraculous interposition, produce changes in the effects which furnish the phenomena of experience. The certainty of empirical knowledge is, therefore, subject to the condition that the usual course of nature and the usual Providence of God remain constant "hic et nunc."

6. We may mention, among later disciples of Occam, Nicholas Amati, Henry of Oyta and Henry of Hesse, both Germans, and professors at the University of Vienna (the latter died 1397); Matthias of Cracow, a Pomeranian (+1410), Nicholas Orasmus (+1382), Nicholas of Clemenge (+1440), and lastly, Gabriel Biel (+1485), Professor of Theology at Tübingen, and usually called "the last of the Scholastics." In his "Collectorium" on the four books of the "Sentences," he again expounds the doctrines of Occam, and compares them with the opposing teachings of other philosophers. In 1473, under Louis XI., a royal decree was issued at Paris against the Nominalists, forbidding the teaching of Nominalism, and binding under oath all Professors to teach Realism. This decree was repealed in 1481, but Nominalism was not helped thereby, since it had already died a natural death.

2. THE REALISTS.

Walter Burleigh, Thomas of Strassburg, Marsilius of Inghen, Raymund of Sabunde, John Gerson, etc.

§ 135.

1. Nominalism, though it made a gallant show in the fourteenth century, was unable to supplant Realism; the latter remained on the whole the dominant doctrine of the Schools at the close of the

Middle Ages. We meet in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with many prominent teachers who resolutely upheld the Realist doctrines in opposition to Nominalism.

2. First among them in point of time is Walter Burleigh (1275-1337). Like Occam, he was a pupil of Duns Scotus; he lectured first at Paris and then at Oxford. He wrote commentaries on the Logic, Ethics, Physics, Methaphysics, and Politics of Aristotle, and a work "De vita et moribus philosophorum." He maintains firmly the reality of the Universal, but explains it in the Thomist, not in the Scotist manner.

3. The way in which he tries to establish this reality is interesting. The immediate and most important purpose of nature, he says, is something extrinsic to our being. Now, nature directs its energies in the first place not to the individual but to the universal, the species. Consequently, the latter must be something existing apart from us, and cannot be a mere creation of our intellect. Again, our natural desires are directed towards something existing outside ourselves. They, too, are directed towards the universal. If we hunger or thirst, we look for food or drink in general, not for any particular food or drink. Therefore, the universal must be real; etc.

4. John Baconthorp (+1346) followed the same line of thought as Walter; Averroes, however, is his principal guide. The so-called "great Commentary" of Averroes on Aristotle was held in the highest esteem during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and was considered by many to be the most genuine, the best, nay, even the only correct exposition of Aristotle. Baconthorp contradicts St. Thomas on many points.

5. Thomas of Strasburg (Thomas de Argentina + 1357), General of the Augustinian Order, is another champion of Realism. In his earlier years he taught theology at Paris. He wrote a commentary on the "Sentences," which was long held in high repute. Generally speaking, he follows closely Aegidius of Colonna, the most renowned teacher of his Order. He rejects the formal distinction between the divine attributes as being inconsistent with the simplicity of the Divine Being. He admits a merely virtual distinction, but asserts that even this distinction can only be made, when we think of the Divine Essence in relation to created things, in which it reveals itself in manifold shapes.

6. Marsilius of Inghen must be named among the other Realists. He was a secular priest, lectured at Paris, and was transferred in 1346 to the newly-founded University at Heidelberg. He wrote glosses on Aristotle, a "Dialectic," and a Commentary on the "Sentences." The reason why he is sometimes included among the Nominalists can only be that he is confounded with Marsilius of Padua, the companion of Occam. His writings have a realist tone throughout, and though he diverges from St. Thomas on some points, he adopts, on the whole, the views of the "Angelic Doctor." There

are no original opinions in his writings, but they are distinguished by their clearness and perspicacity.

7. The Realism of St. Thomas as might be expected, was preserved purest and most persistently in the Dominican School We may mention, as members of this School, Bernard of Auvergne, Petrus Paludanus, and especially Johannes Capreolus (+1444) surnamed "Princeps Thomistarum," who, in his work, "Libri Defensionum," has given the most faithful summary of St. Thomas teaching. To these may be added Dominic of Flanders, Sylvester of Ferrara, and Cardinal Cajetan, who has written a famous commentary on the "Summa Theologiæ" of St. Thomas.

Raymund of Sabunde.

§ 136.

1. A peculiar standpoint was adopted by the Spanish physician, Raymund of Sabunde, Professor of Medicine and Philosophy at Toulouse (about 1437). He acquired great renown by his work on the Philosophy of Religion, "Theologia Naturalis." This book is remarkable from the fact that Raymund employs the method of Raymund Lully, which he consistently follows throughout the whole treatise.

2. There are two books, he says, from which we can learn truth —the Book of Nature, and the Book of Holy Writ. There is no difference in their contents; they are alike in range and subject-matter. The only difference between them is that we can acquire truth from the Book of Nature merely through research and demonstration, while the Book of Holy Writ teaches us the truth itself categorically and by precept; it does not address us by way of proof, but pronounces its teaching authoritatively. As regards the mutual relation between the two books, the Book of Nature is prior in our knowledge to the Book of Holy Writ, and is the path and portal by which we penetrate into the sanctuary of the Holy Scriptures.

3. Accordingly, Raymund, in his "Theologia Naturalis," endeavours to deduce all the doctrines of Christianity, including the Mysteries, from the Book of Nature alone. His avowed purpose is to establish demonstratively the truth of the teachings of Holy Writ, and thereby render them secure against all attack. He bases his argument throughout on nature and reason, and attempts by purely rational methods to determine and prove *a priori* the entire body of Christian doctrines. Only when he has determined and proved in this way the truths of Christianity in all their bearings, does he conclude that Christianity, as it actually exists, is the true religion. His reason is that it contains exactly all that

sum of truth, which has been discovered and demonstratively established from nature and reason.

4. Raymund tries to modify the rationalism which this line of thought involves by admitting that reason could not possibly discover the mysteries of Christianity without the help of Revelation, at least in the first instance (primo). But he asserts that when they have been revealed, reason of itself can conclusively establish the truth of the mysteries. All that is thus gained is that pure rationalism is converted into theosophical rationalism. The point of view adopted by Raymund is essentially similar in character to that of his predecessor Lully.

5. Man, says Raymund, is a stranger to himself; his first task is, therefore, to become acquainted with himself. The means to be employed for this purpose is Nature. Through the knowledge of Nature man may attain to a knowledge of himself. Only from a knowledge of himself can he rise to the knowledge of God. For the things of Nature gradually increase in perfection, some have mere existence, others exist and live, a third class exist, live, and feel; lastly, man possesses thought in addition to existence, life, and feeling. Thus man recognises himself as the Microcosm—as the being which unites in himself all that lies dispersed in Nature. But if man recognises himself as an unity of this kind then he must postulate a cause which has produced this union of perfections in him, and this cause is God.

6. A two-fold production is to be distinguished—a "Productio per modum artis," and a "Productio per modum naturae." A "Productio per modum artis" is to be attributed to God inasmuch as He has produced the world in a certain definite manner. But if this is so, then a "Productio per modum naturae" must also of necessity belong to Him. For, as the last-named production is essentially much higher in character and more excellent than the first, it cannot be denied of God, since all perfections must be attributed to God, as the most perfect Being. In God self-satisfaction must exist in its highest form. But God must take far more pleasure in what He produces from His nature than in that which He merely fashions after the manner of an artist. For this reason also a "Productio per modum naturae" must be ascribed to God. And here we have a ground for ascribing life in a Trinity to God. The "Productio per modum naturae" is the production of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost.

7. God has created the world out of love. On that account man is bound to love Him in return. But on the other hand God, when He creates a world, must seek His own honour and glory in His work. Therefore man is also under an obligation to adore God. Since he loves God he must embody in his love the tribute of adoration. As men are not actually what they ought to be, and as they very often do not fulfil their duties towards God as they ought to fulfil them, we must conclude that some crime has previously occurred

through which the human race has fallen into this condition. To assume this condition to be the original state of mankind is to contradict the wisdom and goodness of God. Accordingly, men are bound to offer atonement to God as long as they are in the state in question. But since they are unable to offer this satisfaction to God, the Son of God had to become man in order to atone to God for the guilt of men and to redeem them from it.

8. This is enough to indicate how Raymund sets about his rational deduction and proof of the Christian mysteries. We pass on to one, who belonged to the latter part of the 14th century and the early portion of the 15th century, and who gained for himself a name in ecclesiastical history, as well as in the history of the philosophy of the period. We allude to

JOHN GERSON.

§ 137.

Born in 1363, at the village of Gerson, in the diocese of Rheims, John was educated at Paris under Pierre d'Ailly, and became afterwards a famous professor and chancellor of the University of Paris. At the Council of Constance he did much towards settling the disputes which were then distracting the Church. Exiled by the Duke of Burgundy for having publicly accused the latter at Constance of having planned the murder of the Duke of Orleans, he lived for a long time in the Bavarian Alps. The last years of his life were spent in the Celestine monastery of Lyons, where he died in 1429. The works of Gerson are very numerous and varied. The most important for the history of philosophy are:—the "Theologia mystica speculativa et practica," the "Elucidatio mysticae theologiæ," the treatise "De monte contemplationis," the "Concordia metaphysicae cum logica," the "Centilogium de causa finali, de simplificatione cordis, de illuminatione cordis, et de consolatione theologiæ."

2. In his theory of knowledge, Gerson tries to effect a compromise between the mutually opposing schools of the Terminists and the Realists. He distinguishes between the real existence of things and their ideal or objectival existence in the intellect. The objectival existence of course coincides with the real existence, but we cannot assert that what we abstract from things exists in things in exactly the same manner as it exists in our intellect. Universality receives existence only in the intellect. The Universal has actual existence only in individuals. On this point the Terminists are in the right as opposed to the Formalists.

3. On the other hand, the Terminists are in the wrong when they deny that there is an intrinsic relation between thought and existence, or, in other words, when they refuse to admit that the

Universal has a foundation in objective reality. They are thus led to deny all objectivity to the Universal and to regard it merely as a fiction of the intellect. From this it would follow that, since the Universal is also eternal and necessary, the eternal being of things is called in question.

4. A "golden mean" must be found between the two extremes. The Universal, as such, is not objectively real, but it has its foundation in reality, inasmuch as it is formed by the intellect on the basis of real being. The intellect strips off, as it were, what is individual in things, and only retains the being that is common to a plurality of individuals. For this reason, there are in God not merely ideas of the individual but also ideas of the Universal.

5. But the labours of Gerson were chiefly directed to turning the attention of men's minds from pure speculation to mysticism. He inveighs against the learned of his time for being filled with a vain craze for curious knowledge, and for being absorbed in barren disputes over philosophic opinions, while entirely neglecting the practices of the mystical life. For his own part he endeavours to imitate the example of the St. Victors and St. Bonaventure, and to bring their mystical doctrines into favour with his contemporaries.

6. To give the necessary psychological basis to his mysticism, Gerson distinguishes between two fundamental faculties of the soul, the cognitive and the appetitive; on these rest the two directions of the spiritual life, the theoretical and the practical. Each of these faculties contains within it three distinct elements. The cognitive faculty includes Imagination, Reason, and Intelligence. "Cogitation" has its root in the Imagination, "Meditation" corresponds to the Reason, while the Intelligence is the organ of "Contemplation." "Cogitation," which is directed towards sense-objects, is controlled by the appetitive faculty of passion or desire. To "Meditation," which raises itself, by the operations of reason, from the sensible to the supra-sensible, corresponds in the soul a pious emotion which shows itself in the love of, and longing for, Truth. Finally, to "Contemplation," which is engaged in the consideration of the Divinity, corresponds the love of God.

7. The mystical life evolves itself in this way. The soul separating itself from the world and concentrating its attention upon itself, raises itself through the intervening grades of spiritual life to the contemplation and love of God. A triple result is thus achieved. In the first place, the soul is filled with rapture by the contemplation and love of God. The ecstasy thus produced causes all the activity of the soul to be absorbed in the contemplation and love of God, and suspends the operations of the other faculties. Secondly, the soul attains to an union with God in love, so much so that it is, as it were, transformed into God. Lastly, the soul obtains rest in God, *i.e.* complete contentment and satisfaction of all its desires. What it beholds in this state cannot be described in words. The infinite light of God, which illumines it, is also infinite darkness, because

what is seen is incomprehensible to the soul. The higher wisdom begins with darkness, *i.e.* with separation from all knowledge of creatures, and ends in darkness, in the darkness of the infinite light of God.

8. Gerson is very diffuse in his description of the mystical life. He opposes that pantheistic conception of mysticism which represents the mystic as turning his thought in on that idea of himself which is in God, in such wise that the loving and the loved are identified and the human soul lost in the divine Essence Moreover, he warns us against the extravagances of love which may lead to sensuous images, and against the phantoms of imagination which induce man to believe that his external senses perceive what mere fancy has depicted to him in a state of morbid excitement. Mystical ecstasies and visions are to be clearly distinguished from the illusions of the imagination. Whoever, in a state of contemplation, beholds things similar in any respect to an earthly object, may rest assured that he does not behold God. God is seen only by the pure of heart, and by these in a way which cannot be described in words.

THE GERMAN MYSTICS.

Meister Eckhardt.

§ 138.

1. The founder of German Mysticism was Meister Eckhardt. Born in the second half of the Thirteenth Century, probably in Saxony, he was for some time a professor at Paris, and later became Provincial of the Saxon Province of the Dominican Order. He resided first at Cologne, subsequently at Strassburg. As a preacher he addressed himself to the people, and endeavoured to make intelligible to them the recondite doctrines of Christian Mysticism. The orthodoxy of his teaching was, however, impugned. He was cited before an Ecclesiastical court held in Cologne, and there made a conditional recantation, withdrawing whatever might be proved to be erroneous in his sermons. Later on, when a specific recantation was required from him, he appealed to the Pope, and a special Congregation was appointed to examine his teaching. This tribunal selected twenty-eight propositions from his sermons, and declared them erroneous. The Bull in which these propositions were condemned by the Pope was not published until after Eckhardt's death (1329).

2. According to Eckhardt's teaching, God is the most absolutely Simple Being, and this in such wise that all and every distinction however conceived, is excluded from Him; distinct predicates are wholly inapplicable to Him; so long as man applies distinctions in his concept of God, so long does he fail to apprehend God Him-

self; so long as he ascribes distinct attributes to God in his thought, he has not yet acquired a true knowledge of God. In God all distinctions disappear; in Him "is" and "is not," are identical.

3. This notwithstanding, Eckhardt distinguishes between the "Godhead" and the Divine Persons. By "Godhead" he understands the simple pure being of God. This being of God, in itself undifferentiated, he calls the *basis*, the ground, the root, the inner source or fountainhead of God. He represents it as an eternal immutable calm, wherein there is no activity, in which, as it were, God slumbers, an eternal darkness in which He is concealed from, and unknown to, Himself. The light of the Father now appears in this eternal darkness, and the Father knowing His own being, in this knowledge of himself, generates the Son. And further, the Father loves Himself in the Son: from Him, together with the Son, proceeds in this act of love the Holy Spirit. Thus does the eternally hidden principle of the Divinity emerge into light: the "Godhead" becomes "God,"—God in three Persons

4. Leaving the doctrine of the Divine Persons, we return to the eternal simple principle of the Godhead. This contains all beings in itself. In His own being God is all beings; and all beings, in so far as they are in God, are God. In Himself He is being, but not determinate being, and He is at the same time the being of all determinate beings. As they are in Him, however all beings are one: there is, as yet, no distinction between them, no being is yet anything "per se." When, however, the Father, knowing Himself, utters the Eternal Word, that is, generates the Son, in this Word He utters all things. The Divine Word is the comprehensive "Idea" of all things.

5. According to Eckhardt, the creation of the world is an effect of the Divine Goodness, and this in the sense that the creation of the world was necessarily required by God's goodness. "What is good," says Eckhardt, "must diffuse itself," that is, must bestow itself upon others. God is the Absolute Goodness, the axiom is therefore applicable with peculiar force to Him. God must "diffuse Himself": "His intrinsic Goodness forces Him in a certain sense to this." "His Godhead depends on this, that He impart Himself to whatever is capable of participating in His goodness; if He did not so impart Himself, He would not be God." Hence "God effects necessarily all that He effects."

6. Reasoning thus we prove the eternity of creation as well as its necessity. "God is ceaselessly active," says Eckhardt, "active in an eternal present, and this action is the generation of the Son. From this generative act all things come, and in it God takes such complacence, that He expends in it all His power." The light which is the Son, and the manifestation of this light in the created world cannot, therefore, be distinguished from one another. The "birth" of the Son and the creation of the world are one and the same thing.

7. If it be asked: How then is the "creation" of the world to be conceived? Eckhardt replies with the formula that God has created the world "out of nothing." "Creation in time," he tells us, "is different from eternal creation in God; just as the work of art differs from its ideal in the mind of the artist." But other expressions of Eckhardt's are to be met with which ascribe to the formula, "created out of nothing," a sense altogether different from the Christian acceptation, and which indicate distinctly a theory of emanation. For example:—

8. "The Divine Being," Eckhardt teaches, "flows out upon all creatures, in so far as each creature can contain this being, and. consequently, whatever is created is God. If things were not filled with the Godhead they would become nothing." Taken by themselve, all beings are mere nothing, inasmuch as they have "emanated" from, and, in a certain degree, "dissolved out" of God; they possess no being by themselves, apart from God; God alone is all in all. "Creatures," he writes, "are mere nothing. What possesses no being is nothing, and creatures have no being, for they exist only in so far as God is present in them. Were He to turn from them for a moment they would cease to exist."

9. This notwithstanding, "God is external to all nature, and is not nature itself. Much as God is in all creatures, He is still as much above them; for what is one in many things, must necessarily be above these things. God exerts his influence in all creatures, and yet remains uninfluenced by them, just as the heavens move all things and remain unmoved themselves."

10. From this summary of Eckhardt's teaching it is obvious that, often as he appeals to the "Masters of the School," he, nevertheless, differs essentially from them in the fundamental character of his doctrine. He follows in the track of the Areopagite as expounded by Scotus Erigena, and loses himself in a maze of Neo-Platonic speculation. The principles of emanation and pantheism break through at every point. That Eckhardt did not deviate consciously and intentionally from the lines of the common teaching, may be admitted: but it must be held proved that there are unmistakable Neo-Platonic elements in his system, which essentially influence his conception of the relation between the world and God. Like every Neo-Platonist, he tries, unsuccessfully, to reconcile the notion of a God whose Being transcends the world with that of a God whose Being is immanent in the world.

Theory of Mystical Elevation.

§ 139.

1. According to Eckhardt, the human soul is a "unifold," that is. a simple being. It is the Form of the body, and, as such, pervades the whole body. Two elements have, however, to be dis-

tinguished in the soul, viz., the "vital spark" and the "faculties" of the soul. That so-called "spark of the soul," "inner kernel," which is named soul, spirit, or mind (mens), is not so much a faculty as the fundamental basis of the soul's being: "it is so pure, so elevated, so noble, that nothing created can have part in it; only God in His pure divine nature dwells therein. It is the basis of the soul's being, analogous to the basis of the Divine Being in God. It is the true interior man who is hidden within the external individual. It is here the image of God is found.

2. This "spark," or image of God, in the soul is not, strictly speaking, a created entity; it is something uncreated and divine. "It is something in the soul," says Eckhardt, "that is so kindred with God that it is one with Him; not a thing united to Him. If man's entire being was of this kind, he would be at once uncreated and uncreatable." This something is the spirit, the "spark," the ultimate basis of the soul's existence. "Here God's primal being is my primal being, and my primal being is God's primal being. Here I live outside my individuality, and God lives outside His individuality." For this reason this "basis of the soul can be designated by no name;" it is free from all names, untrammelled by any forms, as God is untrammelled and free in Himself.

3. This Divine element in the soul is, according to Eckhardt, the organ of mystical contemplation. Man cannot attain to the contemplation of God by natural knowledge; natural knowledge belongs to the "faculties" of the soul, which cannot be brought into immediate contact with God. If man is to contemplate God, he must do so by means of the light, which is God Himself. This light irradiates the "basis" of the soul, for here God is immediately in the soul. With the eye of the spirit the soul beholds God's pure being as it is in itself, not as it is imparted to creatures. The "principle" or "spirit" of the soul penetrates to that basal element of the Divine Being, in which the latter is a mere undifferentiated unity, neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit. There, in His first being, the soul searches for God in order to know Him and to love Him without intermediary or veil. There "my eye and God's eye are one eye and one countenance, and one confession and one love." "The eye by which I see God is the self-same eye by which God sees me." To see God and to be seen by Him are one and the same thing.

4. If we ask: What are the conditions required for man to attain to this mystical contemplation? we are told that the first condition is that man shall be freed from sin by an adequate and true repentance. Next, the individual must detach himself from all external things, and withdraw entirely within himself. He must separate himself even from himself, *i.e.*, from his own faculties, and concentrate himself in the very centre of his soul. When these conditions have been fulfilled, the most important still remains:

Man must abandon himself entirely to God; he must not act himself; he must throw himself completely upon God, and allow God alone to work in him; he must be quite dead, his own will must be entirely quiescent; he must surrender himself to God in a state of absolute passivity. This is the state of "self-abandonment."

5. If the individual holds himself still and motionless in this abandonment to God, a heavenly light will arise in the depths of his soul; the light of God will begin to shine in the very core of his being. In this light God reveals to man the very basis of His divinity; the whole being of God is laid bare to him. The soul is merged into God; its being and life passes into His being and life; man becomes one with God, he passes into a state of deification. In this transition man is born as the Son of God, and this birth of man as the Son of God is the goal of all mystical life.

6. It is to be noted, however, that when man is said to be born as the Son of God in mystical contemplation, this expression is not to be understood in the sense of an adoption, as if man became merely the "filius Dei adoptivus." Rather, man becomes, because of this "birth," the filius Dei naturalis," and in fact he becomes that same "filius Dei naturalis" which is the eternal Divine "Logos." Eckhardt never tires of repeating that man becomes by this second birth that same Son of God which is the Eternal Word. "We are transmuted into the Son, and become one Son," he writes: "Between the soul of man and the Son of God, there is and remains no distinction, as there is none between the nature of the Father and the Son. As the bread in the Eucharist is changed into the body of the Lord, in exactly the same manner is man in this birth transformed into the Son of God."

7. This birth of man as the Son of God is likewise the birth of the Son of God in man. A distinction must therefore be made between a two-fold birth of the Son of God—"an immanent" birth in God Himself, and an "emanent" in the human soul. And the element of the human soul in which this generation takes place is the "basis or vital spark" of the soul. Here, as Eckhardt expresses it, is the cradle of the Godhead. And as God brings forth his Son in the soul, the latter, in return, reproduces the Son. "As God generates His Son in me," says Eckhardt, "so do I generate Him in turn in the Father. To Him from whom I am born I again give birth."

8. This bringing forth of the Son of God in man, effected in the mystical exaltation of the Soul, is not to be regarded as a free act on the part of God any more than the immanent birth of the Son in God. In the last analysis the two generative acts are one and the same; "by the same utterance in which God Himself speaks within Himself, He also speaks in the Soul." Accordingly, Eckhardt teaches that if a man with true self-abandonment to God, duly prepares himself, God must execute His work in Him, "whether He wishes it or not, for His very being compels Him to do it." "It is an assured truth that it is necessary for God to seek us, just as if

His entire divinity depended thereon; God can no more dispense with us than we can dispense with Him. Nay, it is more necessary for Him to give to us than for us to receive from him."

9. Thus man appears to us as the organ of the perfect self-birth of God. Man must be born as the Son of God, for no other purpose than that the Son of God may thus be born in human shape in him. Man is to become God in order that in him God may become man. Here we have the pantheistic idea of emanation which lies at the root of all this mysticism. In this theory the essential difference between the incarnation of God in Christ and His incarnation in all other men disappears. If, by the birth of the Son of God in us, we become sons of God, not by adoption but by nature, it is not easy to understand what prerogative Christ enjoys beyond ourselves. The Christ of history can, at best, be regarded as an ideal for men about to be deified.

10. Eckhardt further teaches that we possess everything, without exception, that God imparted to Christ, the Man-God. We are, if we strive after true sanctity, just as much Man-God as He. What the Holy Scripture says of Christ may be said of every saintly man. Christ is therefore only a type. God would have become man just the same if Adam had not sinned. For, even without sin, man would have been destined to be deified, and would have had in the incarnate God, in the historical Christ, an ideal for his struggle towards that deification.

CONSEQUENCES OF THIS THEORY.

§ 140.

1. Exalting himself to the stage of mystical life thus far described, man attains to true freedom, which consists in this, that he can only will the good, since God alone is now acting in him. "God does not constrain the will," says Eckhardt, "on the contrary He sets it at liberty, so that it wishes nothing but what God Himself wishes. The soul can desire nothing, save what God desires; but this is not slavery, it is true freedom. For it is freedom to be under no compulsion, to be free and pure and unsullied, as we were at our first entry into existence, and were made free in the Holy Spirit." By reason of this freedom "it is as impossible for a man to leave undone what God wishes to have accomplished as it is to do what is opposed to God's will." "It is just as impossible for him to turn away from God as it is for God to be false to His own divinity."

2. A further result of man's entrance into the mystical life is that he is delivered entirely from sin. In proportion, says Eckhardt, as man approximates in likeness to God, as he becomes devoted to God, renounces himself, and seeks neither temporal nor eternal

benefit for himself, in the same proportion does he become exempt from sin and purgatory, and this even if he had committed the sins of all mankind. For as a single drop is to the great ocean, so is the guilt of mankind compared with the fathomless goodness of God.

3. In relation to the mystical life sin is not a thing to be wholly eliminated; it has its purpose. All things turn to the good of those who are themselves good, even sin. God inflicts sin on men, more especially on those whom He has chosen for the greatest deeds. Man should be grateful on this account. He should not wish never to have sinned. He is humiliated by sin and all the more closely united with God by forgiveness. Nor should he desire that temptation to sin should cease, for in that event the merit of the struggle against temptation, and virtue itself, would perish. Regarded from a higher point of view, there is properly no evil, since evil is itself only a means towards the realisation of the divine purposes.

4. External works serve only to prepare the soul for contemplation of itself and of God, and to withdraw it from earthly things; beyond this they have no value. It is false to assert that eternal happiness depends on them; they are a hindrance to it, if man becomes too much attached to them. It is on the inner working of the soul that everything turns. God does not require external work. The true work is purely internal, the working of the soul upon itself, *i.e.*, of the soul in God or through God. With this, and this alone, is eternal bliss connected. The repose of the just is better than all the works that have ever been accomplished.

5. On the other hand, Eckhardt will not dispense the perfect man from all endeavour. "The Apostles," he says, "as soon as they received the Holy Spirit, began to labour. Similarly, the saints, when they become saints, perform acts of virtue." But if these works are to possess any value they must be expressions of the interior life in God, and must therefore be done without any regard for self. As man must love God for His own sake, he must likewise seek no benefit for himself through his work; he must perform the good because it is good, and without any other intention, even without any thought of heaven and eternal happiness. He who works for reward commits a sin. Even if God were not just, man should still love justice; nay, even if God commanded a life of wickedness, man should still be virtuous.

6. Finally, in the mystical life man is raised above the moral law. Law and order in themselves are intended only for those who have not attained the heights of a mystical life—not for the perfect man. Not as if it were permitted to the latter to do what he pleases—good or evil; Eckhardt does not adopt the antinomy of Beghard. Man has to fulfil the law, but this merely for the sake of external order. He has no need of it in his interior life, because without it he is confirmed by God in goodness and true freedom. Virtue has become of the essence of his being through his interior life in God; he not only possesses virtue, he is virtue himself.

7. Such are the consequences of the birth of man as the Son of God, and of the Son of God in man. If we ask: what is the ultimate purpose of this birth of God in man? we are told that by the deification of man all creatures are again led back into God, as they emanated from Him, and thereby God attains to His highest perfection and His highest happiness. In this sense Eckhardt teaches that the ultimate purpose of God in all he does is "rest" in man, and the final goal of man is "rest" in God. Both ends are attained in that birth of the Son of God in the soul, in which mystical life essentially consists. In this birth man is blessed and God is rendered happy, perfectly happy. God is happy in man, and man is happy in God, and the two constitute one happiness. Yet this happiness is only complete for man in a future life. The soul is not annihilated in God, it lives on after the death of the body. But it is not the soul as endowed with faculties that is immortal in us: it is only the "basis" of the soul that is divine. This element of the soul casts itself into the "basis" of God's being to subsist eternally therein, and to be eternally blessed. This is immortality.

John Tauler, Henry Suso, John Ruysbroek.

§ 141.

1. John Tauler (1290-1361) born, it is said, at Strassburg, became a member of the Dominican Order, studied at Paris, and then returned to Strassburg, where he appears to have maintained an intimacy with Meister Eckhardt. He probably belonged to the association founded by Nicolas of Basle, which was known as "the Friends of God." They remained within the Church, but they had little esteem for obedience to ecclesiastical authority, and made light of law and interdict. In this they were imitated by Tauler. He was, like Eckhardt, a preacher, and the writings which he has left us consist, for the most part, of sermons. In addition to these we have his book "On the following of the poor life of Christ."

2. In these writings Tauler follows the same line of thought as Eckhardt. The distinction between the *basis* of God's Being and God himself, between the basis or vital *spark* of the soul and its faculties, the notion of the *birth* of man as the son of God, and of the Son of God in man—all this forms the frame-work on which his system of mystical doctrine is elaborated. Like Eckhardt, he also holds that mystical knowledge can be attained only by closing the mind to natural knowledge. Rational knowledge, he says, is ignorance rather than knowledge. To rise to mystical knowledge man must renounce the knowledge acquired by natural reasoning. "The natural light of reason must be wholly extinguished, if God would enter with His light."

God, says Tauler, turns his gaze in upon the abyss of His own Being, and thus gives birth to the Son; in the same way, to effect in the soul the birth of the Son, the soul must first retire withir itself, withdrawing from everything external to itself; if God is to enter in, everything created must be driven out. The soul must then abandon itself also, must rise above all its faculties, and putting away all knowledge, not only of other objects but of its own being as well, it must descend into the ultimate basis of its life, in which is found the image of God. In this way it attains to true knowledge; in this way the Son of God is born in the soul. On God's entering into Himself there is a going out from Him, *i.e.*, when the Father turns His gaze unto the "basis" of the Godhead, the Son is generated by Him; so also the soul, when it withdraws into the basal element of its own being, goes out from itself, or, rather, rises above itself, and is born the Son of God.

4. Henry Suso is said to have been born at Constance, A.D. 1300, and to have died at Ulm A.D. 1365. He, too, was a Dominican. His works have been published by Diepenbrock of Ratisbon (1837). Prefixed to this edition of his works is an autobiography of the writer for which we are indebted to his spiritual daughter, Elsbet Stäglin. According to the judgment of this critic, "Suso was of a loving and lovable nature, a profound thinker, a man of many acquirements, and of a poetic temperament. Even in his writings we can discern that equanimity which was the rich fruit of a perfectly formed character, the immediate outcome of that harmony of the faculties to which he had attained. He was able to win all men to himself by his genial cheerfulness, to open closed hearts by the power of love, and without sacrifice of his profound earnestness to lead and guide others by the path of kindliness."

5. The man who desires to tread the path of mysticism, Suso tells us, must first of all renounce the body and all animal tendencies and hold fast by the Eternal Spirit. He must then turn away from himself, and putting aside whatever is sensuous, in self-forgetfulness and absolute self-surrender, abandoning the use of his own powers, yield himself wholly to the Divine influence. This is the self-abandonment which is the first condition of all mystical life. Starting from this self-abandonment or self-negation, "the spirit, the image of God in the soul, lifts itself to the Divine Essence, and descending from the infinite heights or soaring upwards from the infinite abyss, unhindered by the clouds and veils of created things, contemplates the marvels of the Divinity as they are in themselves, but in a silent darkness and an absolute repose."

6. "Like a being which loses itself in an indescribable intoxication, the spirit ceases to be itself, divests itself of itself, passes into God, and becomes wholly one with Him, as a drop of water mingled with a cask of wine. As the drop of water loses its identity and takes on the taste and colour of the wine, so is it with those who are in full possession of bliss; human desires influence

them no longer, divested of self, they are absorbed in the Divine Will, mingle with the Divine Nature and become one with it."

7. John Ruysbroek was a contemporary of Suso. Born in the village of Ruysbroek, in the Low Countries, A.D. 1293, he was, in his early life, a secular priest, and at the age of 60 became Canon of the church of Grünthal near Brussels. He was regarded as a model of sanctity, and his reputation drew many visitors to Grünthal, men of every age and rank, dignitaries, noblemen, men of learning, ecclesiastics. Among the rest came Tauler, and the celebrated founder of the "Brothers of Common Life," Gerhard Groot. To the latter Ruysbroek expressed the conviction that he had written nothing except by impulse of the Holy Ghost, and under the special influence of the Holy Trinity. He died in the year 1381.

8. The works of Ruysbroek have been printed in a Latin translation by Surius. This is the only complete printed edition of his works. In this translation the several works have the following titles: (*a*) "Speculum æternæ salutis"; (*b*) "Commentaria in tabernaculum fœderis"; (*c*) "De præcipuis quibusdam virtutibus"; (*d*) "De septem custodiis"; (*e*) "De septem gradibus amoris"; (*f*) "De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum"; (*g*) "De calculo"; (*h*) "Regnum Dei amantium"; (*i*) "De vera contemplatione," with others of less importance. In these works Ruysbroek handles the same themes again and again. The most important of the treatises named above is that "De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum."

9. According to Ruysbroek, God is the super-essential essence of all things; His Godhead is the unfathomable abyss in which man loses himself in blissful unreason. The Divine Essence, as essence, is in eternal repose, and is at the same time the first beginning, the ultimate end, and the living principle of conservation in created things. In the human soul we must distinguish three elements—the sensitive, the intellectual, and the spiritual. Through the sensitive element the soul lives in the body, and, by the body, in the external world; through the intellectual element it lives within itself apart from the external world; by means of the spiritual element it lives above itself, in God. By the "spirit" the soul is the living mirror of God's being; here He has implanted His image. This image—the Son of God—exists essentially and personally in all men, each one possesses it whole and undivided; in it all men are one.

10. We have three degrees of the mystical life corresponding to the three elements of the soul—the active, the interior, and the contemplative. The active life is realised in the moral virtues, which are reducible to three chief virtues—humility, love, and justice. The interior life consists in this, that man withdraws from the external world, and retires within himself; that he there holds devout communion with God, offering to Him the homage which is His due; and that he orders all his actions in conformity with

justice. The contemplative life begins when we wholly renounce self, and die to ourselves in God. At this stage we pass out of ourselves and become one with God. God unites us with Himself in that eternal love which is His very being. The "spirit" becomes one with God by immersion in, and fusion with, the essence or "basis" of God's Being. By an effect of grace the "spirit" is merged in the unity constituted by the Divine Essence, without, however, losing its created nature.

Theologia Deutsch.

§ 142.

1. Before concluding this portion of our work we must give a short notice of a booklet which bears the title "Theologia Deutsch." It has not yet been ascertained who was its author. We may, however, take it as certain that he was one of the "Friends of God." The treatise belongs to the 14th or 15th century. The first printed edition was prepared by Luther (1516 or 1518) who set great store by its teaching. An edition printed from a manuscript, dated 1427, was issued by Pfeiffer of Stuttgart in 1851.

2. All things, the author of the tract tells us, have emanated from God. "Now an emananation is not a real being, it has no existence except in the source from which it emanates; it is an accessory, a ray, a light; it is not being and has not being, otherwise than in the fire from which it emanates, in the sun, or in the blaze." God would not be God if there were no created things. "In such case there would not be a *this* and a *that*, there would not be either act or activity, and so forth. What would or could God then be, or of what would He be the God?" The distinction of Persons in God is not sufficient to permit of perfect action in Him, if He is to be truly God He must diffuse Himself in creatures.

3. We must distinguish in man a twofold light—the light of grace and the light of nature. The light of grace is, as such, the true light; the light of nature is false and deceptive. "Hence the light of nature can never be turned to good, or guided along the path of right; in this respect it resembles the spirit of evil, nay, it is itself the evil spirit." Corresponding to the twofold light there is a twofold love—love of God, and the love of self founded upon nature. And as the light of nature is opposed to the Divine light, so is the one love opposed to the other. The love of God is the true love, self-love the false; the former is good, the latter evil. Hence everything that has its source in the love of God is good; everything springing from the love of self is evil. All self-will is sin; nay, it is original sin; without self-will there would be no sin, no hell.

4. The love of God shows itself in obedience to God. The

obedience does not consist in this, that man conforms his will to the Divine Will, but in this, that all self-will, all "selfness," is annihilated, so that God alone wills and works in man. "The creature," so runs the theory, "must not use his own will, God alone must will, acting through the will which is in man, but which in reality is God's." "Hence the more 'selfness' the more sin." And, on the other hand, the less "I," "my," "mine," "me," assert themselves in man the more does the self of God, that is God Himself, grow in him.

5. These principles form the foundation on which the author builds his theory of the mystical life. The first requirement of that life is that man shall give himself to deep contrition for his sins. But the sorrow must not be because of the punishment which he has thereby deserved, but solely because his sins are an offence to God. In the next place, man must abandon himself without reserve to the Divine influence. He must renounce all "selfness," forbear all action, so that God alone may exercise His power and activity in him. If the soul is to have a glimpse into eternity, it must withdraw from all created things, itself included; "the eye which is open to the light of nature must become blind, self-will must die." The Divine light then flashes forth in man, he gains an insight into the mysteries of the Godhead, and with this vision there grows within him a love of God, pure, unselfish, one with that love which God bears Himself. He has now reached the stage of true mysticism, the state of oneness with God.

6. As this union requires that "selfness" shall be annihilated in man and that God alone shall dwell in him, and act in him, it follows that the union is a deification of man. God becomes human in man; man becomes divine in God. As man puts off self and goes out of himself God enters into him in His proper being, in His own "selfness." God becomes man, and man becomes God. Man is then raised above law, order, commandment and reason. Not that he can henceforth despise order and law—that would be spiritual pride—but that he has henceforth no need of anyone to teach him the law; the spirit of God teaches him what to do and what to omit. In themselves order and law are "guides for men who understand nothing other and better, and do not perceive why law and order have been framed."

End of Vol. I.

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vol. 1 # 4648

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